Studies in
SETTLER
COLONIALISM

Edited by

Finona Bateman and
Lionel Pilkington

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
Politics, Identity and Culture

Edited By

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Robert J.C. Young is Julius Silver Professor of English and Comparative Literature at New York University. He was formerly Professor of English and Critical Theory at Oxford University. He has published *White Mythologies: Writing History and the West* (1990, new edition 2004), *Colonial Desire: Hybridity in Culture, Theory and Race* (1995), *Postcolonialism: An Historical Introduction* (2001), *Postcolonialism: A Very Short Introduction* (2003) and *The Idea of English Ethnicity* (2008), as well as edited collections. He was the founding editor of *Interventions: International Journal of Postcolonial Studies* and remains General Editor; he was also a founding editor of the *Oxford Literary Review* which he edited from 1977 to 1994.

Introduction

Fiona Bateman and Lionel Pilkington

This book, *Studies in Settler Colonialism*, arises from a conviction that a policy of expansion based on the notion of 'unoccupied' or 'virgin' territories is also founded on a commitment to annihilate native or indigenous peoples. In focusing on the territory in settler colonial contexts, the confrontation and extreme violence necessary to create these empty spaces of the colonialists' imagination is frequently obscured. The discourse of settler colonialism describes how, fortified by modernizing narratives and ideology, a population from the metropole moves to occupy a territory and fashion a new society in a space conceptualized as vacant and free: as available for the taking. Typically, such colonial settlements mask their annihilating drive by drawing on the societal structures and culture of the homeland and renaming territory after familiar places or figureheads. With placenames like Sydney, New York, Victoria, Melbourne, Johannesburg, and Kingston, the language is that of the homeland, and every aspect of settler colonial society modelled on the distant, yet controlling, metropole.

There was, and there still is, a brutal side to this nostalgia. As 'natives' were considered inferior, scarcely human – closer to animals than to civilized people – their presence was ignored, treated as a minor inconvenience, walled off from view or physical intrusion, or made the subject of genocidal projects. In Palestine, Hawai'i, Canada, southern Africa, Ireland, and Australasia 'indigenous peoples' were seen, and in some cases still are seen, as dispensable. They are portrayed as roaming the land, flitting nomadically among impermanent settlements, ignorant or wasteful of a colony's natural resources, or – as in Gaza – as potential terrorists and outsiders. Such populations are not considered to truly 'inhabit' the land, and certainly not in any worthwhile and perdurable sense.

In territories where the native population's attachment to the land had a fundamentally unfamiliar form, and where there was a lack of written, legal documentation, land was perceived to be 'available' to the colonizing power. While settlers view the land's potential as the basis for exploitation in the name of agriculture, industry, and commerce and this is supported by law, the indigenes' relationship with the land tends to take the form of a connection, often incomprehensible to the colonizer, which is spiritual and cultural, as well as economic. Indigenous people, assumed to be backward, lacking in culture and civilization, and incapable of owning land were treated as animals, either herded to inferior land or systematically eliminated, so that a civilized population could be 'planted' or 'settled' on the territory. Enforced physical displacement often meant extreme poverty and degradation. Another aspect of the separation of the native population from the land was an intellectual alienation; a splitting of the spiritual and cultural elements of existence from the practical aspects of life, which resulted in a fragmentation of indigenous social structures.

In more densely populated territories, where the climate and land itself was unsuitable or not so valuable for agriculture, and the logistics of clearing the terrain too difficult, colonialism took a different form. Rather than settle a new population in the colony, the indigenous population was used as a workforce to exploit the natural resources. As the age of imperialism faded, the colonies of exploitation gradually gained independence and, while the natural resources had in many cases been exhausted, the indigenous populations regained control of their own territory. However, by the time independence was achieved for many settler colonies the indigenous populations (greatly reduced in numbers by various projects of control and elimination) had been marginalized, disempowered, and disinherited of their ancestral lands. Their culture and history had been undermined if not irreparably damaged.

As conflicts in Northern Ireland and the Middle East remind us – not to mention the many incidents of uprising and resistance that have taken place in Hawai'i, Canada, South Africa and Australia – it is misleading to refer to settler colonialism in the past tense. Although the settler colonial projects were instigated in previous centuries, the effects are permanent and the process is still current. The settlers, now often second or third generation, consider themselves to belong to the country in which they were born, and attempts by indigenous peoples to reclaim land or assert prior ownership of resources and territory leads to conflict and resentment. As a widespread historical and contemporary political phenomenon, settler colonialism continues to

exercise a profound effect on an extensive range of societies. In the words of Patrick Wolfe, 'indigenous people's colonizers never went home' and in countries like Australia and Canada where remnants of the indigenous population survive, these vestiges of the indigenous are too frequently treated as second-class citizens and suffer from economic, social, and cultural disadvantage. Even in the context of a growing awareness of the injustices of the past, there is still a struggle to meet the needs of those most damaged by the process – the indigenous, as well as another population now dealing with the consequences, the descendents of the original settlers, who have inherited the blame, and possibly the guilt, but have no alternative identity, no other homeland.

In addition to the classic sites of European settler colonialism (Ireland, the Americas, Africa, Australasia), settler colonialism structures relationships as historically and culturally diverse as those between Chinese and Tibetans, Indonesians and Papuans, 'Americans' and Hawai'ians, and Israelis and Palestinians. *Studies in Settler Colonialism* assesses the distinctive features of settler colonialism, and discusses its political, sociological, economic and cultural consequences across continents and historical contexts. In identifying the shared histories and parallel experiences of settler colonies, in various temporal, geographical, and cultural circumstances, this multi-disciplinary collection of essays raises questions and initiates discussion about the character and consistency of settler colonialism as a phenomenon, about resistance, and about the extent to which analysis of historical occurrences of settler colonialism informs our understanding of current situations of conflict and injustice.

The volume begins with Tadhg Foley's discussion of the key nineteenth-century debates around British colonization and colonialism – debates that have a powerful bearing on contemporary conceptualizations of settler colonialism. This was the period when the new 'science' of political economy was used to theorize and justify colonization in economic terms; indigenous peoples were seen variously as natural hazards, impediments to the march of empire, potential labour, or candidates to be rescued from barbarity or saved from paganism. 'A colony', wrote G.C. Lewis in his *Essay on the Government of Dependencies* (1841), 'properly denotes a body of persons belonging to one country and political community, who, having abandoned that country and community, form a new and separate society, independent or dependent, in some district which is wholly or nearly uninhabited, or from which they expel the ancient inhabitants'. Charter colonies, mercantile depots and dependencies of various kinds were excluded from this definition. Foley's argument is that for the nineteenth century the only proper colonies

were settler colonies and this profoundly affected the official under-standing of colonization and the relationships between the imperial centre and the colonies.

Chapters 2 and 3 (by Daniel Carey and John Patrick Montano) con-sider specific instances of settler colonialism from the perspective of sixteenth-century Ireland and the rhetorical strategies that assert the rationale and logic of the process. Carey's argument is that Samuel Purchas – an English writer-cleric and editor of travel accounts in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth century – created an immediate relation-ship between the landscape of Virginia and its new English occupants that effectively elided the native presence. For the poet Edmund Spenser, on the other hand, the occlusion of the 'native' population in Ireland was impossible; nevertheless Spenser's complex poetic engagement with the country suggests an intention not only to discredit the indigenous popu-lation but also to remythologize its landscape. Extending the volume's discussion of settler colonialism and representation to the early modern period, Carey's chapter reveals how indigeneity functions as an important site of interest and contestation.

Complimenting this perspective is John Patrick Montano's dis-cussion of the extent to which Ireland was viewed as a blank space to be filled in by the civilizing influence of English colonialism. For English settlers in late sixteenth and seventeenth-century Ireland the building of houses was regarded as establishing a legal right to settle-ment. In Montano's account, the indigenous Irish recognized that the efforts of the colonizer to assert control over the territory effectively undermined their traditional relationship to the land, and developed strategies of resistance accordingly.

Our book then moves on to consider the fundamentally trans-national nature of settler colonialism across a variety of contexts. In Chapter 4 Dermot Dix discusses the implications of the loss of the prized American colonies of settlement on Lord Cornwallis's thinking on India and on Ireland. Cornwallis spent seven years in India as Governor-General, rode the storm of Ireland's 1798 Rebellion and steered the Act of Union through the doomed Irish Parliament in 1800. His letters contain revealing opinions: disillusioned with both of America's divided settler groups (Loyalists and Patriots alike), he also held a generally poor view of European groups in British India and, later, of Irish Protestants for what he saw as their misguided treatment of Ireland's Catholic popu-lation. Dix's argument is that those at the heart of the empire in the eighteenth century adapted and revised their strategies of settler colonial-ism to particular situations, but fundamentally envisioned the empire as

having a unity, with common policies designed to serve the various elements.

But if imperialism has a unity, so too, it can be argued, do the anti-colonial struggles that oppose it. Thus, Robert J.C. Young considers Irish Fenianism and the internationalization of violent anti-colonial struggle in nineteenth-century North America. Young focuses on the case of Irish settler populations in North America. Relative indifference by the British government towards Irish dissent and the conditions in Ireland in the 1840s changed significantly in 1858 when James Stephens founded the Irish Republican Brotherhood in Dublin, committed to win Irish independence through violent insurrection, and John Mahoney established a branch of the Fenians in New York the following year. This marked for the first time the internationalization of violent anti-colonial struggle, as a result of which Irish populations in North America and Australasia began to threaten the British government with a global colonial alliance. Young's essay examines the international activities of the Fenians, particularly the Fenian invasions of Canada in the 1860s in order to demonstrate the ways in which Irish anti-colonial struggle conducted on an international basis impacted on British political perspectives and offered a new model of anti-colonial strategy.

In Ben Silverstein's essay, the transfer of ideas concerning the colonial policy of indirect rule from the plantation and franchise colony of Nigeria to the settler colony of Australia provides another instance where the transnational nature of settler colonialism is evident. Silverstein suggests that the process of translating these ideas from one very different colonial situation to another helps to foreground key points of settler colonial difference. Examining the influence of the policy of indirect rule on activities of the Adelaide-based Aborigines' Protection League (APL) and on the Victorian Aboriginal Group (VAG), based in Melbourne, Silverstein argues that indirect rule, a policy famously developed by Sir Frederick Lugard (1858–1945), developed in Australia into a form of rights for indigenous people which then ended up as a policy of assimilation. The apogee of indirect rule in Australia, Silverstein concludes, was integrationist to its core; it did not displace, therefore, but rather rendered more pervasive a philosophy of assimilation.

Chapters 7 and 8, by Claire McLisky and Jane Carey respectively, consider the ideological and specifically gender implications of settler colonialism for indigenous peoples at different moments in Australian social history. It is notable that the status of both the indigenous and the settler populations are drawn into these debates, and that a new territory is perceived as a new beginning, an opportunity to develop a

population which is both healthy and Christian. Historically, settler colonies have sought to eliminate indigenous peoples, replacing them on the land with settlers; thus, missionary efforts to Christianize and integrate the indigenous populations often promoted a policy at odds with the colonial project by endorsing reproduction regulated within marriage, and assimilation of indigenous populations to European norms. Exploring the experience of two settler missionaries, McLisky argues that their mission – like so many 'humanitarian' projects – ultimately worked to entrench, rather than to undermine, the imperialist and eliminative logic of settler colonialism and its genocidal effects on the indigenous peoples of Australia. Jane Carey's chapter focuses on the roles being claimed by white women in the settler colonial project in Australia in the early twentieth century. Concentrating on the activities of Australia's largest women's group, the National Council of Women, Carey explores how the desire for a strong white population animated many of these projects. Elite women appropriated racial discourses in order to support their reforming campaigns as well as to argue for a larger public role for themselves. Indigenous people were rigorously excluded. Campaigns for kindergartens, domestic science, sex education, public health services and even general hygiene, all emphasized the importance of white racial improvement for national progress. Jane Carey argues that these discussions have a significance that lies beyond the history of the women's movement alone since they point to the ways in which discourses of whiteness formed a major field of racial discussion in Australia more broadly. This chapter demonstrates that racialized thinking is a key legacy of settler colonialism and that it has moved beyond the spheres of political rhetoric and scientific theorizing to influence the way in which white Australians construct themselves and their role in national progress.

In Chapter 9 Laura E. Lyons demonstrates the continuing and pervasive consequences of settler colonialism in contemporary Hawai'i, and the continuing implications for different population groupings, specifically in relation to land ownership, land use, and homelessness. In this essay Lyons compares media coverage of the 2006 closing of the Del Monte pineapple operations in Hawai'i with media coverage of the state's attempts to deal with homeless peoples on Hawaiian beaches and parks. Such a comparison reveals how one of the tenets of settler colonialism – namely, that rights accrue to those deemed to make the land productive in the most crass capitalist terms – continues in remarkably bald forms. The different treatment afforded the pineapple workers and the homeless demonstrates the privileges still afforded

to agricultural labour and the devastating results settler colonialism continues to have on Native Hawaiians.

Also focusing on Hawai'i is Karen K. Kosasa's chapter examining the role of museums in telling, or avoiding the telling of, the story of colonialism. Kosasa points out that Hawai'i is rarely discussed under the heading of settler colonialism and that ignorance of this 'other' history is a way for settlers to maintain a false innocence by clinging to a white-washed history in which Hawaiians are misrepresented as embracing American culture and a Western lifestyle. But, Kosasa claims, while museums may be preeminent sites of hegemony, they also have the capacity to represent alternative views and challenge accepted ways of understanding historical truth.

Chapters 11 and 12 address the fraught subject of Israeli-Palestinian relations, with John Collins and Salah D. Hassan arguing that Palestine is another outstanding contemporary context in which the territorial, transnational and genocidal character of settler colonialism is made manifest. Collins considers the Palestinian catastrophe (or *nakba*) of 1947–48 as an example of settler colonial success. Specifically, his essay examines the Palestinian catastrophe alongside two political-military logics: that of deterrence and of decolonization. His argument is that the Palestinian experience was prophetic with the post-*nakba* saga of the Palestinians appearing as a microcosm of a much wider global process through which the logic of deterrence came to eclipse the practice of politics. The blurring of the line between militarism and humanitarianism has its roots in the emergence of a regime for which the Palestinian refugee 'problem' was an early test case. In this sense, Collins concludes, the postwar international security order of 'mutually assured destruction' combined with the economic power of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, ensured that while the racial underclass of the United State was having its dreams deferred, the peoples of the 'third world' were having their dreams deterred.

Salah D. Hassan's chapter focuses specifically on Israel's creation of a Palestinian refugee community and the emergence of Palestinian right of return politics. Exploring the ways that this right of return has been displaced by theories of diaspora, Hassan argues that the future dilemma facing Israel is either to embrace the growing Palestinian population and its bi-national character or undertake, once again, the massive ethnic-cleansing of Palestinians.

How the ideological legacies of settler colonialism play out in various kinds of narrative is a crucial theoretical question for Lorenzo Veracini in Chapter 13, where he argues that the narrative of settler colonialism

is unlike any other colonial narrative form. He suggests that a settler sensibility envisages a particular set of narrative refrains and a specific understanding of history where 'progress' is typically understood as a measure of indigenous displacement and ultimate erasure, and not merely displacement with permanent subordination. Veracini concludes that in settler colonial contexts withdrawing from colonial practices of indigenous dispossession can only be perceived as a 'backward' movement signalling a demise of original settler colonial claims and their legitimacies.

Two chapters, by David Attwell, who discusses the South African novelist J.M. Coetzee, and Saree Makdisi's revisionist study of Amos Oz's *A Tale of Love and Darkness* (2005), provide an opportunity to consider reading settler colonialism in literary texts. In Chapter 14 Attwell reflects on the ways in which the ideological legacies of settler colonialism play out in literary representations of Africa and argues that Coetzee subjects Africa and the African subject to a process of 'occultation'. 'Occultation', or partial obscuring, is deployed not as a strategy of avoidance but in order to bestow on the African subject an ethically disturbing aesthetic power. In a trenchant critique of what Saree Makdisi terms 'softcore' or 'postcolonial' Zionism, Chapter 15 offers a critical re-reading of the writings of the celebrated Israeli novelist Amos Oz. For Makdisi, Oz's literary representations of the Palestinian/Israeli conflict not only denies the settler colonial ideology of Zionism but also glosses over the extent to which the policy of displacement or forced expulsion had been deliberately prepared for over the previous decades. His essay is a passionate insistence on settler colonialism as the perspective through which the issue of the destruction of Palestine must be considered.

Our volume concludes with an essay by Elleke Boehmer on Nelson Mandela and the battle for indigeneity, and one by Patrick Wolfe on the role of racial discourse in seeking to eliminate the perspective of the native. In Chapter 16 Boehmer offers an important theorization and case study of what happens when two competing claims to indigeneity (in this case, African and Afrikaner) come into contact. Instead of the annihilating violence that Frantz Fanon's *Black Skin, White Masks* predicts as inevitable to the decolonizing process for settler colonial countries, she posits that Nelson Mandela's political career in South Africa points to a decolonizing model that avoids bloodbath and is politically productive.

In our final chapter Patrick Wolfe argues that, despite considerable regional variations and historical specificities, settler colonialism exhibits an important degree of cross-cultural consistency. This is strikingly manifest in the treatment of indigenous peoples including territorial removal

and/or confinement, the imposition of regimes of private property, discourses of miscegenation, child abduction, institutional surveillance and religious conversion. Wolfe contends that the cross-cultural consistency of settler colonialism stems from its primarily territorial character, and an ongoing desire to achieve the social death of the native. Surveying the treatment of native peoples in the United States and in Australia, Wolfe shows how settler colonialism's emphasis on expropriating native land is evident in the striking contrast between the stigma of miscegenation in relation to black populations and the blood quantum rule that means that any trace of white blood eliminates native status. Wolfe's concern in this chapter is with the ways in which the unequal social relations that are produced by settler colonialism are encoded and reproduced through different processes of racialization, and how this constitutes settler colonialism's distinctive feature.

The essays in this book explore and discuss the process, the effects, strategies of resistance, and possibilities of resolution and reconciliation in relation to settler colonialism. Reflecting upon settler colonialism in such diverse settings, including in places which might not traditionally be considered under that rubric, increases awareness and may generate opportunities to develop strategies to challenge, change, and resist. We suggest that knowledge of the distinctiveness of settler colonialism is vital to resisting imperialism in its old and new forms, hence the importance of knowing settler colonialism in all its manifestations and from all perspectives.

While imperialism concerns expansion and gaining control of territory, acknowledging the human cost of settler colonialism provides another focus for critical debate and a retelling of history, or indeed a reframing of contemporary events, from the perspective of the indigenous. If we recognize the confiscation of land from the Aboriginal population in Australia as cruel and unjustified, how can we refuse to comment on the destruction that has been inflicted on the Palestinian people in present day Gaza? If the destruction of buildings and walls by the Irish in the sixteenth century is accepted as valid resistance to the imposition of settler colonialism, can we simply dismiss attacks on military installations in territories which may be perceived as 'occupied' in the twentieth century as terrorism? Perhaps an awareness of the genocidal tendencies of settler colonialism towards the indigenous might temper our critical awareness of the phenomenon, and influence our ability to find means of resistance and, indeed, a space for the negotiation of indigeneity.

1

'An Unknown and Feeble Body': How Settler Colonialism Was Theorized in the Nineteenth Century

Tadhg Foley

The word 'colonialism' was very rarely used in the nineteenth century. It carried with it unambiguous connotations of the inferiority of the practices and usages of settlers in the colonies compared with those of the 'mother' country. The Oxford English Dictionary (OED) gives but two examples of the usage of the term with the meaning 'The practice or manner of things colonial' and only two with the meaning 'A practice or idiom peculiar to or characteristic of a colony', where its usage is compared to that of the word '*provincialism*'. In general, the word colonialism connoted that which was local, parochial, provincial, insular and hence narrow, restrictive, inferior. The only other meaning given in the OED, the more abstract 'The colonial system or principle', has just two citations, the first of which is from the distinguished jurist A.V. Dicey's *England's Case against Home Rule*, and it reads: 'English Colonialism works well enough'. Dicey, who wrote four books opposing home rule, was referring to Ireland, though the OED does not notice this.

What dictionaries refer to as the 'derogatory' meaning of the modern usage of the word colonialism seems to be no older than post-World War II. What is now called settler colonialism was known in the nineteenth century as 'colonization'. From the foundation of the National Colonization Society in 1830, which propagated the ideas of Edward Gibbon Wakefield, colonization was theorized and justified by the hired prize-fighters of empire totally in economic terms, using the new 'science' of political economy. Previous classical economists had been either hostile to or, at best, unenthusiastic about colonies. As Donald Winch put it, 'In the years between 1776 and 1830 the economists and their Benthamite associates figured mainly as opponents of the concept of empire implied in the old colonial system' (Winch 1965, p. 1). John

Stuart Mill, however, could later write (in words reproduced as an epigraph to Wakefield's book, *A View of the Art of Colonization*) that 'There need be no hesitation in affirming, that Colonization, in the present state of the world, is the very best affair of business, in which the capital of an old and wealthy country can possibly engage'. The focus of analysis of the colonial reformers was the colony of people from the 'mother country', overwhelmingly its economic and political and, to a much lesser extent, its cultural fate. Such was the success of this theory that the colonization of South Australia in 1836 and of New Zealand in 1837 was conducted in its terms with the 'science' of colonization, perhaps uniquely, preceding its 'art'.

Defining colonies

Though a modern colony was defined as a *territory* rather than a *people*, there was frequent semantic slippage, as is obvious even in the most influential formulation of all, that of George Cornewall Lewis in his *Essay on the Government of Dependencies*. A colony, he wrote:

> properly denotes a body of persons belonging to one country and political community, who, having abandoned that country and community, form a new and separate society, independent or dependent, in some district which is wholly or nearly uninhabited, or from which they expel the ancient inhabitants. (Lewis 1841, p. 170)

Herman Merivale, the most systematic of colonial theorists, pointed out that in his work:

> the term Colony is used in the ancient and proper sense, and not in that which has passed from official into general usage, in which it comprehends every species of foreign possession, – military stations, such as Gibraltar and Malta; conquered districts, possessed by native inhabitants with a slight admixture of the conquerors, such as Ceylon; mercantile emporia, such as the factories of European powers on the coast of Africa. By a Colony I understand a territory of which the soil is entirely or principally owned by settlers from the mother country. (Merivale 1861, p. xii)

The only proper colonies were settler colonies. British India, for instance, consisting partly of indigenous people and partly of immigrants who arrived there at various times and from various places, and where the

British constituted but a tiny part of the whole population, was not considered a colony. I suppose it is a considerable historical irony that India, the home of postcolonial theory, was not itself considered to be a colony. This official understanding of colonization determined, in large measure, the relationship between the imperial centre and the colonies, between the colonists and indigenous peoples, and the whole question of colonial self-government.

   A colony was a group of, say, British people who abandoned their home for, in effect, the Greek notion of a colony as 'a home away from home'. Indeed, according to Merivale, 'The fundamental idea of the older British colonial policy appears to have been, that wherever a man went he carried with him the rights of an Englishman, whatever these were supposed to be' (Merivale 1861, p. 103). Contrasting the English love of home with French sociability, Samuel Smiles (of *Self-Help* fame) had a running headline in his book *Character* which read, 'Shyness and Colonization' (Smiles 1913 [1871], p. 282). Here he saw the sociability of the French, and indeed the Irish, as seriously debilitating for colonial enterprises, whereas 'the comparatively unsociable Germans, English, and Americans', were 'spreading over the earth' (Smiles 1913 [1871], p. 281). According to Smiles:

> Give the Englishman a home, and he is comparatively indifferent to society. For the sake of a holding which he can call his own, he will cross the seas, plant himself on the prairie or amidst the primeval forest, and make for himself a home. The solitude of the wilderness has no fears for him; the society of his wife and family is sufficient, and he cares for no other. (Smiles 1913 [1871], p. 280)

The Englishman left home but did so in order to 'find' or 'make' a home, in the words of Rupert Brooke, 'some corner of a foreign field / That is forever England'. In a sense, the colonists, unlike mere emigrants 'defining themselves' as settlers (as against the supposed nomadism of indigenous peoples) never left home. In general, the English and the Lowland Scots, with their alleged rugged individualism, were seen as the best colonizers. The Irish and the Highland Scots, however, being excessively 'social' and lacking in manly independence and self-reliance, were regarded as poor colonizers, a view held by John Stuart Mill. Wakefield believed that colonial prosperity only attained its maximum 'in colonies peopled by the energetic Anglo-Saxon race' (Wakefield 1849, p. xiii), whereas the 'Milesian-Irish race', in his view, 'never colonize, but only emigrate miserably' (Wakefield 1849, p. 456). The 'hordes of Irish-pauper

emigrants' who poured into North America were, by and large, 'virtually slaves by means of their servile, lazy, reckless habit of mind' as well as their 'degradation in the midst of the energetic, accumulating, prideful, domineering Anglo-Saxon race' (Wakefield 1849, p. 175). However, as we shall see, the limitations of this individualism became more obvious when it was exported to the colonies.

Systematic colonization

Some of the members of the National Colonization Society, the 'unknown and feeble body' (Wakefield 1849, p. 40), including Wakefield himself and Robert Torrens, were practical colonizers and most were political economists, including Wakefield and Torrens but also Richard Whately, Charles Buller, and Sir Richard Molesworth. Adam Smith's *Wealth of Nations*, published in 1776, a work not unrelated to the traumatic loss of the American colonies of the same year, has a chapter on colonies but, in Wakefield's view, Smith did not subject colonization to a rigorous and comprehensive analysis. This the Society set out to do; it had two separate but related objectives:

(1) To substitute systematic colonization for random emigration and
(2) To explain and justify colonization in terms of the new science of political economy.

In the terminology of the day, the Society was dedicated to both the art and the science of colonization. Prior to 1830, Wakefield claimed, the subject of colonization presented 'one very remarkable feature', 'an immense amount of practice without any theory' (Wakefield 1849, p. 41).
   To achieve its economic objectives, the idea of colonization was to 'plant' 'New Englands', new English nations abroad. Plantation was an earlier name for colonization, with an extensive vocabulary of organic metaphors of, for example, seeds, sowing, stock, shoots, and grafting. According to Lewis, 'A colony may be compared to a swarm of bees, which issue from the parent hive in a separate body and form a new hive' (Lewis 1841, p. 173), an image also used by Cairnes (Cairnes 1873, p. 6). A colony had to be a faithful representation, a child of the mother country, complete with family resemblances. According to the 'Colonist' in Wakefield's *A View of the Art of Colonization*:

   It would be gratifying to our national pride, if our colonies were made to resemble their parent; to be extensions of the mother-country

> [...] over the unoccupied parts of the earth of a nationality truly British in language, religion, laws, institutions, and attachment to the empire. (Wakefield 1849, p. 106)

The National Colonization Society promoted systematic colonization rather than sporadic and random emigration. It complained that colonization was once a noble, even heroic, activity engaged in by the highest in the land (such as Lord Baltimore and Sir William Penn); now the colonies were used, in the words of Charles Buller, for the 'shovelling out of paupers' (quoted in Wakefield 1849, p. 39), or as dumping grounds for criminals. But with the emigration of, overwhelmingly, members of the lower classes and with convict colonization (planting with 'nettle-seed', as Archbishop Richard Whately of Dublin picturesquely put it in 1832 [p. 96]), the new English nations would scarcely be clones of the original stock but rather what one authority, Samuel Hinds (later to become Bishop of Norwich), called a 'monstrous family' (quoted in Wakefield 1849, p. 117).

The colonization enterprise sought to reproduce in the new country the class divisions and gender roles of the mother country, in practice, and indeed in theory, a chimerical ideal. For these 'visionaries', according to Cairnes:

> the ideal of an English colony was England herself in little, transferred to the other side of the globe – an epitome, perfect in all its parts, of the society from which it issued – England, with its capitalists and labourers, its hierarchy of ranks, its hereditary aristocracy, its landed gentry, and, of course, its Established Church – transferred complete, as by the enchanter's stroke, to the pastoral wilds of Australia! The idea was a taking, perhaps a noble one; unfortunately it has not proved practical. The progeny is, in fact, turning out something very different from the parent's image. In place of feudal subordination there is democracy; in place of a high electoral qualification, manhood suffrage; in place of primogeniture, equal division of property; in place of state churches, voluntary religious associations. (Cairnes 1873, pp. 32–3)

To ensure proper colonization, what the Society advocated, as against this horizontal segment of plebeian British society, was the emigration of a vertical cross-section, ideally including representatives of all classes. Robert Torrens, for instance, with reference to the Irish, suggested that a Catholic Archbishop, with an appropriate number of subordinate

clergy, be appointed on the recommendation of the Roman Catholic hierarchy (Torrens 1847, p. 12). Wakefield noted that when the Society asked for a bishop for the first settlement of New Zealand everyone laughed (Wakefield 1968, p. 786). But Merivale said that 'No thought was ever seriously entertained of supplying the colonies with the elements of an aristocracy' (Merivale 1861, p. 104).

Political economy and colonization

The discourse of colonization should be carefully distinguished from that of colonialism. The economic, and to a lesser extent, the political, social, and cultural destiny of the colony (meaning the colony of settlers), was virtually the only focus of the discourse of colonization. Indigenous peoples, whose fate impinged infrequently on the theorists of empire, were seen variously as natural hazards, impediments to the march of empire, potential labour, candidates for rescue from savagery and barbarity, or as souls to be saved.

Since the beginning of the industrial revolution there was a widespread idea that it was now impossible for Great Britain to feed its own people. According to Wakefield, the country had a peculiar problem, what became known as *lebensraum*, 'a want of room for people of all classes' (Wakefield 1849, p. 65). Wakefield makes this point in *A Statement of the Principles and Objects of a Proposed National Society* in advocating the cure and prevention of pauperism by means of systematic colonization (Wakefield 1968, p. 29). Colonial possessions were safety valves to relieve perceived pressure of population, including those of 'surplus' women, criminals, and Irish paupers. Colonization was conceptualized in terms of the relationships between population and capital. 'Mother countries' or 'old countries', like Great Britain, it was argued, had an excess of labour and capital but a severe shortage of land, whereas colonial territories had an abundance of land but a debilitating shortage of labour and capital. Fortunately enough labour and capital, unlike land, were mobile factors of production and their movement to the colonies was assumed to be profitable to the economic interests both of the home country and the colony. There was some criticism of the possible deleterious effects on the mother country of the exportation of excessive amounts of labour and capital. Other observers felt that the colonies could suffer from importing these excesses. The National Colonization Society promoted practical colonization, deployed economic concepts in its understanding, and, by advocating the sale of colonial land, introduced the market to the colonial enterprise.

   With reference to colonization, Cairnes wrote that the 'fundamental cause and the justification of colonization are to be found in the laws of population and capital. In old countries population and capital tend to become redundant' (Cairnes 1873, p. 30). But, however:

> in new countries the conditions of production are exactly reversed. Fertile land exists there in abundance, while capital and labour are scarce. Seen in this light, the true remedy for our evils at once appears. It is, that what is in excess in each should be brought to supplement what is deficient in each; in a word – that we should colonize. (Cairnes 1873, p. 31)

Charles Buller put it thus:

> When I ask you to colonize, what do I ask you to do but to carry the superfluity of one part of our country to repair the deficiency of the other: to cultivate the desert by applying to it the means that lie idle here; in one simple word, to convey the plough to the field, the workman to his work, the hungry to his food? (quoted in Wakefield 1849, p. 474)

Colonization thus relieved the mother country of the pressure of 'excess' population, while providing it with a profitable use for unemployed or under-employed capital. It also enabled the exploitation of colonial resources for the home country while creating a market in the colonies for British manufactured goods. According to a paper in the *Colonial Gazette* (12 December 1846):

> The tastes and habits of the British colonists are the same with those of their fellow-countrymen in the old country; their mode of conducting business, their notions of obligations, are the same: the commodities of the old country suit its colonial market better than those of any other: trade is carried on between them with a more frank confidence and perfect understanding. The bond thus created to unite the colony to the mother country is found to survive political severance. (quoted in Merivale 1861, p. 190)

Wakefield and the National Colonization Society introduced the market to the activity of colonization. This was to counteract the economically wasteful practice of the granting of vast tracts of land to colonists. The money acquired by the government from the sale of colonial land was

to be used to pay the passage of labourers from the old country to take the place of those who had bettered themselves and become land owners. This seemed to solve the age-old problem of the cost of colonization to the mother country. Here, in fact, or at least in theory, was a realization of the idea of self-financing colonization. As Cairnes summed it up, the 'sale of wild land at a uniform price, the application of the proceeds to assist emigration, the selection of the emigrants, and self-government for the colonies – these may be taken as the cardinal points in the reformers' charter' (Cairnes 1873, p. 34).

Adam Smith observed that the great cause of prosperity in new settlements, economically speaking, was 'plenty of good land' (quoted in Merivale 1861, p. 255). But, as Merivale put it, land, 'however rich, is of very little value to the owner without capital to cultivate it' (Merivale 1861, p. 256). As an example, he mentioned the great cost of clearing forests in some very fertile American settlements. But, he added, 'Land and capital are both useless unless labour can be commanded' (Merivale 1861, p. 256), illustrating this maxim by reference to the sad fate of Thomas Peel in what became Western Australia:

> When the colony at Swan River was founded, magnificent grants were made to the chief contributor, Mr. Peel: he took out with him, it is said, £50,000, and 300 individuals of the labouring classes; but they were all fascinated by the prospect of obtaining land in a country where the preliminary labour of clearing is unusually slight; and in a short while he was left without a servant to make his bed, or to fetch him water from the river. (Merivale 1861, p. 256)

But many of the labourers perished, some returned to England, 'and only a few, after long struggles, attained at last a state of comparative ease' (Merivale 1861, p. 257).

Exporting individualism

Political economists soon discovered that some of the tenets of their science, while valid in the old countries where they originated, were less suited to colonial circumstances. The colonies were responsible for generating new concepts relevant to their own situation or ones which had been occluded or simply unnoticed in the mother country. For instance, according to Wakefield, Great Britain had a peculiar problem 'a want of room for people of all classes' (Wakefield 1849, p. 65). By a want of room, he meant, 'a want of the means of a comfortable

subsistence according to the respective standards of living established amongst the classes, and obviously arising from the competition of the members of each class with one another' (Wakefield 1849, p. 66). The 'hurtful competition of labourers with each other is an old story among political thinkers; that of the other classes, had not been noticed till it was pointed out by the colonizing theorists of 1830' (Wakefield 1849, p. 66). There was, however, plenty of room for all classes in the colonies and both labour and capital were fully and remuneratively employed. Even *wants*, later to be seen as the mainspring of economic activity, were much less palpable in the mother country than in the colonies. According to Wakefield, 'People in a highly civilized country, like England, are not aware of their own wants. The wants exist, but most of them are supplied as soon as they are formed', whereas, for example, 'in the desert, almost every want is severely felt before it is supplied' (Wakefield 1968, p. 104).

It was, however, individualism (that powerful but cyclopean political ideology), which was seen as the great engine of economic progress at home, which created the greatest problems, economically and culturally, in the colonies. The exportation of individualism exposed the limitations of the doctrine at home and abroad; its crucial social and communal matrix, ideologically concealed at home, was rudely uncovered in the colonies. Marx, though he regarded Wakefield as the most notable political economist of the 1830s, remarked acutely that it was Wakefield's 'great merit' to have discovered 'not anything new about the Colonies, but to have discovered in the Colonies the truth as to the condition of capitalist production in the mother-country' (Marx 1974 [1887], p. 717). Wakefield, according to Marx, discovered that capital was 'not a thing, but a social relation between persons, established by the instrumentality of things' (Marx 1974 [1887], p. 717). The two major economic doctrines generated out of colonial experience were the combination and the constancy of labour (concepts which also applied to capital), both bearing eloquent witness to the social nature of production and laying bare the limitations of individualism.

Combination of labour

The idea that combination and constancy of labour were indispensable conditions of production of industry went unnoticed in old countries but soon became obvious in new ones, where colonial capitalists suffered from the division and inconstancy of labour. The axiom of political economists that the produce was great 'in proportion as the labour

is divided' failed to take cognisance of the fact that the division of labour was dependent upon 'combination amongst the labourers' for they must be induced to cooperate (Wakefield 1849, p. 167). Wakefield rejected the term 'division of labour', believing that the proper term was 'division of employment'; in Adam Smith's famous example of pin-making, Wakefield argued that the work or employment was divided but the labour was combined (Wakefield 1849, p. 167). Furthermore, division of employment could not take place without combination of labour, while combination of labour was indispensable to the carrying out of works which could never be divided into parts, such as lifting a large tree which needed combination of labour but not division of employment. According to Wakefield:

> The principle of the combination of labour, which seems more important the more one reflects on it, was not perceived until a colonial inquiry led to its discovery: it was unnoticed by economists, because they have resided in countries where combination of labour takes place, as a matter of course, wherever it is required: it seems in old countries like a natural property of labour. But in colonies the case is totally different. There, the difficulty of inducing a number of people to combine their labour for any purpose, meets the capitalist in every step of his endeavours, and in every line of industry. (Wakefield 1849, pp. 168–9)

The principle of the combination of labour became evident from the tendency of colonists to disperse themselves across the land, though, as Merivale observed, there were some 'natural' barriers to their dispersal:

> The tendency of settlers to isolate themselves, and spread over the surface of the land, may be counteracted, in the first place, by the limited extent of the land itself; as in islands, or valleys surrounded by impracticable mountains, like those of the upper Andes; by the density of natural forests, rendering clearing more difficult; by the numbers and warlike character of the native population, as in parts of the Cape colony, where the boors are forced to congregate together for self-protection, and in the new French colony at Algiers. (Merivale 1861, p. 275)

Merivale went on to remark that the causes which increased to its maximum the 'natural tendency to dispersion' were a 'wide extent of fertile soil, a wholesome climate, the absence of dense forests and other

natural obstacles, and the want of navigable rivers, upon the banks of which men are usually inclined to establish themselves in communities' (Merivale 1861, p. 276). He realized that this dispersal had cultural as well as economic consequences:

> In colonies thus circumstanced, the inclination of men for the ease and independence of pastoral, semi-savage life, a propensity which seems to overcome that of self-interest, even in the most enterprising and industrious races, undoubtedly places great obstacles in the way of civilization. (Merivale 1861, p. 276)

The advantages of concentration were well stated by Lord Glenelg:

> The territory, expanding only with the pressure of population, is commensurate with the actual wants of the entire community. Society, being thus kept together, is more open to civilizing influences, more directly within the control of the government, more full of the activity which is inspired by common wants, and the strength which is derived from the division of labour; and, altogether, is in a sounder state, morally, politically, and economically, than if left to pursue its natural course. (Quoted in Merivale 1861, pp. 424–5)

Constancy of labour

Regarding the doctrine of the constancy of labour, 'which nothing points out to the economical inquirer in old countries, but of which every colonial capitalist has been made conscious in his own person', Wakefield wrote:

> By far the greater part of the operations of industry, and especially those of which the produce is great in proportion to the capital and labour employed, require a considerable time for their completion. As to most of them, it is not worth while to make a commencement without the certainty of being able to carry them on for several years. A large portion of the capital employed in them is fixed, inconvertible, durable. If anything happens to stop the operation, all this capital is lost. If the harvest cannot be gathered, the whole outlay in making it grow has been thrown away. (Wakefield 1849, p. 169)

So, he continued, 'constancy is a no less important principle than combination of labour' (Wakefield 1849, p. 169). At home, combination

and constancy of labour were effortlessly provided for through an abundance of labourers for hire but this was not the case in the colonies.

Many authors remarked on the tendency of colonists to disperse, becoming, as Wakefield put it, 'mere earth-scratchers' (quoted in Merivale 1861, p. 262) who were unable to engage in larger projects that demanded a concentration and constancy of labour and capital. But the dispersal of labour and capital also had serious consequences for the other factor of production, land. The fear was that with the easy availability of land, and with relatively little clearance to be made, it would be much easier to move on once the productivity of the soil declined. With no necessity of increasing the productivity of labour, of rotating crops, or of applying fertilizers, there was a considerable incentive to move when the soil became exhausted. This was the ecologically destructive procedure of 'Sow, Mow, and Go', or what one might call nomadic agriculture. Settlement itself, that sure sign of civilization, began to succumb to the nomadic, the infallible signifier of savagery or barbarism.

The individualist ambition to become proprietors and the desire for domestic monarchy were seen to have dire cultural as well as economic consequences. Only the concentration of colonists could preserve the cultural values and practices of the mother country; dispersal into the wild exposed them to the threat of cultural 'degeneration'. According to a source cited by Wakefield:

> the Hollanders in North America were kept together by dense forests and hostile savages and they preserved the civilized habits of their mother country. The Hollanders in South Africa, meeting neither dense forests nor hostile savages, dispersed themselves over the colony; they were far separated from each other; every one of them did everything for himself and by degrees they became half savages. (Quoted in Wakefield 1968, p. 16)

Both a hostile environment and warlike natives contributed to maintaining a concentration of colonists, which was economically enabling and preserved the cultural standards of the mother country. Wakefield and Torrens argued that government should restrict the 'casual' or 'natural' distribution of capital and labour in the colonies. For colonies exporting to Europe, Merivale agreed, but not in the case of new colonists and where extra production would find no market. Wakefield noted that 'In the history of American colonization there is but one instance of a person having settled totally out of the reach of markets – the celebrated Daniel Boon' (quoted in Merivale 1861, p. 265).

Merivale argued that concentration was not in all cases a virtue and that the economic loss which the colony 'inevitably' sustained by not being left to 'follow its natural course – by being forced to concentrate itself on the less valuable soils' would 'probably overbalance all these real or imaginary advantages' (Merivale 1861, p. 425). He clearly felt that a *laissez-faire* policy, then dominant in the imperial centre, should normally be also applicable to colonial situations:

> Concentration of inhabitants of course can only take place where some of the settlers relinquish the advantages of appropriating the most fertile land within their reach, in order to secure the real or supposed advantages of congregation. Now fertile soil is, to the settler, the machine with which he works; it is that for the sake of which he is content to forego all the benefits which he might have derived from remaining a member of an older and denser community. To prevent his occupation of the most fertile soil within reach, either by raising its price, or by any other conventional arrangement, is to force him to resort to the use of a less productive machine; it is to force him to waste a portion of his precious labour, to forego a part of his expected reward, with a view to certain speculative advantages for the community. (Merivale 1861, p. 263)

End of empire?

Security of property, wrote Wakefield, was 'the indispensable foundation of wealth' and it depended wholly on government (Wakefield 1849, p. 81). Without it, and security of person, neither labour nor capital would be attracted to the colonies. So provided then

> that care is taken to prevent temporary gluts of either capital or labour in very young colonies, and provided also that colonial government is tolerably good, it may be affirmed with confidence, that neither too much capital nor too many people can be sent to a colony. (Wakefield 1849, p. 82)

Self-government by the settler colonies was a central aim of the colonial reformers. From 1794, colonies were ruled through the Colonial Office in London, though many of them maintained a pretence of self-government. In 1846 the principle of 'responsible government' was introduced into Canada and was rapidly extended throughout the British Empire. Formerly, members of the powerful colonial Executive Council

were appointed 'during pleasure' of the Colonial Office. Under the new dispensation, the words 'during pleasure' were omitted, and, instead, the members were appointed on the understanding that they should hold their posts only so long as they retained the confidence of the colonial assemblies, making the executive subordinate to the legislature. The result was, as Cairnes put it, 'Power and patronage passed in a moment from the Colonial Office to the colonial assemblies' (Cairnes 1873, p. 38).

By the mid-nineteenth century there was a widespread belief that colonization was over as most suitable territories in the world were already colonized. It was also felt that the beginning of the end of the British Empire was at hand, given the increasing tendency of colonies to govern themselves and the spread of free trade internationally which militated against preferential terms of trade between colonies and the mother country. Advanced liberals like Cairnes and Goldwin Smith had no regrets about these new developments. Many commentators remarked on the large sums expended on protecting the colonies who frequently showed their gratitude to the mother country by erecting prohibitive tariffs and by professions of 'ironical allegiance' (Cairnes 1873, p. 50). In the words of Cairnes:

> We have abandoned all the objects for the sake of which our colonial empire was founded. We are unable to impress our will upon our colonies in any particular, however in itself reasonable, or just, or apparently necessary for their safety or ours. Wholly irrespective of our wishes, they enter into alliances, unite and separate, dispose of their lands, recast their constitutions, and even combine for the avowed purpose of thwarting our designs. (Cairnes 1873, p. 55)

According to the economist J. Shield Nicholson, writing in the first decade of the twentieth century, in general trade no longer followed the flag and surplus capital, and labour flowed as easily to the United States as to the British Empire. 'In brief', he concluded, 'our foreign trade and the migration of labour and capital are determined mainly by economic and not by political considerations. Labour follows wages; capital follows profits; and neither follows the flag' (Nicholson 1909, p. 518).

Moral empire

With the waning of economic and political bonds came the emphasis on cultural ones, bonds of affection replacing those of interest. As in

Ireland, the focus was changed from coercion to kindness, a truly danger-
ous concept. Politically the Act of Union came to be seen not as a cold,
legalistic bond but a warm, vital 'union of hearts' of John Bull and
Cathleen the daughter of Hoolihan, indeed, a version of the 'free unions'
that marriage reformers were advocating around the same time.

As we have seen, a paper in the *Colonial Gazette* (12 December 1846)
noted that the 'tastes and habits of the British colonists' were 'the same
with those of their fellow-countrymen in the old country', thus facil-
itating mutually profitable trade. The article argued that the 'bond thus
created to unite the colony to the mother country is found to sur-
vive political severance' (quoted in Merivale 1861, p. 190). But Merivale
questioned

> whether either more accurate economical reasoning, or statistical
> inquiry, warrants these conclusions. Plainly expressed, the theory
> amounts to this: So long as British nationality prevails, and until an
> absolutely new community is created, so long there will be a tendency
> in the colony to buy a dearer article from England in preference to a
> cheaper article from elsewhere. (Merivale 1861, p. 190)

It was, however, according to Merivale, relatively easy to estimate the
cost of colonization but not the value of a colonial empire to its
mother country. To retain or to abandon a dominion was not an issue
which would 'ever be determined on the mere balance of profit or loss;
or on the more refined but even less powerful motives supplied by
abstract political philosophy' (Merivale 1861, p. 675).

In Merivale's estimation the true value of a colonial empire to the
mother country could not be calculated in terms of lowly utilitarian
economic and political factors:

> The sense of national honour, pride of blood, the tenacious spirit of
> self-defence, the sympathies of kindred communities, the instincts
> of a dominant race, the vague but generous desire to spread our civ-
> ilization and our religion over the world: these are impulses which
> the student in his closet may disregard, but the statesman dares not,
> for they will assuredly prevail, as they so often have prevailed
> before, and silence mere utilitarian argument whenever a crisis calls
> them forth. (Merivale 1861, p. 675)

Merivale ended his book with the visionary claim that the 'tie of sub-
jection to a common crown, justly as we may value it, is in truth but a
slight and temporary thing, while the alliance of blood, and language,

and religion bids fair to subsist as long as human society endures' (Merivale 1861, p. 677).

For Goldwin Smith, a 'grand moral unity' would replace a mundanely material one. He asked:

> Do not these schemes of 'universal empire' and a universal state, of which we and our antipodes are to be citizens, spring, in part, from an exaggerated estimate of the moral grandeur to be derived from enormous political combinations? A political unity is not a moral unity, nor will moral grandeur be gained by stretching it till it bursts. If people want a grand moral unity, they must seek it in the moral and intellectual sphere. Religion knows no impediment of distance. The dominions of science are divided by no sea. To restore, or to pave the way for restoring, the unity of long-divided Christendom, may seem the most chimerical of all aspirations, yet perhaps it may be less chimerical than the project of founding a world-wide state. (Smith 1863, p. 86)

Cairnes concluded his lecture even more lyrically than Merivale. The British Empire, he wrote:

> such as it has hitherto been known in the world, has reached its natural goal. That British power, or that the influence of British ideas, will in consequence suffer declension, is what at least I, for one, do not believe. Contemplating our career as a whole, it seems to me that we have out-grown the restraints and supports of our earlier state, and are now passing into a new phase of existence. Instead of a great political, we shall be a great moral, unity; bound together no longer indeed by Imperial ligaments supplied from the Colonial Office, but by the stronger bonds of blood, language, and religion – by the common inheritance of laws fitted for free men, and of a literature rich in all that can keep alive the associations of our common glory in the past. Thus sustained and thus united, each member of the great whole will enter without hindrance the path to which its position and opportunities invite it; while all will co-operate in the same work of industrial, social, and moral progress; exchanging freely – let us hope, in spite of some present indications to the contrary – exchanging freely our products and our ideas – in peace good friends and customers, and firm allies in war. (Cairnes 1873, pp. 57–8)

In the opinion of Nicholson, 'The method of estimating the advantages and privileges of empire in terms of money' was 'altogether inapplicable

and fallacious' (Nicholson 1909, p. 519). The empire had 'grown in strength because liberty and natural affection' had been allowed to 'displace narrow economic interests' (Nicholson 1909, p. 519). Nicholson concluded that instead of seeking to 'tighten ties', the ideal should be 'to enlarge the sympathies; and instead of trying to barter government for revenues, the people of this country should endeavour more and more to govern by consent' (Nicholson 1909, p. 520).

Conclusion

Settler colonialism, as we have seen, was theorized almost totally in economic terms, though there was widespread agreement by these theorists that the empire would endure, albeit changed, as a cultural entity with the breaking of economic, and, indeed, political bonds between the colonies and the mother country. In contemporary colonial and post-colonial analysis economic categories have disappeared virtually without trace. The cultural fate of indigenous people is quite properly studied but rarely the economic motivation of imperialism or its economic consequences for the colonized. Poststructuralism, which centrally informs postcolonial theory, is a libertarian project but liberty has a price and that price is inequality, a price worth the paying many would say. Postcolonial critics correctly draw attention to the cultural matrices in which economic systems live and move and have their being, but they less frequently advert to the extent to which cultures are economically shaped and formed. Their focus is almost exclusively culturalist and in their conceptual apparatus the most salient aspect of the weight of economy in society is its unbearable lightness. Some cultural practices are the products of economic marginality and do not survive its demise. It should also be noted that the victims of a world ill-divided also suffer a severe abridgement to their liberty. It would appear that the justifiable critique of economic *determinism* has led to the jettisoning of all economic categories of social understanding and explanation. In like manner, with reference to the construction of gender, though biological categories are culturally mediated this should not entail the liquidation of the biological. But these excessively culturalist turns were enabled by the discourse of political economy itself substituting a subjective theory of value for one based on labour or cost of production, thus dramatically replacing (rather than supplementing) a focus on production with one on consumption. These ideas, associated in Britain with the name Stanley Jevons, culminated in Alfred Marshall's doctrine of consumer sovereignty. The focus of attention was totally removed from the ownership and control of

factors of production to the subjective wants of individual consumers. However, in a cultural context, there seems to be an extraordinary homology between the Barthean death-of-the-author, variously conceived notions of reader power, and the doctrine of consumer sovereignty. There is a nice irony in the fact that the anti-authoritarian, libertarian trust of reception theory, widely perceived as unimpeachably progressive, is intimately related to a doctrine which constitutes the conceptual core of neoclassical economics. Questions of social class, which were central to classical political economy, disappeared as a category of analysis in neoclassical economics. A philosophical system focused totally on 'difference' must needs be silent on the question of class which is centrally concerned with structured economic inequality, though there are people who celebrate inequality for its rich heterogeneity. In conclusion, it is worth noting that the development of subjective theories of economic value closely paralleled the growth of the culturalist definition of the settler colonies as constituting, in the words of Goldwin Smith, a 'grand moral unity'.

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2
Spenser, Purchas, and the Poetics of Colonial Settlement*

Daniel Carey

In a provocative essay contributed to the first volume of *The Oxford History of the British Empire*, David Armitage questioned a well-established account of the relationship between literature and empire in the early modern period. According to this view, English literature in the later sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries emerges as a consequence of empire, both dependent upon and essentially supportive of the efforts of exploration and settlement that marked the age. Armitage identifies this critical orthodoxy as prevailing not only among postcolonial opponents of empire, but also, in a curious convergence, among earlier historians of literature who welcomed the fraught but successful efforts of mariners and colonists to establish an English presence in the New World; the 'facts' were not in dispute, even if their interpretation remained subject to controversy (Armitage 1998).

  In answer to this tradition of thinking about literature's complicity with empire, Armitage complicates the story of how exploration, settlement, and writing interrelate in the English case. Not only was the 'discovery' of a New World 'haltingly received' in England (Armitage 1998, p. 100), as elsewhere in the European imagination, but English efforts to create viable colonies were also fitful before the late 1620s. He argues that the 'impress of Empire on English literature of the early-modern period was minimal' (Armitage 1998, p. 102), while describing a largely critical attitude toward empire among humanist authorities, including the last humanist intervention in the English Renaissance, Milton's *Paradise Lost*. Although he considers other forms of literary expression, the argument hinges on the absence of an English epic celebratory of imperial achievements that would compare with Camões's *Lusiads* (1572) or Ercilla y Zuñiga's *La Araucana* (1590).[1]

This account introduces a useful caution against anachronism and the making of easy assumptions about literature and empire. But the pre-occupation with epic tells only part of the story of English responses, which appeared in a more diffused generic context. Furthermore, it is clear from his examples that there was scope within English humanism both for a critique of empire and an endorsement of it. As Armitage remarks of Edmund Spenser, for example, his 'ethical purposes were accordingly at one with the aims English humanists hoped to achieve through the study of *litterae humaniores*, while his political vision of English domination throughout Britain and Ireland presented perhaps the most ambitious and hard-line British imperial vision of its time' (Armitage 1998, p. 115).

In this essay, I revisit the question of how literature and empire relate by considering Spenser and Samuel Purchas, the well-known editor of travel accounts and successor to Richard Hakluyt. My claim is that English colonial activity, whether in Ireland (where Spenser wrote) or Virginia (which Purchas described and defended) invoked what can be called a poetics of colonial settlement. The generic location was not confined to epic in Spenser's case but appeared in hybrid forms of pastoral, myth, and romance in various poetic settings. His prose work, *A View of the Present State of Ireland* (c. 1596), displays a related imaginative engagement in its account of the Irish landscape. As the latter case suggests, the set of contexts in which one can identify a connection between the work of literature and colonialism should be expanded beyond the limits of formal verse, consistent with Armitage's recognition of the importance of training in rhetoric that prevailed in humanist education. In this vein, Purchas's essay 'Virginias Verger' combines legal discourse and the idiom of the sermon with heightened praise for Virginia that takes on the character of eroticized romance. Thus the 'impress' of empire on literature emerges in part by redirecting our attention to a wider set of rhetorical occasions. Spenser's remythologizing of an allegorized landscape required an act of substitution in which he played the part of a rival Irish bard, while Purchas's invocation of Virginia reimagined the territory as inviting English settlement, in which the native population was either absent or figured as alien to it.

I

The principal generic locus of Spenser's encounter with Ireland comes in the context of pastoral. *Colin Clouts Come Home Againe* (1591)[2] recounts the visit to Kilcolman (Spenser's estate in Cork) by the 'Shepheard of the Ocean' – Spenser's figure for Sir Walter Ralegh. Recalling the occasion,

Colin, the forlorn poet, tells of the song he sang of two rivers: the Bregog and Mulla, the latter being the beautiful daughter of Old Father Mole, the mountain range.[3] Mulla is promised by her father to the river Allo, yet she is in love with Bregog, whose waters flowed near Spenser's land.[4] The plot has overtones of comic romance, to the extent that an unwanted suitor and the will of the father debar the lovers from their union. Yet in this case, Bregog has an etymological connection with the Irish term *bréagach* (lying or deceitful).[5] This casts him more in the role of the wily servant of new comedy who subverts his master and makes away with his goods, surreptitiously conjoining with Mulla:

> First into many parts his streame he shar'd
> That whilest the one was watcht, the other might
> Passe unespide to meete her by the way;
> And then besides, those little streames so broken
> He under ground so closely did convay,
> That of their passage doth appeare no token,
> Till they into the *Mullaes* water slide.
> So secretly did he his love enjoy. (Spenser, 1989, p. 532, ll. 138–45)

A shepherd boy, informing on them, provokes the anger of Old Mole who casts down mighty stones, and breaking Bregog's course, 'scattered all to noght' (Spenser 1989, p. 532, l. 153).

In her reading of the poem, Lin Kelsey argues in favour of an identification of Spenser with Bregog, rather than the more traditional assumption that Ralegh's fortunes are represented in the allegory (after his fall from grace following his ill-advised marriage to Elizabeth Throckmorton without seeking the queen's approval).[6] On Kelsey's account, Spenser describes his own way of eluding Lord Burghley's displeasure by going underground, which she links to the classical account of the river Alpheus's passage below the sea to find his beloved, Arethusa, identified with virtue itself (Kelsey 2003). This account receives some support from Spenser's description in Book IV of *The Faerie Queene* of the assemblage of rivers who arrive as guests to celebrate the marriage of the Thames and Medway. Spenser enlists a host of Irish rivers for this event, including:

> Strong *Allo* tumbling from Slewlogher steep,
> And *Mulla* mine, whose waves I whilom taught to weep. (Spenser 2001, IV.xi.41)[7]

The Allo (once promised to Mulla) is mentioned here, but the possessive places Spenser in the Bregog role. If Spenser is indeed to be understood as

Bregog, then he is the figure who has conjoined with the Irish land-scape.[8] The intensity of his identification positions him as a poet, I would argue, in the role of a rival bard, displacing his Irish peers whom he had disparaged in *A View of the Present State of Ireland* for their lewd praise of thieves and outlaws (Spenser 1997, pp. 75–7).[9]

For Spenser, the encounter with Ireland is an opportunity to remythologize the landscape. We see this development not only in *Colin Clouts Come Home Againe* but in the darker vision of 'Two Cantos of Mutabilitie'. The precise status of these cantos, which appeared in print in 1609 after Spenser's death, is difficult to determine. They may, as some have argued, represent a continuation of *The Faerie Queene* (the stanza form and canto structure are the same), or the disheartened conclusion of an abandoned epic, or as J.B. Lethbridge (2006) has recently suggested, a late reworking by Spenser of material that was once included in or intended for *The Faerie Queene*. In Canto VI, the rivers and mountains near Spenser's estate once again provide an imagined location, in this instance for a retelling of the story of Diana and Actaeon in an Irish setting. Although the presence of the tale within a narrated struggle for sovereignty between Mutabilitie, and Jove and the other gods, indicates a generic framework of epic, Spenser introduces the episode with an apology:

> And, were it not ill fitting for this file,
> > To sing of hilles & woods, mongst warres & Knights,
> > I would abate the sternenesse of my stile,
> > Mongst these sterne stounds to mingle soft delights;
> > And tell how Arlo through Dianaes spights
> > (Being of old the best and fairest Hill
> > That was in all this holy-Islands hights)
> Was made the most unpleasant, and most ill. (Spenser 2001, VII.vi.37)

Despite the suggestion of inappropriateness to the thread (*filum*) of his poem,[10] Spenser continues with the story undeterred. There is thus a sense of something disjunctive in terms of subject matter, though the emphasis on change and loss in fact complements the larger pattern described in the mutability cantos as a whole.

We learn that at Arlo Hill, the highest peak in Old Mole's range, in former times,

> The Gods then us'd (for pleasure and for rest)
> Oft to resort there-to, when seem'd them best. (Spenser 2001, VII.vi.38).

There the huntress Diana took great pleasure in the wholesome waters:

> But mongst them all, as fittest for her game,
>   Either for chace of beasts with hound or boawe,
>   Or for to shroude in shade from *Phoebus* flame,
>   Or bathe in fountains that doe freshly flowe,
>   Or from high hilles, or from the dales belowe,
>   She chose this *Arlo*; where shee did resort
>   With all her Nymphes enranged on a rowe,
>   With whom the woody Gods did oft consort. (Spenser 2001,
>   VII.vi.39)

The story centres on the treachery of the river Molanna in whose waters Diana bathes. Molanna is the sister to Mulla, and Spenser reminds us of Colin's former tale of this river 'faire and bright: /Unto whose bed false *Bregog* whylome stole' (VII.vi.40). The sisters share a trait of duplicity. Initially Molanna appears in a chaste guise, flowing innocently downhill through woods and dales. The poet compares her course to garlanding the hair of a bride:

> For, first, she springs out of two marble Rocks,
>   On which, a grove of Oakes high mounted growes,
>   That as a girlond seemes to deck the locks
>   Of som fair Bride, brought forth with pompous showes
>   Out of her bowre, that many flowers strowes:
>   So, through the flowry Dales she tumbling downe,
>   Through many woods, and shady coverts flowes...
>   (Spenser 2001, VII.vi.41)

The foolish god Faunus – Spenser's Actaeon equivalent – approaches the river, intent on gaining sight of the bathing Diana. He corrupts Molanna with 'Queene-apples, and red Cherries from the tree' in order to discover 'what time he might her Lady see, / When she her selfe did bathe, that he might secret bee' (Spenser 2001, VII.vi.43). Molanna consents to this betrayal on condition that Faunus intervene and win for her the love of the river Fanchin, who has remained indifferent to her. With the agreement made, she tells him when Diana may be found.

   After Faunus is detected by Diana, he manages to escape his pursuers, unlike Actaeon – perhaps a reference to the Irish rebels who prove so difficult to track down or eradicate. But Diana exacts revenge on Molanna

by overwhelming the river with stones (just as Old Mole had done to Bregog). Yet Faunus remains true to the promise he made to Molanna, that if she disclosed Diana's secret, he would unite her with her love, Fanchin:

> So now her waves passe through a pleasant Plaine,
>   Till with the *Fanchin* she her self doe wed,
>   And (both combin'd) themselves in one faire river spread.
>
> <div align="right">(Spenser 2001, VII.vi.53)</div>

However, the story does not end there. Spenser's account becomes the prelude to a greater loss. Diana and her train abandon Ireland and the delicious brook, 'In whose sweet streame, before that bad occasion, / So much delight to bathe her limbes she tooke' (Spenser 2001, VII.vi.54). This mythic loss prepares the way for hostile forces to re-gather, as Diana lays a heavy curse:

> To weet, that Wolves, where she was wont to space
>   Should harbour'd be, and all those Woods deface,
>   And Thieves should rob and spoile the Coast around.
>   Since which, those Woods, and all that goodly Chase,
>   Doth to this day with Wolves and Thieves abound:
>   Which too-too true that lands in-dwellers since have found.
>
> <div align="right">(Spenser 2001, VII.vi.55)</div>

The eroticized landscape experiences romantic fulfillment despite Diana's punishment, but the 'in-dwellers' (of which Spenser is apparently one) remain beset by wolves and thieves. Thus the rich imagining in which the waters couple eternally cannot displace the experience of ongoing conflict and threat, which gives his verse its distinctive notes of consolation and loss.

It is tempting to interpret the sombre note in these verses as something of a final word on Ireland, and to conclude, as Armitage does, that the 'abandoned and truncated' condition of Spenser's epic speaks to the failure of imperial ambitions in the country (Armitage 1998, p. 116).[11] As far as the Cantos of Mutabilitie are concerned, issues of dating and their relationship to the larger *Faerie Queene* make it difficult to draw on them as definitive evidence. What I would emphasize is the generic variety of Spenser's responses to the Irish landscape, which together constitute an imaginative form of settlement, even when the tale becomes a cautionary one.

The opening sequence of *Epithalamion* (1595) occupies similar ground, but the expression is more hopeful, as we might expect in a poem in celebration of a wedding day. In the imperative mood, the poet addresses the nymphs associated with Mulla who act as guardians of the waters' stores:

> Ye Nymphes of Mulla which with carefull heed,
> The silver scaly trouts doe tend full well,
> And greedy pikes which use therein to feed,
> (Those trouts and pikes all others doo excell)
> And yet likewise which keepe the rushy lake,
> Where none doo fishes take,
> Bynd up the locks the which hang scattered light,
> And in his waters which your mirror make,
> Behold your faces in the christall bright,
> That when you come whereas my love doth lie,
> No blemish she may spie. (Spenser 1989, p. 664, ll. 56–64)

Spenser expands the cohort of protective deities invited to join the marriage celebration to include

> ye lightfoot mayds which keep the dere,
> That on the hoary mountayne use to towre,
> And the wylde wolves which seeke them to devoure,
> With your steele darts doo chase from comming neer,
> Be also present heere,
> To helpe to decke her and to help to sing,
> That all the woods may answer and your eccho ring.
> (Spenser 1989, pp. 664–5, ll. 67–73)

Whatever threat the wolves may pose does not intrude on the joy of this occasion, while the woods become a place of echoing song instead of danger.

Nor should we limit our references to poetry alone in considering the range of Spenser's responses. The complex rhetorical performance in *A View of the Present State of Ireland*, Spenser's dialogue on Irish colonial policy, invites the reader to recognize the countryside as 'goodly', with fertile lands and rich potential (although beset by rebels and ranging natives who defile rather than improve the land). As Irenius, the figure experienced in Irish affairs, describes it to his auditor, Eudoxus:

> And sure it is yet a most beautifull and sweet countrey as any is
> under heaven, being stored throughout with many goodly rivers,

replenished with all sorts of fish most abundantly, sprinkled with many very sweet islands and goodly lakes, like little inland seas, that will carry even shippes upon their waters, adorned with goodly woods even fit for building of houses and ships, so commodiously, as that if some Princes of the world had them, they would soone hope to be lords of all the seas, and ere long of all the world: also full of very good ports and havens opening upon England, as inviting us to come unto them, to see what excellent commodities that countrey can afford, besides the soyle it selfe most fertile, fit to yeeld all kinde of fruit that shall be committed thereunto. (Spenser 1997, p. 27)

This account creates a mythic romance of another kind. It is not derived from classical mythology, nor does it engage in overt allegory. Yet the portrait transfixes the reader by imagining a landscape free from the effects of a hostile human population, rich in resources (like the fish superintended by the nymphs in *Epithalamion*). The land is 'commodious' and accepting, with fruitful promise if properly wooed. The repetition of 'goodly' and 'sweet' frames it invitingly in romance terms, but Irenius also assesses its commercial and military potential: with this paramour, any prince would realize his imperial ambition and compete for lordship of all the world.[12] Naturally, England stands to benefit, as the terrain itself, through its ports and havens, opens up toward its neighbour country, inviting exploration.

II

Samuel Purchas's representation of Virginia is continuous with this mode of writing about landscape, in which romance, allegory, and the erotic combine with an evaluation of natural resources as part of a poetics of settlement. He manages to separate the native people from the territory and to fashion an immediate relationship between the English and the land, which they approach as suitors respectful of its virgin purity. What makes these rhetorical moves so striking is that they occurred after the indigenous uprising of 1622, which parallels the longstanding hostilities and war in Munster that troubled Spenser's time in Ireland.

Purchas's long essay 'Virginias Verger' appeared in 1625 as part of his massive compilation of travel accounts, *Hakluytus Posthumus, or, Purchas his Pilgrimes*.[13] Purchas was educated in Cambridge, ordained as an Anglican priest, and around 1613 or 1614 he became chaplain to George Abbot, Archbishop of Canterbury, who shared his geographical interests.[14] Purchas acquired Richard Hakluyt's manuscripts and continued the work of

issuing redacted travel accounts and chronicling English and other efforts to explore the globe.[15] In 'Virginias Verger', he provided what he called a 'Discourse shewing the benefits which may grow to this Kingdome from American English plantations, and specifically those of Virginia and Summer Ilands' (Purchas 1905–7). His purpose was to defend and promote the Virginia colony above all,[16] and it is one of the great if neglected texts of early English colonial discourse. His invocation in the work of the Summer Islands (i.e. Bermuda) was important not only because of the political and economic link between this Caribbean chain and Virginia but also because it established a kind of norm – the Summer Islands had, in fact, been unoccupied when the English arrived there in 1609–10. Thus it constituted a plantation in 'pure soil', to use Francis Bacon's phrase (2000, p. 106), and its productivity made it exemplary. Virginia was another matter. The fitful attempts to settle it, beginning in the 1580s in Roanoke, had notably failed, with a considerable hiatus before the establishment of Jamestown in 1607. The often uneasy negotiation between English settlers and the Powhatan tribes who inhabited the area had broken down, disastrously, in 1622, when a coordinated Indian attack resulted in the death of 350 settlers, imperilling the fragile colony as a whole.[17] Thus Purchas was not writing in the optimistic or promotional mode of Thomas Harriot in 1588 in *A briefe and true report of the new found land of Virginia*, composed in support of Ralegh's efforts to seek backing and settlers for the new colony. Harriot concentrated on the ways of sustaining life in the colony, based on hospitable relations with the native inhabitants, and the paucity of any military threat they posed.[18] Purchas faced a very different challenge to reinstate a sense of English entitlement, while abandoning the notion of a cooperative existence with native peoples.

Purchas's document served a variety of purposes, including that of defending English entitlement to locate in Virginia. He provided an elaborate set of legal justifications, assembled in a classically overdetermined way to ensure that no contingency was unaddressed. He began with a general validation of colonial settlement. This ranged from the Biblical mandate to inherit and settle the earth, to the dispersal of Noah's sons after the Flood, who engaged, from time immemorial, in the first colonial settlement of the world, to a so-called right of merchandise (*ius commercium*) and providential distribution of goods around the world by a God who expected and rewarded adventurous voyagers and traders. Purchas became more specific in asserting the right to establish a presence in Virginia, arguing for ownership of

land through a cascading set of reasons, each amplifying and reinforcing the other: he cited invasion and conquest, 'first discovery, first actuall possession, prescription, gift, cession…livery of seisin, [and] sale of price' (pp. 224–5).[19] Of course the latter term – sale of price – remained in tension, if not outright contradiction with his legal and Christian defence of settlement based on unoccupied territory: '[A]s men', he said', 'we have a naturall right to replenish the whole earth'. What he called the 'law of nature and humanitie' conferred a 'right of Plantation' so long as the 'Countrey be not possessed by other men' (p. 222).[20] Such was the case in the Summer Islands,[21] but Virginia required a different mode of analysis and representation. Here, of course, Purchas had to acknowledge that the country was 'inhabited', but he qualified this by saying that it was occupied 'in some parts therof, other parts remaining unpeopled'. This open space 'giveth liberty to other men which want convenient habitation to seat themselves'. Indeed their right was the same as the right exercised by the original Indian settlers of the land; but it was enhanced for the English 'where the people is wild, and hold no settled possession in any parts' (p. 222). Thus there were not only 'vacant places' and 'roome enough',[22] but he concluded with respect to their native rivals: 'I can scarsly call [them] Inhabitants' (pp. 222–3). In a remarkable move, he even cited Indian hospitality as acknowledgement of the right of the English to settle there. The law of nature, written in their hearts, and the light of nature, in their minds, led them to offer 'kind entertainment in mutuall cohabitation and commerce' (p. 224).[23] Their subsequent perfidiousness in slaughtering those who settled lawfully beside them justified the right of punishment under the law of nature; they constituted now, in Purchas's classificatory ethnography, not a 'Nation' (being 'wilde and Savage') but rather outlaws and rebels against a properly constituted nation; their lack of civility, arts or religion, made them 'more brutish then the beasts they hunt, more wild and unmanly then that unmanned wild Countrey, which they range rather then inhabite' (pp. 224, 231).

Purchas adopted a complementary rhetoric in positioning the indigenous peoples in his account. On the one hand, he presented them as existing outside the realm of civility which meant that they participated only in nature; he assimilated their forms of life to the grazing or ranging of animals which conferred no right of habitation.[24] On the other hand, he cast them as hostile or alien to the landscape itself, as precisely *unnatural*. But he needed to go further in order to create a poetics of colonial settlement, naturalizing an English relationship with the land that gave a moral privilege to the English presence there.

The naming of Virginia was crucial to this move, allowing a complex allegory of courtship to emerge. In his account, the land became a virgin bride to be wooed. Before discussing his prose poem on this subject, we need to take note of Purchas's positioning of the indigenous population as rapists who violate the land. Virginia, he says, 'was violently ravished by her owne ruder Natives, yea her Virgin cheeks dyed with the bloud of three Colonies' (Purchas 1905–7, p. 229).[25] The personification of the landscape, its intense identification with Elizabeth, gives it a moral presence and identity in which its Englishness no longer appears adventitious. Purchas spells this out by declaring the country 'naturalized English' by virtue of the accumulated rights associated with the growing list of entitlements that extends from discovery and possession to 'naturall inheritance' of those born there, and the vassalage of the Indians who become their subjects. Whatever 'remainders of right' enjoyed by the native population had been surrendered as a result of their 'disloyal treason'. This rhetorical strategy declares them enemies of the state, in which they appear as 'unnaturall Naturalls', while the Country itself, now becomes 'wholly English' (p. 229).

But for Purchas legal right is not enough. There must also be an act of imaginative settlement which consolidates and naturalizes the claim. In the examples I am discussing landscape is crucial because it invites an immediate relationship, bypassing the indigenous people who appear as incidental or actively hostile and alien to it. Thus Purchas has already prepared the ground, in a manner of speaking, for his most rhetorically ambitious representation, which invites his reader to

> looke upon Virginia, view her lovely lookes (howsoever like a modest Virgin she is now vailed with wild Coverts and shadie Woods, expecting rather ravishment then Mariage from her Native Savages) survay her Heavens, Elements, Situation; her divisions by armes of Bayes and Rivers into so goodly and well proportioned limmes and members; her Virgin portion nothing empaired, nay not yet improved, in Natures best Legacies; the neighbouring Regions and Seas so commodious and obsequious; her opportunities for offence and defence; and in all these you shall see, that she is worth the wooing and loves of the best Husband. (p. 242)

This complex passage encourages the loving but acquisitive gaze of the bridegroom assessing the wealth and beauty of a bride. The poetic blazon refashions the landscape as female body composed of well-proportioned limbs, with a modesty that only heightens her sexual

appeal. Like Miranda in *The Tempest*, she is marriageable, yet the native offers only ravishment.[26] Purchas orchestrates an alternative courtship and encourages the husbanding of this plantation.

Purchas intensifies the courtship by sexualizing the landscape, first subtly and then in a much more overt erotics. Allowing for a response of 'covetousnesse', he notes that ten Judaeas and a hundred paradises may be found in Virginia, 'whose mid-land Regions are wholly unknowne' (p. 243). He positions Virginia as an aristocratic figure of romance, whose navigable rivers receive tributes from smaller springs, brooks and rivulets, yielding a 'commodious intercourse' between the territory. His most heightened invocation is worth quoting at length:

> I know not how Nature hath here also wantonized and danced a Loath to depart in the winding of those Streames, which seeme willingly again and againe to embrace that beloved Soile, and to present her with rich Collers of silver Esses, murmuring that they must leave so fresh and fertile a Land, of which at last with Salt teares they take their leave, but contracting with their New Sea Lord to visit their old Land-lord and former Love every Floud. Meane whiles those many impetuous clippings and sweet embraces, searching refuges every way make shew as if they would meet together in consultation, and agree on some Conspiracie, which howsoever disappointed, yeeld neverthelesse many conveniences of entercourse and easier portage …. All these Rivers runne into a faire Bay, on which the Earth every way is a greedie gazing Spectator, except where the Ocean rusheth in to ravish her beauties, flowing neere two hundred miles into it, and forcing a Channell one hundred and fortie, of depth betwixt seven and fifteene fathome, and ten or fourteene miles in ordinary breadth. The earth yet undermining it by Ilands, and mustering those River Captains and innumerable Springs and Brookes, maintaineth his fresh challenge with continuall Warres, forcing backe the Ocean every Ebbe to retire, which yet loth to lose so sweete a possession returneth within few houres, freshly flowing with Salt reenforcements. (pp. 244–5)

Purchas offers a complex narrative of courtship, physical intimacy, and romance conflict between rival suitors. Freshwater streams embrace the land and offer her the silver collar of esses, a royal livery 'much favoured by English kings',[27] departing with tears made salty by arriving tidal waters of the sea. Nonetheless they form a contract with their 'Sea Lord' to return at the changing of the tide. This authorized form of contact is

complemented by a more secretive and conspiratorial coupling in Purchas's tale. The struggle between the ravishing ocean and the rivers continues in an allegory of armed battle, where the earth resists the ocean's force through island defences and the countless springs and brooks which fight back the sea at the ebb-tide. Undeterred, the sea returns with reinforcements to renew the contest. What had, in his earlier account, constituted a violation by the native people, now becomes an erotic exchange in which the land resists the sea's ravishing force. Both chaste and wanton, this courtship makes the occasion less one of Petrarchan frustration than of Donnean urgency and imperative in that newfound land, America.[28] Purchas's somewhat incongruous measurement of the channel is of course an invitation to English shipping to penetrate the interior, and the freshwater he takes note of is a vital resource for the sustenance of settlers.

Purchas participated in a well-established tradition. The most famous example of course is Sir Walter Ralegh's description of Guiana (to which Ralegh had turned his attention after his initial efforts in colonial settlement in Virginia failed). '*Guiana*', he proclaimed, 'is a Countrey that hath yet her Maydenhead'. He not only sexualized the landscape, stressing its virginity, but he also invited a form of sexual conquest in the act of settlement. Ralegh extended the metaphor, saying that the country was 'never sackt, turned, nor wrought, the face of the earth hath not beene torne … It hath never been entred by any armie of strength, and never conquered or possessed by any Christian Prince' (Ralegh 2006, p. 211).[29] But in some ways Purchas's account is closer to the description of Ireland offered in Spenser's *View*, where, as we have seen, he assessed its beauty, the goodly, well-stocked rivers, and woods which promise to yield plentiful resources for shipping and housing. Nearer to the time at which Purchas was writing, John Fletcher's *The Island Princess* (1621) created a similar vision of an exotic landscape offering its fruitfulness to Europeans, in gestures unmediated by native peoples. In the Spice Islands of Southeast Asia, the Portuguese navigator and hero Armusia remarks:

> The very rivers as we float along,
> Throw up their pearls, and curl their heads to court us;
> The bowels of the earth swell with the births
> Of thousand unknown gems, and thousand riches;
> Nothing bears a life, but brings a treasure.
>
> (Fletcher 1982 [1621], I.iii.29–33)

What makes Purchas's contribution distinctive, apart from the fact that it comes from the pen of a priest in the Church of England,[30] is that he

wrote it in circumstances of a violent breakdown in relations with Powhatan peoples. As I have emphasized, he therefore sets out in a deliberate fashion to remake the history of the landscape in a way that excluded a native presence from it, other than as ravishers.

How then should we reassess the relationship of literature and empire? We can locate the connection between them in hybrid literary contexts – in pastoral and romance, in legal discourse and the rhetorical scope of promotional tracts. What emerges in the examples I have discussed is a poetics of colonial settlement which takes different forms – in Spenser an impulse to allegorize and remythologize the landscape which is premised on supplanting rival bards, or in Purchas, an imagining of Virginia that figures the territory in romance terms, as the virgin bride awaiting civil courtship while threatened by a hostile and unnatural native population.

Notes

*For comments and suggestions I'm grateful to Jane Grogan and Sarah McKibben.

1 For an essay that comes to similar conclusions about Continental literature of the period, see Cohen 2004.
2 The dedication is dated from Kilcolman 27 December 1591, but the poem was not published until 1595.
3 Old Father Mole represents two ranges north of Kilcoman, the Ballyhoura mountains and the Galties. Galtymore is the highest peak. Mulla is the Awbeg river (Deane 1991, 1: 225n).
4 The Allo or Broadwater is now called the Blackwater. On the topos of the river in Spenser's poetry and its tradition, see Herendeen 1981; and more generally, Herendeen 1986. On the classical literary tradition, see also Jones 2005.
5 Colin explains Bregog's name as based on his 'deceitfull traine' (l. 118), that is, because the river's course flows underground for some two miles before joining with the Awbeg.
6 For the view associating Ralegh with Bregog, see for example, Nohrnberg 2006, pp. 269–71.
7 The Mulla bordered Spenser's estate and the reference may be to his building of a small waterfall to make it 'weep' (see Spenser 2006, p. 435n).
8 Elsewhere, in *A View of the Present State of Ireland*, Irenius complains of the creation of allegiances between commoners and lords in Ireland, with rebellious consequences. He praises the Saxon custom of 'tithing by the pole' as a policy worth introducing in Ireland: 'For by this the people are broken into small parts like little streames, that they cannot easily come together into one head' (Spenser 1997, p. 140), an image that places him, by contrast, in the punitive position of Old Mole.
9 Spenser's complex reaction to Irish bards and 'attraction to a bardic persona in *Colin Clouts*' are discussed in Highley 1991, pp. 87, 93. Similarly, Starke 1991, p. 137, remarks that Colin's role in the poem is 'exactly that of the

Irish bards described by Spenser in *A View*'. McCabe 2002, especially pp. 201–5, emphasizes Spenser's appropriative gesture in adopting Irish folklore and myth, and his (and his English contemporaries') replacement of Irish river names with English toponyms as part of reassignment of the territory to a new identity.

10 Herron 2007, pp. 158–63, has argued that Spenser refers to himself by the Irish term *file* or poet here, suggesting the creation of an Irish identity for his poetic production (Herron mistakenly uses the plural *filí* rather than the singular *file* which in fact matches Spenser's spelling, although in terms of scansion it is worth noting that the Irish *file* is disyllabic).

11 See also Canny 2001.

12 On this subject, see Pagden 1995.

13 The essay, which dates from early 1624, was originally intended as a pamphlet for separate publication. It appeared in *Purchas his Pilgrimes* with some abridgements. See Ransome 1997, 1, pp. 359–60.

14 George Abbot published *A Briefe Description of the Whole Worlde* (1599), which went through many editions. His younger brother Maurice Abbot would later become governor of the East India Company, and Purchas had dealings with him in his search for manuscript material on travel. See Ransome 1997, 1, pp. 355, 361.

15 See especially Ransome 1997, 1, pp. 329–80.

16 In May 1622, Purchas was admitted a 'free brother' of the Virginia Company, together with John Donne and six others, and he attended various meetings of the company court from 1622 to 1624 (Ransome 1997, 1, pp. 356–9).

17 On this event and responses to it (including Purchas's), see Kupperman 1980, pp. 176–9; Porter 1979, pp. 459–83; Fausz 1981, pp. 21–37; Rountree 2005, ch. 16; Vaughan 1995, pp. 105–27.

18 According to Harriot in *A briefe and true report of the new found land of Virginia* (1588), the Powhatan Indians had 'no edge tooles or weapons of yron or steele to offend us withall, neither knowe they how to make any: those weapons that they have, are onlie bowes made of Witch hazle, & arrowes of reeds, flat edged truncheons also of wood about a yard long, neither have they any thing to defend themselves but targets made of barks, and some armours made of stickes wickered together with thread' (Harriot 1955, 1, p. 369). Harriot affirmed that the English had the advantage of unfamiliar and destructive weapons, ordinance, and greater military discipline.

19 Literally 'livery of seisin' entails delivery of possession. The OED definition refers to the customary and symbolic practice of exchanging 'property': 'the delivery of property into the corporal possession of a person; in the case of a house, by giving him the ring, latch, or key of the door; in the case of land, by delivering him a twig, a piece of turf, or the like'. In order to acquire 'ownership' of land one had to be 'seised' of it, as these examples suggest, through the performance of ceremonies or symbolic exchanges that made it fully valid in legal terms.

20 Jennings 1975, p. 77, points out that in Purchas's earlier work, *Purchas his Pilgrimage* (1613), written before the uprising, Purchas had emphasized that the English paid the Indians for the land they occupied, something for Purchas 'of no small consequence to the conscience, where the milde Law

of Nature, not the violent law of Armes, layes the foundation of their possession'. Quoted from *Purchas his Pilgrimage*, 4th ed. (London, 1626), p. 836.

21 In his poem 'The Battle of the Summer Islands' (1638), Edmund Waller describes the country as fruitful and delicious. Before narrating a mock-heroic conflict between the settlers and a whale, the poet imagines himself reclining 'Under the plantain's shade' where, with his song, he promises to 'make the listening savages grow tame'. For a reading of the poem, see Chernaik, 1968, pp. 176–84.

22 See in this context Locke 1988, 2nd Treatise §36.

23 Purchas is drawing on St. Paul's letter to the Romans 2:14 here. In the Geneva Bible, the passage reads: 'For when the Gentiles, which have not the Law, do by nature the things *contained* in the Law, they have not the Law, are a Law unto themselves, Which shew the effect of the law written in their hearts, their conscience also bearing witness, and their thoughts accusing one another, or excusing'. For some discussion of assessments of native peoples in this context, see Carey 2006, pp. 73–4.

24 For an important reading of Purchas as indebted to José de Acosta's influential ethnographic classification, see Fitzmaurice 2008. However, this valuable essay does not discuss Purchas's major statement in 'Virginias Verger'.

25 The three colonies to which he refers are enumerated as Sir Richard Greneville's (which settled Ralph Lane and other colonists in Roanoke in 1585), Ralegh's subsequent Roanoke settlement, and the Jamestown colony visited by the 1622 massacre.

26 On the literary trope of rape and romance, see Kathryn Gravdal 1991, and Gravdal 1992. She remarks that 'the threat of rape, attempted rape, and the punishment of a rapist…constitute familiar episodic units in the construction of a romance' (Gravdal 1992, p. 564).

27 Fletcher 1997, p. 199. Fletcher traces the history of the collar which became associated with John of Gaunt. The meaning of the 'S' may have been religious originally; it may also have stood for '*Souveragne*, sovereign, the chief, superior to all' (p. 199). The favoured form in the Tudor period was a heavy chain of linked esses (p. 197).

28 See John Donne's elegy 'To his Mistress Going to Bed' (rejected by the censor when his verse appeared in print posthumously in 1633), which ends in a famous exclamation:

> O my America, my new found land,
> My kingdom, safeliest when with one man manned,
> My mine of precious stones, my empery,
> How blessed am I in this discovering thee!

The poem first appeared in *The Harmony of the Muses: or, The Gentlemans and Ladies Choisest Recreation* (London, 1654). For discussion, see Young 1987; and Raman 2001.

29 This line was parodied in George Chapman, Ben Jonson, and John Marston's *Eastward Ho* (c.1604/5), III.iii.14–15, when Seagull announces: 'Come, Boys, Virginia longs till we share the rest of her maidenhead'. Chapman's involvement is significant since he had contributed the poem 'De Guiana, Carmen Epicum' to the account published by Lawrence Keymis, Ralegh's deputy.

Keymis himself adopted a less felicitous phrase in inviting settlement in Guiana: 'here whole shyeres of fruitfull rich groundes, lying now waste for want of people, do prostitute themselves unto us, like a faire and beautifull woman, in the pride and flower of desired yeares' (Keymis 1596, sig. F2v). For discussion of Ralegh's trope, see Montrose 1993. For further examples and discussion of this rhetorical tradition, see Kolodny 1975, ch. 2; and Parker 1987, ch. 7.

30   This is something he had in common with John Donne, of course.

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3
'Dycheyng and Hegeying': The Material Culture of the Tudor Plantations in Ireland[1]

John Patrick Montaño

In the *Founding Legend of Western Civilization,* Richard Waswo shows how the Latin words for culture – *culto, cultum, col* – are also the root words for the verb 'to cultivate', and thereby serve to link all manifestations of high culture to the tilling of the soil. These ideas, created by and for settled agricultural communities that sow, harvest, and build walls and cities further serve to qualify as *savage* all other relations that people have with nature. Indeed, the 'image of civilization is the city, usually in the form of walls and towers' (Waswo 1997, pp. xi, 1). One obvious example of this is that for the Romans, the goddess Cybele – protectress of agricultural and civic life – is represented seated on a throne wearing a crown of walls and towers. Conversely, it was Herodotus who helped to define barbarians as people whose primary characteristic was their 'ignorance of ploughing and sowing and the fact that they do not dwell in houses' (Hartog 1988, p. 194). Accordingly, as the rhetoric that associated cultivation with civility and order began to emerge as an ideological strategy in Tudor Ireland, the humanist officials responsible for policies in Ireland became committed to the establishment of urban settlements and to the attendant material culture that they considered as essential markers of civilization.[2]

One important idea from the medieval period to survive the rebirth of values from classical antiquity was the distinction between culture and nature. While the Romans were careful to distinguish the city (*urbs*) from the country (*rus*), many in the Middle Ages insisted on a divide between culture – that which was cultivated, built, inhabited – and the natural world that was wild or untamed. On the one side we find castles, cities, villages and enclosed fields, while on the other side are forests, mountains, and, in the case of Ireland, bogs. Culture, of course, is what distinguishes man from the brute beasts, but also from the wild

men of the forest, the *gens silvestris,* and by 1500 there was a long established tradition of describing the Irish as savage: a people whose habitat was the wild forest, whose style of life was undisciplined, unruly, governed by instinct, and little more than beastlike. Consequently, at this time, terms like savage, *silvestri Hibernie*, wild Irish, and *wilde-hirrsheman* are used interchangeably to characterize a wild people living in a wild, impenetrable, and disordered land; in short, 'both in their habitat and in their personal status they were "wild" as a direct consequence of being *silvestris*' (Leerssen 1995, pp. 25–8, 30; Le Goff 1988, p. 58).[3]

For Hayden White, wildness is a peculiarly moral condition, a cause and a consequence of being cursed, but also a place. In other words, there is a conflation of a moral with a physical condition, leading to the assumption that people who roam and do not build walls, cities, and houses cannot be considered civilized. Just as all civilized life depended on tillage and cultivation in a fixed location, walled cities are an integral part of what qualifies people as civilized, a concept rooted in the Latin words for cities (*civis, civiis, civitas, civilitas*) (White 1972, pp. 13–15; Waswo 1997, pp. 4–9). As a result, official efforts to extend cultivation and civility beyond the Pale were accompanied by the desire to erect hedges, ditches, fences, walls, houses, and to establish cities that would help clarify the division between ordered and wild places and would articulate the cultural differences between civil and savage people. Significantly, the structural means used to communicate the importance of civility, as well as the fear and contempt of settled farmers for other modes of social organization, eventually provided both visible and tangible manifestations of the cultural conflict in Ireland: a material culture that the Irish would associate with the settler and his project of colonialism.

One reason that the material culture of building and engineering is so important in Tudor Ireland is its role as an ideological structure that articulates identity and difference. In the same way that land use and the spatial organization of territory were deployed as instruments to signify cultural differentiation, this material culture became part of an ideology that served to encode the cultivator as the bringer of culture: a culture founded on the production of agricultural surpluses and settlement in cities and permanent dwellings. One way to try and understand this ideology is to root the analysis in the substantive and public manifestation of the material culture of the settlers in Ireland, as it was created (and creatively assailed) in an ideological context (Baker 1992, p. 3). In Tudor Ireland, the reorganization of the landscape and

the ordering of the built environment were meant to convey assumptions about what it was to be civilized and to express authority and the symbolic order of English culture. Therefore, if we follow cultural geographers in seeing landscape as rife with meaning, then we can read the built environment as a document or ideological text created to convey a particular message or view of the world (Baker 1992, pp. 4–6; Mukerji 1997, pp. 300–36).[4]

The 'new English' who arrived in Ireland following the Reformation held the belief that the subjugation of nature through husbandry, gardening, and improvements to the land was the mark of civilization. They accepted the received wisdom about Ireland: that it was an island of barbarous people without either settled roots or productive interest in the land. From this ideological perspective, the mobility of her pastoral society made Ireland appear under-populated, under-improved, and under-exploited (Andrews 1970, p. 177). The recent arrivals, convinced of their civility and superior culture, assumed that a civilized country was one that looked remarkably like England. To establish order and to introduce civility to the 'waste' lands of the wild Irish was their mission, and the introduction of an agricultural landscape, economy, and society was central to that end. Enjoying unspoiled nature was fine for the native Irish, but a more active role for the subject that involved improving the land was an essential part of the English vision of the natural world. Similarly, officials considered the attendant material culture of stone houses, roads, hedges, fences, walls, fields, forts, and towns as an essential tool in transforming the landscape and people of Ireland. Indeed, Ireland was often viewed as a blank space to be filled, with Mountjoy claiming that the queen 'can work this kingdom into what fashion she will … or make it as a *tabula* and to write in it what laws shall best please herself' (*CSP Ireland* 1600–01, p. 251). However, such material culture can also serve as a site of contestation, and there are revealing examples of native responses to, and assaults on, the material culture that was imposed on Ireland.

Patricia Seed points out that a distinctive feature of English rituals when claiming possession of lands is that 'neither a ceremony nor a document but the ordinary action of constructing a dwelling place created the right of possession'. Indeed, the ideological implications of material culture can be seen in the assumption that building houses 'also established a legal right to the land upon which they were constructed. Erecting fixed (not movable) dwelling places upon a territory, under English law created a virtually unassailable right to own the place' (Seed 1995, pp. 4, 19). But these structures threatened the customary

openness of the landscape, and the mobility of a society accustomed to transhumance and large herds of animals was certain to be curtailed by the walls, fences, hedges, and ditches that necessarily follow. By enclosing their lands, establishing private property, cultivating fields, and building walls the settlers constructed their version of civilization; at the same time, they created physical boundaries between the cultivated and the wild, between civilized and savage. In fact, early writers on husbandry emphasized the importance of creating a border between cultivated and waste lands, with Thomas Tusser warning that 'ill husbandry loseth for lack of a good fence; Good husbandry [en]closeth' (Tusser 1580, p. 147). Similarly, Heresbach insisted on the need for good fences: 'The first thing needful for a Garden is water. The nexte to that is enclosure … [It must] be well enclosed, both from unruly folks and thieves and likewise from beasts' (Heresbach 1586, p. 50). Control over the landscape, referenced here in its role in advancing cultivation, is deemed essential in the demarcation between civilized and savage.

If, in the words of Tadhg O'Keeffe, a border or a frontier 'is a concept of space, [then] perception is its dynamic', and the perception of the Irish and their buildings as savage and primitive meant that the material culture of the English was capable of playing a significant role in the ideological conquest of the Irish (O'Keeffe 1992, p. 58). However, as late as 1494, the Pale had no tangible frontier in the landscape until Poynings' Parliament passed a law in which all the land defined as 'the Pale' in 1488 was 'to be enclosed with a double-ditch of six foot of earth above the ground' (O'Keeffe 1992, p. 70; Conway 1972, p. 215). But it was the determination of Henry VIII and his children to extend the area of civility that led to the decision to order the landscape in an English manner. In fact, it was the desire to extend this cultural boundary – rather than the tangible boundary of banks and ditches – that grew dramatically after the accession of Henry VIII. The most obvious manifestation of this project was the effort to build permanent settlements that were – at least at the outset – themselves bounded, protected, and set apart from the insidious threats of the natives and their culture. These settlements, usually near a fort or castle, formed an important early strategy in the plans for the reformation of Ireland. One account in 1514 lamented how most of the 'Englyshe folke … are of Irishe habyt of Irishe Language and of Iryshe condycions, except the Cyties and the walled townes' (PRO 60/1/9, 1514). So, if having 'landes be tylled and occupied with the ploughe' was to be the primary cure, then the remedy would have to include a tangible demarcation of the border between civil and savage, between the cultivated and the wild.

Consequently, a *Plan* in 1515 recommended that every village and town 'within 5 myles to the wylde Iryshe, be dycheyd and hegeyd strongly aboute the gates of tymbre, after the maner of the countrye of Kildare … and the said dycheis and hegeis [to be made] in all haste possible' (*SP Henry VIII* 2:20, 'Plan for Reformation', 1515). Here we see the importance of material culture in delineating cultivated and improved lands from the wild and uncontrolled landscape beyond, as well as its role in articulating the cultural conflict over the use of land.

The limitations and permeability of the frontiers were made clear during the Kildare Rebellion of the mid-1530s. Initially, confiscated lands were used to help fortify the borders of the Pale, with four new tower-houses added to the area between the rivers Boyne and Barrow in 1540. The government also reinstated the £10 subsidy and the grant of one ploughland for anyone who built a castle 'on the borders and marches of the Irish, which should be a great key (and) defence' (Loeber 1991, p. 10). More importantly, by 1541, Lord Deputy St Leger was looking to draw the natives to civility by persuading their leaders to accept their lands from the king. A key part of any such agreement was the lord's willingness to put all land 'mete for tillage, in manurance and tillage of howsbandry, and cause howses to be made and buylt for suche persons, as shalbe necessarye for the manurance therof' (*RDKRI* 1: 81, Indenture with O'Toole). It is clear that St Leger saw houses and castles as the central agents in civilizing and assimilating the Irish – lords, tenants, and husbandmen. By linking regular modes of inheritance and tenure to settled living arrangements within an ordered and cultivated landscape, St Leger was preparing the Irish for the civil customs and culture already flourishing in England. In addition, each native custom eliminated and each English practice adopted – just as each structure erected and every area of wasteland cultivated – could be recorded, quantified, and reported to officials in Dublin and London.

If primogeniture, cultivation, and the lease were to be the solution for the disordered and unsettled landscape of Ireland, then written records would have to be created to certify the existence of order and civility. Beginning with Queen Mary in 1556 and an 'Act for Shiring Ireland' in 1569, a rational division of the landscape was sought by officials in Dublin and London. Shiring signalled the arrival of English property law – the instrument for passing land from father to son and encouraging cultivation and improvement. But before houses, towns, fields, and gardens could appear, the official location of the new authority had to be established. To symbolize the change from the

personal government of the native rulers to the concept of a central place for administration, new borders were drawn and territories renamed. In the years to come O'Rourke's country became Leitrim and the MacMahon's country became Monaghan, shires named after their new urban county seat. The newest counties – King's and Queen's – also had towns with English names, Philipsburg and Maryborough, rather than what were perceived as their former incomprehensible, cacophonous Gaelic ones of *an Daingean* and *Port Laoighise*. These county towns had their own coded grammar of architecture, a grammar intended to define the boundaries between civility and barbarism. Wherever possible this would be a walled town with the full complement of the material emblems of an English shire: a stone mansion for the Sheriff, 'in everye shyre a comen gayle', and an impressive session house, all of which constituted the essential architecture of the county system. Indeed, the material culture of the shire 'created images of practices that colonists and anglicizers sought to impose on a dread wilderness or, with more difficulty, a dreading and dreaded native population' (*SP Henry VIII* 2: 501; Andrews 1970, pp. 180–2; Noonkester 1997, pp. 261–3, 80).

Early on, St Leger's demands that grantees build houses, mansions, and castles, as well as the forts and garrisons established outside the Pale were all intended to extend civility, order and the common law through 'gentle means'. But the government's determination to extend the Pale to the west beyond Kildare led to the appearance of new settlements, buildings, and farms that in turn accentuated the changing nature of the landscape and the built environment. Anyone receiving land was 'bound to build houses for husbandmen … so as the said countries may be well replenished with houses and inhabitants for the manuring and defense of the same' (Nicholls 1994, vol. 1, p. 216). The houses imagined were to be built of *quality* materials like timber or stone and to be characterized by right angles to express proportion and order. In this way they could offer a visible indication of the control of the landscape reflecting both authority and civilization: houses, like cultivated fields, represented 'a kind of permanence' (Fraser 1990, pp. 35–9; Seed 1995, p. 31). The border may have moved west, but in the end it remained a border, and one that was now characterized by immobile, valuable objects. As these objects were often isolated and commonly surrounded by a people perceived as inhospitable and disgruntled, they were frequently subject to spoil or attack. Garrisoned forts were established in the areas beyond the Pale under Edward VI, but the moment that troops left the area the rebels returned to 'attack

the town of Athy, and burned the town and monastery, and destroyed many persons both English and Irish, both by burning and slaying'. The garrison proved unable to protect the settlers, and any attempts to exact revenge resulted in the Irish attacking and spoiling 'all the poore people that dwelleth about those ffortes to their utter decaie and waste' (Duffy 1989, p. 16; Dunlop 1891, pp. 62–5; PRO SP 63/1/fos 51, 72, September 1559).[5] As an example of Irish resistance to the imposition of English ideals of civilization, the message was unequivocal.

Not surprisingly, the significance and ideology behind the proliferation of artifacts of material culture was readily appreciated and understood by the natives, and their hostile reactions indicate their feelings about the changes to the environment. While impressive examples of native masonry like remodelled monastic buildings, tower-houses, and the primary residences of the great lords still dotted the landscape, stone houses for individuals were relatively rare in Gaelic Ireland and farming was limited to the *churls* whose low status and sedentary lifestyle was roundly despised.[6] Thus, officials regarded both the landscape and material culture in Ireland as evidence of incivility. Henry Sidney described Munster as having 'no house standing nor any manurance of the earth', a fertile area in want of reform (Hogan 1878, p. 156).

While Sidney and others were determined to see what centuries of observation had prepared them to see, the natives also recognized the cultural distinctions represented by material culture. Conn 'Bacach' O'Neill proscribed constructing houses, considering them as little more than temptations to the English invaders. On his death bed he is reported to have laid a ban on any of his descendants who would sow corn or build a house, for 'to build was but for the crow to make a nest to be beaten out of it by the hawk' (Stuart 1900, p. 165, n. 1; Hore 1854, p. 139). Fearflatha Ó Gnímh, hereditary bard of the O'Neills, lamented how the fair territory of his clan 'had been narrowed and its hunting fields disfigured by towers' (Walker 1818, vol. 1, p. 201). But even if the towns and buildings were readily identified – and assaulted – as symbols of the foreigner, William Cecil and others remained convinced they were essential for 'reducing the Irish countries [*sic*] to obedience'. The civility of material culture would help to order the landscape and extend the authority of the Queen's writ. The resulting order would be, in Cecil's words, the surest way to counter the 'inordinate tyranny of the Irish captaines … and to cause them to taste of the sweetness of civil order and justice' (Hore 1854, p. 141).[7] Walls, towns, houses, and the symbolic authority of the Queen's writ were initial manifestations of civility and order.

The relationship between counties, towns, husbandry, and royal officers was acknowledged by both natives and settlers. Whereas Sir Ross MacMahon had willingly accepted an English knighthood, he eventually ran afoul of the government after refusing to admit a sheriff into his country and later murdering Captain Willis who was sent to reduce him to obedience. At the same time, MacMahon forbade his followers to till the land for three years, encouraging them instead to plunder English farms in nearby Louth (Shirley 1845, pp. 81–5; Hore 1854, pp. 144–5). Just as MacMahon viewed tillage as a threat to Irish ways, officials in Ireland regularly encouraged William Cecil in London to measure the success or failure of the *mission civilisatrice* in terms of material culture. Marshal Bagenal, a second generation settler, extolled 'the fortifications and buldinges made there [in Newry]' by his father while condemning the failed colony of Thomas Chatterton for having 'neither house, pile, nor castle left standing in it, but only a little sorry fort, pitched of sods and turves' (Hore 1854, pp. 151, 44). Yet so long as the English persisted in measuring civility by counting the 'fayre Houses, the number of Castles and [the] Inglysh manner of Inclosure of their Groundes,' it should come as no surprise that the natives took every opportunity to destroy such improvements, making sure to leave 'neither house, pile, nor castle [to be] left standing' (Hogan 1878, p. 65). While such structures were evidence of the civilizing process, they also served as convenient, sedentary, and easy targets. If the transformation of Ireland and Irish land use were to succeed, then more puissant examples of civility would be required.

Accordingly, another step in fashioning a terrain of collective occupation was the determination to connect the garrisons, forts, and towns by secure roads. Similarly, many rivers were bridged in an attempt to lessen their value as natural defences and to force the natives to use roads and bridges as a means of bringing them to visibility (Scott 1998, pp. 2–8, 45–58, 73–81). Though expensive, the need for forts, roads, and bridges to link the county town settlements was considered a necessary step for controlling the native population.[8] Edmund Spenser was voicing the assumptions of many of his fellow Irish officials when he insisted that all roads should pass through securely built towns with gates 'so as none should passe but through those townes'. Some of these were to be market towns, 'for there is nothing doeth sooner cause civility in any countrie then many market townes, by reason that people repairing often thither … will daily see and learne civil manners' (Spenser 1997, pp. 156–7; Brady 1989, pp. 26–34).

Consequently, one of Cecil's early plans for the future security of Ulster called for the area to be divided into shires and given a Provincial President to be located in the walled town of Armagh. When Essex came to Ulster in 1574, he too sent Cecil a plot 'for the Townes of Belfast, Coleranie & the Blackwater. All these will be sett on very fyn and playne ground … [and] many settled in the Pale promise to come and build forts' (British Library, Titus BXII fo 453). While Essex died bankrupt in Ireland, by the 1590s Armagh was scattered with stone houses situated on large plots amidst gardens. Significantly, the streets of Armagh were renamed in English, with the roads – for example Monaghan St, Dundalk St, Newry St – all leading from Armagh to secure English centres with walls, forts and garrisons (Stuart 1900, pp. 169–81; Andrews 1970, pp. 182–3). Here again we see the conflation of order with material culture, and civility linked to the conviction that building houses was a fundamental attribute of order and civilized living.

The Irish were well aware of both the strategic and emblematic value of material culture. The region of the Fews, near Armagh, was made 'desolate [so] that it might not yield to the English Armie any succor of relief, either of men, or Victuals for men or horses, or any convenient place for soldiers to garrison in' (Ó Fiach 1963–74, pp. 17–29). The Irish avoided attacking the forts and walled towns, well aware of the futility of that strategy, but any fort abandoned or taken by subterfuge was burned and destroyed rather than occupied by Irish forces. The assault was in no way random, for when Sidney sought to rebuild Athenry after it was burnt by the Burkes, the 'fewe poore Houses were sacked' and 'the newe [oak] Gates of the same [set] on Fier'. Furthermore, the carved heraldic arms of Elizabeth were also destroyed after the Burkes 'beat away the Masons, and other Laborers, (which were workinge on the Wall …) and fought for the Stones, where-upon the Armes were cutt, to have broken them; swearing that none soche should stande in any Wall there' (PRO SP 63/56/6, Sidney to the Council, 1576). A final example from 1577 illustrates well the native hostility to English settler material culture: Rory Óg O'More and O'Connor attacked the town of Naas, burning 'betwne vij or viij C. [7 or 8 score] thatched Howsies,' and they tarried not halfe an Howre in the Towne (Collins 1746, vol. 1, pp. 166–7, Sidney to the Council). Apparently, consuming the structure with fire satiated the native desire for retribution, 'for they neither stoode ther, upon killing or spoyling of any'.

The continuing native hostility to English versions of the built environment and civility took on an ominous (and foreign) tone following

the arrival of Catholic forces at Smerwick. Rory Óg attacked settlers once more, leaving 'not a stake or a scollop in Naas-of-Leinster, or in twenty miles on ever side of it', with the same letter telling the Earl of Desmond that O'More had already burned Naas, Athy, Carlow, Leighlin Bridge, Rathcool, Tassaggart, Kilbride, Ballymore, Kill, and Rathmore (O'Donovan 1858–59, p. 361). Nevertheless, the Desmond Rebellion was put down by 1583 and *Articles* drawn up for the plantation of Munster. There remained a coherent theoretical backbone that ran through the many versions of the *Articles of Plantation*, an ideological spine that conflated cultivation, material culture, and civilization. Indeed, the regulation of nature and the built environment were the plantation's primary focus: the wild Irish were mentioned merely as a potential threat. Revealingly, one early proposal called for 'the building of 7 towns walled, every town a mile about, 7 bridges, and 7 castles' to increase the visibility and ability to control the natives. In doing so, 'the realme wilbe as it were walled in … [and thereafter, I trust] the wast partes of that land may be planted and peopled with good subiectes' (PRO SP 63/114/32, Perrot to Parliament). For the new deputy, the appropriate material culture was the *sine qua non* of a civil society.

The *Articles* and ensuing grants to undertakers revealed a similar devotion to the construction of a built environment that would allow husbandry to emerge and a model community to flourish. The *Articles* provided evidence of the accumulated wisdom from earlier plantation efforts, demanding that all 'suche as ioyne in … [any] undertakinge for the peopling of Munster … [shall be] planted one by the other as near as the sayde [lands] … may be lade together without interuption or intermixture of others'. Similarly, grants to 'Corporation[s allowed them to] erect walls and ditches for fortifying the town … [and] may tax dwellers in the town towards the rebuilding of decayed houses'. In fact, officials were so anxious to have lands enclosed that undertakers were allowed 'with pales ditches or hedges or otherwise to inclose and impark' up to 600 acres for breeding (Nicholls 1994, p. 2, # 4574; Huntington Library, *Ellesmere MSS* 1706, fo 4). But the most important symbols of a settled landscape, the objects most likely to evoke the familiar landscape of England were permanent houses, houses that would soon be surrounded by the cultivated fields, fences, hedges, and ditches associated with husbandry and civility. As a result, the *Articles* required the grantee to 'erect, set up, renew, and establish … so many dwelling houses and habitations as in the whole will make up four score and eleven severall familes, whereof the one must be for the

pryncypall habitacion of the said [grantee]' (Huntington Library, *Ellesmere MSS* 1746, fo 12). If all went according to plan, the twenty-five seignories would generate 2,275 houses and 11,375 settlers. Assuming that the majority would manure and cultivate their holdings, the landscape would be transformed, a settled agricultural society would emerge, and the revenues would begin to pour into the royal coffers. But then English assumptions and plans did not take account of the Irish response.

Sturdy, permanent, buildings would form the foundation of the new society. Material culture was so central to the plan that 'if after seven years the houses were not built' the crown reserved the right to enter and retain the lands 'until the houses be built'. Furthermore, if any houses remained uninhabited for sixty days in one year, 'notice shall be given … and they remaining unoccupied for 6 months may … be entered by the crown' (Huntington Library, *Ellesmere MSS* 1746, fo 17). The only way to recover the lands and houses was to provide occupants for them. It should come as no surprise that the anticipated produce from the new farms would require some type of distribution network. The plan therefore directed that 'there shall be a convenient number of market-towns and corporations erected for … tradesmen and artificers'. The resulting settlements formed tidy squares that enclosed the castle, farms, houses, cottages, courts, and bawns within an ordered and defensible community. The *Articles* for the Munster Plantation included specific details intended to ensure the establishment of these crucial marks of a transformed landscape, a civil settlement and an ordered province. The tidy symmetry of the carefully arranged seignories, the central market towns, the castles, houses, fences, walls, ditches, and enclosed agricultural fields were all meant to signify a cultural and material border excluding the natives from the planters' territory. With the pre-Georgian symmetry of its architecture and portions, the newly refashioned settlement might also serve as a regular reminder of the landscape left behind: the familiar, and civilized, landscape of England.

The carefully planned settlement was designed to bring together English administration, fortifications, towns, houses, and farming to improve both Ireland and the Irish based on English assumptions about civility and the proper way of ordering the built environment and using the land. Officials believed that the orderly settlements of the planters would provide a pattern of 'light and learninge … [and] supplant all wild and idle living', thereby eliminating the native habit of living in 'swine-styes [rather] than houses', a primary cause of their 'so beastly manner of life, and savage condition' (Rowland White

quoted in Canny 1977, fo 90; Spenser 1997, pp. 83–4). But despite the unprecedented building campaign initiated by Cecil, the forts and towns amounted to little more than isolated pockets of civility and order.

Moreover, as palpable evidence of English intervention the material culture of the plantation was undoubtedly resented, and an outbreak of violence in 1598 saw '54 towns altogether burned' and more than 70,000 animals restored to the unenclosed landscape that the natives regarded as their own (PRO SP 63/202iii/113, Note of the Spoils of Ownie O'More, 15 October 1598). A petition from Roscommon listed the 'castles abbeys forts and houses of strength surprised and taken by rebels', and a settler from Drogheda could only guess at the destruction inflicted in the area, 'but much hurt I know they did by reason of the great fires wee beheld' (PRO SP 63/189/59, Humble Petition, May 1596; SP 63/195/38, Edward Moore to the Chancellor, 25 November, 1596). Remarkably, the extensive plantation of civil English husbandmen on hundreds of thousands of acres in Munster was obliterated in less than three months (Sheehan 1982, pp. 14–16, 21–2).

Likewise, the destruction of homes and towns in 1598 also served to increase the Irish awareness of the significance – both symbolic and material – of the most glaring example of the English influence: fields of grain. The reports of destroyed crops are a regular feature in official correspondence, but even in times of peace the Irish were able to communicate their hostility to cultivated fields:

> For an instance of theire malice to the Englishe, an English man did strongly inclose a peece of ground for meadowe, and hee pitched out from thence an exceeding number of stones, and when he came to mowe his grounds he found more stones then he tooke out (for the Irish never went that way, day or night) but threwe in stones from under their mantles. (Huntington Library, *Ellesmere MSS* 1746, fo 12)

The subtle resistance to the spread of civility and cultivation did not mean that the Irish were in any way opposed to taking advantage of the English cultivators' hard work on land the natives considered rightfully theirs. The same settler complained that he lost

> his corne and grasse at night (for like the devell they alwaies wake when wee slept) & when they feede their Cattell on our groundes, a light-footed churle watcheth at our doores, who when he spieth any

body comminge forth he runeth away crying wth a barbarous noyse, wch his Cattell understanding also runn away, so that the poore Englishe findes his grasse or his corne eaten, but findes no eaters. (Huntington Library, *Ellesmere MSS* 1746, fo 12*v*–13)

In the end, visible and material aspects of the plantations in Ireland were like a second front in the war of occupation. For every successful survey of Irish land, there was also the example of the cartographer Richard Bartlett, who was beheaded in Donegal because 'the inhabitants would not have their country discovered'. For all the Sheriffs policing the new shires, there remained lands where it was 'almost sacrilege for any governor of Ireland to look into'. Despite the improvements in law and order there were large areas impassable for any man 'that weares a hatt on his head, or a clok on his back, or that speaks a word of English [to go] without [MacMahon] taking his head from his shoulders' (*CSP Ireland*, 1608–10, 280; PRO SP 63/173/64iv, 27 February 1594). For each house, town, gate or wall erected, or field cleared, an occasional fire or destructive act reminded the planters of their elusive foes. The settlers were convinced that their material culture was a mark of civility, but improvements and change obliterated native history and suppressed indigenous culture. Irish pastoral society found the changed environment espoused by the farmers as foreign as the *gall* themselves. It was the different attitudes to the land and landscape that helped distinguish the English and Irish in Tudor Ireland; indeed, the structured and controlled landscape which resulted from the English ideology that associated civility and cultivation with material culture, increasingly served as a battleground in the century to come.

Notes

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2 The colonial strategies discussed here emanated from English officials in London and Dublin, so most of the evidence presented comes from records and documents in the English archives.
3 Many of these terms were subsumed under the more general description of the natives as *Hibernicus et inimicus noster*, thereby defining the Irish as enemies to the civilized English subjects of the king.

4 For cultural geography see (Darby 1951; Sauer 1925).

5 For the influence of Machiavelli's *Discourses* on attitudes to garrisons and colonial theory in Tudor Ireland (see Jardine and Grafton 1990; Jardine 1990).

6 The English used *churl* to describe natives of low status who were not members of the warrior elite, most often husbandmen or unarmed retainers who followed raiders in the hope of plunder.

7 Bagenal's *Description* is annotated throughout in Cecil's distinctive hand.

8 An excellent example of the emphasis on bridges, roads, forts and towns can be found in the Earl of Essex's 'Opinion for the Government and Reformacion of Ulster', British Library, ADD MSS 48015, fos 314–45*v*. For a mason's plan for bridge, its castle, drawbridge and fortifications, see (Hore 1911, p. 406).

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4

A Settled Question?
Charles, Lord Cornwallis, the Loss of America and the Mind of Empire

Dermot Dix

Introduction

The loss of the prized American colonies of settlement was the first crisis of British settler colonialism. To explore the reverberations of this loss and its impact on imperial thinking and strategies, this chapter examines the letters of the first Marquis of Cornwallis, who surrendered at Yorktown but who also, after spending seven years in India as Governor-General, rode the storm of Ireland's 1798 Rebellion and steered the Act of Union through the doomed Irish Parliament in 1800. Disillusioned with both of America's divided settler factions (loyalists and patriots alike), Cornwallis also held a generally poor view of European groups in British India and, later, of Irish Protestants for what he saw as their misguided treatment of Ireland's Catholic population. Using Cornwallis's career and views as lenses, this chapter seeks to address the following questions: What lessons did those at the heart of empire draw from the American context, and did these lessons help shape the response by the British state to the 1798 Rebellion in Ireland? Did the loss of the American settler colonies thus in some sense affect directions taken by the Irish (both settler and 'native') and their rulers into the nineteenth century? Did these late eighteenth-century crises affect the ways in which the very identity of the British empire was imagined in the century that followed?

America

Lord Cornwallis arrived in New York in 1776. His votes in the House of Lords had made him appear something of a friend to America in the 1760s; indeed, Cornwallis was one of just five peers (as against 125) to vote against the 1766 Declaratory Act, which claimed the right to

legislate for the colonies in all cases. The American argument was that since the colonies had their own representative assemblies, Parliament had no authority to legislate for them directly, and it would appear that Cornwallis was in that very small minority of British parliamentarians (in either House) who accepted this argument. The conjunction of Cornwallis's friendly view of the American colonists (before 1775 at least) with his later exasperation at Irish Protestant bigotry against Catholicism, as well as with his frequent railing against 'jobbery' among the ranks of East India Company officials in India (see Dix 2006), presents a side of Cornwallis that, somewhat unexpectedly, echoes a number of the important positions of the Irish political thinker Edmund Burke (1729–97).

Although Burke served in the Rockingham ministry that pushed through the Declaratory Act that Cornwallis had opposed, the differences between the two on this issue are much slighter than they appear. The Declaratory Act was a face-saving measure to accompany the repeal of the much-hated (in America) Stamp Act, the first measure to allow direct taxation of the American colonists by the British Parliament. Burke and Cornwallis agreed on the more important consideration that the Stamp Act (passed in 1765 by the Grenville ministry) had been a serious blunder and had unnecessarily incited huge anger and opposition in America. In his opposition to the Declaratory Act in 1766, Cornwallis appears even more of a friend to America than does Burke; but on the broad spectrum of opinion their positions are close, in the sense that both favoured a light touch in dealing with the colonies. By 1775, the year Burke made a famous speech in Parliament in favour of conciliation with the American colonists, they seemed closer still.

A case for an overlap of views between Cornwallis and Burke in two other contexts – India and Ireland – can also be made. Burke stingingly dismissed the Anglo-Irish Ascendancy as a 'plebeian aristocracy' that treated the Irish Catholic majority oppressively, a view that accords with Cornwallis's disgust at Irish Protestant bigotry. Looking to India: Burke spent ten years prosecuting a case against Warren Hastings, Governor-General of the British possessions in India, for – in Burke's view – presiding over a system of corrupt rule whereby many British officials' chief occupation appeared to be self-enrichment. This position coincides with Cornwallis's oft-expressed intention to stamp out corruption among East India Company servants in India, though it must be said that in the wider realm of policy Cornwallis himself presided over at least one major 'reform' – the Permanent Settlement of Bengal's land revenue system – that would prove disastrous for the Bengal peas-

antry into the nineteenth century (see Dix 2006, p. 202). Still, Cornwallis's and Burke's views can be seen to overlap to a considerable extent in three major contexts – America, India, and Ireland.

After hostilities had started in 1775 between the American colonists and the British army, Cornwallis the parliamentarian, with friendly views towards the American colonists, turned into Cornwallis the military man, who intended to do his part to stamp out rebellion and help restore the colonies to their 'proper relation' to the mother country (Wickwire and Wickwire 1980, p. 41). After serving under both Generals William Howe and Sir Henry Clinton in the northern theatre, Cornwallis gained an independent command in the south in June 1780. Cornwallis had a lot to say about the population of the Carolinas, and – bearing in mind the work of historians who have worked on the subject of emigration to the colonies in this period – one might question about whom Cornwallis is talking here. The historian Kerby Miller claims that between the late 1600s and 1815, some 400,000, mainly male, mainly Ulster Presbyterian Irish, moved to America, predominantly to small frontier communities in the southern colonies (quoted in Breen 2006, p. 277); Bernard Bailyn argues that in the period 1760–75, over 55,000 Protestant Irish emigrated to America (Bailyn 1986, p. 9). We should bear these statistics in mind when we inch towards conclusions about the thoughts of metropolitans such as Cornwallis.

The war ministry's southern strategy rested on the conviction that much of the population of the Carolinas retained its allegiance toward the Crown and merely awaited a decent show of force by the British in order to re-establish the imperial connection. Cornwallis used the show-of-force theory as his main operating principle in the Carolinas, believing that, once the regulars had demonstrated sufficient force to encourage the loyalists and to awe the patriots in an area, the loyalist militia would prove strong enough to police the area independently. Cornwallis expounded this theory at length in one of his March 1781 dispatches to Lord George Germain, the Secretary of State for the Colonies (Stevens 1888, i, pp. 354–62) and also in the pamphlet he wrote after the war in an effort to exonerate himself of blame for his defeat at Yorktown, which essentially lost the war for Britain (Stevens 1888, ii, p. 65).

In his early days in the south, in 1780, Cornwallis sympathized with the plight of 'our poor distressed friends' who had suffered and were continuing to suffer at the hands of the patriots. He admired 'the patience and fortitude with which those unhappy people (North Carolina loyalists, in this case) bear the most oppressive and cruel tyranny that ever was

exercized over any country' (Cornwallis 1859, i, pp. 54, 74). Disillusionment, however, set in quickly. He had received from loyalists quite a number of letters pledging support; but areas that he had believed contained reservoirs of loyalism yielded all too few militiamen to the cause. He came to see the Carolina loyalist population as weak and unfaithful. He thought the militia riddled with 'supineness' and 'pusillanimity' and complained to the Loyalist Moses Kirkland that,

> if those who say they are our friends will not stir, I cannot defend every man's house from being plundered; and I must say that when I see a whole settlement running away from twenty or thirty robbers, I think they deserve to be robbed. (Cornwallis 1859, i, p. 69)

In November 1780 he wrote that he hoped the North Carolina loyalists would 'behave like men', but feared that they would prove 'as dastardly and pusillanimous as our friends to the southward'. The North Carolinians would disappoint him: a month later he wrote that '[o]ur friends here [Winnsboro, North Carolina] are so stupid that I can get no intelligence' (Cornwallis 1859, i, pp. 67–8, 69, 74). Frustration here yields to outright exasperation. Nearly twenty years later, in Ireland, Cornwallis would voice similar views about the misguidedness of 'friends' (Irish Protestants): according to Cornwallis, in both contexts (though in contrasting manners), loyalists threatened the security of the empire. In America, the patriot rebellion was victorious (largely owing to Loyalist weakness, according to Cornwallis). In Ireland the United Irishmen would fail in their attempted rebellion; and, in his remaining time in Ireland (he left in 1801), Cornwallis would expend considerable effort to curb what he saw as the more foolish instincts of Irish loyalists.

Cornwallis saw Carolina loyalists as weak, passive, and stupid, but he saw the Patriots very differently. 'Atrocity' is the keyword here (Cornwallis 1859, i, pp. 67, 71, 73, 75, 76). The behaviour of the patriot backwoodsmen after their rout of Ferguson's unit at King's Mountain appalled him; the victors had butchered prisoners and defiled Ferguson's dead body. Cornwallis told Clinton in December 1780 that he had made arrangements to encourage Native American attacks on backwoods settlements such as Watoga and Holstein in order to force rebel 'backmountain men', to return to their defence; he added that '[i]f the account given of the behaviour of the Indians … is true, their humanity is a striking contrast to the shocking barbarities committed by the mountaineers' (Cornwallis 1859, i, p. 76). It is safe to assume that he does not intend this as praise

for Native Americans; he is surely using their accepted status as 'savage' in order to make his point about the backwoods patriots.

Patriot savagery explains loyalist weakness in Cornwallis's accounts. He reported to Germain that 'many of our principal friends' in North Carolina had been 'confined in dungeons, loaded with irons, and several … put to death'. The patriots' 'rigour' had successfully 'intimidated those on whose good-will and ability to give the most accurate intelligence we had the greatest reason to depend' (Stevens 1888, i, pp. 490–1). Cornwallis could not deny patriot successes. Without exactly respecting them – his letters frequently complain of their deceitfulness in breaking the terms of their surrender paroles (Cornwallis 1859, i, pp. 60–1) – Cornwallis conceded, grudgingly, that southern patriots came close to making worthy enemies. He told Clinton he had little praise for the patriot militia, but had to admit 'the list of British officers and soldiers killed and wounded by them since last June, proves but too fatally that they are not wholly contemptible' (Cornwallis 1859, i, p. 102).

Patriot 'rigour' aside, loyalists demonstrated innate weakness. Even after the regulars had produced a show of force in a given area, the loyalist population still seemed too weak to hold its own; this weakness puzzled and frustrated Cornwallis. In one letter he wrote dryly: 'I have too often observed, that when a Storm threatens, our friends disappear' (Stevens 1888, i, pp. 489–90). Cornwallis could not see that loyalists needed more concrete assistance – in the form of training and arms – and not merely the morale-boosts allegedly born of shows of British force. Cornwallis moved on to Virginia without having come close to re-establishing British control in the Carolinas, and suffered his infamous defeat at Yorktown in 1781. According to him, British arms failed in the American south (especially in the Carolinas), not because of his own or other Britons' mistakes, but rather owing to the faults of a portion of the settler population, which failed to curb the wilder instincts of the remainder (Stevens 1888, i, p. 80).

If the white population attracted a great deal of Cornwallis's attention, we cannot say the same of other groups he encountered in America. Aside from the one reference in his letters quoted above, he does not refer to Native Americans. Furthermore, while Cornwallis must have come into almost daily contact with slaves in the area round Charleston (a grouping which represented a very significant proportion of the population, at least in lowland areas), his letters contain not a single reference to them. Neither did he have any comment to offer on American planter culture. In this exact period a lively discourse in Britain (noted with alarm by Benjamin Franklin), portrayed American colonists,

especially southern slave-owners, as degenerates. This was a discourse that went hand-in-glove with high-level suspicions of East India Company corruption; evidenced, for example, by the Parliamentary examinations into the careers of Clive and Hastings (the latter presided over by none other than Edmund Burke). Cornwallis would later have a good deal to say about corruption in the East India Company, but he was silent about American slavery – both the slaves themselves and what the prominent pamphleteer James Otis disdained as the 'dissolute "creolean planter" – a despot schooled by slavery in "ferocity, cruelty and brutal barbarity"' (Otis quoted in Greene 1998, p. 226). Evidently, despite having moved a long way from the days of his vote against the Declaratory Act, which he deemed so unfair on America, and despite his determination to crush the rebellion, Cornwallis spent no time decrying the malaise in white southern culture claimed by many of his contemporaries.

A number of conclusions may be drawn about Cornwallis's assessments of the people he encountered in America. It is apparent from his letters that he navigated the situations in which he found himself by producing a typology to explain the groups he encountered; collective verbal portraiture emerges as his favoured mode of presentation. His understanding of the Carolinas and their settlers appears very neat with lines starkly drawn: craven, treacherous loyalists face barbarous, deceitful patriots. Here, Cornwallis's rather subjective approach is evident: his assessments of the groups he encountered depended on his judgements of how these groups affected the achievement of his purpose in fighting and winning a war, a purpose which placed no premium on ambiguousness.

Further, Cornwallis's views about patriot and loyalist groups do not merely set them up in a clearly-defined opposition; they imply some very basic assumptions he had about his own world. Certainly the standard he expected of British troops precluded them from exhibiting the foibles of the local population: weakness, violence, and dubious trustworthiness. The twin factors of context and function help explain the simplicity of these conclusions. Assessments of American patriots and loyalists – formed in the context of a rebellion, when few considerations seemed important other than those related to the struggle – carry a parallel minimalism in Cornwallis's implicit construction and understanding of his own world. In the American context, Cornwallis saw all agents involved in the conflict – patriots, loyalists, his own kind – in the starkest possible terms. Back in 1766, his vote against the Declaratory Act had shown Cornwallis to have had enormous patience

in regard to American opinion; by 1780–81, that patience had long since been lost. In the Ireland of 1798, though the context here was that of a rebellion too, his portraits would assume greater sophistication.

Ireland

Britain's military difficulties during the American war, starting with their defeat at Saratoga (1777) and substantially exacerbated by Cornwallis's defeat at Yorktown (1781), produced a crisis in Anglo-Irish relations. The opportunistic, Irish Protestant 'nationalist' response has been well documented. The American-inspired armed Irish Volunteer movement (mainly Presbyterian in Ulster, but with significant Anglican support and even Catholic approval) was aware of the mother-country's embarrassment in America and chose this as the moment to strike in order to extract concessions from the British Parliament, such as the 1782 constitutional adjustment whereby the Irish Parliament attained something close to legal parity. These concessions rankled in Westminster and help to set the scene for Cornwallis's time in Ireland.

Cornwallis arrived in Dublin in 1798 and, at first, the 1782 'adjustment' would have been far from his mind: the country was in the midst of its most far-reaching and most violent rebellion. With the loss of America's settler colonies, Cornwallis worried a great deal in the summer of 1798 about the possibility of losing Ireland too. In the short term, he abhorred the bloodshed of the reprisals after the United Irish Rebellion. For the long term, he saw religious bigotry as a severe hindrance to tranquility and security on the island.

Anglo-Irish Protestant grandees contented themselves with the belief that the Rebellion had domestic causes. Cornwallis saw it otherwise: he felt sure that the French deserved primary responsibility. Within weeks of his arrival in Dublin, he told the Home Secretary, the Duke of Portland, that he intended to 'suppress the folly which has been too prevalent in this quarter, of substituting the word *Catholicism* instead of Jacobinism, as the foundation of the present rebellion' (Cornwallis 1859, ii, p. 355). He needed no direct experience of Ireland to learn what he had known for years – that the French, bent on exporting their hideous revolution at all costs, filled the villainous roles. He wrote of

> that deep-laid conspiracy to revolutionise Ireland on the principles of France, which was originally formed, and by wonderful assiduity brought nearly to maturity, by men who had no thought of religion but to destroy it, and who knew how to turn the passions and prejudices of the different sects to the advancement of their

> horrible plot for the introduction of that most dreadful of all evils, a Jacobin revolution. (Cornwallis 1859, ii, p. 358)

Here he is again in a Burkean register, this time railing against the French Revolution and its contagiousness in the Irish context. For Cornwallis, Protestants' prejudice prevented them from understanding what he saw as the true causes of the Rebellion. Furthermore, their diagnosis offended not only because of its inaccuracy, but also because of the danger that it would prove self-fulfilling.

With the French as the true villains, Cornwallis could see the native supporters of the United Irish movement merely as their dupes – something, he felt, the Protestant clique could not see or would not admit. Cornwallis knew about the violence perpetrated by some of the rebels (for example, in Wexford), yet he still thought of the rebels as somehow both pathetic and goaded; he saw them as 'cruel murderers' and, at the same time, as 'deluded wretches' (Cornwallis 1859, ii, pp. 355, 361). We can extract sense from these seemingly contradictory assessments only by factoring in Cornwallis's thoughts about the Protestant clique, which he considered bigoted and vengeful. The Protestants, he wrote, 'are blinded by their passions and prejudices, talk of nothing but strong measures, and arrogate to themselves the exclusive knowledge of a country, of which, from their mode of governing it, they have, in my opinion, proved themselves totally ignorant' (Cornwallis 1859, ii, pp. 361, 404). Cornwallis felt that Protestant ignorance had had a terrible cost.

To Cornwallis, order in Ireland faced a constant threat of subversion: albeit with misgivings, he allowed martial law to remain in force for most of his time there. He arrived to hear of 'feeble outrages, burnings, and murders … still committed by the Rebels'. He found, though, with horror, that many of the 'principal persons of this country' were demanding summary retribution for all those implicated. The militia and yeomanry forces, commanded in many cases by these same 'principal persons' or their relatives, happily obliged, dispatching many innocents in the process. '[M]urder', Cornwallis declared, 'appears to be their favourite pastime', and he feared for 'any man in a brown coat' found too close to an engagement (Cornwallis 1859, ii, pp. 369, 358, 355).

The faults of timidity and passivity, which Cornwallis had ascribed to loyalist groups in America and India, did not plague him in the Ireland of 1798. The defence forces there went to the opposite extreme. 'The yeomanry', he reported,

> are in the style of the Loyalists in America, only much more numerous and powerful, and a thousand times more ferocious. These men

have saved the country, but they now take the lead in rapine and murder. The Irish militia … follow closely on the heels of the yeomanry in murder and every kind of atrocity. (Cornwallis 1859, ii, p. 369)

Their ferocity, however, only reflected weak resistance on the part of the rebels. Cornwallis believed that the Irish militia would have collapsed in the face of serious opposition: he described them as 'totally without discipline, contemptible before the enemy', and (echoing the judgement of his predecessor as Commander-in-Chief in Ireland, Sir Ralph Abercromby) 'only formidable to their friends' (Cornwallis 1859, ii, pp. 357, 413). It seems that the Irish defence forces reminded Cornwallis of the American loyalists. At first, the American analogy looks inadequate; indeed, Cornwallis himself appeared to have misgivings, and immediately qualified the comparison – '… in the style of the loyalists in America, *only much more numerous and powerful, and a thousand times more ferocious*' (my emphasis). However the analogy does offer some insights into Cornwallis's reading of the Irish situation. Reference to American loyalists suggests a group seen as weak, supine, pusillanimous. If Irish loyalists manifested similar characteristics, then perhaps Cornwallis saw their own weakness as the explanation for their vengefulness.

Cornwallis defined Irish loyalism not only in the context of the Rebellion, but also in the context of the proposed Act of Union. He portrayed opponents to the measure as at best misguided or irresponsible, at worst downright disloyal. Late in 1798, Cornwallis wrote that 'from the folly, obstinacy, and gross corruption which pervade every corner of this island, […] it is impossible that it can be saved from destruction' (Cornwallis 1859, iii, p. 16). Cornwallis complained: 'my occupation is now of the most unpleasant nature, negotiating and jobbing with the most corrupt people under heaven' (Cornwallis 1859, iii, p. 102).

In December 1798 Cornwallis told Lieutenant-General Harris: 'I had my difficulties in India; but they were trifling compared with those which attend the wretched situation which has been imposed upon me' in Ireland (Cornwallis 1859, iii, p. 26). No prior experience had tested him emotionally as did his time in Ireland. As early as the winter of 1798–99, admitting that his 'thoughts may be more gloomy, as a black north-east wind is blowing with great violence, and darkening the hemisphere', he predicted destruction for Ireland (Cornwallis 1859, iii, p. 16). 'For myself,' he wrote, 'I see no hope of deliverance, but feel that I am doomed to waste the remainder of my life, and sacrifice the

little reputation which the too partial opinion of the world had allowed me, in this wretched country, where nothing can prosper' (Cornwallis 1859, iii, p. 56). He yearned for his 'deliverance' all the more keenly when the Union seemed near (Kent Archives Office: U24, C3).

Cornwallis hoped to leave the Protestant clique too weak to rule Ireland after Parliament would carry the Act of Union. He also regarded the Union to be an insufficient solution to Ireland's almost chronic instability without full Catholic Emancipation. Prominent Protestants opposed Emancipation tooth and nail. They argued that Irish Catholics would never be good subjects to a Protestant Government. Cornwallis, on the other hand, felt sure that Catholics would prove good subjects once they 'feel themselves no longer the objects of suspicion, and are relieved from their present mortifying and degrading exclusions' and his final letters from Dublin rarely omitted a sentence in favour of Emancipation (Cornwallis 1859, iii, pp. 331, 337). In fact, William Pitt, the Prime Minister, agreed with Cornwallis on the issue of Emancipation and resigned when he failed to secure its passage. George III himself proved the crucial stumbling block, something Cornwallis realized late in his tenure; he wrote in November 1800 that the 'conduct of a great personage, with respect to this Country, is weak and narrow-minded' (National Army Museum, Ms. 6602–45).

Conclusion

This chapter asks questions about the directions taken by the British empire as it learned its lessons from settler colonial crises in America and Ireland, and about the ways in which the empire was newly imagined into the nineteenth century. Some have argued for a shifting connotation of 'Britishness' in precisely Cornwallis's period. Linda Colley has written of a crisis – a 'massive strain on the lives, nerves and confidence of the British elite' brought on by defeat in America together with war against revolutionary France. She instances a remarkable number of untimely deaths: nineteen members of parliament known to have committed suicide between 1790 and 1820, more than twenty lapsed into insanity, and a 'heightened, almost violent emotionalism on the floor of the House of Commons' (Colley 1992, p. 151). But she also writes:

> In the wake of the loss of the American colonies … Celtic elites (from Scotland, Wales and to a lesser extent Ireland) amalgamated with their English counterparts far more extensively than before, reinvigorating the power structure of the British empire and forging a unified

and genuinely British ruling class that endured until the twentieth century. (Colley 1992, p. 156)

The direct connections between the loss of America and the emergence of this new apparatus or power structure are of course much harder to draw out, and the entire process is more complex than can be teased out through an examination of just one individual. However, Cornwallis found himself in key contexts at key junctures, and his career and views, taken together, offer a premonitory sense of what was in store for the empire and its subject people into the nineteenth century and, perhaps, beyond.

According to Cornwallis – and others – American settlers showed themselves to be worthless: the loyalists were scarcely more acceptable than the 'savage, barbarous' patriots, though Cornwallis never went so far as to state that the empire was a better one without them (Josiah Tucker's was an almost solitary voice advancing that position, arguing correctly that valuable American trade would be retained after separation). In the Irish context, Cornwallis, in guiding through the Union of 1800, abolished the separation of Irish and British kingdoms. Aside from being appalled at the bigotry of Irish Protestant settlers, Cornwallis saw them as not fully trustworthy. The lessons of Irish Volunteer activity would not have been lost on him, and the memory of Irish Protestants with a proverbial gun to the head of the British government during the American War would in all likelihood have remained vivid. He made them pay in the sense that they lost their legislative parity and independence. This cosy settlement would be destroyed during and after the Famine, when it became patently clear that Ireland was nowhere near to achieving an equal footing to its powerful neighbour; but from 1800 Ireland was legally deemed not to be a colony of settlement – because, constitutionally, it was not a colony at all. Was this a conscious policy choice? Perhaps it was simply the metropole's opportunity to undo the concessions of 1782. Thomas Bartlett argues that after the loss of the thirteen colonies in 1783, the anomalous situation of Ireland's Parliament came starkly into relief – it could no longer hide in the 'crazy-paving of legislatures' in the empire, and the anomaly could no longer be tolerated (Bartlett 1998, p. 269). Still, the shift was momentous.

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5
International Anti-Colonialism: The Fenian Invasions of Canada

Robert J.C. Young

I

Even before the advent of the revisionist historians, there were those who spoke of the Fenian invasions of Canada of 1866–71 as little more than a comic opera scenario still waiting to be set to music. Although there is one plaque commemorating the invasions still to be found in Toronto, the Fenian invasions can hardly be said to have achieved legendary status in the annals of Irish nationalism. Yet considered from a broader perspective of the history of Irish and other forms of anti-colonialism, they were, I want to argue, far more important than they are generally taken to be.

While anti-colonialism has been extensively studied in postcolonial studies, for the most part attention has been concentrated on the kind of anti-colonialism displayed by the independence movements after World War II. These movements usually consisted of struggles, peaceful or violent, by indigenous populations against the colonial regime and, where necessary, against the colonial settler population, as for example in the case of Algeria. The influence of Frantz Fanon has ensured that this has become the dominant way in which people now think of anti-colonial struggle.

However, this was the particular situation of twentieth-century anti-colonialism. In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, much anti-colonialism took a rather different form, which I would characterize as 'colonial anti-colonialism', or 'diasporic anti-imperialism' – that is, where the immigrant population of the settler colonies were themselves agents and activists resisting the imperial centre. This was not always a form that fits our modern paradigms of resistance easily – often the feeling of anti-imperialism developed because the centre wasn't imperialist enough,

lacking enthusiasm for territorial expansion (as was the case in Australia and Southern Africa), or because the metropolitan government or influential political factions insisted on interfering with their namby-pamby liberal concerns such as the well-being or protection of the native populations (the anti-Slave Trade movement, the Aborigines Protection Society). The attempt by the Organisation de l'armée secrète (OAS) of Algeria in the early 1960s to stage a coup against – as they saw it – a recalcitrant and insufficiently supportive French government, was perhaps the most spectacular example of the desire of colonists to challenge and transform the attitudes of the metropolitan government.

So in one sense, colonial anti-colonialism paradoxically was not necessarily anti-colonialist as such, according to our modern ways of thinking. It resembled an earlier kind of anti-colonial settler colonialism, the enlightenment republican revolutions of the USA, Latin America, and arguably Wolfe Tone's rebellion of 1798. I want to suggest though that the Fenian invasions of Canada were different again, and mark a new, but ultimately decisive stage in the development of modern anti-colonialism, the final stage of anti-colonialism perhaps, as yet unsurpassed, namely its transformation to an international arena, a global domain in which anti-colonial activism is actually performed and played out. As with most forms of anti-colonialism, this strategy was invented by the Irish.[1]

II

Already by 1866, pacifying Ireland no longer meant just pacifying the Irish in Ireland. For unexpectedly, the English were beginning to suffer the long-term effects of the emigration that had been forced on the Irish population for the past three decades at least. From the English point of view, Irish emigration was seen in relation to that of Great Britain in general. While absentee landlords were generally glad to have their lands vacated in Ireland, attitudes towards emigration were otherwise ambivalent. In times of economic slump, it was considered the most benign solution of the various stark Malthusian alternatives. At other times, however, there was sometimes a concern that too many people were leaving the country. At its worst, emigration from Great Britain during the nineteenth century constituted an exodus: a mass defection of millions of people from the state. What made it more alarming was that the vast bulk of them went not to British colonies but to the United States, which was then perceived neither as an ally nor even as a friendly power. By 1844, the United States was receiving 60 per cent of British emigrants (the total number during the classic period of

emigration (1815–1930) has been estimated at 18,700,000) (Richards 2004).

It was only gradually, from the 1830s onwards, as a result of the writings and campaigns of Horton, Napier, Wakefield, Buller and others, that economists and colonial secretaries began to link the issue of emigration with the empire, and tried to coordinate the questions of overpopulation and 'spontaneous' emigration with colonization. In 1847, the *Times* put forward a novel idea of startling simplicity: why not turn all these emigrants into colonists? 'Let the emigrant cease to feel that he is forsaking his country, and all that he holds dear. Make Canada a county of England. Steam has brought it closer than Scotland at the era of the union' (*Times*, 3 June 1847, p. 4).

In the years that followed, settler colonialism would gradually become an instrument of government policy. However, by the 1860s the appearance of Fenians in the US and Australia meant that politicians in Britain were given something new to worry about: the possible effect of the colonies, and the former colony of the USA, becoming full of English-hating Irish – settler colonialism with a vengeance. Already in 1847, in the context of a discussion of transportation to Australia (the transported 'convicts' were of course very often Irish nationalists), the *Times* had raised the spectre of a colony bent on a Frankenstinian revenge on its creator, threatening England with a modern-day version of the fall of Rome:

> should a great piratical confederacy spring from the south and spread over the oceans, the archipelagos, and the labyrinths which those islands so entirely command; – should the fair peninsulas of Asia, should Africa, and South America be threatened by a new form of Anglo-Saxon audacity and ambition, returning upward from the farthest south, the horrors of the northern hordes and the fall of Rome might then be repeated; and England herself might in process of ages fall by the hands of her own outcast offspring. (*Times*, 14 June 1847, p. 4)

England destroyed by her own colonial outcasts: the remedy for this alarming spectre of vengeful Irish colonies was first to end transportation, secondly, to try, belatedly, to include the Irish amongst the English by rethinking the exclusivity of the ethnicity of Englishness,[2] and thirdly to try to reroute emigration to the British colonies where loyalty to the Crown could be cultivated. What travellers to the United States consistently noticed was that while the Irish abroad remained

Irish in their sense of loyalty and nationality, it was very different with the English, who once they had emigrated rapidly became Canadians or Americans and lost their English identity altogether. On the one hand, therefore, the prospect of powerful colonies full of English-hating Fenians significantly changed perceptions of the powerlessness of Ireland, while on the other hand, the continued loyalty of the Irish abroad to their mother country encouraged the English to try to emulate it for themselves amongst their own emigrants.

With the Fenians apparently plotting against him all over the world, the Englishman at home became increasingly apprehensive, feeling as if 'some impalpable and vindictive being was coming against him, gathering forces against him in its vague world' (Joyce 1916, pp. 221–2). Like most nightmares, the demon was largely conjured out of his own imagination. For 'Fenianism' was in many ways a spectre of the British Establishment's – particularly the *Times* – own creation. It had been John Mahoney who created them, naming them after the legendary Fianna warriors in 1859. The term was largely popularized, however, by the British press, particularly the *Times* newspaper, as John O'Leary noted at the time in an article in the *Irish People* (9 September 1865).[3] Having demonized Irish politicians as Celts since the time of O'Connell, the *Times* took up the new term to create a new bogey – the revolutionary republican nationalist committed to armed struggle, threatening anarchy across the land. Rather as with many later anti-colonial nationalists, or later still communists, the term was useful as a catch-all name that could be applied to anyone or any group suspected of subversion. As McGee notes: 'By 1865 … the Irish public was fully conditioned, from a Tory as well as a Catholic perspective, to view any disturbances that might take place in Ireland as the work of the "Fenians", and this is exactly what happened' (McGee 2005, p. 33).

In this context, an assessment of the Fenian invasions of Canada in their own terms, as military events of very minor importance in their own right, misses the point that their main significance was in the alarm that they produced in public perception in England, particularly through the nation's most powerful public organ, the *Times* newspaper.

No power in England is more felt, more feared, or more obeyed. What you read in the morning in that journal, you shall hear in the evening in all society. It has ears every where, and its information is earliest, completest, and surest. It has risen, year by year, and victory by victory, to its present authority …. It has its own history and famous trophies. In 1820, it adopted the cause of Queen Caroline,

and carried it against the king. It adopted a poor-law system, and almost alone lifted it through. When Lord Brougham was in power, it decided against him, and pulled him down. It declared war against Ireland, and conquered it. (Emerson 1923 [1956], pp. 155–6)

In 1856 Ralph Waldo Emerson spoke a little too soon in *English Traits* when he announced that the *Times,* having declared war against Ireland, had vanquished it. Two years later, in March 1858, James Stephens was to form the Irish Republican Brotherhood in Dublin, committed to win Irish independence through violent insurrection. This secret revolutionary fraternal organization was soon augmented by the formation of the National Brotherhood of Saint Patrick, through which the IRB could proselytize and organize openly. The following year John Mahoney founded the Emmet Monument Association in New York. By 1865 Mahoney was claiming that the Fenian Brotherhood in exile had a membership of over 200,000 (*Times*, 18 October 1865, p. 11).

During the American Civil War (1861–65), sympathetic British treatment of the Confederates meant that American politicians in the North made regular threats to invade Canada either in retribution or, should the South succeed in secession, in compensation for perceived British hostility. During the Civil War, as relations between the North and Great Britain crept to the brink of war with the Trent Affair of 1861, there had been much talk of an invasion, which had been discouraged by Lincoln who had remarked 'one war at a time, gentlemen!' (Cited in Dilke 1868, p. 258). With the formation of the Irish Brigade as a division within the Federal Army in 1861 (a gesture not lost on the British), by the end of the Civil War many Fenians – in contrast to the IRB in Ireland – had gained military experience (McGee 2005, p. 33). They then threatened to invade Canada in their own right – no longer with respect to issues relating to the Civil War, but as a means of demanding Irish independence. In 1866, the raids began, and though unsuccessful, they continued through to 1871.

It is customary for most historians to dismiss the historical significance of the five Fenian invasions of Canada that took place between 1866 and 1871, even if they were powerful enough to effect the creation of Canada itself. In 1812, the US had sought to exploit Britain's vulnerability during the Napoleonic wars by invading Canada (for which the British gave due retribution, burning the White House), and for much of the nineteenth century the memory and prospect remained a threat to Britain's North American colony. The Fenian army was designed to exploit the legacy of the tense relations between Britain and the United States with respect to

Canada, and ideally to precipitate them into a war which would bring about the liberation of Ireland.

III

The detailed events of the Fenian invasions of Canada have been thoroughly charted by Hereward Senior (1978, 1991); I will therefore limit myself to a short account to remind the reader of the historical scenario. The Fenian strategy was simple, but by no means absurd. First of all, the Canadians, despite US threats to invade during the Civil War, had steadfastly refused to arm themselves, partly on the grounds that the long border with the US was indefensible. In 1864 the *Times* fulminated:

> The British Government and people have a right to ask how it is that in this time of peril on the American continent, when the Federal States swarm with soldiers that are to be counted by the hundred thousand, and when there is at least a possibility that Great Britain may be dragged into a quarrel with the Federal Government, the Canadians have done so little towards their own defence …? (22 October 1864, p. 9)

British North America, as it was then called, was effectively a collection of separate states, so an invasion of one state would not necessarily involve all the others. Given the highlighted vulnerability of these disparate territories, as soon as the Civil War was over, the Fenians themselves started to threaten to invade in their own right. There were two strategic possibilities that would follow: either to seize control of the key cities, which would then be released in exchange for the freedom of Ireland, or to effect that liberation themselves by embarking with an invasion armada from Halifax. These plans were well publicized, together with their laying up of the many surplus arms that were left over after the American Civil War. A letter to the editor of the *Times*, of January 1865, from Henry Fitz Herbert of Springfield, Massachusetts, for example, warned that:

> One of the most extraordinary developments of the intense hostility which exists among Irishmen in America to the mother country [England] is strongly illustrated by the formation in the States of the extensive organization known as the Fenian Brotherhood. This organization … now numbers over half-a-million of men, and has at

its disposal over $1,000,000, and already forms a powerful element in American politics. (17 January 1865, p. 4)

The organization, Fitz Herbert claimed, 'has spread almost universally throughout the Northern States, and even gained a foothold in Canada'. A call for a general convention of Fenians to be held at Cincinnati, Ohio, he wrote, had announced that 'the fires of liberty will be rekindled upon the altars of Ireland, and Irishmen from all parts of the world will be flocking back to the Emerald Isle to right the many centuries of British wrong'. In May 1865, the *Times*, in an extraordinary gesture designed to instill maximum alarm, under the heading 'Ireland for the Irish' reprinted an entire page from the *New York Herald* on the Fenian movement, its organization and objectives. Given that the *New York Herald*, scarcely less than the *Irish World*, was effectively a Fenian newspaper, it is bizarre that the *Times* deliberately chose to publicize Fenian propaganda by printing it on an extra half sheet of its own. The initial headings give a good flavour of the tone of the publication:

BRITISH 'NEUTRALITY' COMING HOME TO ROOST
THE FENIANS AT HOME AND ABROAD
SIXTY-FIVE THOUSAND FENIANS ARMING AND DRILLING IN IRELAND
CANADIAN MOVEMENTS & ORGANIZATION A MYSTERY
FULL PARTICULARS OF THE ORDER IN THE UNITED STATES
LOYAL TO THE LAND OF THEIR ADOPTION, LOYAL TO THE LAND
OF THEIR LINEAGE
FENIAN CONTRIBUTIONS TO OUR ARMY AND NAVY
…
THE FENIANS, OR 'I.R.B.' IN IRELAND
THEIR MILITARY AND SPY-PROOF ORGANIZATION
'They shall not fail, the Fenian race'
'Soon we shall see the Irish Green above the English Red'
ROBERT EMMET'S MONUMENT TO BE BUILT
THE SPIRIT OF THOMAS DAVIS ABROAD ON WHIRLWIND WINDS
'WE SHALL TELL THESE FOREIGN SAXON SWINE THIS IRISH LAND
IS OURS'
&c &c &c
(*Times*, 23 May 1865, reproducing the *New York Herald*, 5 May 1865)

In an accompanying editorial, the *Times* commented: 'It is not pleasant to be informed on respectable authority that almost every Irishman in the United States has joined a Society pledged to annex Canada and to

liberate Ireland …' (23 May 1865, p. 6). What was discomforting and unusual was that this 'domestic' insurrectionary movement was not only 'foreign organised', but that in the sympathetic environment of New York (by the 1860s, New York already had a larger Irish population than Dublin), it was entirely outside British control: the 'distinctive and peculiar characteristic of this Fenian plot', wrote the *Times*, 'is that its origin is solely and entirely foreign' (30 October 1865, p. 6).

Already by this time, the *Times* had twenty odd years of virulent anti-Irish, that is anti-Catholic Irish, vituperation behind it. It had been edited since 1842 by John Thadeus Delane, who, like the owners of the *Times,* John Walter II and III, was hostile to Irish Catholics and any kind of assertion of Irish nationalism. Delane himself had a Protestant Irish background: he was a descendant of the Delanys of Mountreth, Queen's County (now Mountrath, County Laois) in Ireland, a town notorious for its Orangeism and history of violent Protestant hostility towards Catholics. When his branch of the family emigrated to England in the eighteenth century they strategically changed the 'y' at the end of their name to an 'e' to mask their Irishness. Since Delane's appointment as Editor in 1842, the *Times* had taken a fierce and derisory attitude toward Irish nationalist politics, beginning with an unremitting campaign against O'Connell (Williams 2003). The *Times'*s record during the Famine is well known – appointing its so-called 'Commissioner to Ireland' to report on what was happening, and choosing as its 'commissioner' Thomas Campbell Foster, who had no previous knowledge of Ireland other than *The Times*'s own view of the culpability of the indolent Celt.[4] By the time of the Fenians, however, its initial characteristic derision became marked with some ambivalence as it gave increasing coverage to Fenian activities, both nationally and internationally.

By 1865 the American Fenians, who were funding the *Irish People*, started to put pressure on Stephens to prepare for an insurrection in Ireland itself, and began sending over arms and ammunitions, together with army officers and generals (disguised as travellers or newspaper correspondents) to Dublin. The British navy in turn started to patrol the Atlantic for invasion ships packed with armed Fenians. The British authorities were in fact well aware of what was going on since their agents had infiltrated the American Fenian Brotherhood. While dismissing the Fenian threat as nugatory, Dublin Castle nevertheless characteristically also responded with mass arrests and highly publicized trials, most strikingly in September 1865 with the seizure of the *Irish People* offices and the arrest of James Stephens – as well as many other

humbler activists including, for the record, one of my own ancestors, John Bagnall, a boot and shoe maker of Madgalene St, Drogheda, arrested in October 1865 on suspicion of Fenianism (the *Times*, 9 October 1865, p. 15). After the capture of Stephens and most of the IRB leaders in November 1865, the trial that followed was designed to substantiate the reality of the Fenianism of which they were accused. The power of the Fenians, however, was then dramatically demonstrated in Stephens's spectacular escape from Richmond Prison the following January, which produced an electrifying effect internationally: 'The name of Stephens is now a rallying cry with the Fenians all over the continent' commented the New York correspondent of *The Times*, who went on to quote the *New York Daily Herald*: 'What is demanded now is action. They should go to the frontiers. The Government of Canada is imbecile. The capital, Ottawa City, can be easily taken by a handful of determined Fenians' (9 January 1866, p. 4). Rumours of the impending invasions of Canada abounded, while Canadian Fenians were reported to 'have a large steamer ready for armament' with 'numerous government officials … engaged in the conspiracy' (*Times*, 14 November 1865, p. 12).

The invasions of Canada duly began the following year, 1866, and were for the most part successfully repulsed by the ill-equipped Canadian militia, aided, against all Fenian expectations by the United States army. The first raid in April 1866, of about 700 men who planned to seize Campobello Island between Maine and New Brunswick, was dispersed by the US military. This was followed in June by a more substantial invasion when a party calling themselves the Irish Republican Army, led by John O'Neill, which had gathered at Malone and St Albans, crossed the Niagara river and skirmished with Canadian militia at Ridgeway. The Canadians retreated and the Fenians celebrated their first victory over the British. After a second successful clash at Fort Erie, the Fenians retreated across the river to Buffalo when they found themselves faced with more substantial British reinforcements, together with the unwelcome news of a proclamation by President Andrew Johnson requiring the enforcement of US neutrality. The Battle of Ridgeway, as the whole encounter became known, is widely considered to have been the deciding factor that tipped the balance for the last reluctant Canadian provinces to assent to the idea of becoming part of the confederation of Canada, which was formed in 1867. Canada, we might say, was a Fenian creation.

There were further invasion attempts in 1868, 1870, and 1871, though with their plans fully revealed in advance by the British spy Henry le Caron none of them were as successful as Ridgeway or were afforded the same kind of coverage in London as the first. The threat always remained

however. Throughout the 1870s and 1880s, Fenians on the West coast continued to organize, threatening to invade British Columbia. Other schemes were constantly being hatched, such as the construction in New York in 1881 of the Fenian Ram, a submarine designed by the Irish submarine inventor John Holland to attack British ships.

Despite the implicit encouragement of the US government after the Civil War, its tolerance and even encouragement of Fenian organizing and procurement of weapons, when the invasions actually started the US government withdrew its support and the invasions gradually petered out. However, the historical events in themselves, which are easy to dismiss in terms of their seriousness, do not tell the whole story. What is equally important is the perception and anticipation of those events. The actual ineffectiveness of the invasions did not prevent them from inspiring fear within England, and producing a reorientation of views towards the Irish – instead of being despised as weak, disorderly and inept by writers such as in Carlyle in the 1840s, for the first time the Irish were a people to be feared who could command a global military reach. It would not be long before the Fenians would establish international links with other anti-colonial organizations, or intervene directly to support those fighting the British, such as the O'Kelly brothers organizing weapons to help the Mahdi against the British-Egyptian army in 1883–84, or the formation of John MacBride's Irish Transvaal Brigade during the second Boer War (1899–1902) (O'Sullivan 1998, pp. 131–56).

IV

In their day, the Fenian invasions of Canada produced a good deal of fear and anxiety in Canada and even in London. The *Times* provided extensive coverage. Though the comments of its leader writers were initially derisory and dismissive, as time went on the paper took the Fenians more and more seriously, repeatedly publishing reports from its American correspondent which urged the English not to be complacent or to underestimate the threat. Moreover, what the *Times* reported was that the invasions were not isolated instances, but took part at the same time as Fenian activities in Ireland and England, Australia and New Zealand. Looked at from a global perspective seen through the windows of Printing House Square, the threat of the Fenians seemed everywhere.

This was the context in which Matthew Arnold wrote his famous essay 'On the Study of Celtic Literature', with its suddenly conciliatory

attitude towards the Irish. The year in which he wrote it, 1867, was also the year of Fenian uprisings in Cork, Dublin, Kilmallock and Tipperary; of an abortive Fenian raid on Chester Castle, supposedly preparatory to an invasion of Ireland; of the trial, execution, and iconization of the Manchester Martyrs; of the rescue of the Irish-American Fenian leader James Kelly from a prison van in Manchester – his arrest had already raised the legal and diplomatic complications of trying Irish-Americans such as Kelly, Burke, or Father McMahon in Canada; and of the Clerkenwell bombing.[5] In the same year, the 'floating hell' *Hougomont*, the ship carrying the last group of convicts to be sent to Western Australia, included sixty-two Fenians, many of them arrested after the 1867 uprisings. Rumours spread that a Fenian naval vessel had embarked from a British port in pursuit in order to liberate its prisoner passengers, and a British navy vessel immediately set sail for Perth (*Times*, 22 April 1868, p. 5). The ship's passengers, their passage courtesy of the British government, included John Boyle O'Reilly, who eventually escaped to the US in 1869 and would then mastermind the dramatic Fenian escape from Fremantle prison in 1876. In the following year, 1868, the well-known loyalist Irish-Canadian politician, the Hon. T. D'Arcy McGee, who opposed the Fenians and had, during a visit to Wexford in 1865, publicly renounced his earlier career as an Irish rebel, was murdered 'while putting the latch-key into his street door' in Toronto. This assassination was followed by another Fenian raid into Canada (*Times*, 27 April 1868, p. 8).

Meanwhile in Sydney, Australia, in April of that year, a Fenian called O'Farrell tried to assassinate the Duke of Edinburgh, the son of Queen Victoria, who was making an early royal tour of Australia and New Zealand. After hearing of Fenian demonstrations in support of O'Farrell in Hokitika, the capital of Westland on the West Coast of the Middle Island of New Zealand, the Duke cancelled the rest of his trip and quickly returned home. The Duke did not enjoy his visit to the antipodes, opining that 'at Adelaide they stole my jewels, at Melbourne my character, and at Sydney they would have taken my life' (*Times*, 15 June 1868, p. 12). The *Times* commented:

> It is difficult to speak with calmness of the horrible and dastardly attempt which has been made upon the life of the Duke of Edinburgh at Sydney …. In this case there can be no doubt of the origin of the crime, for the assassin at once avowed himself a Fenian, and his purpose was, doubtless, to show that the murderous society was

world-wide in its organization, and could strike down a victim even on the other side of the globe. (*Times*, 27 April 1868, p. 8)

Quite so: first the United States, then Canada, then Britain, and now Australia: the Fenians had shown their ability to strike anywhere on earth. In fact, the Duke's decision to avoid New Zealand was probably well advised. Hokitika at that time was marked by its Fenian activism – for example, the citizens of the town had recently staged a funeral for the Manchester martyrs (who had not only been hanged, but also denied a Christian burial) (*Times*, 19 May 1868, p. 5). They were led by Father Larkin, editor of the *Hokitika Celt*, and John Manning, former journalist for the *Ballarat Times*, who had already been tried (and acquitted) for high treason over his involvement in the Eureka stockade in Ballarat, near Victoria in 1854. Both were subsequently arrested (*Times*, 29 May 1868, p. 5).

   The internationalization of the Irish struggle across Australia, New Zealand, Canada, and the United States – with the *de facto* support of an American government more or less hostile to British interests – meant that Irish discontent came to the permanent foreground of British politics. Though the country was not seriously threatened, it produced a sense of insecurity, a threat of anarchy (a word often used in this period to represent the threat of democracy generally as well as Irish nationalism, or both), as represented in *Punch* cartoons and dutifully countered by Matthew Arnold with the mighty weapon of culture, whose effects would continue to be felt for decades to come. Over the years, the Fenians in America produced an unstoppable flow of financial, political, and military support, while Fenian organization produced a grass-roots form of anti-colonial participation that combined national and international activism. The politicization of the diaspora helped dramatically to transform perceptions of the Irish at home. It was no longer possible complacently to blame the Irish as victims lacking in energy and resourcefulness, as was often the case in the 1840s. The Irish had asserted themselves internationally, had a powerful ally in the United States, and had to be accommodated. On his election in 1868, Gladstone duly declared that he felt it necessary to deliver 'justice to Ireland', and a new era in English-Irish politics began.

V

'The "Fenian Fever" in the press between 1865 and 1868', as McGee notes, 'left an indelible mark on the Irish and British public imaginations'

(McGee 2005, p. 37). We can see the impact of Fenianism in an influential book of this era, Charles Wentworth Dilke's *Greater Britain* of 1868 – a book that the Bolshevik Karl Radek would later describe as 'a sort of Koran for British Imperialism' (Radek 1920, pp. 90–1). In this book, Dilke proposed a whole new ideology of a Greater Britain, a global confederation of the English that would hold the empire together even when all the colonies were independent. This idea of continuing loyalty of colonial subjects to the mother country, as I have already suggested, was modelled on the Irish example. The more formidable the Irish abroad became, the more the English tried to emulate them in certain respects, constructing a global counter-community of loyal Englishmen. By the same token, however, the problem for Dilke's project was that these same colonies were already full of English-hating Irish.

Dilke's fear of Fenian militancy was not assuaged by what he saw in America. His republican enthusiasm for the United States in particular was tempered by his fear of its potential Irish domination, and his awareness that five million Irish had emigrated there in coercive circumstances that made England their bitter enemy, not their natural friend. Dilke begins his chapter on the Fenians in America ('Brothers') by recounting that he was in Buffalo to witness the Fenians returning from their invasion of Canada in 1866. Everywhere he went, he encountered Fenians:

> At Chicago, I went to the monster meeting at which Speaker Colfax addressed the Brotherhood; at Buffalo, I was present at the 'armed picnic' which gave the Canadian government so much trouble. On Lake Michigan, I went on board a Fenian ship; in New York, I had a conversation with an ex-rebel officer, a long-haired Georgian, who was wearing the Fenian uniform of green-and-gold in the public streets. The conclusion to which I came was, that the Brotherhood has the support of ninety-nine hundredths of the Irish in the States. (Dilke 1868, p. 250)

What he feared above all was that with so many Irish in the United States, still flowing in, more and more cities would become Irish. 'Irish ascendancy' he argued, was producing a 'danger to our race and to the world' – although the more immediate danger, he suggested, was to the United States itself (Dilke 1868, p. 38). According to him, New York and Boston were already Irish, and their power was increasing steadily. Already, he commented with some accuracy, the Irish more or less controlled the press (as was also the case in Australia). The larger

possibility was that they would take over not just the government of New York, but of the United States altogether: 'The single danger that looms in the more distant future is the eventual control of Congress by the Irish …' (Dilke 1868, p. 232).

Dilke's fear of the rise of Fenianism in the United States forms a constant theme of his discussion of the country. He seems to have come across Fenians wherever he went, and remarkably their message to him never varied. The Irish diaspora was militantly politicized. The ubiquity of Fenian support can be illustrated with an anecdote of local interest, a description of an encounter that took place as Dilke left Utah for the West Coast. He reported that:

> This time again I was not alone: an Irish miner from Montana, with a bottle of whisky, a revolver and pick, shared the back-seat with the mail-bags. Before we had forded the Jordan, he had sung 'The Wearing of the Green', and told me the day and the hour at which the republic was to be proclaimed at his native village in Galway. (Dilke 1868, pp. 152–3)

Dilke does not care to share with us the predicted date of the proclamation of the Irish Republic in Galway. One cannot help but wonder how close the confident Irish miner actually was. Though probably somewhat over-optimistic, his general predication was correct. In showing his loyalty to his native village, the nameless Irishman managed to highlight the extraordinary irony of Dilke being inspired by the Fenians for the late if not last model of the British Empire, 'Greater Britain' – while telling Dilke at the same time, if he had cared to listen, that his vision of a loyalist British empire, free of formal political ties, would always be predicated on a denial of the history of how much of that empire had been populated. The Fenians, meanwhile, turned the loyalty of the diasporic Irish across the US and the British Empire into a much more effective weapon – creating the first transnational international terrorist organization which would eventually achieve at least three-quarters, if not a little more, of its political aims.

Notes

1 This essay reprises and develops certain parts of the argument made in my book *The Idea of English Ethnicity* (Oxford: Blackwell, 2008).
2 For a detailed elaboration of this argument, see my *The Idea of English Ethnicity*.
3 See John O'Leary, '*The Times* on Fenianism', *Irish People*, 9 Sept 1865, cited in O. McGee (2005), p. 33. On the British Press see M. de Nie (2001).

4 The reports of the *Times* Commissioner to Ireland, by T.C. Foster, were col-
   lected as *Letters on the Condition of the People of Ireland* (London, 1846).
5 Variously reported in the *Times* on 11 March, 27 May, 1 October, and Decem-
   ber 14 1867, and 24 January 1868. See K.R.M. Short (1979); P. Quinlivan and
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6
Indirect Rule in Australia: A Case Study in Settler Colonial Difference

Ben Silverstein

In 1927, the Adelaide-based Aborigines' Protection League circulated a petition calling for the establishment of an Aboriginal state in northern Australia. This state would, in their conception, be self-governing and ruled according to traditional laws and customs such that the Aboriginal people living within it could seek out a future 'on their own lines' (Genders 1929). The inspiration for this plan was the system of indirect rule – government through what were considered the traditional structures of authority in 'native' communities – then being popularized around the British Empire, primarily by Frederick Lugard, recently returned from Nigeria to England where he exercised a profound influence on colonial policy.

The implementation of indirect rule in a franchise colony like Nigeria is, however, significantly different to its implementation in a settler colony such as Australia. While in a franchise colony the colonial state usually worked to manage the articulation of African and settler modes of production (indirect rule was used to govern the spaces and economies outside, but articulated with, colonial capitalism), in a settler colony such as Australia there was little desire to manage indigenous economies; rather, the development of colonialism tended towards their elimination (Wolfe 1994, p. 93). In this chapter, I look at the process of translating approaches to empire in a transnational setting. What happens when ideas of indirect rule are moved from Africa to Australia?

I will first look at the acquisition and consolidation of British rule over Africa, and the development of the philosophy of indirect rule by such figures as Lugard. I will then examine two Australian humanitarian campaigns, one by the Aborigines' Protection League and another by the Victorian Aboriginal Group, which I argue were heavily influenced by indirect rule. How, I ask, did humanitarian

groups understand the development of indirect rule and how did they consider it applicable to Aboriginal people? This process of translation into a settler colony linked the empire together and incorporated a different form of colonial rule, illuminating settler colonial difference.

The British Empire in Africa

In the second half of the nineteenth century the British acquired control, first on paper and then in practice, of an African empire that stretched across the continent. The use of indirect rule to govern these new colonies emerged from a number of influences. First, a new philosophy of colonial rule, based on the experience of empire, began to be elaborated from the mid-nineteenth century. A number of mid-century crises – the Rebellion in India in 1857, New Zealand Land Wars of the 1860s in Aotearoa/New Zealand, the Morant Bay Rebellion in 1865, continuing violence and instability on South African and northern Australian frontiers, and catastrophic death rates throughout the Pacific – produced a sense for the colonizers that colonial rule was too unstable, and needed to be based on a more solid foundation of indigenous legitimacy (Mamdani 2004).[1]

At the same time, the empire faced a problem of resources. Both the economic orthodoxy of the time and British domestic political constraints mitigated against any large expenditure on the colonies, leaving the colonial state to manage with limited funds and few staff (Constantine 1984). This produced the problem of securing control through a colonial state with little British manpower and a reliance on African administrators and governors. The raising of funds to cover the costs of governing the colony itself required further colonial exploitation. This enrichment through labour, taxation, or export would, of necessity, involve transforming Africans' work practices and production.

In the African colonies, the transformation wrought by colonialism was one of extreme violence, as colonizers encountered resistance to the imposition of colonial authority and to their attempts at redefining African people's relations to production and accumulation. African economies persisted, albeit in changed circumstances and alongside a new capitalist mode of production. The principle task facing the colonial state was that of limiting resistance, or at least institutionalizing it and deferring its target, through managing the primary cause of instability: the articulation of settler or merchant capitalist production with African peasant production. That is, administrators sought both to secure rule and to ensure that a surplus could be extracted from some indigenous

<mark>labour, while ensuring that indigenous modes of production continued and supported the colonial capitalist mode.</mark>

In British-ruled African colonies, the state thus had a hybrid function: it had at once to work to restructure local production to meet the demands of the metropole, and to work to cohere colonial society as this massive transformation took place. This was possible through the regular exercise of superior military force, but more effectively achieved through using a legitimate authority accepted by native populations: to move from political to civil hegemony on the back of neo-traditional structures of authority. The resolution of this problem was found in the use of 'Native Authorities' through indirect rule.

Bruce Berman and John Lonsdale have argued that we need to understand such an arrangement of state and production as a political relationship between dominant groups in each domain, joined to the exclusion, or for the exploitation, of peasants or labourers (Berman and Lonsdale 1992, p. 79). An uneasy and constantly renegotiated alliance between metropolitan capital, represented in Africa by administrators and settlers, and African elites was represented by the bifurcated yet united state, where the hegemony of this alliance was both produced by and reflected in the relations of government (Hall *et al* 1978, p. 69). Here we see the form of collaboration that made indirect rule possible. It was through this process of allying the interests of an African elite, to whom African 'peasants' owed allegiance and tribute, with those of the colonial state that the imagined legitimacy and increased stability of the state could be secured.

What Mahmood Mamdani describes as the bifurcated state took shape all over British Africa, albeit in a slightly different form in each territory (Mamdani 2004). Legislative bodies would rule capitalist Africa: settlers, capitalists, native urban elites, the emerging working class: those often described as 'detribalized'. The 'tribal' Africa, that comprising peasant economies, would be governed under indirect rule: the functions of local government were devolved to what were considered traditional native structures of rule.

Nigeria is generally considered the birthplace of the philosophy of indirect rule. Lugard had developed the system there, and publicized it in his influential book, *The Dual Mandate in British Tropical Africa* (1965) [1922]. In the Sokoto Caliphate of Northern Nigeria, Lugard had found an existing structure of Muslim rule and elected to use it as part of the colonial state, in part for utility and in part because it would have been almost impossible to smash. 'Every Sultan and Emir', he proclaimed after taking Sokoto, 'will rule over the people as of old time … but will obey the laws of the Governor and will act in accordance with

the advice of the Resident' (Iliffe 1995, pp. 200–1). The colonial state removed the legal basis of the Caliphate as a political unit and established each emir as the head of a distinct Native Administration with powers of legislation, jurisdiction, and, most importantly, tax collection, remitting part to the British authorities. This constituted what Lugard described as indirect rule.

Though the process and dynamic differed across Africa, in each African colony the British found, revived, invented, or were forced by the local African populations to accept, tribes ruled by male emirs or chiefs, governing according to customary law. The colonial state now transformed these African leaders into salaried officers of the state, with the responsibilities of government and new powers over land and labour.

By the 1920s, indirect rule was considered the ideal way to manage 'native' populations in Africa.[2] It was used creatively in mostly franchise colonies where the colonial state needed to manage the articulation of two overlapping and intertwined modes of production: one in an African peasant economy, and the other in a settler or colonial capitalist economy. Indirect rule functioned to administer the African peasantry through what were considered to be 'native institutions' which would both enable stable rule and mobilize African populations to work and pay taxes such that the colonial state could cover costs.

This was in no way a smooth process. Rather, the transformation of chiefly power – for example, power to inflict violence on their subjects – into a power to produce was a shift that was frequently resisted (Cooper 1981, pp. 51–2). It is important to write this resistance into the history of the African colonial state. While I have given a mostly structural analysis, I do not mean to suggest that the state was purely a structural imposition by western agents of capitalism in its imperialist phase. This would be to present what Frederick Cooper describes as 'dominance and articulation, without dominators and articulators … Such an argument defines away all possibility of incomplete domination, of resistance to capitalism, or of African societies being ordered in any way except to maximize the advantage of capital' (Cooper 1981, p. 15). Rather, the balance in each colony between the various modes of production and spheres of governance was constantly shifting, worked out by the dynamics of aggression and resistance, the nature of precolonial economies and political structures, the size and actions of the settler population, and so on. The colonial state attempted to gain control over 'the labour power and production of African societies' in a context of struggle and uncertainty (Berman and Lonsdale 1992, p. 133). Africans reacted to colonialism and capitalism in diverse and

complex ways, rendering colonial domination and exploitation always uncertain and unstable.

The bifurcated state could, it was believed, resolve this uncertainty and instability. Lugard and others imagined a colonial rule that could avoid the need for constant and irregular violence through making use of Africans' supposed obedience to traditional authorities, rendering the social formation more stable and controllable. This required, obviously, Africans to obey chiefs. Lugard had served in India prior to his African service, and brought with him a distaste for educated and 'politically-minded' Africans, preferring, in Southern Nigeria, what he considered more authentic, tribal Africans to the educated urban elites.[3] These tribal Africans would, he believed, be susceptible to tribal authority, customs and laws.

Moreover, the process of bringing territories under British control was by no means a peaceful one. As a district officer wrote from central Nigeria in 1925, 'I shall of course go on walloping them until they surrender. It's a rather piteous sight watching a village being knocked to pieces and I wish there was some other way but unfortunately there isn't' (Iliffe 1995, p. 191). Nor was British rule entirely secure once indirect rule had been implemented. In 1929 Igbo women led uprisings in south-eastern Nigeria against both the colonial state and the 'warrant chiefs' who had been imposed on the Igbo people who had no tradition of chiefly rule, and where women had been active in public life (Afigbo 1972, pp. 241–2; Amadiume 1995, p. 38). These responses sparked by colonial transformations did not figure as more than recalcitrance embodied in extraneous 'elements of disorder' in Lugard's indirect rule imaginary (Lugard 1965, p. 203).

Lugard's indirect rule

The dynamic of imperialism and resistance played out all over British Africa, and indirect rule which was, according to Lugard, successful in Northern Nigeria, spread as the explicit philosophy of the state. At the level of ideology, indirect rule was a fundamentally peaceful manner of adopting the traditional practices of indigenous people and using them to secure colonial rule. Lugard's instructions, published as his *Political Memoranda*, which were read by every member of the colonial service before travelling to Africa, were that the Political Officer will 'in every case … endeavour to rule through the Native Chiefs' (Lugard 1970, p. 10). In the case of 'advanced tribes', the 'primary duty and object of a Political Officer [the state's "man on the spot"] will be to educate …

[the Chiefs] in the duties of Rulers according to a civilised standard; to convince them that oppression of the people is not sound policy, or to the eventual benefit of the rulers' (Lugard 1970, p. 11).

The collection of taxation should be carried out by these chiefs. Even in the case of so-called 'backward tribes', the chief's authority would be supported. The Political Officer, or Resident, also had a responsibility to 'establish a Native Court in every city or district where it appears advisable to do so, and will constantly supervise its work, especially in the lower grades of Courts' (Lugard 1970, pp. 18–19). The law in these courts would be drawn from 'native law and custom'.

Lugard's philosophy went beyond this basic structure of the state and expanded to encompass the entire regime governing native peoples. Trade was to be encouraged, though not too greatly in case it caused too extensive a transformation in the native economy (Lugard 1970, p. 30). Labour, similarly, was to be encouraged but not forced. How this played out in practice is an entirely different matter, but as an expression of the idea of indirect rule, Lugard's emphasis was firmly on the maintenance of order through the use of traditional structures.[4] His education policy, as with every other policy, was designed to minimize resistance. For example, he discouraged Nigerian schools from teaching about the Stuart Kings as it may provoke awkward questions and encourage 'disrespect for authority' (Falola and Roberts 1999, p. 518).

The idea of an authentic 'Native rule' relied upon a sharp different-iation between white and black, settler and native. Segregation was more than just restrictive legislation or the division of government power: it was the articulation and legitimation of difference. The typical African, Lugard believed, was 'a happy, thriftless, excitable person, lacking in self-control, discipline, and foresight, naturally courageous, and nat-urally courteous and polite, full of personal vanity, with little sense of veracity, fond of music, and "loving weapons as an oriental loves jewellery"'. He or she was, most importantly, steadfastly loyal (Lugard 1965, pp. 69–70). Lugard resisted any transgression of the 'native' cat-egory (which could problematize this loyalty), whether through religious conversion or secular education.[5] Such cultural change, he imagined, would loosen the tribal bonds and therefore loosen the authority a chief held over his people. The 'Europeanised African' was 'separated from the rest of the people by a gulf which no racial affinity can bridge' (Lugard 1965, p. 81). This fragmentation was troublesome and prevented ease of control, and was the focus of much of his governing philosophy. Lugard's tax policies, for example, were designed to 'group … communities under responsible heads' (Lugard 1970, p. 201).

British colonialism had a long history of associating its role as colonial power with one of trusteeship. This was confirmed in the postwar resolution of the issue of former Ottoman and German colonial territories, which were to be administered by League of Nations mandatory states as a 'sacred trust of civilisation' (Covenant of the League of Nations 1920, art. 22). Lugard's *Dual Mandate* explained Britain's role in the colonies: they were there both as trustee for the advancement of the subject races, and for the development of the material resources of the colonial territory for the benefit of mankind. Liberal and conservative theorists and technicians of empire were, therefore, able to argue for the implementation of indirect rule, based on the *Dual Mandate*, as an exercise in trusteeship over indigenous peoples. The move to tie indirect rule, through the dual mandate, to a benevolent colonial rule was so successful that by 1938, when Lord Hailey surveyed the African empire with an eye to setting out principles of administration going forward, he noted that: 'The principle of indirect rule has, in particular, passed through the stages, first, of a useful administrative device, then that of a political doctrine, and finally that of a religious dogma' (Hailey 1939, p. 202).

So, to summarize, indirect rule as conceived by Lugard was designed primarily to secure the hegemony of British rule over Africa through managing the articulation of two modes of production: colonial capitalism and African peasantry. It was the latter economy that was governed by indirect rule. Importantly, Lugard's indirect rule was not merely the rule through 'native' peoples, but rule through what were considered to be 'native' institutions. Hailey described it as the 'systematic use of the customary institutions of the people as agencies of local rule' (Hailey 1944, p. 48).

Indirect rule in Australia

The problems facing the state in Australia have been fundamentally different from those of the colonial state in Africa. Australia is a settler colony, where the imperative is not managing the articulation of Indigenous modes of production with settler capitalism, but rather effecting their elimination. As many historians have noted, the exclusive occupation of land is the object of settler colonialism – the logic of the settler colonial mode of production is thus one of elimination (Wolfe 1994). Given this basic difference, indirect rule does not, in this characterization, appear to have any role in a settler colony such as Australia. However, it was a policy which had influence in Australia in the

inter-war period when around the Empire it had become, as Hailey suggested, a 'religious dogma'.

Different Australian groups argued for the implementation of indirect rule in diverse ways. The most explicit of these was the Aborigines' Protection League (APL), a group of mostly, though not exclusively, white middle-class men and women based in Adelaide, who, in their 1927 petition and accompanying manifesto, unsuccessfully called for a large area of land in Arnhem Land in the Northern Territory to be 'handed back to the natives now on it, and that they be told it is their own country, to be managed by themselves' as a 'separate aboriginal State'. This state would be 'ultimately managed by a native tribunal as far as possible according to their own laws and customs but prohibiting cannibalism and cruel rites'. Any 'persons, other than aborigines, except Federal Government officials and duly authorized missionaries, teachers and agricultural instructors', were to be banned from entering. Also excluded from the state would be so-called 'half-castes' and 'detribalised' Aboriginal people, who constituted a separate 'native problem', and for whom the League suggested coercive direct treatment (APL, 1927).

The League explicitly referred to this plan as indirect rule. Members of the League had read and often quoted Lugard, and the Secretary J. Chas Genders referred to Jan Smuts' influential 1929 Rhodes memorial lectures, in which he argued for a similar form of territorial and institutional segregation ('A Native Policy for Australia [*by a Member of the Aborigines' Protection League*]', NAA: A1/15, 1932/4262; Smuts 1930; Genders 1930). The League was working in a context of extreme state control over Aboriginal people. They were receptive not only to colonial ideas of 'native' self-rule, but also in a way to Australian Aboriginal people's calls for what we might now describe as self-determination.[6] The APL saw indirect rule as a system which could guarantee indigenous rule 'on their own lines', would free Aboriginal people from those feelings of 'loneliness, of exile, even of slavery' caused by the present system of rule, and which would ensure that Aboriginal people had the right to be ruled according to the system which suited them best (APL, 'Proposed Aboriginal State: Manifesto', AFA Papers, SRG 139/1/65).

This was never implemented, but it is significant that a fairly standard proposal for indirect rule was, in this case, couched in terms of 'rights' rather than of 'rule'. For the League, the Aboriginal state was all about saving Aboriginal people; they could see no other possible future for a continuing Aboriginal presence in Australia. Ultimately unsuccessful, the failed campaign was, perhaps, too much to have hoped for: an

economically self-sufficient and self-determining future for Aboriginal people was not a plan that the settler colonial state was likely to implement.

Another, much more conventional humanitarian group was the Melbourne-based and exclusively white Victorian Aboriginal Group (VAG). The VAG splintered off from the Citizens Educational Fellowship, a Christian organization, in 1933. They had begun in 1930 as the 'Study of the Australian Aboriginal Group' within this Fellowship when they had conducted a programme of reading anthropologists and ethnographers – Howitt, Basedow, Spencer and Gillen, Gribble – and attending lectures (AB Papers, MS9212, 3652A: VAG Minutes 1930–1931).

The VAG came to indirect rule not through Lugard, but through Sir Hubert Murray. Murray was then Governor of the Australian Territory of Papua and was a wide reader and student of imperialism. He was familiar with Lugard's work, as well as that of Sir Arthur Gordon in Fiji, and tried to implement it in Papua, albeit in a modified form. The VAG's study, and their idea of Murray's techniques, led them to advocate a plan of separate development which would 'reserve enough land for tribes to keep within their own natural boundaries. Let them live in their own way teaching sanitation cut out cruel customs and introduce religion by degrees' (AB Papers, MS9212, 3652A: VAG Minutes 12 June 1930).

Murray also described indirect rule in a more expansive sense, which greatly influenced the VAG. He described his government's use of indirect rule through the following example relating to a smallpox scare in 1915:

> We wanted the natives to consent to vaccination, so we told them that there was a very powerful and dangerous sorcerer in the West – that was the quarter from which the smallpox was expected – and that this sorcerer had made a very bad sickness, which he might bring along at any moment. But, though the sorcerer was strong, the government was stronger, and would protect all those who claimed its protection; a mark would be put upon the arm of those who trusted themselves to the government, and the sorcerer, when he came, would see the government mark, and would retire foiled and baffled to his home in the West. This was sailing pretty close to the wind, but it was Indirect Rule all right, and, furthermore, we were successful beyond our wildest dreams … (Murray 1930, p. 5)

Perhaps Murray was thinking here of Lugard's suggestion that: 'Where new ideas are to be presented to the native mind, patient explanation

of the objects in view will be well rewarded, and new methods may often be clothed in a familiar garb' (Lugard 1970, p. 9). What he effected here was the co-option of indigenous narratives into the colonial state, rather than (in fact, as well as) co-opting indigenous chiefs or political systems. This technique of government was important in the reception of indirect rule in Australia.

This and others of Murray's technologies of rule provided a base for the plan suggested by the VAG for the Northern Territory which was, ultimately and in a modified form, adopted by the Australian Commonwealth Government. They argued for trained anthropologists to be appointed as patrol officers, who would be the main governmental contact with Aboriginal people. They wanted Aboriginal reserves to be closed and inviolable except for these patrol officers; they also called for better educational opportunities and special native courts for the trial of native offences (Public Meeting, 19 September 1934, 'A Policy for the Australian Aboriginal', AB Papers, MS9212, 3652A). Inspired by Hubert Murray, they described this as indirect rule. While it appears significantly different from the indirect rule described by Lugard in Africa, in that there is no indigenous involvement in government, it was a version translated into an appropriate form for a settler colony.

The Commonwealth Government's new policy for the Northern Territory, announced in 1939 and only partially implemented due to economic constraints following the declaration of war in September that year, adopted many of these proposals. Where the bifurcated African colonial state envisioned a sharp racial divide between tribal and urban Africans, the 1939 policy categorized Aboriginal people into four classes: 'fully detribalised'; 'semi-detribalised'; 'Myalls or aboriginals in their native state'; and 'Half-castes'. Those 'natives who are still living in tribal state' should be 'left alone … to their ancient tribal life,' protected by officers of the government (Commonwealth of Australia 1939, pp. 2, 5).

There would henceforth be a 'separate Branch of Native Affairs in the Northern Territory' which would be 'placed under the control of an officer, with administrative ability and training in practical anthropology, who will function as Director of Native Affairs'. This Director would appoint 'District Officers, Patrol Officers and Officers capable of imparting education to the natives' after training in anthropology. Further,

> Courts for Native Affairs will be established, on similar lines to those of Papua and New Guinea. The district officer will, *ex officio*, be the

> Magistrate in Charge of the Court. It will be competent for him to constitute a Court at any place in his district. He will hear all cases as between native and native, and will dispense justice in accordance with native custom or along lines prescribed. (Commonwealth of Australia 1939, pp. 3, 9)

This was not only a response to the white people's activism I have described, but also to the growing prominence Aboriginal people were gaining for their political action and resistance, both in the southeastern states and in the Northern Territory itself, where, in Arnhem Land, Aboriginal people had continued to live largely outside the authority of the settler state. It also attempted to deal with the developing labour shortage in the Territory's pastoral industry, endorsing a regime for extracting labour that relied on a temporarily distinct Aboriginal reserve economy.

The 1939 policy has been considered and legitimately critiqued as one of assimilation, with its aim to 'transform people from a nomadic tribal state to take their place in a civilized community' (Commonwealth of Australia 1939, p. 2; Attwood 2003, pp. 116–18). This is, however, to miss the distinctly different strands of the policy. While all are, in their way, assimilationist, they differ importantly and produce more complex immediate results than merely working to erase Aboriginality. This was the result of the Territory's labour problem and the incorporation of suggestions from groups such as the VAG who were arguing for a form of indirect rule. They were not the only, or even the most prominent, group to work towards this policy; anthropologists such as E.W.P. Chinnery, the man charged with implementing the new regime, then on leave from the New Guinea administration and A.P. Elkin, then holding the Chair of Anthropology at the University of Sydney, were major influences, while other humanitarian groups also had an impact.[7]

The VAG may be considered as representative of these groups. They argued for, and achieved, a policy based on a benevolent and paternalistic form of indirect rule. This consisted of building on and developing anthropologically defined 'native' institutions and forms of rule derived from Lugard, but lacked the element of indigenous self-management or self-government. This suggests a limit of indirect rule in a settler colony. There was no imperative for the settler state to allow or control the continuing existence of indigenous people's self-management or economic lives. Indeed, the opposite was the case. To the extent that the Australian settler state was, and remains, based on the acquisition and total control of land, Aboriginal people, with a prior claim not only to ownership of,

but also sovereignty over, the land, pose a threat to settler hegemony and legitimacy. For settler colonialism, therefore, a continuing Aboriginal presence in Australia represents a persistent claim that could never be fully resolved within its structures.

For all this, there was, however, a need to reform the government of Aboriginal people in the Northern Territory to secure a more peaceful twentieth-century rule. An increasing prominence of humanitarian and anthropologically-based groups on the one hand, and international pressure to conform to standards established by the League of Nations Mandates system on the other, forced Australia to reform those policies. This need to appear at least to be 'doing better' facilitated a more positive reception for liberal proposals for dealing with Aboriginal people.

Ultimately, the movement of indirect rule into Australia worked within the elementary structures of settler colonialism. The influence of indirect rule can be seen in humanitarian calls, such as that of the VAG, for a more benevolent rule over Aboriginal people, which would ultimately work towards their assimilation through a form of separate development. In a sense, then, this form of indirect rule is not inconsistent with the policy agreed to at the 1937 Conference of Commonwealth and State Aboriginal Authorities: to manage the vanishing remnant of so-called 'full-blood' Aboriginal people, and the 'ultimate absorption' of the rest (Commonwealth of Australia 1937). It is not inconsistent with the aims and practices of Australian settler colonialism.

Through this process of translation into the settler colony, indirect rule became a form of rights for indigenous people, and ended up as a liberal project of citizenship, where colonial ideological formations such as anthropology were mobilized to achieve a more sophisticated form of government over Aboriginal people. The 1939 policy, the apogee of indirect rule in Australia in the first half of the twentieth century, was assimilationist to its core, albeit a blueprint for assimilation that envisioned a longer than usual timeline. It did not displace, but rather rendered more pervasive, the assimilation at the heart of settler colonialism.

Notes

1   The experience of governing India was particularly instructive in crafting a colonial conception of the effects of British rule. Throughout the second half of the nineteenth century, British colonial thought was pervaded by a sense of unease with and distaste for the (semi-)educated Indian man – imagined as a shifty, feminized, Bengali 'babu'. This figure of discourse came to stand in for the uncertainty of a colonial rule resting on the shifting foundations of colonized societies: if the result of Western education and colonization

was to unmoor the native from his or her natural state, in which traditional regimes of custom and control were effective, then British rule would be more productive of dissolution than stability: see, for example, Seth (2007, chapter 2). Rule in Africa, therefore, ought to be based upon 'traditional' and 'authentic' colonial subjects. It was argued in Margery Perham's course on Colonial Administration in Oxford in 1941 that the 'compromise has been worked out in Africa; but if no Englishman had ever set foot in Calcutta or Bombay it is unlikely that Nigeria would have seen the experiment, founded on a self-conscious political philosophy, of indirect rule'. Stannard, 'Principles of Colonial Administration', 16 April 1941, p. 3, Perham Papers, MSS Perham 244/5.

2   In 1930, Sir Anton Bertram wrote that indirect rule 'is indeed the most significant movement now proceeding in our Colonial Empire and merits the careful attention of the political student' (Bertram 1930, p. 70). It was Lugard's indirect rule that became the template for the other British colonies. Crowder and Ikime (1970, p. xx) write that when colonial administrators spoke of introducing indirect rule, they meant they would remodel 'their chieftaincies or units of local self-government on the Northern Nigerian pattern'. Where tribes did not fit into the model foreseen by Lugard, as in the case of the so-called stateless peoples or acephalous societies that Ifi Amadiume describes as 'anti-state decentralised political systems', either warrant chiefs or 'foreign' natives were appointed to rule indirectly (1995, p. 38; see also Afigbo 1972).

3   Lugard wrote from Lagos in 1912 that 'I am somewhat baffled as to how to get into touch with the educated native … To start with, I am not in sympathy with him. His loud and arrogant conceit are distasteful to me, the lack of natural courtesy antagonize me'. Frederick Lugard to Flora Lugard, 10 October 1912, cited in Perham (1960, pp. 389–90). See also Lugard (1965, pp. 79–82).

4   The violence of labour recruitment was a rarely mentioned feature of indirect rule, where chiefs would recruit labour through force to complete projects for the colonial state, including roads, railways, and government lodgings. In 1927, for example, in Kavirondo in western Kenya, Chief Ogada ordered women and girls to work on a project building residences for elders of the tribe, 'without the knowledge of the District Commissioner and in spite of the fact that he himself well knew that orders had been issued prohibiting the compulsion of women to work'. When this breach was officially brought to the attention of the District Commissioner, his public response was to instruct Ogada to pay the women who had worked, and to comply with the law in future. See Henry Monck-Mason Moore to Leo Amery, 9 March 1929, CO 533/386/12. As an Assistant District Commissioner in Kilifi, in south-eastern Kenya, reported in 1918, success in acquiring labour, whether for white settlers or for other projects, 'depended on how far he [the chief] could be induced to exceed his instructions': Assistant District Commissioner, Kilifi to Provincial Commissioner, 18 October 1918 (cited in Cooper 1996, p. 43).

5   'The influence of Missions in the Southern Provinces has in the past been … destructive, I fear, of Native authority, for the converts considered themselves emancipated from the rule of their Chiefs' (Lugard 1970, p. 168). While missionary education had its benefits – it was to missionary efforts that 'the country owes the existence of the class from which its supply of clerks to carry

on the Administration are drawn' – Lugard wrote that in preamalgamation Southern Nigeria:

> with some notable exceptions, education seem to have produced discontent, impatience of any control, and an unjustified assumption of self importance in the individual. No doubt such results of the extension of education are not confined to Nigeria. The local press, inspired by a superficial, and misdirected education, is, in the opinion of responsible and thoughtful natives, doing much 'grievous harm', especially among its clientèle of school-boy readers, by fomenting racial animosity, by its misrepresentation, and its invective against all Government action. This attitude is not one of recent origin (1968, pp. 147–8).

6   In the early 1920s a group of Aboriginal men in New South Wales led by Fred Maynard, formed the Australian Aboriginal Progressive Association with a platform of Aboriginal land rights, citizenship, stopping the practice of child removal and defending a strong Aboriginal cultural identity. They were inspired and heavily influenced by Marcus Garvey, who was a Jamaican-born black activist who lived in the US, and who called for a symbolic and spiritual return to Africa and to pride in blackness (Maynard 2005). Later, in the 1930s and also in New South Wales, a group of Aboriginal people led by William Ferguson and Jack Patten, formed the Aboriginal Progressive Association that campaigned for the Aborigines Protection Board to be abolished and for full citizen rights. Along with the Australian Aborigines League in Melbourne, led by William Cooper, they also organized the national day of mourning in 1938, on the 150th anniversary of white invasion and settlement. Australia day (Attwood 2003, p. 54).

7   In 1938, E.W.P. Chinnery, then Government Anthropologist in New Guinea but on leave in mainland Australia, accompanied the Minister for the Interior, John McEwen, and the Administrator of the Northern Territory, C.L.A. Abbott, on a tour of the Northern Territory. In regular correspondence with Elkin at the University of Sydney, Chinnery advised McEwen on the shape of the new policy and was appointed Chief Protector of Aborigines in the Northern Territory.

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7

(En)gendering Faith?: Love, Marriage and the Evangelical Mission on the Settler Colonial Frontier

Claire McLisky

Heterosexual love, marriage and reproduction have always occupied an ambivalent place in settler colonies like Australia. While reproduction of the 'right' sort of settlers is imperative to the numerical increase of the colonizing population, indigenous peoples' reproduction is more problematic. This is in distinct contrast to many 'plantation' colonies, where the reproduction of a working or slave class of indigenous peoples is desirable for the colonizing powers who wish to exploit their labour (Wolfe 1994, p. 93). Because the validity of the settler colonial state is predicated on denying the very existence of its indigenous owners, settler colonies have, historically, sought to eliminate indigenous peoples in any way that they could, replacing them on the land with settlers. Patrick Wolfe has referred to this aspiration as the 'logic of elimination' (Wolfe 1994).

While the most obvious, and abhorrent, form of this logic in Australia was the settler urge to exterminate indigenous peoples physically, this was not the only way in which the logic of elimination could work. Segregating indigenous peoples by removing them from the proximity of settler enclaves, or attempting to erase indigeneity through assimilation, were two other ways in which the significance of these groups' existence – a constant reminder of their competing claims to land and sovereignty in the desired territory – could be denied. Because segregation was based on the premise that indigenous peoples were a 'dying race', it was only in this third context of assimilationism that Indigenous reproduction (reframed as the reproduction of the settler whole) could be in any way tolerated.

The discourse of elimination was, of course, a gendered one, and in Australia as elsewhere the settler colonial state consistently deployed gender as a category with which to mark colonizer from colonized.

Aboriginal people and the land which they owned were figured as female, a 'carte blanche' for male conquest; colonizers, whether men or women, were imagined as male. This dichotomy, of course, was not just used to justify the 'penetration' of 'virgin' lands by 'virile' explorers. It was also used to defend a long history of specifically gendered atrocities, including rape of Aboriginal women and violent crimes against Aboriginal men for their perceived resistance to emasculating discourse and practice.

Christian missionaries in Australia occupied an ambiguous place in relation to the settler colonial logic of elimination, not least because of the long historical association between Christianity and settler colonialism. The European right to colonization had been formalized in two fifteenth-century Papal Bulls which allowed Portugal and Spain the right to claim sovereignty over 'undiscovered' (i.e. non-Christian) lands and peoples (Williams 1990; Muldoon 1977, pp. 54–6). When France and England began making counter-claims for territory in the sixteenth century, they also invoked the principles of Christianization and civilization as a mandate for colonization (Miller 2005, p. 12). Even imperialism's fiercest critics, including the evangelical humanitarian lobbyists who campaigned against slavery for much of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, criticized European colonization more on the basis of its attendant vices than its founding premises. Indeed, most proponents of humanitarianism during this period, including the missionaries who constitute the subject of this chapter, envisaged the possibility that empire could be a virtuous undertaking. If enough attention was paid to the virtue of both colonizers and colonized, the colonies could even act as sites of metropolitan redemption while at the same time building a Christian colonial utopia.

This was a project which relied as much upon the transformation of indigenous peoples as it did upon the requisition of their land. Thus it was that despite campaigning against the 'extermination' of Aboriginal peoples, settler colonial missionaries actively endorsed and benefited from colonial policies of segregation, which for much of the nineteenth century gave them almost complete control over their 'charges'. Missionaries supported segregation because they believed that isolation would protect indigenous peoples from the vices of settler society, though whether this protection was in order to 'smooth the dying pillow' of the Aboriginal 'race', or to fortify and educate them for eventual assimilation into a virtuous colonial population was a matter of some contention. Thus, whereas their fellow colonists were primarily interested in removing and segregating Aboriginal people from the settler population in

order to extract their land, missionaries hoped to colonize the people themselves, not primarily as a material resource or source of labour, but for the heavenly value of their souls. The survival of Aboriginal people was thus very much in their interests, at least until they could be converted to Christianity.[1] For this reason, many missionaries argued vehemently against the violence – both physical and metaphorical – which stemmed from 'dying race' rhetoric (Matthews 1890).

Even as they battled the fatalistic predictions of their fellow colonists, however, settler colonial missionaries were equally interested in erasing the indigeneity of Aboriginal converts. Firstly, the missionaries perceived that indigenous spirituality posed an enormous threat to Christian evangelization. For this reason traditional spiritual and cultural practices – song, dance and even language – were generally discouraged by Australian missionaries, who sometimes punished mission residents for engaging in them. The second problem with the category of indigeneity was perhaps even more serious. Evangelical missionaries in settler colonial Australia did not just aspire to produce indigenous Christians, they hoped to create productive, self-regulating colonial indigenous citizens, a category which was constructed (though not realized) as universal. Thus, although missionaries made claims for their projects based on the indigeneity of the people they claimed to champion, the point at which their claims for equality were acknowledged was the very point at which the indigenous claimants' indigeneity needed to be forgotten. Once an indigenous person had become a self-supporting Christian, their indigeneity became a threat to the very Christianity and 'civilization' of the indigenous convert, something to be shunned rather than celebrated.

In this context Aboriginal marriage and reproduction represented both a problem and an opportunity for settler colonial missionaries. On the one hand, so-called 'tribal' relationships between Aboriginal men and women were denigrated, inter-racial relationships were abhorred for their exploitative nature, and missionaries constantly lamented the prospects of young Aboriginal children being brought up 'in sin'. Yet romantic love and marriage were also seen as key sites in which missionaries could teach and perform 'correct' Christian gender roles.[2] The culmination of contemporary Christian and romantic ideals of virtue, marriage, was seen as a unique opportunity for both sexes to join together in a mutual love of Christ and each other.

The missionary position on love and marriage was thus complex.[3] For the missionaries themselves, and missionary women especially, romantic courtship and marriage could represent a site of transformation and redemption, a rare source of power and agency. Yet, paradoxically, when

it came to Aboriginal unions, it was just these traits which had missionaries worried. Thus, while recognizing the 'bright' opportunities which Christian unions offered to Aboriginal converts, missionaries were also wary of the 'dangers' of uncontrolled Aboriginal sexuality for their civilizing and Christianizing projects. Unsanctioned Aboriginal unions and reproduction threatened not just the civilizing mission, but the settler colonial project which enabled it, and were to be avoided at all costs.

This chapter explores these considerable tensions in the settler colonial missionary project through two stories, both related to the nineteenth-century Maloga Aboriginal Mission. After a brief survey of Maloga's place and significance in the history of Australian missions to Aboriginal peoples, the chapter moves to a consideration of the unique place of heterosexual love and marriage in nineteenth-century Protestant evangelical discourse. In this context, the chapter goes on to consider how understandings of love and marriage – both settler colonial and evangelical – are reflected in the two stories mentioned above, both of which hold special positions in the history of Maloga. The first story focuses on the two missionaries, Daniel and Janet Matthews, but is located in the period of their courtship, when the idea of the mission was first seriously raised. The second considers one of the first marriages ever held on the mission between two of Maloga's Aboriginal residents, that of the Yorta Yorta couple Freddy and Sarah Walker.[4]

Founded in 1874, Maloga mission was situated on the Murray River in New South Wales, thirty miles from the nearest town, Echuca and on the traditional lands of the Yorta Yorta and Bangerang peoples. Over the course of its existence the mission was home to over 200 Aboriginal people and in its heyday housed around 150 permanent residents. These were large numbers for a mission in south-eastern Australia during this period, at a time when the NSW Aborigines Protection Board had yet to be established. And this was not the only sense in which Maloga Mission was unusual. Firstly, Daniel and Janet's mission had no affiliation to a missionary society, making it a relative anomaly in the nineteenth-century Australian mission landscape. Unlike most of their missionary peers who had set out for the New World with only the propaganda of missionary societies to give them any indication of what they were to encounter, Daniel and Janet Matthews had arrived in the settler colony of Victoria as child immigrants, and had come of age in its thriving evangelical community. They were thus well-informed about the context in which they would be working, and the initiative for starting the mission was very much their own.

Secondly, unlike its Moravian, Anglican, and Lutheran equivalents in the South East during this period, Maloga mission was envisaged, and administered, as a non-denominational institution. While Daniel had been raised a Cornish Methodist, and Janet a Scottish Baptist, they had put aside these differences in the ecumenical spirit of the times to ensure the success of their project. And finally, the mission itself was built with private money, not on church or government land, but on a plot selected by Daniel in 1865. It was sustained over the years through subscriptions and the Matthews' own personal savings. In all of these senses, then, the mission was a most unusual, and a very personal undertaking. Indeed, as this paper will show, the idea of Maloga – as well as its physical existence – underpinned the strength and fervour of Daniel and Janet's own romantic, and married relationship.

Like the settler colonial venture of which it was a part, Maloga mission was a gendered project.[5] Indeed, for nineteenth-century Evangelicals such as the Matthews, the correct assignment and performance of gender roles was seen not just as a reflection, but as the embodiment of divine grace. With its shift from masculinist structures of church and hierarchy, the evangelical movement, it has been argued, 'enhanced the status of women, since it implied a new spiritual dimension to their traditional role as guardians of the hearth' (Tosh 2005, p. 16). In the mission setting, however, the gendered nature of evangelicalism could have rather more complex implications.

Nineteenth-century Protestant evangelicalism emphasized the importance of individual salvation; as Gregory Schneider has put it, 'each man, woman, and child had to meet the sovereign God individually and struggle through on his or her own to a saving faith in an affectionate heavenly father' (Schneider 1993, p. 76). Marriage, conceptualized as the union between two consecrated souls, was to be founded on 'this mutual love that came from God' (Schneider 1993, p. 76). This shift towards individualism in turn placed a greater emphasis on the ethics, and the mechanics, of romantic attraction. Whereas the Puritans had seen all forms of extra-marital heterosexual love as a potentially subversive force, their nineteenth-century equivalents came to see the first signs of attraction as, in Zsuzsa Berend's words, 'the sign of a God-ordained union, oneness a spiritual ideal deemphasising sensual and sexual implications, and self-forgetfulness the epitome of selflessness' (Berend 2000, p. 937). This 'new theology of the romantic self' brought together romantic ideals of love with an Evangelical sensibility, requiring that potential suitors experience not just shared attraction but a 'shared identity' (Lystra 1989).

Yet while the expectation of romantic, as well as spiritual communion with one's suitor may have seemed to be loosening the strictures of a tightly closeted society, it created complications for the young men and women who subscribed to it. Finding the right partner for marriage became not just a matter of physical attraction, general suitability, or financial expediency, but a question of the greatest spiritual import. And how to identify the man or woman who had, from thousands of other possible suitors, been consecrated by God to be one's husband or wife? Even when a suitable partner had been found, the standard problem of how to cherish loved ones without allowing the special affections felt for them to diminish the love felt for Christ (and through him for all humanity), was only intensified.

Thus while married love had by the nineteenth century come to be seen as the pinnacle of Christian affection, for many Protestant evangelicals (especially women) the prospect of a less than perfect marital union was worse than none (Berend 2000). Because serious Christianity 'demanded private space for individual introspection', many women perceived that becoming a wife and mother might impede their piety in significant practical ways (Davidoff and Hall 1987, pp. 90–1). These reservations, combined with high expectations about marriage and the paucity of suitable candidates, combined to make it 'socially and personally acceptable not to marry if marriage involved compromising one's moral standards'. And with this shift, Berend argues, there 'emerged a new, morally charged conceptualization of women's love and its mission which allowed for a broader understanding of women's usefulness' (Berend 2000, p. 936). It is this conception of a woman's 'usefulness' not limited to the private sphere that we have to bear in mind when considering the position in which Miss Janet Johnston found herself in early 1872.

Daniel and Janet had first met in the 1860s through Janet's father, the Reverend Kerr Johnston, Missionary of the Bethel Union Seamen's Mission in Sandridge, but it was not until 1872, after a fateful meeting in the drawing room, that he initiated personal contact. In an unsolicited letter, dated 3 January that year, he expounded his feelings for her. It was, he stated, his 'admiration of her character, as well as her family connexions', which formed what he called 'sufficient inducements' for him to propose marriage (Matthews, 3 January 1872).[6]

Janet's response was somewhat wary. At the time of the letter's writing she was twenty-three years old and ran a girls' school with her sister, though both still lived in the family home. As a young woman Janet was independent, forthright, and determined. And, as we learn

from her letters to Daniel, she was newly converted. Although Janet had grown up in a Baptist family, with a missionary for a father, she had ceased to be a believer in her teenage years. In July 1871, however, a 'failed love affair' made her 'become a decided Christian again'. And, having committed herself to God with renewed vigour, her primary preoccupation was with God's plans for her.[7] In the months that followed Janet was uncertain, however, exactly what it was that God intended for her.

The specific source of her misgivings became clear a week later, when Janet, apparently reassured by a visit from Daniel, confessed by letter what had been troubling her. She wrote:

> Perhaps I should tell you that one reason I could not bring my mind to our unison was that the position you offered me seemed too pleasant and easy for me. I had nerved my mind up to do great things for my master … Christ, and I could not submit to an easy position. I wanted to bear something great. I have long wished to become a missionary – ever since I was a child I have felt interested in missions and when I met missionarys [*sic*] or heard them speak my heart would burn with desire to work for Christ, though then I did not love Him at all. Now that I do love him & have given myself to him, I have felt that desire increase and when your first letter came my prayer was Thy Will, O God, be done. You will now understand better how difficult it has been for me to give up all my own wills. (Johnston, 10 January 1872)

Immensely revealing both of its author's state of mind, and the new level to which the correspondence had developed, this statement made the distinction between personal will and the will of God clearer than ever. It also, however, gave Daniel the insight into the object of his affection that he had been waiting for. Janet's desire to be a missionary was to be ignored at the risk of losing her altogether.

By early April, however, Janet's position had changed again, presumably in response to a letter or visit from Daniel. The incident itself is not described in their correspondence, but the cause of her change of heart is alluded to in a letter dated the fourth of that month, in which Janet wrote that 'Since you told me of your plans for the Aborigines I seem to see more clearly the way God is leading me and the reason I was so led' (Johnston, 4 April 1872). These 'plans' described Daniel's stated desire to establish an Aboriginal school on the Murray River and, in the weeks that followed, Janet encouraged Daniel to pursue this

project with a passion that surprised even him. And, though she only tentatively, at first, put herself forward as his 'helper', it is clear that the possibility of her own role in this venture was a crucial factor in her increasing commitment to him.

Janet and Daniel's negotiations were, however, far from over, and a few months later when he suggested a doubt about the missionary project, she was so upset that she nearly broke off the engagement. Daniel wrote at once to assure her that he was sure he had been 'called' to 'this work'; his misgivings were only as to whether God himself intended the project to go ahead. Despite his eagerness to reassure her of his continued commitment to the project, however, Daniel ended this letter with a strongly-worded reproach. He wrote:

> On reading over your letter again I find that you are under the impression that Satan holds me as his captive slave. My dear, dear Janet, I am Christ's. I live by faith in him day by day … you don't know me–not yet. By and bye you will, I trust. (Matthews, 24 April 1872)

This emphasis on proving faith was to continue throughout their correspondence. Perhaps sensing that this was the surest way to her heart, Daniel subsequently couched his professions of love for Janet in terms of his admiration of her faith (though even then he was on occasion reprimanded by her for flattery).

But Janet's faith was not merely the object of Daniel's admiration; he looked also to what it could do for his own. Faith was for Daniel attainable *through* Janet – she would order his chaos and strengthen his trust in God, would be both his salve and salvation. From the very beginning of their correspondence she objected to being seen as the agent of his redemption, writing rather that any grace she might display derived directly from Christ working through her; it was Christ he should praise, not her (Johnston, 9 January 1872).

Yet, however constrained their relationship was by the expectation and performance of normative gendered roles, these early letters unquestionably reveal that religion allowed Janet an unusual degree of freedom for a woman of this period. Faith gave her a legitimate basis on which to seek something other than a life of domestic routine. And Daniel was the object that enabled her desire, who could, through his status as male and middle class, potentially provide the material support and respectability to make her missionary dream a reality. Given their compatibility in many other ways, it is perhaps not surprising that Janet

consented to marry Daniel, and, in July 1872, went to live with him in Echuca.

Once on the mission, Daniel and Janet to a large extent assumed the roles they had outlined for themselves two years before – Daniel as self-appointed saviour, and 'civilizer' of Aboriginal people, and Janet as his help-meet (in other words, chief mission worker) and exemplar of feminine virtue. With its high percentage of female residents, and a focus on the domestic, it could be argued that Maloga mission itself, like other nineteenth-century missions, was 'gendered feminine' – not just in the way that others saw it, but also in terms of the specific activities and approaches which were encouraged on it (Huber and Lutkehaus 1999, pp. 1–38). It was not for nothing that Daniel had written, on setting up the mission, that he was entering a 'new sphere of labour' (Cato 1993 [1976], p. 67). What this meant in practice was that most of the work fell upon Janet – while Daniel supervised the men working outside on the land, or concerned himself with letter and report-writing, Janet was left with the task of training the Aboriginal women in domestic duties, teaching children in the school, cooking, cleaning and overseeing the domestic management of the entire institution.

It was not only the missionaries who were marked by their gender for specific duties and behaviours. Through rearrangements of time, space and history on the mission, they sought to create a community that would reflect the structure and relationships of both the Family of God and the bourgeois nuclear family supposedly made in its image (Thomas 1992). And, while the 'family' constituted by missionaries and mission residents was far from nuclear, it acted as the model through which relationships on the mission were understood. In this schema Aboriginal people were assimilated into a family-like structure, in which Janet and Daniel positioned themselves in parental roles. In this way, the mission worked to deny the autonomy of Aboriginal families or kinship groups and rejected the authority of Aboriginal adults to teach, control or regulate their children, and in some cases, themselves. As an example of how these imperatives worked to define the limits of what Aboriginal faith, and Aboriginal gender could look like on the mission, we turn now to the 'conversions', and marriage of Sarah and Freddy Walker on Maloga Mission in March 1876.

Aboriginal conversion to Christianity at Maloga was a lengthy process monitored intensively by both Daniel and Janet. In order for a convert to be accepted into the fold, he or she had to prove their faith through continuing and consistent performances of modesty, piety, and sobriety. Just one slip of speech, expression, or action could call the convert's

commitment to God into question, and even when conversion seemed unimpeachable, the missionaries lived in constant fear of 'backsliders'. Once a Maloga resident had converted, however, they had access to enhanced privileges, rights and status. Converts were given increased responsibilities on the mission (such as Daniel's 'right hand man', Bagot Morgan, who was allowed to travel with him on recruiting drives), and were also the subject of Daniel's appeals for land and the right to vote.

Marriage on the mission was for Aboriginal people a similarly fraught process. The rewards, however, were undeniable – married couples were granted a private hut to themselves, and received increased respect from missionaries and the mission community at large. However, the stringent nature of Daniel's requirements meant that many couples on the mission were forced to wait months or even years before they could access privacy and respect for their relationships. The values the missionaries empha-sized when preparing Aboriginal converts for marriage were the same as those emphasized in most other Christian marriages in nineteenth cen-tury Australia: modesty, decorum, and obedience for the wife, and staunch self-sufficiency for the husband. Yet, unlike non-Aboriginal couples who entered into this same contract, who were answerable only to God and their spouse, Aboriginal couples were monitored and surveilled in almost every aspect of their married lives. And the primary model for Christian marriage on the mission was, of course, the missionaries' own. This was the context in which Sarah and Freddy Walker, already man and wife under Aboriginal law, would attempt, between October 1875 and March 1876, to be joined in a Christian marriage.

Sarah Walker had come to the mission in its first year of establish-ment with her son Herbert, but, disliking the fact that she was forced to do domestic work, had not stayed long. A little less than two years later, on a recruiting trip to nearby Moira Lakes, Daniel spotted her. He observed in his diary that during her period of absence she must have lived a 'life of debauchery and licentiousness'; with no other existing records about Sarah's life at this time it is impossible to know how she herself would have described her life at the Lakes (Matthews, 30 October 1875).[8] However, at this time she again agreed to come to Maloga, and her husband Freddy followed her to the mission soon afterwards. On their arrival the couple expressed a wish to be married in a Christian ceremony, but Daniel was initially hesitant, due to his perception that both were 'drunkards' and 'very low in morals'. In the third mission *Report*, he wrote that although they had for a length of time wished to be married, he had 'discountenanced it, until they both proved their determination to abandon strong drink' (Matthews, 17 March 1876).

How these refusals would have felt to Sarah and Freddy it is impossible to know. What is certain, however, is that they continued to petition him, and by early 1876 Daniel had finally agreed to their marriage. It is not clear why he did so; he certainly had not reported their conversions in his diary as was his custom. But for whatever reasons it came to pass that on the morning of Saturday 17 March, Daniel drove the couple into Moama, accompanied by a large party of friends and relatives. The Registrar not being at home, Daniel continued on to Echuca to ask the minister there to perform the ceremony, and, finally, the couple were married in a Christian ceremony that lasted just under an hour.

Daniel took it upon himself to record the event, writing in his diary that 'The marriage ceremony was very solemnly read by the reverend gentleman, and I think quite appreciated by the aboriginal audience' (Matthews, 17 March 1876). The party then returned to Maloga, where, Daniel reported: 'In a little while we were all seated around a well spread table … on which rested a large wedding cake, while compliments, good wishes, fruit and cake, were freely dispersed'. In the meantime, Janet modelled decorous female behaviour for the new bride by 'fitt[ing] up a neat and comfortable apartment for the newly married couple'. For the missionaries, Aboriginal marriages were red-letter days, always reported in detail and with enthusiasm in the annual mission *Reports*. They were also occasions on which the missionaries professed particular emotions – joy, love or sometimes misgivings – which reveal much about the ways in which they conceptualized their relationships with mission residents, and their own roles in brokering the mission's 'success'.[9] In this case Daniel concluded his account of the wedding by crowing: 'Who can estimate the value of this act of civilisation upon the temporal and eternal interests of Freddy and Sarah?' (Matthews, 17 March 1876).

Daniel had warmed to the theme, and the next day's services and bible lessons at the mission were all about marriages: 'The marriage in Cana of Galilee', 'Behold the bridegroom cometh', and 'The marriage of Isaac' were among the texts canvassed (Matthews, 17 March 1876). The latter of these is a story about filial obedience, in which Isaac submits to his father's decision that he should marry. The woman he is to marry, Rebekah, is only consulted after both her father and her brother have given their consent, and she, according to Christian readings of the text, is said to have believed that God's hand had selected her to be Isaac's wife, and thus agreed to go. The passage, according to scriptural commentators, is generally intended as a guide for parents who want to instruct their children to yield to, and respect, their authority. In the circumstances it is difficult not to read Daniel's inclusion of this text as

a direct justification of his own paternalistic behaviour in first refusing, and then putting himself at the centre, of Freddy and Sarah's marriage.

A week later, he reported again in his diary on the married couple, opining that Sarah's marriage seemed to have 'improved' her. This was evident, he wrote, in the fact that she 'does not yield so readily to fits of temper, and she is readier to assist in the various duties' (Matthews, 24 March 1876). By this account at least, it seems that Daniel celebrated Sarah's conversion and marriage not because it offered her freedom or agency, but because it appeared to have curbed her unruly nature, and made her a more productive and obedient domestic helper. Freddy, for his part, was encouraged by Daniel to seek employment outside the mission, thus cementing the male/female, public/private, station/mission divide which proved so disruptive to Aboriginal couples and families. And, despite their new status as a Christian couple, Freddy and Sarah's behaviour, both public and private, continued to be monitored by the missionaries.

In the coming years Daniel developed a non-tolerance policy on drinking or misbehaviour, which saw many Aboriginal men banned from the mission for months on end, forbidden to see their wives and children. His authoritative approach to enforcing prayer, teetotalism, and labour, and his intrusion into the lives of couples, whether married or unmarried, would continue as the years went by. Towards the end of his time at Maloga, as he became more frustrated and disillusioned, he even resorted to physical violence on occasion in order to enforce discipline. The missionary still saw himself as a father figure to the Aboriginal people of Maloga, and indeed many remembered him with respect and affection long after the mission's demise. Yet the gap between the universalist rhetoric of his evangelicalism, and the demands it made for cultural and spiritual homogenization, was an unavoidable source of conflict between the missionary and Maloga's Aboriginal residents.

How was it, then, that conversion to Christianity and marriage within the faith held so few of the boons for Freddy and Sarah which Daniel and Janet had experienced through their courtship and union? How could Christianity, which taught that 'all nations are made of one blood', offer Janet freedom from the mundane domesticity of the nuclear family, but shackle Sarah inevitably to it, or be used to attempt to undermine Freddy's patriarchal power when it undoubtedly reinforced Daniel's? These questions, in the end, had nothing to do with the missionaries' claims to a Christian doctrine of racial equality, and everything to do with the power structures they had instituted on the

mission – power structures which in so many ways reflected the hier-
archies of the broader settler colonial enterprise. This schema, as observed
above, positioned Janet and Daniel as mother and father figures, and
treated all Aboriginal people as their figurative children, to be tutored and
preached to, chastised and rewarded, as their missionary parents saw fit.
Unlike Janet and Daniel, Sarah and Freddy were not even entrusted with
the responsibility of identifying or maintaining their own faith. That, on
Maloga, was envisaged as a job for the missionaries.

Ultimately, while 'correct' performances of Christian masculinity
and femininity gave Daniel and Janet the means to adopt positions
of status and authority, their Aboriginal converts were limited in the
scope of what their performances of either faith or gender could entitle
them to. This contradictory dynamic – between what evangelical Christi-
anity promised its Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal adherents, and what it
delivered – played itself out in countless interactions on Maloga Mission
over the course of its fourteen years of operation.

The significance of this case study lies in its ability to demonstrate
both the ways in which Christian missionaries diverged from settler
colonial practices, and the fact that, ultimately, the missionary approach
to Aboriginal love and marriage was informed by an assimilationist 'logic
of elimination'. Missionaries such as the Matthews were actively opposed
to the contemporary government practice of turning a blind eye to the
physical violence which often constituted, and was explicitly intended by
some settlers as an attempt at, the extermination of Aboriginal people.
Yet the segregationist and assimilationist policies they developed and
promoted were equally designed to eliminate Aboriginal indigeneity.

The missionaries' willingness to impose their own will upon Aboriginal
marriages might seem surprising in the context of evangelical approaches
to the subject, which generally emphasized the right of both parties to
choose both their partner and the timing and the nature of their union
with him/her. The fact that Daniel and Janet Matthews chose to ignore
both their spiritual doctrine *and* the evidence of their own experience
illustrates just how important marriage was as a site of both Christian-
ization and 'civilization'– or, in other words, the key to Aboriginal assim-
ilation – for Australian missionaries. In this respect, albeit with arguably
'better intentions', the missionaries' approach to marriage was as informed
by the logic of elimination as the trigger-happy frontier settlers and the
disinterested colonial administrators they battled against. Though this
chapter has only considered one brief study of the missionary approach
to marriage, it is presented here as exemplary, in the hope that fresh
analysis will provoke fresh thinking around the roles – both material and

metaphysical – of missionaries and marriage in settler colonial projects of nation building.

Notes

1 While missionaries often expressed their joy at the high numbers of death-bed conversions to Christianity during this period, the lack of sustained conversions by healthy Aboriginal residents gave them real cause for concern. To have saved a soul was of inestimable divine worth, but did not help particularly with the ongoing work of spreading the faith amongst the convert's community.

2 As Susan Thorne (1999, p. 43) has noted, missionaries were increasingly convinced that '[h]eathen women , like their metropolitan counterparts, were the most important influence on their entire family's capacity for piety. It was they who would support or discourage their husbands through the sacrifices and suffering entailed in receiving Christ into their lives'. Joanna Cruickshank (2008, p. 118) has further commented that marriage was 'seen as a source of salvation or damnation: a means by which Aboriginal men could be "reclaimed" or by which Aboriginal women could "relapse" into "savage habits"'.

3 Aspects of this issue have been discussed in a previously published book chapter. See Claire McLisky (2008).

4 Unfortunately I have not been able to find any sources outside the Maloga reports appear to mention Freddy and Sarah Walker, and thus rely on Daniel Matthews' account of their lives and history, acknowledging the limitations that this places on my analysis. In his *Seventh Report* the missionary categorized mission residents, including Freddy and Sarah, into 'tribes' based on the areas they lived in before they came to the mission. Freddy was reported to have come from the Ulupna tribe, and Sarah from the Moira. The couple were also mentioned in the 2002 Australian High Court decision against the Yorta Yorta Native Title claim. Despite finding against the claimants (many of whom were descended from Freddy and Sarah), Justice Olney accepted that because Freddy's father Edward Walker, was born in the 1830s in the Moira area, there was 'a reasonable basis upon which to draw an inference that Edward Walker's antecedents were indigenous inhabitants in 1788 of the part of the claim area known as Moira' (Olney). For a Yorta Yorta perspective on the finding, see Atkinson (2001).

5 For discussions of the gendered nature of the imperial project, see Mary Huber and Nancy Lutkehaus (1999). For discussions of the gender dynamics on Christian missions, see Patricia Grimshaw (1989) and Jane Hunter (1984). In the Australian context, Hilary Carey (1995, 1998) has provided the most sustained analysis.

6 This and subsequent letters between Janet and Daniel can be found in Box 1 of the Norman Family Papers, PRG 422, Mortlock Library, South Australia.

7 Janet recalls this period in an unpublished document, 'Reminiscences', p. 4, Box 7, PRG 422, Norman Family Papers, Mortlock Library, South Australia.

8 All excerpts from Daniel's diary, including this one, are taken from the *Second Report of the Maloga Aboriginal Mission School*, *Murray River, New South Wales* (Echuca: Haverfield & Co., General Printers), pp. 9–20.

9   Despite the fact that most nineteenth-century mission reports are suffused with emotion, the realm of affect – its intimacies and its implications for power relationships – has been somewhat neglected in mission historiography. A recent article by Jane Haggis and Margaret Allen (2008) goes some way to redressing this absence.

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8

'Wanted! A Real White Australia': The Women's Movement, Whiteness and the Settler Colonial Project, 1900–1940

Jane Carey

> The race problem … is a women's problem, and the proper care and supervision of mental defectives and the gradual elimination of the unfit should be one of the responsibilities undertaken by associations of this kind … these defectives are a heavy charge on the nation, and an endeavour should be made by us to prevent the race from degenerating.
>
> > Mrs Pymm, delegate to the National Council of Women Congress, Sydney 1912 ('Women and the Race Problem', *Argus*, 2 August 1912).

> [T]he uncontrolled reproduction of the lowest types of humanity must result in the physical deterioration of the race … In a young, partially developed country like Australia the need for a virile stock to propagate the generations to come is particularly urgent … unless steps are taken to ensure the perpetuation of a healthy and normal population before it is too late, we will be inviting inevitable shipwreck as a people.
>
> > Lorna Hodgkinson, Superintendent of the Education of Mental Defectives, 1923 (evidence to the New South Wales Royal Commission on Lunacy Law and Administration, 1923, p. 660).

This chapter examines some of the new roles being claimed by white women in the settler colonial project of 'White Australia' in the early twentieth century. Focusing on the activities of the National Council of Women, then the country's largest women's group, and some prominent women reformers, it explores how ideas about race and nation, particularly the desire for a large and healthy white population

to secure the country's future, animated many of their projects. While exhibiting little interest in the 'Aboriginal problem', or the 'peril' of Asian immigration, their extensive campaigns around white racial betterment reveal an enthusiastic promotion of eugenics and racialized identifications. From early in the twentieth century 'mental deficiency' in particular was identified as one of the greatest threats to the future of the white race and an issue that needed urgent attention. Women's organizations advocated strong measures to combat this 'menace' – including segregating such unfit bodies into 'farm colonies' or other institutions, along with sterilization, to prevent their 'propagation'. At the same time they promoted women's work as essential in effecting these reforms. More significantly, as the opening quotations illustrate, their campaigns demonstrate how the 'race problem' in early twentieth-century Australia was frequently conceived entirely in terms of white racial health.

In Australia, the various ways in which the state, missionaries, scientists and others, have sought to eliminate, control and contain Aboriginal bodies has been extensively explored (Haebich 2000; Attwood 2003; Markus 1994; Reynolds 1982), as have the fears of 'Asian invasion' and resulting institution of the White Australia Policy at the nation's Federation in 1901 (Walker 1999). But these histories have rarely been linked, in Australia or elsewhere, to the concurrent obsessions with preventing white racial degeneracy or effecting white racial improvement. These obsessions revolved around the desire to enforce bodily controls in the intimate domains of sexuality and reproduction. Whiteness, built on fictive ideas of racial purity, was inextricably intertwined with concerns about bodies, sex, and 'miscegenation'. Such anxieties, I suggest, at times played a highly significant role in the making of racial categories in the colonial context.[1] This reached its apogee, or at least was most explicitly articulated, in settler colonies, where the maintenance of white supremacy was seen to be imperative to national identity and even survival. Founded as it was on the doctrine of the White Australia Policy (1901), Australia is perhaps exemplary of these transnational trends.[2]

The women's movement played a leading role in these endeavours, indicating how such bodily interventions were associated with women's work. While procreative imperatives are usually associated with moves to limit white women to their domestic and reproductive roles, to their status as 'mothers of the race' (Bacchi 1980; Davin 1978; Kline 2001), this chapter explores how, at the same time, these racial discourses were appropriated and promoted by elite women for their own ends, to support their reforming campaigns and their claims to expanding public roles. The substantial body of scholarship on the racial dimensions of the western

women's movement has so far concentrated on white women's constructions of themselves in relation to racial 'others' (see for example Burton 1994; Midgley 2007; Grimshaw 1996; Woollacott 2001; Newman 1999; Mohanty *et al* 1991). The voluminous, inward-looking discussions of whiteness, evident in the Australian women's movement from at least the early 1900s, have not, to date, received much attention. Although a few women eugenicists have attracted some scholarly interest (Bland 1993, pp. 222–49; Curthoys 1989; Bix 1997; Jones 1995; Robb 1998; Allen 2000), the broader links between race science, feminism, and white women's self-representations, in Australia or elsewhere, have yet to be fully examined.

Since eugenics was primarily concerned with reproductive protocols and the environments in which children were raised, it was an area in which claims to specifically feminine expertise could be made. Such interests flowed naturally from the racialized frames at the foundations of western feminism (Midgley 1998). Ideas of progress, Social Darwinism, eugenics, and other racial concepts were prominent within feminist rhetoric and the broader reform agenda of the women's movement from the late nineteenth century. The very phrase 'new woman' relied on evolutionary models. Such racial formulations operated as enabling discourses for elite women, who deployed them in support of their claims to wider public authority and status, not to mention actual employment in the work of promoting white racial health.

White women's racial mission

The granting of the vote to white Australian women in 1902, well before this reform was achieved in most other countries, left the middle-class women's movement freer to concentrate on constructively contributing to the 'new' nation. Race was a central concern of many of the projects they conceived. An early pamphlet describing the work of the National Council of Women of New South Wales described its mission for 'human betterment' in explicitly racial terms: 'While friendship is love between individuals, philanthropy is the love of the race – the stooping of the higher down to the lower … [we] are all working to the same end – the uplifting of the race' (National Council of Women of New South Wales, ~1895). This racial mission emerged out of the wider social context within which women's new duties were situated. As the Council's 1914 biennial report expressed it:

> Our great object is the welfare of the home, the education of the children, the health of the home and its environment, our duties

> not only to the home but to society … woman's duty [is] to her country and to humanity at large … There are few who can shroud themselves in the privacy of their homes without hearing in their hearts the summons to serve their fellow creatures in some way or another. It is a most holy call and high vocation. (1914, p. 8)

From an early point it was evident that the elite women of New South Wales were well-versed in the new racial philosophy and terminology which was developing with the rising influence of eugenics. In 1899, in one of the first papers delivered to the Council, Honor Fell, speaking on the topic of 'Women's Hospitals', began by pointing out that these were 'aids to scientific race culture and preservation' (National Council of Women of NSW, Minutes, 25 May 1899). The seemingly diverse agenda of the women's movement could with apparent ease be subsumed under the project of racial betterment. Thus Mrs Pymm, in the opening quotation to this chapter, summed up the major themes of the National Council of Women's 1912 interstate conference as revolving entirely around the 'race problem'.

The menace of mental deficiency became a central focus for these racial anxieties. In May 1918, with World War One still raging, the Women's Reform League of New South Wales selected this issue as the focal point for its annual Founder's Day conference. This interest resonated strongly with the organization's primary objective: 'To promote the highest advancement of the human race, spiritually, morally, materially and intellectually'. At this event Miss A.D.V. MacCallum, of the Lunacy Department's Reception House at Darlinghurst, forcefully argued the need for a psychiatric clinic to deal with the rising numbers of mental deficients, who were currently left 'free to breed': 'We talk of the calamity of race suicide and the necessity for an increased birth rate etc., but we overlook this tragedy of national suicide which must ensue upon an increasing proportion of degenerates'. Miss Bloomfield similarly emphasized the 'grave consequences to the community and the future race' in her paper on 'The Need of Control'. While Mrs Montefiore's concluding reflections, dealing more broadly with 'Eugenics', observed that 'a nation is only rich in so far as it is peopled by a race healthy in mind and body, and the increase of degenerates is an unmistakable sign of national decay' (*Woman's Voice*, pp. 1, 9, 11,12).

This event signalled what was to be a central concern for the women's movement in New South Wales in the postwar years. In 1919 the National Council of Women held a meeting where several papers were delivered on the issue. At this event Mr Green urged 'the need to

obtain legal control of the feebleminded for life. Without that the country would be flooded with the feebleminded', while Dr Grace Boelke, formerly a school medical inspector, argued that 'The state should not be threatened by the existence of 9000 feebleminded who were free and were allowed to marry' (Minutes, 28 August 1919). At the Council's next meeting Boelke, formerly a school medical inspector, convened a special committee to tackle this 'menace', arguing that the issue 'should rightly' be taken up by the Council, so that it 'might be credited with accomplishing a great national work' (Minutes, 25 September 1919).

The Council's annual report for that year highlighted the efforts which had been made in this direction and observed '[given] the appalling and ghastly tragedies resulting from the uncontrolled actions of the "Mentally Abnormal" it is surely the plain duty of this Council to continue without cessation agitation for reform' (1920, p. 8). In 1921 a resolution urging the 'pressing need' for legislation 'for the legal control and the segregation of the mentally unfit' was listed as the topic of first priority for the interstate conference (Minutes, 22 August 1921). Then in 1927, they hosted a conference on 'The need for the care of the abnormal and feebleminded child', as the Council's contribution to 'Health Week', after which a deputation to the Minister of Health 'urging urgent legislation' was organized. This argued the need for more facilities particularly 'graded institutions or colonies for their charge and permanent care when this is necessary' (National Council of Women of NSW 1928, p. 20).

The eugenic focus of the women's movement in New South Wales was also starkly revealed in the magazine *Herself*, a publication jointly produced by the State's major women's groups from 1928–1931. Its April 1929 issue was specifically designated 'The Eugenics Number', and included a report on the new Eugenics Study Group in Newcastle. This emphasized that knowledge of eugenics was 'essential if posterity is to be assured, a heritage of racial purity and efficiency' (*Herself* April 1929, p. 12). The previous month, a preview of this upcoming eugenics issue discussed a recently published sex education manual for mothers, Marion Piddington's *Tell Them!*, observing that 'Every mother in Australia should know what to tell her child, because WE ARE THE RACE and our mothers the guardians of it' (*Herself* March 1929, p. 8). The September 1929 edition reported on the eugenics study circles being set up around Sydney, and included a column entitled 'Women's Objective – A Perfect Race' which discussed the activities of the Australian Mothercraft Society (*Herself* September 1929, pp. 2, 16). The magazine also reported frequently on the activities of the Racial Hygiene Centre and on the National Council of Women's efforts to promote the segregation of the physically

and mentally 'unfit'. This message extended even into the magazine's advertising; one advertisement for Uncle Toby's Oats promoted this product on the basis that 'On Australia's mothers rests the responsibility of building a race Physically perfect' (*Herself* September 1930, p. 25).

The July 1930 edition included a column by Irene Longman, who had recently become the first woman elected to the Queensland parliament and was sometime president of that state's National Council of Women. Longman's article also included a section on 'Women's Objective – A Perfect Race', in which she argued that:

> Many of our most pressing difficulties … could be relieved by the scientific and courageous tackling of such problems as mental deficiency and other questions concerning the health of the race … *We women must seriously consider this terrible problem* … The women of our day and generation are more fitted than those of any other period to continue the great traditions of the race from which we have sprung. (*Herself* July 1930, p. 23)

The women of New South Wales were by no means alone in their concerns. The activities of the Australian National Council of Women (an umbrella organization encompassing hundreds of women's groups across the country) reveal the broad appeal of this racial mission. Discussions of 'mental deficiency' featured prominently at all of the Council's national conferences throughout the 1920s and 1930s. At the 1926 conference, after a special address on this issue, a resolution was passed to: 'impress on both Federal and State governments the urgent need for them to unite in taking uniform action on the matter of mental deficiency throughout the Commonwealth' (National Council of Women of Australia, Minutes of Annual Meetings, 23 July 1926). In 1928 a similar resolution urging the need for legislation was discussed at length, while at the 1929 meeting, a special evening forum was entirely devoted to 'Mental Deficiency'. At this event, as at previous conferences, warm support was expressed for the 'farm colony' solution. Edith Cowan, Australia's first woman member of parliament, went so far as to advocate that 'defective' children should be compulsorily removed from their parents, since 'Many parents did not realize the cruelty of keeping defective children among normal people' (Minutes of Annual Meetings, 19 September 1929). During a 1932 conference discussion, concerning 'mental deficiency with regard to segregation and sterilisation', Mrs Cumbrae Stewart of Queensland observed that: 'mental deficients were increasing. They should be segregated altogether, and most of her committee agreed that sterilisation should be brought in'

(Minutes of Annual Meetings, 22–25 November 1932). In 1936 yet another resolution gave 'vital support to the segregation of the Mentally Deficient', with Lillie Goodisson, of the Racial Hygiene Association of New South Wales, giving a long speech supporting this 'absolutely necessary' reform. South Australia abstained from voting on this resolution, but only on the grounds that 'there is a great difference of opinion in our Council whether children could not be sterilized, and so let them go free for the rest of their lives' (Minutes of Annual Meetings, 17 September 1936). Indeed, throughout the 1930s the Council went to considerable efforts to have segregation and sterilization placed on the agenda of the International Council of Women so that a global inquiry into the efficacy of these 'treatments' could be carried out.

Feminism and eugenics

The eugenic interests of the women's movement in New South Wales, and beyond, were exemplified, and in no small part fuelled, by the prominent sex education campaigner Marion Piddington, who was prominently featured in *Herself*.[3] Piddington's eugenic interests stemmed back at least to her attendance at the 1912 International Eugenics Conference in London. Although this Congress was dominated by male speakers, some of whom were overtly anti-feminist, Piddington must nonetheless have come away from this event convinced that women had a role to play in this great racial movement. And indeed, she was by no means alone in this conviction. The popular eugenics movement in Britain had in fact arisen largely due to the efforts of women, particularly the founding secretary of London's Eugenics Society, Sybil Gotto (Neville-Rolfe 1949, pp. 11–48; Bland 1993, pp. 222–49).

Although Piddington took a broad interest in eugenics, her life was dominated by a single ambition – her scheme for 'Faculative', 'Celibate', 'Scientific' or 'Eugenic Motherhood' to allow women (of good stock) who were left husbandless by WWI to have children through artificial insemination. Her 1916 booklet, *Via Nuova or Science & Maternity*, outlined the scheme in detail, emphasizing it was designed 'for the amelioration of individual and national destiny after the war such as will accord with the principles of modern eugenics' (p. 23). It was this work which brought her into contact with the infamous British birth control advocate and eugenicist Marie Stopes. Piddington's extensive correspondence with Stopes began in 1919 and continued for nearly twenty-five years. In her first letter Piddington wrote of her plans to send

information about her scheme 'to the Eugenicists everywhere. For I cannot think they will reject a scheme for race improvement ... Scientific Motherhood is <u>bound to come</u>' (Marie Stopes Papers 10 March 1919). Piddington was extremely heartened by Stopes's positive response to her ideas, which she published in the seventh edition of *Married Love* (Stopes 1919). Stopes in turn enlisted Piddington to promote her work and particularly her new Society for Constructive Birth Control and Racial Progress (Marie Stopes Papers 10 November 1921).

In 1926 Piddington published her major work, *Tell Them! Or the Second Stage of Mothercraft*, a treatise and practical guide for mothers to provide sex education to their children; this book contains some of Piddington's strongest eugenics pronouncements. It opened with a prefatory note quoting at length from Dr Mary Melendy's book *The Science of Eugenics and Sex Life*. And the final two chapters were devoted to 'Racial Prophylaxis', in which Piddington emphasized the need for both physical and mental 'Race improvement', the need to combat the racial poison of venereal disease, and 'the eugenic value of fear for the race' (p. 182). The book ended with a reflection on 'Racial Despair and Racial Hope':

> As a result of the war the race has lost a generation of the flower of its males and females as eugenic parents ... The hope of every race is in its Youth, the children the race are calling for good environment, those yet to come for sound heredity. (p. 199)

Piddington was constantly ambitious for her ideas and zealously pursued any avenue through which she thought they could be promoted, sending her work not only to Stopes and the British Eugenics Society, but to American eugenicists Charles Davenport and David Starr Jordon, and even to Freud. In 1923 she wrote to Stopes of her hopes 'to publish "Eugenic Celibate Motherhood" before long' (Marie Stopes Papers 15 June 1923). Piddington also wrote frequently to Stopes of her growing influence and how she was leading the interlinked movements for sex education, birth control, and eugenics in Australia. In 1929 she reported, 'Last year I held 270 classes with an attendance of 8000 persons. This year I hope to start a Eugenics Council ... only Eugenics can save the race' (Marie Stopes Papers 22 August 1928). She continued to publish articles and pamphlets on sex education, the racial poison of VD, and eugenics, and gave numerous sex education classes, taking rooms for this purpose from which, in 1931, she attempted to establish an Institute of Family

Relations (Piddington ~1929). She was also involved with the eugenics study circle established by the Women's Committee of the Workers Educational Association in 1921 (*Australian Highway* 1921–29).

As I have discussed in greater detail elsewhere, Piddington was also instrumental in the formation of the Racial Hygiene Association of New South Wales, forerunner of the present-day Family Planning Association. This was to become Australia's largest and most enduring eugenic organization, and it owed its existence to the extensive links between the women's movement and eugenics in this period (Carey 2009). Formed in Sydney in 1926, at a meeting arranged by the Women's League, the overwhelming majority of its active members were women. Indeed, as a report of an early meeting observed, 'It was noticeable that it was nearly all women who were bent on improving the race. Men were conspicuously absent' (Racial Hygiene Association Minutes, 23 June 1926). Although Piddington herself soon fell out with the Association, many other leading figures of the New South Wales women's movement joined its executive committee. The Association's activities included film screenings accompanied by lectures warning of the racial danger of VD. By 1927 it was claimed that numbers attending such meetings had grown from fifty to over 500. Numerous deputations were organized and sex education classes were held, initially run by Marion Piddington. In 1933 they opened Australia's first birth control clinic – the activity for which they are mainly remembered.

The Association's three objectives were to campaign for sex education, for the 'prevention and eradication of venereal diseases', and the 'Education of the Community on Eugenic Principles' (Minutes, 11 July 1927). All of its activities were in fact eugenically inspired. Promotional literature listed its birth control clinic under 'eugenic' work and claimed this offered 'advice [by] qualified medical women … for the improvement of the Race, by suitable mating, by clean living, and by preventing the propagation of the Mentally Unfit' (Racial Hygiene Association ~1933). And in 1936 they established a Marriage Advisory Centre to provide pre-marital medical examinations, which included 'mental tests'. All of these efforts were specifically directed at White Australia. As Judge Walter Bevan's address at the launch of the Association's appeal for funds in 1927, reported in the press under the headline 'Wanted! A Real White Australia', made clear: 'Are we going to have a White Australia; not merely white in skin, but white at heart – a really good, clean Australia?' (*Sydney Morning Herald* 23 June 1927). Nevertheless, although some prominent men lent their support to the cause and attended occasional high-profile special events, it was largely women

who undertook the actual work of the Association, and who actually attended its meetings. Evidently, saving the race was women's work.

Working for the race

Not only did white racial salvation provide a wide arena for elite women's activism, it also opened up new arenas of paid professional employment. Indeed, the anxieties surrounding white degeneracy produced numerous fields of work – particularly in the reformation of the working class who were seen as largely responsible for racial decay. Thus, early women kindergarten teachers argued that their work would 'combat the evil which heredity has wrought' (Brisbane Crèche and Kindergarten Association 1910, p. 126). As the Free Kindergarten Union of Victoria put it in 1915, this was:

> in the highest sense a national service … [We] must continue to fight for opportunities for the children of our race … [so] they may be trained physically, mentally and morally to become later worthy citizens of our glorious Empire. (p. 12)

They argued that, since: 'It is a generally accepted fact that our working-class population needs lessons in … how to bring up their children', this work required the 'right women … Women of education, from cultured homes' (Free Kindergarten Union of Victoria 1917, p. 7; 1913, p. 6).

In the 1920s, women were highly visible not only as activists but in the small but growing number of professional workers in the care of the 'feebleminded'. Indeed, three of the first four government psychologists appointed to such positions in Australia were women. Constance Davey, with a PhD in psychology from the University of London, became psychologist to the South Australian Department of Education in 1924, where she worked with 'mentally defective and sub-normal children' (*Age* 31 August 1935). Psychologists Lorna Hodgkinson and Ethel Stoneman were appointed to similar positions in New South Wales and Western Australia respectively at around the same time (Turtle 1990, 1993). Both of these women were confirmed eugenicists.

Lorna Hodgkinson began her teaching career in Western Australia in 1903, and from 1910 was in charge of a class for 'Mental Deficient Children' at the Perth Infants' School. She moved to Sydney in 1913, and from 1917 was appointed by the State Children's Relief Department to teach mentally defective girls in a 'cottage' institution known as May Villa. In 1920 she proceeded to America, at the Department's

expense, to complete a doctorate in education at Harvard University, writing her dissertation on 'A State Program for the Diagnosis and Treatment of Atypical Children in Public School Systems' (Legislative Assembly, NSW 1923, p. 983). On her return she was appointed as Superintendent of the Education of Mental Defectives. Hodgkinson was a firm believer in segregation. In an address at the 1929 conference of the Racial Hygiene Association, she argued that 'mental defectives are breeding freely and bringing … all the evils which are associated with mental degeneracy, such as crime, pauperism, venereal disease … money should be spent on scientific preventive measures … for our national progress'. Such a 'scientific scheme' demanded 'permanent care and control in properly established working colonies' (Hodgkinson 1929, pp. 35–6).

She had earlier attempted to effect such a programme in her professional work. Writing to the Minister for Education in April 1923 of the pressing 'need for a "Cottage Colony System", where the definitely feeble-minded can be treated, trained and, if necessary, segregated for life', she claimed there was virtually no provision for children in this class, and many had thus been placed in mental hospitals as there was no other place for them. 'For the work I am now doing I most urgently need a residential training school for 500 children, with room to extend the system later to accommodate 1,000'. Her attached report argued, 'Only a system of proper permanent care can ever solve this most fundamental of all social problems, namely, the propagation of the unfit'. She stressed that such institutions were running successfully across America, and that:

> Such an institution would be a beacon-light to the whole of Australia … I have brought with me from abroad every kind of information for the organisation, establishment, and conducting of such an institution … I have also the knowledge of this problem which the State needs, and I only ask you to give me the opportunity to use for the benefit of humanity. (Legislative Assembly, NSW 1923, pp. 984–6)

Hodgkinson, like many women involved in this area, took up her cause with missionary zeal. She possessed a strong conviction of her worth, and ability to do valuable work in the field. She did after all possess a doctorate from Harvard and had years of experience working with such 'unfortunate' children. She went so far as to request the incredible sum of £100,000 to implement the scheme. Her proposals were rebuffed. Instead, she found herself dismissed by the Education Department, ostensibly for having falsified her educational qualifications to gain

entry to Harvard, although the Department was clearly unimpressed by her public criticisms of its treatment of 'mentally deficient' children. Nevertheless, her criticisms weighed heavily with the Royal Commission on Lunacy Law and Administration, which was being conducted and which drew extensively on her evidence in its report. Her glowing assessment of the effectiveness of the 'colony' system in the United States was quoted at length, as was her ominous warning, cited at the beginning of this chapter, that:

> In a young, partially developed country like Australia the need for a virile stock to propagate the generations to come is particularly urgent … unless steps are taken to ensure the perpetuation of a healthy and normal population before it is too late, we will be inviting inevitable shipwreck as a people.

The Commission recommended the institution of a board of control, special schools and 'industrial and farm colonies' (Legislative Council, NSW, 1923, pp. 655–8). And in 1929 the Education Department did establish a residential school for mentally deficient children at Glenfield – an institution which Hodgkinson would have commended. Indeed she went on to establish her own private residential school for such children, one the few of its kind in Australia, which included an emphasis on training for self-sufficiency.

The invisible 'Aboriginal problem'

In contrast to the time and energy devoted to the arena of white racial health, the New South Wales National Council of Women, in common with most other states, paid relatively little attention to the 'Aboriginal problem'. It was not until 1913 that this issue first attracted some notice, with Mrs Edgley delivering an address on the Society for the Protection of Native Races (National Council of Women of NSW Minutes, 2 October 1913). Aside from some very occasional correspondence, this issue was not taken up again until 1933, when the Council became involved in efforts for the welfare and 'protection' of 'natives', particularly requesting that a white woman be appointed to the Aborigines Protection Board (Minutes, 5 October 1933; 2 November 1933). Over the next several years they engaged in a few similar activities. For example, in 1936 the Health and Child Welfare committee proposed a resolution that the Minister for Health should be asked to make the maternity bonus available to: 'all eligible aboriginals, and $^3/_4$ caste

women who are living under ordinary civilised condits. … such to be expended by the Aboriginals Protection Board in the best interest of the patient' (Minutes, 2 July 1936). This issue was also taken up, in the same terms, at a national level.

Such issues were also occasionally addressed at the Council's national conferences, where the discussions largely reflected the desire to prevent 'miscegenation' by banning contact between white men and Aboriginal women. The 1926 national conference passed four motions urging restrictions on the marriages and movements of Aboriginal peoples towards this end (National Council of Women of Australia, Minutes of Annual Meetings, 26 July 1926). In 1938, the lengthy discussion of a proposed new national Aboriginal policy which was then being put to the Federal Government articulated similar sentiments. The debates focused particularly on the programme of biological 'absorption' for 'half-castes' which was being promoted by key figures such as A.O. Neville, the Chief Protector of Aborigines in Western Australia. Mrs Cumbrae Stewart protested against this strongly: 'I am particularly against the blacks being absorbed in the whites. I think we all felt that way very much before' (Minutes of Annual Meetings, 14 September 1938).

Previously, at the 1934 Conference, newspaper reports that the Commonwealth Government was arranging for 'octoroon girls' from the north to be sent to Victoria for adoption 'so that they might grow up in decent surroundings and be able to marry white men' sparked a fierce and prolonged debate. One speaker argued:

> The Mendelian law says that the Australian aborigine does not show traces of any black blood at the octoroon degree … These girls are as fair as any of us. If they come, and they will come, it gives them a chance, and who is to know of the stigma of their birth?

Speaking strongly in support of the motion Mrs Bonnin deployed equally racialized frames:

> can you think what it means to a girl with a white skin to be told she must go and live in a blacks' camp? … You speak anxiously of the women who lose their nationality by marriage, and what to do for her. We should do something for these girls who have our own white blood in their veins. After all, why should we be so scared of a little bit of black blood? We have many nationalities in our race.

Arguing against this 'positive' outlook, Mrs Couchman observed: 'There is a great difference between mixed nationalities and mixed

races … I do not think they should be brought among the white people in the south, but they are our fellow-women and it is our duty to help them'. More harshly, another speaker contended it would be 'most dangerous' and suggested, 'It would be much better to sterilize them' (Minutes of Annual Meetings, 21 November 1934).

While some scholarship has characterized the Australian women's movement of this period as 'pro-Aboriginal' (Paisley 1997, 2000; Lake 1999), the limited activism undertaken in this area by the National Councils of Women hardly constituted a ringing endorsement of indigenous rights, or a commitment to racial equality. Rather the Council repeatedly expressed a firm belief in the idea of racial difference (see also Holland 2001). Moreover, although these campaigns have been the subject of significant scholarly attention, Aboriginal issues were not in fact a major area of women's activism. By contrast, the threat of white degeneration occupied a central place in the movement's reforming agenda.

* * * *

For many elite women the spectre of racial degeneracy loomed large, threatening the overturn of white supremacy. In undertaking the work required to combat this threat, they responded to some of the central racial concerns of this period, not only in Australia but across the western world. Anxieties about white degeneracy abounded in numerous settings (see for example Wray 2006; Soloway 1990). Such women simultaneously claimed an important new public role for themselves in securing the settler colonial project of white Australia *and* emerged as central agents in the spread of racial ideologies. Despite working largely through informal organizations, they carried on the national project through their activities. These discussions are thus significant beyond the women's movement alone. They point to the ways in which discourses of whiteness, like eugenics, formed a major domain in which racial thinking was being articulated. Their endeavours show how racialized thinking moved beyond the spheres of political rhetoric and scientific theorizing and came to influence the ways that white Australians constructed themselves and their role in national progress. It is only by recognizing whiteness too as 'race' that the racial frames permeating the women's movement, and indeed Australian society at large, are revealed.

Responding to an enquiry about steps being taken 'to maintain the racial qualities of the Australian in the future', an anonymous

correspondent to the *Eugenics Review* in 1916 detailed the racial landscape informing local priorities thus:

> the Emigration Act [*sic*], which is rigidly enforced, prevents ingress into Australia of undesirable aliens, of persons suffering from various disease … and of indigent persons. As the aboriginals of Australia have nearly disappeared, and do not intermarry save to a very slight extent with whites … [thus] the population is almost entirely a sturdy Anglo-Saxon one … intermarriage between races … hardly concerns Australia, inasmuch as the population may be considered almost entirely white … I am of opinion that it is essential to Australia that she should be quickly and efficiently populated so as to maintain her status in the world and prevent possible absorption by a foreign power … every encouragement should be given to emigration of suitable persons of white races. (*Eugenics Review* April 1916–January 1917, pp. 222–3)

In this instance the writer explicitly referenced 'aboriginals'. However as this chapter has demonstrated, articulations of whiteness were not necessarily dependent on the direct deployment of 'non-white others'. 'Internal' preoccupations with whiteness were not limited to Australia, but settler societies were particularly conducive to the formation of such racial anxieties. If, as Patrick Wolfe has argued, settler colonialism was driven by the 'the logic of elimination' in relation to Indigenous peoples (Wolfe 2006, p. 387), then the imperative of vigorous white propagation was its necessary corollary.

Notes

1 I am drawing here on Ann Stoler's observation that race was 'a central colonial sorting technique' and Patrick Wolfe's observations about the 'organizing grammar of race' underpinning settler colonialism (Stoler 2006, p. 2; Wolfe 2006, p. 387).
2 As Marilyn Lake has so acutely observed, the 'trans-national circulation of knowledge' was central to the construction of white identity (2003, pp. 247–8). And Lake and Reynolds's joint work charts 'the spread of "whiteness" as a transnational form of racial identification' (2008, p. 3). I have also argued the need both to situation whiteness in its proper transnational context, and to pay attention to its specific local or national formulations (Carey 2009; Carey 2007; Carey *et al* 2007). For other scholarship emphasizing the necessity for interrogating whiteness as a racial category see for example: Roediger 1991; hooks 1992; Morrison 1992; Frankenberg 1993; Moreton-Robinson 2000; and Anderson 2002.

3 Ann Curthoys has suggested that Piddington, and other Australian feminists, were primarily interested in eugenics as it offered support for birth control (Curthoys 1989).

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9

From the Indigenous to the Indigent: Homelessness and Settler Colonialism in Hawai'i

Laura E. Lyons

In April 2007, Genshiro Kawamoto, a real estate mogul known as the 'Donald Trump' of Japan, made the unprecedented and media attention-getting move of turning over keys to three of his many mansions in the Kahala neighbourhood of Honolulu to Native Hawaiian families. Promising these previously homeless families a rent-free place to live for at least the next ten years, Kawamoto further announced his intentions to convert another five of his twenty-two Kahala residences for the same purpose; he explained that because his business is primarily conducted out of Tokyo, any income from rentals on these multi-million dollar Hawai'i properties 'is pocket money to me' (CBS 2007). Kawamoto purportedly financed the acquisition of these Kahala residences by selling off 150 or so other O'ahu properties. Ironically, as his critics highlight, tenants of those properties were often given only one month's notice to vacate their premises.

More than a year later, Kawamoto's detractors point out that the other mansions remain unoccupied, some in obvious disrepair, and charge that his ostensibly charitable gesture is part of an elaborate plan on his part to drive down property values in one of the island's wealthiest districts. City Councilman for the area, Charles Djou argues that Kawamoto has 'taken a sledgehammer to the neighborhood' (Gomes 2008b). The Councilman further complains, 'A lot of the homes just sit there', noting that one in particular 'almost looks like an abandoned crack house' (Gomes 2008b). Still others attempted to charge Kawamoto with discrimination under the Fair Housing Act (FHA) because his offer of free Kahala housing was available only to Native Hawaiian families. The Office of Housing and Urban Development, however, found these accusations unmerited on the grounds that the FHA applies only to real estate transactions: because those living in Kawamoto's homes were not paying rent, no such transaction occurred (Gomes 2008a).

Meanwhile, homelessness throughout the Hawaiian islands, but especially for Native Hawaiians, continues to rise as the cost of living escalates, particularly with fluctuating gas prices, and soaring unemployment rates. Even before the fallout from the 2008 global financial crisis, social services have been stretched as never before. In response to the strain on resources, the Hawaii-state government recently announced that the Institute for Human Services (IHS), which runs shelters for the homeless, will begin charging a monthly fee of $90–180 per family or single person for those residing in their shelters for three or more months (Vorsino 2008). This new scheme, the IHS argues, will allow it to recoup some of its expenses and follows an increasingly common trend throughout the United States of charging the homeless for such social services as a way of encouraging budgeting and management of household expenses. Connie Mitchell, an Executive Director of two shelters in the industrial area of Honolulu, justifies the practice by explaining, 'I know it sounds counterintuitive to ask someone who is homeless to pay, but it really works. We really took a look at how we could empower people beyond the shelter' (Vorsino 2008).

Taken together these two events illustrate how both private and state-sponsored efforts on behalf of the homeless cannot extricate themselves from the web of paternalism, racism, and profit motive that have come to characterize public policy on the growing homeless problem throughout the United States, and particularly in Hawai'i. Kawamoto's ambiguously benevolent gesture towards Native Hawaiians points to the current waxing value of land for real estate speculation and development. His intentions aside, what the controversies generated by his philanthropic plan exemplify are the continued ways in which the economic value of land overwrites both the cultural value of land in indigenous terms, as well as its use-value as habitation. For its part, the IHS fee scheme is indicative of the waning resources appropriated for social services under neoliberalism. Underlying the justification for charging the homeless for their place in the shelter is the patronizing assumption that homelessness might be alleviated by instilling values such as individual economic responsibility, as realized through budgeting skills. This presumption leaves unquestioned the political and economic forces that have put housing beyond the reach of many, or that in the case of Hawai'i have quite literally pushed Native Hawaiians off of their land. Moreover, in the context of Hawai'i, these two events are also examples of the continuing dynamics of settler colonialism within which largely non-Native benefactors (who are sometimes difficult to distinguish from beneficiaries) determine who lives where, for how long, and at what price.

Such dynamics, as Patrick Wolfe reminds us, are at the core of settler colonialism. Wolfe argues that rather than view settler colonialism as a once-off event, we might understand it instead as a way of structuring social relations. He defines settler colonialism as 'an inclusive, land-centered project that coordinates a comprehensive range of agencies, from the metropolitan centre to the frontier encampment, with a view to eliminating Indigenous societies' (Wolfe 2006, p. 393). The expropriation of land and the concomitant elimination of natives from the land are, for Wolfe, the hallmarks of settler colonialism: 'territoriality is settler colonialism's specific, irreducible element. [...] as I put it, settler colonizers come to stay' (Wolfe 2006, p. 388). My concern in this chapter is with the ways in which statist and cultural discourses create a binary opposition between the 'unworthy' and the 'worthy' homeless. In Hawai'i, too often the former group is identified with Natives while the latter group has recently been comprised of non-Native agricultural workers deemed redundant by the contemporary economy. The claims of these workers, unfortunately, can serve as the rhetorical means to de-legitimate Native land rights.

In the history of settler colonialism, and most certainly in the case of Hawai'i, *staying* has often entailed the colonizer's literally putting down roots on Native soil. From 1848–50, the Māhele allowed for the privatization of land previously held widely in common. '[T]he ultimate effect of the Māhele', according to J. Kēhaulani Kauanui, 'was to create and introduce private ownership of land and commodification of labour and to accelerate the dislocation of Natives' (Kauanui 2008, p. 78). Such proprietary shifts from the mid-nineteenth century onward displaced native conceptions of stewardship of the land, or *aloha ā'ina*. Indeed, by some accounts within a five year period 75 per cent of the land was controlled by non-Hawaiians (Trask 1998, pp. 6–7).[1] These rapid changes enabled American businessmen to create sizable sugar, coffee, and pineapple plantations and ultimately facilitated the overthrow of the sovereign Hawaiian monarchy and the forced annexation and incorporation of the islands into the United States of America.[2]

Large-scale agriculture, then, has played a key role in the history of Native Hawaiian dispossession of land. As Patrick Wolfe argues, settled agriculture requires the elaboration of laws that uphold ownership of land as an individual right (Wolfe 2001, p. 869). 'In distinctly Lockean fashion', Wolfe explains, 'property in land resulted from the mixing of one's labour with it to render it a more efficient provider of wealth than it would have been if left in its natural state' (Wolfe 2001, p. 869). Plantations such as those that formed the basis of settler wealth in

Hawai'i for most of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, however, required much more than 'one's labour,' and quickly necessitated the importation of foreign labourers first from Japan and China and later from Korea, Portugal, Puerto Rico, the Philippines, and elsewhere in the Pacific.[3] Thus agricultural development in Hawai'i not only changed land use, that is, what happens on the land; it also to a large extent determined who would inhabit the land. The demographic makeup of the islands shifted so that non-Native groups now vastly outnumber Native Hawaiians. In the 2000 census, the state's racial makeup was roughly 41 per cent Asian, 23 per cent white, and 10 per cent Native Hawaiian and other Pacific Islanders (US Census 2000).[4]

Such disruptive transformations are part of the 'logic of elimination' that Wolfe delineates. For him, the elimination of Natives certainly involves the historical battles against indigenous people by settlers, whether waged physically or discursively through 'legal' instruments such as treaties – political events that might be relegated to a distant past deemed over and done, which nevertheless continue to effect the present. But he further argues that when we understand settler colonialism as a *structure* rather than as an event, we can comprehend the ways its 'complex social formation', though dynamic and responsive to historical changes and local specificities, also entails some 'continuity through time' (Wolfe 2006, p. 389). We might ask, then, how and to what effect for Native Hawaiians does the logic that yokes land and labour to produce private property rights prevail now that the service sector, and tourism in particular, has surpassed agricultural production as the economic base for the state? Discussions of the problem of homelessness in Hawai'i, I would argue, are informed by such an eliminatory logic. Indeed, the agrarian origins of settler colonialism in Hawai'i have been insidiously invoked in dealing with two different groups of people facing recent housing problems, Del Monte pineapple workers and the homeless. A comparison of public discourse on the housing problems faced by these different groups reveals how one of the tenets of settler colonialism – namely, that rights accrue to those deemed to make the land productive in the most base capitalistic terms – continues in remarkably bold forms.

On 17 June 2007, in the main newspaper for the island of O'ahu, *The Honolulu Advertiser*, the cover story announced that the number of homeless people on that island had risen almost 30 per cent over the previous two years (Hoover 2007).[5] Two surveys, one by the city and county of Honolulu and another by the state confirmed increases in homelessness on O'ahu, but these studies diverged on actual numbers

of people without homes. The city survey concluded that there were approximately 3,750 homeless people on the island and the state survey estimated slightly more than twice as many, or 7,825 (Hoover 2007). Both surveys focused exclusively on homeless people living outside of shelters, neither counted those in transitional housing. It is likely then that the percentage of homeless ranges from four to nine per cent of the total population of Oʻahu, in comparison to the national statistics that estimate approximately one per cent of the total US population to be homeless (National Coalition for the Homeless 2009). This sharp rise in homelessness and escalation of the comparative numbers of homeless is all the more devastating when we consider the fact that the areas of Oʻahu with the highest increases over the last two years are along the leeward, or Waianae coast, a part of the island with one of the higher populations of Native Hawaiians. Not surprisingly, and unfortunately, the number of homeless Native Hawaiians is disproportionate to their overall demographic profile. The two-year increase in homelessness serves as an indictment of the state and the city and county of Honolulu, which have repeatedly addressed the growing problem with criminalizing policies such as a new law that would make it illegal to sleep in public, evicting the homeless from beach encampments, and sweeping public parks (Star Bulletin 2009).

Such criminalization stems from rather outmoded conceptions of who the homeless are and how they became that way. The chronically homeless, for example, have typically been defined not only as those who have been without permanent housing for some time, but those who are also disabled in some way. According to the US-based non-profit National Alliance to End Homelessness, 'many chronically homeless people have a serious mental illness like schizophrenia and/or alcohol or drug addiction. Most chronically homeless individuals have been in treatment programs, sometimes on dozens of occasions' (National Alliance to End Homelessness 2007). These definitions are beginning to change to reflect duration and frequency of homelessness rather than cause, so that in Hawaiʻi the chronically homeless are now defined as those who have been homeless for more than a year, or three times in the past four years, and who typically have a disability (Hoover 2007).

As the US and Hawaiʻi economy weaken under the pressures of rising oil costs and depressed economic markets globally, the number of workers who find themselves homeless, as well as families without housing, will likely rise. The 2007 survey of homelessness on Oʻahu found that the Waianae coast had the largest percentage of homeless families: 37 per cent (Hoover 2007). According to the *Honolulu Advertiser*, most

of those 'living in 16 miles of tents along the coast are largely lower-income wage earners caught between runaway rents and a shrinking supply of living quarters' (Hoover 2007). A special report on the utilization of services available to the homeless found that 28 per cent of those in shelter and 38 per cent of those accessing outreach programmes to the homeless are Native Hawaiian (Center on the Family 2008, pp. 4–8). It is evident that Native Hawaiians are disproportionately affected by homelessness relative to other ethnic groups in the islands.

Given the history of the US dispossession of Native Hawaiians from their lands, we might see their higher rates of homelessness as an important, though frequently overlooked, part of the ongoing legacy of settler colonialism. Native Hawaiian scholar, sovereignty activist, and nationalist Haunani-Kay Trask has suggested that rather than wallow in guilt about the bad history that has brought settlers and tourists to Hawai'i, non-Natives can and should act in concrete ways to address the problems faced by homeless Native Hawaiians. In an interview, Trask states,

> [Hawaiians] are suffering and they're dying. They don't have land, they suffer ill health. When somebody once said to me, 'Well, what can I do? I can't give you anything', I said, 'You don't know that. Let me ask you. Do you own a house? Give it to me. Sign it over to me. Do you have a car? I got all these Hawaiians that are taking the bus from Waimanalo. Give it to me, and I'll give it to them. There's lots you could do, but you just want to cry and tell me that you feel badly for me. I don't need that. I don't need your feelings. I need two million acres of land that were stolen at the overthrow. (Franklin and Lyons 2004, p. 242)

At a meeting with officials from the United Church of Christ, Trask challenged them to put tangible actions with real material consequences behind their reconciliation efforts:

> I also told them, 'Christ says feed the hungry and clothe the homeless. Okay. Here is where all the homeless are. They're in Kapi'olani Park. They're being harassed in Makapu'u. They're being kicked out of Wai'anae. You go down there and you feed them'. (Franklin and Lyons 2004, p. 242)

Genshiro Kawamoto's act of giving three Native Hawaiian families free housing for ten years, though certainly an inadequate solution to

homelessness, nonetheless resonates with the ways that Trask throws back a discourse of personal responsibility at those living and doing business in Hawai'i.

The concrete link that Trask makes between colonialism and homelessness stands in stark contrast to discussions of these terms in postcolonial studies, where the nexus of nation and home is primarily, though not exclusively, discussed in one of two ways. In work that focuses on diaspora, 'homelessness' most often refers to no longer being resident in a country of origin. While such a state certainly has real, material effects, many of them no doubt negative, nonetheless this kind of homelessness is frequently posited as an existential condition, which offers the subject epistemological privilege.[6] In postcolonial and settler studies, 'homelessness' also sometimes refers to political refugees, or those who are stateless, and is frequently used to characterize victims of famine and warfare. The UN High Commission for Refugees, for example, reported that the number of refugees grew fourteen per cent in 2006, largely because of the 1.2 million Iraqis who sought refuge (primarily in Jordan or Syria) since the US war against that country began, making Iraqis along with Afghans, Somalis, and the Sudanese the four largest groups of refugees (CNN 2007). This kind of homelessness is also invoked in relation to Palestinians and their displacement and social subjugation by Israeli settlements, and their repression by the Israeli state. In both the Palestinian and Hawaiian contexts 'homelessness' serves as an apt metaphor for the lack of political sovereignty in territory to which these groups have historical claims: from house demolitions in the Occupied Territories to beach evictions in Hawai'i, we see how this metaphorical homelessness is rendered brutally literal.

While the Palestinian problem of being homeless in one's homeland can also describe Native Hawaiians' homelessness, this is a homelessness that is more typically understood on an individual level as the result of psychological problems. Even while the soaring cost of housing now joins drug abuse, mental health problems, and disabilities at the top of the list of causes for homelessness, little attention is given to why these problems disproportionately affect Native Hawaiians. Sociological and psychological approaches to homelessness in Hawai'i, as in most places in the US, often fail to address the historical causes and thus limit the potential to address the problem in political terms. Those in state agencies assimilate US continental explanations of homelessness and map them onto the homeless in Hawai'i. In the wake of the 1996 Welfare Reform Act, assistance for the homeless (and access to

social services more generally) is increasingly tied to a discourse of 'personal responsibility' and the prevalent belief that not all of the homeless are worthy of help.

I would argue that this process of categorizing the poor and homeless is consonant with the ways in which the state and its violence towards indigenous people is naturalized, relegated to the kind of past that many would prefer to view as done, if not 'settled'. Having once played a role in altering the way Natives use their land, the state now enlists the discourse of personal responsibility to explain homelessness and justify the increasingly draconian policies that affect the homeless. Personal responsibility ultimately consigns culpability for endemic homelessness to the homeless and so covers over the ways that dispossession is itself not a singular event but sets up sets of social relations that continue to have material consequences. This split between the deserving and the undeserving homeless, as well as the colonial origins of such categorizations, becomes particularly evident when comparing the coverage of a housing crisis faced by agricultural workers with that of homelessness in Hawai'i more generally.

In February 2006, Del Monte announced that it had planted its last crop of pineapple in Hawai'i at its Kunia Plantation on O'ahu, explaining that they were unable to get extensions on their leases from the Campbell Estate – one of the largest landowners in Hawai'i. Citing costs, Del Monte actually closed its operations in advance of its scheduled final harvest. The Del Monte pullout resulted in the loss of 776 jobs, of whom about 150–200 of those workers lived in plantation housing at Camp Kunia, which was at the time the last extant working residential plantation in the islands. Coverage of the Del Monte closing focused primarily on the plight of these workers. According to International Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's Union President, Fred Galsones, 'Many of them, often second-third generation plantation workers, still have yet to grasp the concept that *their way of life* is about to change' (Nasako 2006, pp. A1–2). Galsones and others argued that agricultural work constitutes not only a means to earn wages but also a 'way of life' worth preserving. The newspaper picked up Galsone's phrase reporting that the workers were waiting for a 'miracle announcement that somehow *their way of life* would continue' (Nasako 2006, pp. A1–2 [emphasis mine]). Evicting the older generations of workers, the Union insisted, would be particularly traumatic given their long-standing relationship to the Kunia lands.

The emphasis on the workers' 'way of life' may be seen as a last ditch, pragmatic attempt by Union officials to align the pineapple workers with

the Asian ascendancy in the state, many of whom rose through the plantation system to capture political hegemony. My point here is not to pit the Del Monte workers, who are overwhelmingly second and third-generation Filipinos, against Native Hawaiians, or even the homeless more generally. Rather, it is to understand what appeals the union officials found most efficacious and why. Local Asian settlers, as Eiko Kosasa has shown, have gained their hegemony largely by buying into a 'nation of immigrants' ideology that ignores Native Hawaiian claims to land (Kosasa 2004). Haunani-Kay Trask explains the nostalgia such narratives generate:

> The ideology weaves a story of success: poor Japanese, Chinese, and Filipino settlers supplied the labor for wealthy, white sugar planters during the long period of the Territory (1900–1959). Exploitative plantation conditions thus underpin a master narrative of hard work and the endlessly celebrated triumph over anti-Asian racism'. (Trask 2000, p. 2)

Similarly to Patrick Wolfe, Trask foregrounds the political power that accrues to agricultural labour at the same time that Natives' rights to their land are written out of the dominant narrative.

The resolution of the housing crisis faced by the laid-off Del Monte workers itself speaks to value of land as real estate – that is, as a commodity whose exchange value complicates any straightforward notion of use value. In May 2008, the city of Honolulu announced that it had negotiated a deal with the James Campbell Company to sell the plantation houses for $1.00 to the Hawai'i Agricultural Research Center, a non-profit organization formed to manage the Kunia homes as affordable rentals for agricultural workers and retirees (Boylan 2008). The James Campbell Company also agreed to make improvements to the infrastructure of the camp, in exchange for the right to claim the 115 or so homes towards its required set-aside of affordable homes on a housing development elsewhere on the island. For its part, the city received twenty acres of land needed to accommodate its light rail project, two new daycare centres, and a fire station. The deal covers only a small amount of the land that Del Monte returned to James Campbell Company when the fruit and vegetable company left Hawai'i. Some of that land is part of an Environmental Protection Agency superfund, previously mandated to undergo a federal clean-up in order to rid it of an accumulation of pesticide and other chemical contaminants. More ironic and particularly chilling, however, was the announcement at the

end of April 2007 that Army Hawai'i Family Housing, a joint part-
nership between the US Army and ACTUS (a private developer of
residential communities for the military) had bought 2,500 acres of the
Kunia land from the Campbell Estate for what it called 'future needs'
(Magin 2007).

At roughly the same time as ILWU representatives and the city searched
for a feasible housing solution for the Del Monte workers, the problem of
homelessness in Hawai'i was making (and continues to make) news head-
lines, perhaps most memorably in 2007 when Honolulu Mayor Mufi
Hanneman responded to the growing problem by removing the homeless
from Ala Moana Beach Park and moving many to a warehouse-like
shelter in Kaka'ako, the industrial heart of the city. Hanneman hoped
that two new shelters on the Waianae coast would decrease the amount
of visible homeless in that area. Similarly camping permits are being
limited and enforced on that coast as well as along the North Shore
of O'ahu, where homeless families living in cars at Mokuleia Beach Park
are repeatedly told to remove their vehicles or risk having them towed
(Aguilar 2007).

Media coverage and letters to the editor about this problem fre-
quently cast the homeless as 'eyesores' threatening to the state's par-
adise image or as a menacing presence that makes the beach park
unwelcoming for locals and visitors. At times the homeless are even
castigated for being selfish. Michael Lyons, Chairman of the North
Shore Neighborhood Board, asserts that the 'homeless are taking over
some beaches and aren't sharing …. The beaches belong to the com-
munity not just a few' (Aguilar 2007, p. B5). Lyons's comment demon-
strates how those, who can afford property on or near the beach, can
hijack for their own benefit those laws that say no-one (with the excep-
tion of the military) can restrict access to the beach; laws that were
made to keep wealthy, private landowners in check. Moreover, Lyons
displays an ignorance of the importance cultural and material values
that beaches hold for Native Hawaiians.

These two crises around housing, involving different segments of
Hawai'i's population, raise for me important questions about who has
a right to a home, what constitutes a legitimately recognized home,
who has claim to a given piece of land and under what circumstances
that claim will be recognized, and what it means to use land properly
or productively. How the state and other agencies, groups or corpor-
ations respond to housing crises says a great deal about how these
questions get answered. It is in the state's interest to differentiate between
forms of homelessness, creating one category for those deemed worthy

of housing (and whose homelessness is understood as a misfortune), and another category for those whose presumed vices make them undeserving of accommodations and whose homelessness is in itself viewed as a 'criminal activity'.

Although it has now ended, the pineapple workers' labour, renders these workers as having a 'productive' relationship to the land. In managing this housing crisis for its union members, the ILWU found it useful to make appeals that linked the specific kind of labour the workers performed to their rights to housing – a strategy that worked for some but not all of the former Del Monte employees. Commenting on the deal over the plantation homes, Fred Galsones noted with regret: 'Many of the current residents will be displaced because they are no longer working in agriculture. These families have worked long and hard, and they truly deserve the housing security this agreement will help provide' (Boylan 2008). By contrast, efforts by the homeless to survive, raise families, and build communities on beaches and parks in one of the most expensive real estate markets in the US, in the face of ever-dwindling state assistance, cast them as a blight on the landscape, damaging to the state's touristic image. The different treatment that these two groups receive demonstrates the privileged place that agricultural labour still occupies in the politics of the state and the devastating results settler colonialism continues to have on Native Hawaiians.

Settler colonialism in Hawai'i was accomplished in part through large-scale agricultural production; as agriculture's economic importance in the state declines, we see the difficult and ongoing legacy that settlement has had for Native Hawaiians. The conjoining of land and labour to underwrite private property rights under settler colonialism continues to have remarkable political currency today. Taken together the media coverage of the pineapple workers and the homeless exposes, naturalizes, and perpetuates a capitalistic and settler centred relation to land in Hawai'i. Indeed we might say that from its beginnings the logic of settler colonialism, in Hawai'i as elsewhere, is structured around the transformation of the indigenous into the indigent.

Notes

1   For a detailed treatment of the Māhele, see Kamaʻelehiwa's *Native Land and Foreign Desires* (1992).
2   For a compelling account of Hawaiian nationhood from a Native Hawaiian historian, see Jonathan Kamakawiwoʻole Osorio's *Dismembering Lahui: A History of the Hawaiian Nation to 1887* (2002). Noenoe Silva's groundbreaking book, *Aloha Betrayed: Native Hawaiian Resistance to American Colonialism*

(2004) is particularly noteworthy for using Hawaiian language sources to uncover the magnitude of Native Hawaiian resistance to American denigration of their culture and illegal occupation of their nation.

3 For a thorough discussion of Asian settler ascendancy in Hawai'i, see Candace Fujikane's introduction to *Asian Settler Colonialism: From Local Governance to the Habits of Everyday Life in Hawai'i* (2008).

4 These statistics represent those who chose to identify primarily as one race, but an additional 21 per cent of respondents chose to identify with two or more racial categories.

5 The term 'homeless' is itself controversial with many activists and organizations preferring the designation 'houseless' for its greater architectural accuracy and less value-laden sensibility. For the purposes of this article, I use the term 'homeless' both because of its greater currency in the literature and for the ways it can refer both to dwellings and to a geographically and politically defined homeland.

6 See in particular Aijaz Ahmad's elaboration of this point in relation to Salman Rushdie in his book *In Theory: Classes, Nations, Literatures* (1993), pp. 123–57.

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10
Searching for the 'C' Word: Museums, Art Galleries, and Settler Colonialism in Hawai'i

Karen K. Kosasa

Introduction – settler ignorance

According to Hawaiian scholar, poet, and nationalist Haunani-Kay Trask, the settler population resides in Hawai'i without understanding the islands' colonial history and, in particular, the oppression of the indigenous population and the expropriation of indigenous land.[1] Not knowing this 'other' history is a way for settlers to maintain their innocence while asserting 'imperialist privilege' and hiding behind 'American ignorance' (Trask 1996, p. 912). This chapter is about searching for references to this other settler colonial history in the spaces of museums and art galleries in Hawai'i.

Historically, after the 1893 overthrow of the Hawaiian kingdom by white businessmen and the United States military, non-indigenous activities in civil society assisted with the transformation of an indigenous place into an American settler colony. It was accomplished by white settlers with the eventual assistance of a large population of Asian settlers. Many of the latter were brought to Hawai'i, beginning in the 1850s, as labourers to work on white-owned sugar plantations. Almost a century later, Asian settlers, especially those of Japanese ancestry, rose to political power in the Territorial and Hawai'i State governments as a result of a colonial structure that benefited the settler population over the indigenous people.[2]

Within the colony of Hawai'i today, settlers avoid references to colonialism or only obliquely allude to its political existence. These rhetorical erasures and tactics of avoidance are strategic. Settlers are largely unaware of the existence of colonialism and their participation in it. Central to my research are these questions: How is the maintenance of colonialism *an educational project*? How do art galleries and museums – sites

of informal learning – participate in the naturalization of colonialism in Hawai'i by educating settlers to ignore it?

My experiences as a visual artist, teacher of studio art, and director of a museum's studies programme inform the sites of my research – exhibitions in museums, art galleries, and related places. It is driven, however, by my ethical obligation as a Japanese-American settler to understand my role as a colonizer, and my educational obligation as a teacher to confront difficult knowledge, the things we cannot bear to know. At issue is an ethical and pedagogical concern: that cultural institutions like art galleries and museums should educate the public about settler colonialism and the history of US occupation.[3]

Museums and hegemony

In *Museums and Communities* (1992), editor Ivan Karp describes the crucial role played by museums. In their function as repositories of cultural objects and disseminators of cultural knowledge, they contribute to the shaping of social identities within a nation. Grounding his analysis on the theoretical work of Antonio Gramsci, Karp explains the importance of the museum's strategic location within civil society (Karp 1992, p. 4). Unlike governmental agencies (for example, the military, police, and judicial systems), which control citizens through coercion or its threat, the agencies of civil society (for example, schools, the media, and museums) regulate citizens by eliciting their consent, or what Gramsci identifies as hegemony. The 'cultural and moral systems' associated with museums and the institutions of civil society educate visitors to 'legitimate the existing social order' (Karp 1992, p. 4).

Museums are pre-eminent sites of hegemony. Through their meaning-making activities, they help to define and legitimate the values of the dominant social group and naturalize existing social hierarchies. In Hawai'i, they are respected sites of informal learning where settler colonialism is legitimated through an absence of information, and this chapter demonstrates how museums are involved in this pedagogical process.

Interpretive frameworks and written texts

The study of semiotics has shown us that signs have variable meanings depending on the contexts in which they are read. In a similar manner, objects and images in museums have more than one meaning. These meanings are not implicit or stable but emerge within frameworks of interpretation that 'anchor the endless play of signification, and make provisional closure possible' (Hooper-Greenhill 2000, p. 111). Therefore,

museums must develop specific narratives or frameworks of interpretation that convey particular messages to the visitor (for example, asserting the existence of settler colonialism). These narratives, generally developed by a curator or an exhibition team, are constituted by the entirety of an exhibition – the presentation of objects/images along with the design of the space, explanatory text and labels, visual aids, and other supporting materials. In addition, outside the gallery space, catalogues, websites, lectures, and educational programmes reinforce and extend the messages in an exhibition.

I am particularly interested in how written texts help to shape narrative frameworks and how these frameworks generate meanings and interpretations. Toward this end, I have been documenting references to colonialism or settler colonialism in Hawai'i in the form of written wall texts, labels, and captions in exhibitions, and in explicit uses of the word 'colonialism' and its variations ('colony', 'colonized', 'colonial', and so on), as well as references to related activities such as imperialism, invasion, and occupation.[4]

Searching for the 'C' word in Hawai'i

A. *Art of the Philippines,* Honolulu Academy of Arts, Honolulu

My first example is an exhibition in Hawai'i, but not *on* Hawai'i at the Honolulu Academy of Arts, a prominent settler art museum. In the *Art of the Philippines,* one of the two introductory text panels describing the history of Spanish and American conquest carefully avoids direct or overtly negative terms:

> In the 16th century, Spanish explorers made the first European contact with the Filipino people. Over the next 350 years, *Spanish political and religious control resulted in the flourishing of Christian religious art, largely replacing the indigenous art forms*. Only in the mountainous regions of northern Luzon, the interior of Mindanao, the Sulu Archipelago, and other isolated areas did existing cultures maintain their traditional arts. [6th paragraph, my emphasis in these and all subsequent quotations]

> In 1893, Spanish rule in the Philippines ended. After a brief period of independence, the islands *came under the control of the United States* before gaining full independence in 1946. [7th paragraph][5]

While it is important to emphasize the resiliency of the Filipino people and their eventual attainment of political independence, it is

disturbing to note the positive slant of the narrative treatment of the Spanish takeover and the seemingly objective portrayal of the American presence in the Philippines. I refer to the passages above that state that Spanish colonialism resulted in the '*flourishing* of Christian religious art', and the use of the word 'control' to hide the deceptions and betrayals of US imperialism.[6]

   In another section further into this permanent and still running exhibition, I finally found references to colonialism on a panel titled 'The Philippines and the Introduction of Christianity':

> In 1521, Ferdinand Magellan made the first European landing in the Philippines and prepared the way for subsequent exploration and *colonization …* It was not until 1565 that Miguel Lopez de Legazpi founded the Spanish settlement of Cebu, and six more years passed before the town that was to become the modern city of Manila was declared the capital of the new Spanish *colony*. [1st paragraph]

Within the narrative framework of this paragraph and the thematic backdrop of other texts in the exhibition, the terms 'colonization' and 'colony' are not used here to expose the brutalities of colonialism nor the political subjugation of the indigenous peoples. They function to naturalize colonization as part of a bloodless trajectory that began with exploration and led to the founding of the colonial settlement that became modern Manila. As evident here, finding written references to colonialism does not guarantee that its negative practices are exposed.[7]

   Although the *Art of the Philippines* texts here refer to political subjugation in a place other than Hawaiʻi, they exemplify two problems confronting gallery spaces in Hawaiʻi – the reluctance to name 'colonialism' and/or portray its brutalities, and the refusal to name American imperialism and colonization.[8] In light of this problem, it should come as no surprise that I found very few references to 'colonialism' in text panels or labels during my visits to museums in the islands. In addition, because settler colonialism is not widely understood, it is nearly impossible to find specific references to this form of colonialism. For the most part, settlers in Hawaiʻi associate colonialism with the conquest of distant lands by European nations, especially in Africa, Asia, and parts of Oceania. Settler colonialism, wherein colonists settle the land belonging to indigenous peoples through a complex range of strategies is especially difficult for US citizens to comprehend or for museum curators to acknowledge.

B. *Life in the Pacific of the 1700s: The Cook/Forster Collection of the Georg August University of Göttingen,* **Honolulu Academy of Arts, Honolulu**[9]

In 2006, an exhibition of international importance opened in the same art museum where *The Philippines* exhibition is located. *Life in the Pacific of the 1700s* at the Honolulu Academy of Arts featured approximately 500 objects from Aotearoa (New Zealand), Tonga, Tahiti and the Society Islands, the Marquesas, New Hebrides, New Caledonia, Hawai'i, and the Pacific Northwest, collected during the second and third voyages of Captain James Cook and his crew in the eighteenth century (1728–79).

Captain Cook was killed by Hawaiian warriors at Kealakekua Bay in Hawai'i in 1779. Hence, this exhibition, which featured the tangible evidence of his encounters with Oceanic peoples, was widely anticipated. One local reviewer described it in terms of a celebratory homecoming 'across two centuries and thousands of miles' (Morse 2006, p. 7). Interestingly, the exhibition did little to address the intervening time and geographic distance between the collecting of the objects and their 'return' or, more accurately, their loan from a university research collection in Germany. In light of the work of Edward Said and postcolonial scholars on the affiliations between culture and imperialism, it was disappointing to find no references to the links between the voyages of Cook and the colonial histories that followed, or between the collecting of objects in Oceania and the production of colonial knowledge about them by European museums and universities. According to the Academy of Arts' director, since the primary content of the exhibition was pre-contact societies, it was not obligated to address post-contact colonial histories (Little 2006).

Although overt references to colonial histories were not available within the spaces of the exhibition, they could not be completely avoided outside of it. At a three-day symposium on the exhibition, the keynote speaker, Brigitta Hauser-Schäublin, acknowledged that viewing the collection was no simple matter. She pointed out that the objects themselves were affected by contact and colonial histories, and that their meanings were contingent on different viewing and representational practices (Hauser-Schäublin 2006). Other references to colonialism followed in the symposium presentations and a few appeared in the exhibition catalogue.

The fact that I found explicit references to colonial histories outside the galleries but none within them is troubling. A museum's galleries are the primary spaces where visitors learn about the material culture on display. The choice of texts or didactic materials to be included, or

excluded, is the result of a careful exhibition development process. Beverly Serrell, an authority on exhibition labels is highly critical of displays that present 'vague' interpretive perspectives on the pretext of allowing visitors to 'find their own meanings'. She explains that these exhibitions do not hold themselves accountable for having a particular impact on visitors (Serrell 1996, p. 9). Following Serrell, I would argue that the Academy of Arts abandoned its responsibility to help visitors understand how European and American colonial practices informed and misinformed our knowledge of the collected objects and their cultures of origin.

C. *Abigail Kinoiki Kekaulike Kahili Room*, Bishop Museum, Honolulu

The Bishop Museum is one of the largest and most prestigious museums in the islands. Its vast holdings of ethnographic and natural science materials from Hawai'i and the Pacific are highly regarded by scholars of the region. In its famous *Kahili Room,* displays of Hawaiian *kahili* (feather standards that were traditional symbols of the chiefly class) flank portraits of the monarchs of the Hawaiian Kingdom who ruled from 1810 to 1893. Here, my interest is in the text panel installed in front of a large photographic portrait of the last reigning monarch, Queen Lili'uokalani. Three paragraphs on the panel's left side briefly describe important events in her two-year rule. The central and right sections of the Lili'uokalani panel serve as standard 'object' lessons in the museological tradition of 'show and tell'. They feature a photograph of the queen with a written reference to her trip to Washington, D.C.; a fragment of music notation from a famous song she wrote, '*Aloha "Oe"*', with a reference to her talent as a composer; and a gold bracelet mounted in a small vitrine with a descriptive caption below it.

The following are the panel's title and the second paragraph from the introductory text section:

<div align="center">

Queen Lili'uokalani
Reign 1891–1893
Onipa'a
Stand Firm!

</div>

In 1893, Queen Lili'uokalani introduced a draft of a new constitution to restore the power to the monarchy relinquished during earlier reigns. This move alarmed the business community who formed a 'Committee of Safety' to protect their interests. On January 17,

1893, the *Committee abolished the Hawaiian monarchy* and established a provisional government in its place. In 1898*, the Hawaiian Islands formally became part of the United States.*

Although the entire panel pivots around the theme of why and how Lili'uokalani's rule came to an end, its textual references to the 'abolition' of the monarchy by an officious sounding 'Committee', the 'establishment' of a provisional government, and the process of 'formally' making the Hawaiian kingdom 'part of the United States' do not convey the gravity nor underscore the illegality of the violent acts that forced the queen to abdicate and led to the loss of Hawaiian political independence. It is only in the lower right corner of the panel that we find the more pointed and accurate term 'overthrow' used. It is incorporated into the caption for the bracelet:

The engraving inscription on the inside reads 'Liliuokalani Jan 5…93.' Twelve days later her attempt to promulgate a new Constitution resulted in the *overthrow* of the Hawaiian monarchy.

Despite the bold use of the term 'overthrow' here, its rhetorical ability to disrupt the panel's naturalization of the events that brought the queen's reign to an end is limited, as is its ability to urge readers to question the legality of the United States' presence in the islands. First, the term is not found in the introductory passages located on the left side of the panel that most visitors first read and some visitors will only read. Its slightly smaller font size from this main text and its placement in the extreme right corner subtly signals its relative unimportance. Second, it is used in a caption for a piece of jewelry and not for describing the historic context of the queen's rule in the introductory text. Third, its ability to forcefully describe a violation of international law that continues to have political, economic, and cultural consequences for many Hawaiians is undercut by a more prominently located sentence at the end of the third and final paragraph of the introductory text section.

Though the Queen persisted in campaigning for the return of the kingdom, her efforts were unsuccessful. *Lili'uokalani, however, still reigns as queen in the hearts of her people.* [3rd paragraph]

This last sentence functions as a poignant narrative coda. It subtly suggests that the story about the monarchy (and the Hawaiian government)

came to a definitive, albeit, sad end. The queen must symbolically reign in 'the hearts of her people' because she has no other place to rule.

There are other ways to interpret this panel. Instead of encountering a fatal story, some visitors may find subtle messages of hope and resistance and use them to read against the dominant story about the end of Hawaiian sovereignty. For example, the Hawaiian word '*Onipa'a!*' and its English translation 'Stand Firm!' written at the top of the panel may remind readers of its association with a 1993 march of 10,000 people in Honolulu, primarily Hawaiians, to protest and mourn the 1893 overthrow. But this alternative reading is dependent on visitors who come to the museum with prior knowledge about Hawaiian history, the illegal presence of the US in Hawai'i, and the importance of the contemporary independence movement. As a settler educator, I am primarily interested in how the Bishop Museum as well as other settler museums should educate uninformed visitors, especially US settlers who are not aware of the violations perpetrated by the United States against the Hawaiian nation, and who are not aware of the larger context of settler colonialism or US occupation in the islands. As might be expected, I found no references to this larger context – no mention of US imperialism, [settler] colonialism, or occupation in the *Kahili Room*.

Disturbing the visitor

Historian Eric Foner believes museums are reluctant to present information that challenges the expected ways of describing historical events for fear of alienating audiences (Foner quoted in Arroyo 2006, p. 46). In order to boost attendance, museums tend to oversimplify their messages and present historical narratives that will not disturb visitors' preconceived ideas. According to Foner, however, visitors are capable of understand disturbing information if it is placed in historical context. He points to the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum in Washington, D.C., as a successful example.

Ruth Abram, the founding director of the Lower East Side Tenement Museum in New York City, makes a related point about the failure of historic sites to represent the complexity of their histories. She describes the difficulty she encountered with finding colleagues in the US who were seriously committed to providing a 'usable past'. For Abram, this means making the implicit power of history explicit by helping people make connections between past problems and present day concerns (Abram 2002, pp. 126–7). Through one of its educational programmes, the Tenement Museum encourages students to identify contemporary violations of housing laws after studying the history of housing reform in the early twen-

tieth century. The histories represented at Abram's site are used as tools to emphasize the responsibilities of citizens in a democracy and to educate future community leaders and social activists (Abram 2002, p. 130).

In her book *Lost Subject, Contested Objects,* educator Deborah Britzman explains the necessity and results of learning from horrific historical events. She describes the things we cannot bear to know as 'difficult knowledge' (Britzman 1998, p. 2). Difficult knowledge includes the 'traumatic residuals of genocide, ethnic hatred, aggression, and forms of state-sanctioned – and hence legal – social violence' (Britzman 1998, p. 117). Here, the educational process induces an unacknowledged internal trauma as we learn what we did not know, and recognize the inadequacy of our belated response. True learning, Britzman warns, always involves a process of interference. Education must *interfere* with what we know about ourselves, directly challenging our ego and its understanding of the world and our relationships within it.

Britzman's insights can help us to understand that learning about settler colonialism in Hawai'i and in the continental US involves the learning of difficult knowledge. For many US settlers, it will interfere with their conceptions of the United States and its citizens. Following the challenges raised by Britzman, Foner, and Abram, museums in Hawai'i, as educational institutions, must find ways to help visitors grapple with the difficult knowledge of settler colonialism. This will entail encouraging visitors to acknowledge their participation within a colonial society and to recognize their ethical obligation to counter present day colonial practices.

Educating settlers

As mentioned earlier, the absence of textual references to colonialism in museums reinforces the ideology of the dominant settler culture. Museums are thus involved in the production of settler colonialism and the production of ignorant settlers who are oblivious to colonialism despite the wealth of contradictory information provided by indigenous peoples and scholars. By naming colonialism, the museum could become involved in the educational project of decolonization. For example, if settler visitors to the *Kahili Room* were to encounter the following text on the Lili'uokalani panel in the introductory section, they would learn of the existence of settler colonialism in the United States, some for the first time.

> [...] On January 17, 1893, the Committee along with the US military overthrew the Hawaiian government and established a provisional

government in its place. In 1898, the Hawaiian Islands were illegally annexed by the United States. These acts of imperialism facilitated the establishment of American settler colonialism in Hawai'i.

This simple but direct reference to imperialism and settler colonial history could encourage visitors to think about the injustices perpetrated by the US government and settler leaders against the Hawaiian government and people, and to understand why initiatives for Hawaiian sovereignty are important to many Hawaiians. This alternative text would implicitly ask viewers to position themselves in relationship to historic and contemporary colonial practices. For settlers, this is where the educational work of difficult knowledge will function productively as interference – interfering with their views of their local and federal governments as democratic institutions, and interfering with their views of themselves as ethical citizens.

Exposing colonialism

The last section of this chapter refers to the display of counter hegemonic messages and the production of alternative visions and knowledge.

A. Herman Pi'ikea Clark, *Ho'okumu Hou,* MFA Art Exhibition, University of Hawai'i Art Gallery, Honolulu

On October 20th, 1996, Native Hawaiian graduate student and artist Herman Pi'ikea Clark held an exhibition of his thesis work, *Ho'okumu Hou,* at the University of Hawai'i at Manoa.[10] The exhibition was divided into two presentations – an installation/performance that took place in the open-air courtyard on the third floor of the art department building and a group exhibition, organized by Clark, held in a small gallery on the first floor.

At the entrance to the small gallery, Clark posted a written manifesto articulating his dissatisfaction with the art curriculum. For him, Native Hawaiians were '*colonized* by Western conventions, theories and practices'. He ended the lengthy text with a challenge:

In this my graduate thesis exhibition, I, along with the members of *Ka Maka O Ka Ihe*, request that the University of Hawai'i take steps to end its *colonist* practices by hiring Native Hawaiian teaching faculty and develop courses in Native Hawaiian contemporary art and design. For the first time in the history of the University of Hawai'i Art Department, Native Hawaiian artists have gathered to speak out. In

> this our first expression of Hawaiian sovereignty and art, we chal-
> lenge you who are in power to respond.

This exhibition was important in that it underscored the link between the teaching of art and the learning of colonial knowledge at the expense of indigenous knowledge. In each of the works on display, Clark and other Hawaiian art students expressed their feelings of dissatisfaction with the art department's failure to offer courses on Hawaiian visual practices and perspectives (as opposed to a course on the art history of Hawai'i). They formed a group, *Ka Maka O Ka Ihe*, to support their interests in researching and promoting contemporary Hawaiian visual practices and to advocate for curricular changes.

Since Clark's exhibition, I found references to colonialism in other contemporary art exhibitions that I am unable to mention here for lack of space. Using the word 'colonialism' (or its variations) in these exhibitions functions differently from using it in non-art exhibitions. Artists are stereotypically represented in Euro-American modern society as radical individuals who express unorthodox views. Hence, artists are granted artistic license to say what they want and their works are accepted with implicit disclaimers: 'These are not the views of the museum, but of individual artists'. It is not surprising that I had to look to contemporary art exhibitions to find references to colonialism in Hawai'i. However, while I am interested in documenting the use of the words 'colonialism' and 'settler colonialism' in a variety of museums and art galleries, I am especially interested in finding their use in non-art exhibitions where they are less likely to be dismissed as the opinions of radical individuals. Since I could not find examples in Hawai'i, I began looking for references to colonial histories outside the islands, in various museums in the continental US, Aotearoa (New Zealand), Australia, and Canada. Let me end with an important example in the United States.

B. *Our Peoples: Giving Voice to Our Histories,* National Museum of the American Indian, Washington D.C.[11]

The National Museum of the American Indian (NMAI) opened in 2004 as part of the Smithsonian Institution's complex of national museums in Washington, D.C. Its *Our Peoples* exhibition documents a history of contact, beginning in the fifteenth century, between the indigenous peoples of North and South America and Europeans. The sections of the exhibition of most interest in this context are located in the first third of the gallery space. They include displays arranged under the section titles: 'Invasion', 'Arrival', 'Seventeen Ships', 'Making History',

'The Heye Collection', and 'Wealth, Power, and Abundance'. Although only two panels use the words 'colonial' and 'colonization', their narrative force is reinforced by terms and texts in adjacent panels that describe the devastation caused by the 'invasion' of Europeans and microbes: '[t]he wave of death disrupted food production, fractured Indian communities, and destroyed indigenous knowledge'. In other words, references to colonialism in this exhibition index a destructive enterprise of colonial practices and technologies, unlike their function in the *Art of the Philippines* exhibition in Honolulu.

> Section Title: *Arrival*
> […] The ships that dominate De Bry's images were advanced technology, the *linchpin of Europe's colonial endeavors*. Everything that moved between Europe, Africa, and the Americas was carried on such ships.
> Paul Chaat Smith, NMAI, 2003

> Section Title: *Seventeen Ships*
> [This section begins with the voyage of Christopher Columbus.]
> […] For the next 150 years, European ships brought diseases that devastated indigenous populations, weakened Indian resistance to intrusion, and *laid the foundation for the colonization of the Americas*.

From my study of numerous museums in Hawai'i and the continental US, I would argue that the texts above, as well as many of the other text panels from the *Our Peoples* exhibition, are exceptionally bold and unapologetic in their description of contact and settler colonial histories. One of the curators of the exhibition, Paul Chaat Smith, refers to the exhibition's narrative framework as 'the biggest untold story of all' (Smith 2005, p. 2). Because the museum was built on one of the last open spaces on the Smithsonian Institution's 'mall', he and others felt it was 'time, at last, to speak about the hard things, the painful things, the unspeakable things' (Smith 2005, p. 2).

The exhibition team succeeded in combining forceful texts with visually stunning displays of objects, archival documents, and images. Despite critics who feel the exhibition does not go far enough to explain and analyse the specific details of contact histories and settlement, or to make the displays more thematically cohesive, its striking portrayals and its use of the words 'colonization' and 'colonial' are remarkable.

What is noticeable about many of the text panels is that they are 'signed' by curator Paul Chaat Smith (his name appears at the bottom of several panels). 'Signing' an exhibition has emerged as a museo-logical practice that publicly and visually signals to the visitor that 'the exhibition and its ideas are products of the creators' thoughts and beliefs …' (Dean 1997, p. 21). David Dean explains that although it may seem as if these efforts to sign an exhibition are nothing more than disclaimers, they allow visitors to evaluate the information pro-vided. Theoretically, through this practice, museums demonstrate their respect for visitors as thinking beings who can decide for themselves what information to accept or reject.

Because most wall texts in museums are unsigned, I would argue differently from Dean. While 'signing' at NMAI may allow the museum to acknowledge and honour the important work of its curators, I am concerned with how it functions as a disclaimer. Firstly, because the exhibition uniquely represents the devastating effects of imperialism and settler colonialism in the United States *for the first time,* it can make visitors, especially US settlers, uncomfortable, even hostile. The curator's name-as-signature provides a way for visitors to dismiss what-ever content they object to as the opinion of an individual and not the product of years of collaborative research by the curator, invited scholars, and an exhibition team.

Secondly, the 'signed' panels allow the museum to place some distance between itself and the contents of its texts. While this may strategically deflect visitor criticisms to the signer, it withdraws the institutional sup-port that 'unsigned' exhibitions automatically receive at other museums. Thirdly, in the case of the *Our Peoples* exhibition, Smith's name is not simply found at the beginning (or ending) of the exhibition as is common in many exhibitions, it appears at the bottom of eight panels.

Despite my concerns here, the existence of Smith's powerful texts and narrative framework about the negative impact of the conquest and col-onization of the Americas warrants praise. It is a sign that something major was brokered and won in a national museum in Washington, D.C., and should stand as a model for other museums and curators.

Conclusion

The scarcity of direct references to colonialism coupled with the virtual absence of references to settler colonialism in Hawai'i are evidence of the latter's effectiveness and the power of settlers and settler institutions to disguise their activities as business-as-usual. My conclusion here is both

simple and complicated – we need to see more texts using the word 'colonialism' and 'settler colonialism' within exhibition spaces. These references, however, must be embedded within larger interpretive frameworks about settler colonialism and the historic dispossession of indigenous peoples. As mentioned earlier, I am primarily concerned with educating settlers who do not know about this other history of settler colonialism and showing its links to contemporary problems. Finally, wherever we find these textual references and interpretive frameworks about colonial histories they should be recognized as significant signs in themselves. They are evidence that some institutions and their staff are confronting difficult knowledge and committing themselves to exposing settler colonialism. They are creating the educational spaces we need for the complex and challenging work of decolonization.

Notes

1 The indigenous people in Hawai'i are also referred to as Hawaiian, Native, and Native Hawaiian. The settler population is non-indigenous and comprised of various immigrant groups: Caucasians, Japanese, Filipino, Korean, Black, Puerto Rican, and others. Please note that the diacritical macron *(kahako)* is not used in the spelling of Hawaiian words in this essay.

2 For analyses of the historic interactions between Asian and white settlers in relationship to the indigenous Hawaiian population, see *Asian Settler Colonialism: From Local Governance to the Habits of Everyday Life in Hawai'i* (Fujikane and Okamura (eds) 2008).

3 A growing number of Hawaiian scholars and community activists argue that the term 'occupation' and not 'settler colonialism' correctly identifies the political situation in Hawai'i citing international law and references to the illegal annexation process utilized by the United States government. I hope my continued use of the term 'settler colonialism' will still be valuable in explaining the problems in museums until I can adequately address the shift in terminology in the future. See David Keanu Sai, 'A Slippery Path towards Hawaiian Indigeneity: An Analysis and Comparison between Hawaiian State Sovereignty and Hawaiian Indigeneity and its Use and Practice in Hawai'i Today' (Sai 2008).

4 In the future, I will also document growing references to the term 'occupation'. See note #3.

5 Recorded in 2003.

6 It should be pointed out that this didactic panel, produced in 2003, does not reflect the impact postcolonial scholarship has had on museums and their curatorial efforts to address the colonial histories of their collections. See Tim Barringer and Tom Flynn's 'Introduction' in *Colonialism and the Object: Empire, Material Culture and the Museum* (Barringer and Flynn 1998, pp. 1–8).

7 Patrick Wolfe explains that settler colonialism encompasses both negative and positive dimensions (Wolfe 2006, p. 388). Although Spanish colonial

activity in the Philippines is not considered an example of settler colonialism, Wolfe's analysis is helpful in recognizing that the museum chooses to emphasize the positive aspects of Spanish settlement over its negative ones in this text panel and the introductory panel mentioned earlier.

8 Exhibition was held in Honolulu, Hawai'i, 23 February–14 May 2006, and at the National Museum of Australia, Canberra, Australia, 1 July–10 September 2006.

9 In August 2009 (after this essay was first written), the Bishop Museum unveiled its newly restored Hawaiian Hall. For the first time in its history, it directly represents the historic overthrow of the Hawaiian kingdom, Hawaiian protests over the annexation process, and current Native sovereignty issues. The larger contexts of US imperialism and/or occupation in Hawai'i are not identified in writing, but heavily suggested in several panels and a video presentation. (See also note #3.)

10 *Ho'okumu Hou* means 'to begin again' or 'a new beginning' (Clark 1996, p. 22).

11 The exhibition texts were recorded in 2005.

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11

A Dream Deterred: Palestine from Total War to Total Peace

John Collins

As the century of Auschwitz, apartheid, and the A-bomb recedes into the past, we might be tempted to agree with Erri de Luca's claim that '[h]umanity will banish the twentieth century, the most infamous and murderous of all, from its history; *we should forget it*' (quoted in Virilio 2000, p. xi, emphasis in the original). In time, perhaps. For now, however, the 'most infamous and murderous century' lives on in the complex dynamics of social memory and in ongoing developments on the ground. Nowhere is this truer than in Israel/Palestine, where the sixtieth anniversary of the state of Israel's creation recently provided a platform for starkly divergent interpretations of this pivotal moment in the long twentieth century. For Israeli Jews, 1948 was surely a kind of beginning, but even more profoundly, it represented the end of a nightmare. For Palestinians, the *Nakba* (catastrophe) remains the point of collective trauma generating a host of subsequent and continuing traumas.

Many Palestinians undoubtedly experience this history as a bitter continuation of the much older story of anti-Semitism that Zionism sought to end for Jews (Massad 2005). Yet the post-1948 history of Palestine also speaks eloquently to the realities of the world that has partially overwritten that story – the world we inhabit today. For six decades, the Palestinian drama has been an undeniably global one. This significance is a function not only of diasporic realities, but also of Palestine's diagnostic relationship to ongoing structures of colonization, militarization, and social acceleration (Collins 2009). Far from being simply shaped by processes of globalization, Palestine has served as a laboratory for many of these processes, a kind of monadic unit that contains clues to a series of global truths in the way that a cell contains the genetic coding of an entire body.

This chapter explores Palestine in the context of the global environment that emerged immediately after World War II. I wish to relocate the *Nakba* and the Palestinian refugee crisis in relation to several global processes that converged during this period: the gradual shift to a system of postcolonial control alongside the continuing successes of settler colonial projects; the rise of *deterrence* as a politico-military logic threatening to eclipse the practice of politics itself; the transition from *total war* to what Paul Virilio calls a project of *total peace*; the construction of an international human rights and humanitarian regime; and the consequent blurring of the line between militarism and humanitarianism. In this light, the *Nakba* prophetically illuminates a larger set of stories whose full significance is only emerging today.

1948 and the triumph of settler colonialism

Along with a wave of decolonization, the postwar years brought a series of victories for settler colonial projects. Consider the year 1948. Ideologically armed with the Truman Doctrine, the United States emerged as a global power and flexed its muscles by leading the Berlin Airlift, an early example of militarized humanitarianism. The list of countries that aided in the effort reads like a who's who of settler colonialism: Britain, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and South Africa. Internally, the US was moving away from the 'retribalization' approach of the 1934 Indian Reorganization Act – an approach that relied explicitly on blood quantum requirements to determine the 'allotment' each individual would receive from the state – and toward a 'detribalization' approach that aimed to move the country's indigenous population into cities (Fixico 1986).

In the same year, the Zionist movement won Israel's independence through the near-destruction of Palestinian society and the defeat of Arab military resistance. By 1949, more than 500 Palestinian villages and numerous urban neighbourhoods were emptied of their inhabitants, and roughly 750,000 people were made refugees (Pappe 2006). It is a measure of the ideological success of Zionism that during the following decades, this act of cataclysmic colonization was typically viewed, to quote Amos Oz (1983, p. 22), as a 'brutal twist of fate, unexpected, undesired, unconsidered by the early [Zionist] pioneers'. More recently, however, the release of previously classified documents and the gradual entry of Palestinian voices into the mainstream scholarly arena have opened up space for a radically different interpretation of 1948. On this view, the conflict that resulted in Israel's creation was a *bona fide*, even paradigmatic case of ethnic cleansing (Pappe 2006).[1]

Ironically enough, 1948 also saw the UN General Assembly ratify the Universal Declaration on Human Rights (UDHR). To add to the irony, the National Party's (NP) triumph in South Africa's whites-only elections of that year inaugurated the institutionalization of the *apartheid* system it had adopted as party policy in 1945 (Guelke 2005). The UDHR sought to establish a global standard for human rights, including the right of all human beings to 'equal protection' against discrimination. Undeterred, the victorious NP quickly began implementing its agenda beginning with the Mixed Marriages Act (1949), followed in subsequent years by the Group Areas Act and Population Registration Act (1950), Suppression of Communism Act (1950), Bantu Authorities Act (1951), Pass Laws (1952), Bantu Education Act (1953), and Natives Resettlement Act (1954), among other prominent pieces of legislation.

The same 1940s that brought these settler colonial developments also brought the introduction of the atomic bomb. Avner Cohen (1998) notes that a deep fascination with science and technology led Israel's first Prime Minister, David Ben-Gurion, to initiate plans for an Israeli nuclear programme in late 1948. The nascent state began searching for uranium in the Negev Desert shortly after the war, and Ben-Gurion soon prevailed in the internal debate over the strategic wisdom of pursuing a nuclear weapons programme (van Creveld 1998, p. 165). France facilitated the construction of Israel's Dimona nuclear facility, selling Israel a large reactor and reprocessing plant in 1957.[2] Nuclear cooperation between Israel and South Africa had begun in the 1950s, and the apartheid regime began regular uranium shipments to Israel in 1963 in exchange for nuclear technology assistance. This robust strategic partnership helped both 'pariah' states cement their status as regional powers (Beit-Hallahmi 1987).

The decision of these settler states to join the US and others in the nuclear club implicated them in the global shift to a system of permanent war, a shift that had profound global consequences in subsequent decades. Before turning to this issue, however, we must explore Zionism's emergence out of an earlier world – the world of total war.

Total war, settler colonialism, and the project(ions) of Zionism

In the classic model of Karl von Clausewitz, war constitutes 'the continuation of politics by other means' and should be viewed as a naturally limited undertaking designed to achieve specific objectives. Yet Clausewitz also recognized that war tends to evade its makers' control,

sliding down a slippery slope into *total war*. Any attempt to understand total war's revolutionary significance must begin by recognizing that because it is simultaneously intensive and extensive, total war collapses the local and the global into a single amalgam of ideology, industry, and acceleration. Ideologically, the impulse toward total war derives from the conviction that the state itself is under existential threat (Barkawi 2006, pp. 34–7), a conviction that can profoundly affect the subjectivities of political and military elites and of ordinary citizens who are called upon to defend the nation *en masse*. The industrialization of weapons manufacturing, in turn, enables the state to set the machinery of total war in motion through a powerful joining of mass mobilization and mass production (McNeill 1982).

Finally, as Virilio so provocatively demonstrates, total war is inseparable from the process of acceleration that renders the world increasingly *dromocratic* (ruled by the swiftest). Total war and acceleration share a tendency toward the removal of political, ethical, and technical limitations on movement and action; both can be seen as globalizing forces because both involve what Clausewitz called 'going to extremes' (Virilio and Lotringer 1997 [1983], p. 53). Acceleration, in particular, is a necessary but under-acknowledged factor in the process of moving us from a world of local or national politics to one of terrestrial politics.

Conditions for the emergence of total war began to emerge by the mid-nineteenth century through the rapid mass production of weapons such as the modern machine gun. Given the ideological and industrial realities of the United States during this period, the American Civil War appears as, in William McNeill's words, 'the first full-fledged example of an industrialized war' (p. 242). The inter-imperial wars of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, however, marked the golden age of total war, whose totalizing nature found its ultimate expression in Hitler's Telegram 71. Faced with defeat, the German leader gave his commanders instructions for the systematic destruction of Germany's logistical infrastructure and industrial plant with the pithy aphorism, 'If the war is lost, let the nation perish' (Foucault 2003, p. 264; Virilio 1998, p. 40).

Zionism emerged and grew in the midst of this world of inter-imperial total war and in reaction to a climate of European anti-Semitism that made the project of Jewish self-determination especially urgent. The same environment also created the conditions for Zionism's particular actualization, encouraging the movement's leaders to give their project a settler colonial form. This fateful decision requires us to examine

Zionism as a global project embedded in changing dynamics of sovereignty, war-making and social control.

As Patrick Wolfe argues, settler colonialism is animated by a 'logic of elimination' and a demiurgic impulse that 'destroys to replace' (Wolfe 2006, p. 388). This impulse gives settler colonialism a crucial role in the story of how the world of sovereign war waged against specific external enemies gradually gave way to the world of permanent war waged everywhere in the name of protecting life (Foucault 2003). In his original formulation of this shift, Foucault says little about the centrality of colonization in this process (Medovoi 2007). Yet settler colonialism, which is almost unthinkable without some notion of a biologized 'other' against which 'society must be defended', perfectly embodies the drift toward permanent war that Foucault describes. Settler projects are initially embedded in the discourse of sovereignty, but through the operation of the 'logic of elimination' they come to employ the discourse of permanent war, turning their attention to the task of purging the 'other' from the expanding social body.

Not accidentally, settler states (primarily the United States, Israel, and apartheid South Africa) were leaders in the thirty-year development of an entire industry devoted to the study, prevention, and combating of 'terrorism'. Today's US-led Global War on Terrorism, which shares with neoliberal globalization 'the unbounded surface of the earth as [its] territorial frame of reference' (Medovoi 2007, p. 53), would have been impossible without the discursive and ideological space constructed through the 'terrorism' industry. In carrying out its own projects, in other words, settler colonialism did much to bring about a globalized world of permanent war in which there is no longer any 'outside' (if there ever was).

It is important to note the ways in which Israeli policy *vis-à-vis* the Palestinians has helped push forward the logic of permanent war. From the beginning, notwithstanding the minority of voices seeking to embrace a bi-national reality in Palestine, Zionism's dominant aim was the creation of a 'pure Jewish state' freed of its Arab inhabitants (Pappe 2006), a goal that was actualized in the *Nakba* and the continuing dispossession that followed. After its capture of the remainder of historic Palestine in 1967, however, the Israeli state found itself face to face with the physical limits of its colonial project. In the ensuing years, Israelis and Palestinians alike took part in a process of globalizing their struggle, the former by claiming the right to attack Palestinians anywhere, the latter by using the circuits of global transport and communication to pioneer new strategies of resistance. Zionist/Israeli settler colonialism fuelled permanent war through not one, but two occupations: Zionists occupied Palestine, and

Palestinians responded to their 'national delocalization' by occupying the world's runways and airwaves (Virilio 1990 [1978], pp. 54–7).

The characterization of Zionism as a settler colonial enterprise is not without its vehement detractors. Yet as Maxime Rodinson (1973) argued in his groundbreaking book on the subject, and as subsequent work (Finkelstein 1995; Massad 2005; Pappe 2006; Said 1992; Shafir 1989) has definitively established, the architects of Zionism were conscious and often unapologetic about their status as colonizers whose right to the land superseded that of Palestine's Arab inhabitants. Liberal Zionists and supporters of Israel, by contrast, have constructed a determined edifice of 'cultural denial' (Cohen 2001, pp. 10–11) to deflect the opprobrium now associated with naked colonization.

The fact that Zionism was, structurally and ideologically, a settler colonial project is not incompatible with the fact that individual European Jews had their own reasons for immigrating to Palestine. Zionism is the political glue that cemented these individuals into the settler project, transforming them from a victimized minority into a colonizing minority. Equally important was the influence of European powers for whom Zionism served as a useful tool for outsourcing the problem of anti-Semitism via the establishment of a Jewish state and the creation of another diaspora.

The view of Zionism as a hybrid of self-determination and settler colonialism, however, is incomplete without an understanding of how Zionism's identity politics dovetailed with its territorial ambitions. Referring to Theodor Herzl's futurist novel *Altneuland*, Joseph Massad (2005) describes the complexity of Zionism's 'identitarian' project to construct a remedy for European Jewry's 'abnormal' condition:

> The settler colony was going to be the space of Jewish transformation. To become European, Jews must exit Europe. They could return to it and become part of it by emulating its culture at a geographical remove. If Jews were Asians in Europe, in Asia, they will become Europeans. (p. 4)

Zionism, from this perspective, requires the internalization of the very anti-Semitism it ostensibly sought to combat. Yet the full weight of this irony only emerges when the implementation of Zionism's colonial project causes a second turn of the screw:

> Upon encountering the Palestinian Arabs, Zionism's transformative project expanded. While it sought to metamorphose Jews into

Europeans, it set in motion a historical process by which it was to metamorphose Palestinian Arabs into Jews in a displaced geography of anti-Semitism. (p. 4)

In other words, Massad provocatively concludes, the 'Jewish question' and the 'Palestinian question' *are the same question*, a question whose roots lie in European modernity's dominant cultural formation. Within such a formation, the self is always unproblematic, while other formations are reduced to the status of 'questions' or 'problems'. (Not for nothing did W.E.B. DuBois frame his 1903 book *The Souls of Black Folk* by asking, 'How does it feel to be a problem?')

Europe's relationship to Zionism is thus best conceived as a pedagogical one based on imitation and displacement. Zionism illustrates how in addition to the 'logic of elimination', settler colonial projects are animated by a logic of displacement that turns the colonized space into a laboratory for working out European contradictions. When the displacement of anti-Semitism hit the ground, it spawned a system of *territorial* displacement that has turned Palestinians into refugees (many more than once), labour migrants, fugitives, and frightened residents who spend their time furtively circumventing Israeli roadblocks.

In short, it is clear that even as Zionism attempted to create a more powerful and self-sufficient form of Jewishness in reaction to the perceived weakness of the Diaspora, it has been unable to escape the psychological and ideological structures that birthed it as a movement.

Total peace and the freedom from want

'War today is either nuclear war or nothing', argued Virilio in 1983. 'Sure, there are still thousands of dead all over the place, but we have passed into a dimension other than that of real war … States act like individual terrorists' (Virilio and Lotringer 1997 [1983], pp. 31–2). In such a world, officially declared wars are replaced by 'police actions' and 'humanitarian interventions'. State violence remains as ubiquitous as ever, but most of its manifestations go under the banner of maintaining, seeking, and enforcing 'peace'. When war comes, it comes with a preposition: 'The War on _____' (Glover 2002).

How did we reach this point? For Virilio, the key lies in the invention of the atomic bomb, which represented the fusion of science, technology and warfare into a unique and frightening system that threatens to remove politics from the equation altogether. The existence of the 'ultimate weapon', he maintains, brought the era of total

war to an end and ushered in an era of *total peace* secured through nuclear deterrence.

Arguably the most important characteristic of total peace is its connection with the creation of an economy based on endless war preparation, making it virtually impossible for anyone to opt out of war. Total peace is also not merely international, but truly global. Rather than threatening to defeat a particular enemy, it achieves its ends through the overt and suicidal threat of planetary annihilation. Finally, total peace reveals that speed has become a kind of semi-autonomous force in global politics, particularly with respect to the exercise of violence. In the world of the nuclear revolution, both reaction time and the possibility of avoiding 'accidental' warfare begin to approach zero. With this in mind we can say that total peace is fundamentally anti-democratic: 'Unable to control the emergence of new means of destruction, deterrence … is tantamount to setting in place a series of automatisms' (Virilio 1998, p. 54) rooted less in an old-fashioned 'politics without guarantees' (Hall 1996) and more in an anti-politics of inevitability.

The invention of 'the Bomb' is thus a decisive break with the past: we cannot put the nuclear genie back in the bottle. In framing the issue in this way, Virilio connects directly with Foucault's work on sovereignty and biopower. Foucault (2003, p. 253) notes that atomic weaponry suggests both a traditional sovereign power ('the power to kill … millions and hundreds of millions of people') as well as an unprecedented, suicidal power ('the power to kill life itself'). To engage in apocalyptic, full-scale atomic warfare, therefore, would be to undermine or abdicate the biopolitical 'power to guarantee life', negating the idea of human sovereignty even while performing the very epitome of it.

The total peace of deterrence, however, is connected primarily with the Bomb's indirect use as a tool for the 'endocolonization' of society (Virilio and Lotringer 1997 [1983], pp. 91–101), an inward turn that occurs when high imperialism reaches its outward limits. To illuminate the economic logic behind this process, Virilio looks back to the 'technical surprise' of World War I, when the traditional economy could not keep up with the demands of total war. This led to the creation of a 'special wartime economy' that President Dwight D. Eisenhower famously labelled the 'military-industrial complex' upon his exit from the White House. Yet it was Eisenhower, both as a transnational military leader during the war and subsequently as President, who had shepherded the transition to a peace economy modelled directly on the war economy.[3]

Eisenhower was a visionary when it came to understanding the importance of *logistics*, or the 'flow chart' of war (as opposed to the purely tactical or strategic aspects of war). The triumph of logistics takes us beyond a world marked by a simple civilian-military distinction to a world where 'peace' is waged on everyone by a transnational military class (p. 24).

The rhetoric of bringing and enforcing 'peace' has long played a useful role for imperial powers and is arguably constitutive of empire itself (Hardt and Negri 2000). It is in this light that we may view the 1941 address in which Franklin D. Roosevelt identified 'four freedoms' as general human goals. Three of these (freedom of speech, freedom of religion, freedom from fear) were longstanding principles of the liberal tradition, but the fourth (freedom from want) represented the crystallization of a more consumer-oriented American liberalism (Donohue 2003). For his part, Roosevelt explicitly linked the freedom from want with the global pursuit of 'peace', referring to 'economic understandings which will secure to every nation a healthy peacetime life for its inhabitants – everywhere in the world'.

In Virilio's unusual and provocative interpretation of the speech, 'the freedom from want', which he memorably describes as 'slipped among the others like a marked card', meant that the state took upon itself the right to determine the meaning of 'want' for those who live within, and even beyond, its borders:

> The *freedom from want* is revolutionary to the degree it substitutes man [*sic*] as recipient of health and social services, that is to say, man exposed and alone under statist and clinical scrutiny, for the man of common law with his privileges. The *free* is no longer properly spoken of as a 'citizen'; he is an anonymous organism in a limited situation, since the law sees to the minimal satisfaction of need, that which is indispensable to life … [I]t is the unique precariousness of his situation in the heart of the system that binds him to this, since, for the man thus exposed, assistance has become survival, non-assistance a condemnation to death. (Virilio 1998, p. 32)

The growing role of the State in ensuring freedom from want cannot be separated from the 'problems' and 'questions' posed by stateless peoples who complicated the tidy categories of the interstate system. Not surprisingly, the era of total peace coincides with a growing military involvement in previously 'civilian' functions of policing, border control, and humanitarian relief.

On this reading, Roosevelt's speech is steeped in biopower (the regulation of whole populations through sovereign control over the production, distribution, and maintenance of life). The logic of freedom from want sends a chilling message to the world's subaltern populations – especially those, like the Palestinians, who have suffered catastrophic dispossession or displacement. The message, familiar to anyone who has read Giorgio Agamben's work on 'bare life' (Agamben 1998), is this: we will feed you enough to keep you alive, but we will confine you if necessary in order to do so – and we retain the right to withdraw food at any time.

The same biopolitical logic informs the way the third freedom was marketed for domestic American consumption. Perhaps most notable was the intervention of Norman Rockwell, whose series of four paintings inspired by Roosevelt's speech included 'Freedom From Want', an iconic image of a family seated at the dinner table as the mother serves an enormous Thanksgiving turkey on what is the ultimate settler holiday. With the Great Depression still fresh in mind, Americans could have been forgiven for responding gratefully to the promise of such bounty. While the promise was delivered for some through subsequent years of fitful progress on questions of social justice, the more restrictive face of the freedom from want continued on a parallel track leading from Jim Crow to Reaganism to the endemic structural violence laid bare in the wake of Hurricane Katrina. By 2006 American biopolitics had reached what is arguably its most logical (and horrifying) conclusion: American soldiers in Guantanamo Bay force-feeding detainees in order to keep them from exercising their last remaining source of power: the power to die.

'Sons of the Red Cross'

The freedom from want provides an important context for understanding the world Palestinians confronted after 1948, coping with the shock of the *Nakba* and maintaining only a ghostly presence on the global stage. Scattered throughout the Middle East, they quickly learned that from the state's perspective, denationalized populations are, by definition, dangerous. As recipients of international humanitarian assistance, they experienced the yawning gap between the rhetoric of global human rights and the reality of a world where the democratic realization of those rights often conflicted directly with a refortified state sovereignty (Benhabib 2004) and the decidedly undemocratic sovereignty of the transnational military class.

In his short story 'The Child Goes to the Camp', Ghassan Kanafani offers a glimpse into how this situation played itself out in everyday life. Recalling a childhood spent in a refugee camp, the story's narrator describes a spirited and desperate competition among children scavenging in the market for discarded food. Even close friendships were subject to the logic of the emergency. 'We worked all afternoon, Isam and I, struggling with the other children, or the shop owners or the truck drivers, sometimes even with the police,' he recalls, adding matter-of-factly, 'The rest of the time I fought with Isam' (Kanafani 2000, p. 101). Extraordinary strategies were necessary because, as he repeatedly asserts, 'It was a time of hostilities.' And what did this mean?

> It was war-time. Not war really, but hostilities to be precise … a continued struggle with the enemy. In war the winds of peace gather the combatants to repose, truce, tranquility, the holiday of retreat. But this is not so with hostilities that are always never more than a gunshot away, where you are always walking miraculously between the shots. That's what it was, just as I was telling you, a time of hostilities … [but] … it wasn't a time of hostilities in the sense that you might think. That is, there wasn't really a war. In fact there was no war at all. The whole thing is that we were eighteen people from different generations living in one house, which would have been more than enough at any time. None of us had managed to find work, and hunger – which you may have heard of – was our daily worry. That is what I call the time of hostilities. You know, there is absolutely no difference. (pp. 99–100)

One would be hard-pressed to find a more appropriate expression of what Virilio means by 'total peace'.

In Palestinian poetry we find further images of how it feels to be an object of policies rooted in the freedom from want. Mahmoud Darwish's 1968 poem 'A Naïve Song for the Red Cross' imagines a son questioning his father about the family's condition:

> When the sacks of flour are finished
> the full moon becomes a loaf in my eyes
> so why my father did you peddle my chants & my religion
> for crumbs & Kraft cheese
> in the warehouses of the Red Cross?
> O my father does the forest of olive trees
> shelter us when rain comes?

& will the trees serve us better than fire?
& will moonlight
melt snow? or scorch off the spirits of darkness?
I ask a million questions
& see in your eyes the silence of the stone
so answer me now my father: Are you my father
or have I become a son of the Red Cross?

Using Agamben's work on 'bare life', Peter Nyers argues that refugees are a 'limit-concept' with respect to the interstate system. By virtue of their exclusion from that system, refugees 'make what is hidden come to light, thus "unhinging" the nation-state-territory trinity that conventional theories of the state take for granted' (Nyers 2006, p. 41). Similarly, refugees reveal the failure of the system to protect the very thing – individual human life – that undergirds the state's sovereign power in the first place. Refugees thus perform a diagnostic function that threatens the ideological edifice of state power, and for this they are rewarded with some combination of abandonment, confinement, and exploitation.

The Palestinian refugee 'problem', we should recall, was one of the first crises faced by the United Nations and thus an early test for an emerging era of international cooperation. Faced with a formidable dilemma, the UN ultimately failed to achieve a just solution. By the middle of 1949 it had acquiesced, in effect, to the Israeli government's exceptionalist argument against the Palestinian right of return.[4] In lieu of repatriation, the organization created an entirely new bureaucratic structure, effectively displacing the refugee issue from the juridical to the humanitarian realm.[5] The United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) for Palestinian Refugees in the Near East was built upon a foundation of liberal humanitarianism that initially sought to 'rehabilitate' refugees through involving them in public works projects (Peteet 2005).

While providing employment to Palestinians and helping them avoid further social fragmentation, this approach nonetheless fit comfortably within the framework of the freedom from want. 'Aid discourses', writes Julie Peteet, 'implicitly classified refugees as spatially and culturally liminal, as deterritorialized people in need of humanitarian intervention' (p. 51). This intervention, she notes, was carried out under a dense 'biopolitical' canopy of regulations, assumptions, and disciplinary practices. Consistent with the foundations of total peace, this canopy combined scientific and military elements while

attempting to maintain the 'peace' in refugee communities. The concept of minimal caloric intake provided the scientific rationale for the aid regime: each adult refugee was allotted a minimum of 1,300 calories per day to prevent starvation (p. 77). Peteet reports that UNRWA also conceived of its relationship to refugees in military terms, using the Arabic word *nefar* (a military unit) to describe each registered refugee family.

Subject to the international aid regime or not, all Palestinians had to confront state power in new ways after 1948. Those remaining in Israel were suddenly 'non-Jews' in an explicitly Jewish state committed, as of July 1950, to a Law of Return offering Israeli citizenship to any Jew who wished to settle in the country. As with citizenship, so with land: the law of the Jewish National Fund enabled a massive, state-enforced transfer of land into state (Jewish-only) ownership, leaving the indigenous Palestinian population with a fraction of the land it had previously held (Pappe 2004, pp. 159–60). Unequal treatment based on ethno-religious identity was thus built into Israeli society from its origins, both legally and in practice. As the new state was consolidating its identitarian project, it used the 1945 British emergency regulations to place the Palestinian population under military rule until 1966 (Robinson 2005).

Those Palestinians living in exile throughout the region and the wider world often found host governments less than welcoming. The majority were peasants who had been stripped of their land and their connection with Palestine's village-based agricultural economy (Khalidi 1984; Sayigh 1979). As 'sons of the Red Cross', these refugees often found that their own efforts at surviving and improving their situation brought them into contact with secret police, soldiers, border guards, and other forces of State repression. To be a Palestinian was to risk death itself, a fate brilliantly described in Kanafani's allegorical novel *Men in the Sun*, in which a group of Palestinian labour migrants trying to cross the desert border from Iraq into Kuwait suffocate in a lorry's water tank while the border guards hassle the driver. In the end the driver dumps the bodies, leaving them to bleach in the scorching heat (Kanafani 1999).

Dreams deferred, dreams deterred

Symbolizing all the repressive structures confronting Palestinian refugees during this period, Kanafani's account of anonymous death in the desert illustrates a key fact conveniently ignored in narratives that celebrate the 'successes' of Cold War nuclear deterrence: the more the superpowers

deterred each other through fear, the more the poor of the Global South deterred one another through violence in a perpetual 'time of hostilities'. In this respect, deterrence is organically related to the process of deferral so eloquently articulated in Langston Hughes' 1951 poem on the status of the black American underclass, 'A Dream Deferred'. The new nations of the Third World found that the global wave of decolonization, while undeniable in its world-historical importance, nonetheless came wrapped in a political-economic package that translated into endless postponement of meaningful social transformation.

As I have argued here, the post-*Nakba* experience of the Palestinians is diagnostic of this larger process. While the US pursued its policy of 'containing' communism, Palestinian refugees were confined to camps in the hope that ensuring their freedom from want would prevent them from falling into another 'camp': the Soviet one. Thus did the international community, despite its best intentions, conspire to deter and defer the Palestinian question. Even the First World itself was not immune to the political implications of such policies, as the ascendance of the military-industrial complex fed a general consolidation of executive power whose consequences for the practice of democracy continue to be far-reaching. Humanity, in short, was the victim of a process through which politics itself was deterred.

All of these developments fly in the face of the rhetoric associated with the postwar international human rights regime, the stated intention of which was to establish standards that would apply to all regardless of their status as citizens. In practice, that effort was profoundly wounded by several interrelated processes discussed in this article: deterrence, incomplete decolonization, total peace and the freedom from want, and the shift toward permanent war. These processes created two paths for the 'universal citizen' envisioned in the human rights regime, both of which turn the citizen into what Agamben might call a ~~citizen~~. The first is the 'civilian soldier' (Virilio and Lotringer 1997 [1983], p. 26) whose identity as a rights-bearing individual has been usurped – or rendered obsolete – by the dominance of a system of perpetual social militarization and acceleration. The second is the vulnerable bearer of 'bare life' who may either be abandoned by the state and/or the international community or else constituted as a recipient of 'humanitarian' assistance in order to keep him/her 'barely' alive.

Palestinians and Jews emerged from the era of total war as populations whose shared vulnerability derived directly from the perpetuation of European anti-Semitism. Through the creation of the Israeli state, many Jews avoided continuing on the path of 'bare life', only to become 'civil-

ian soldiers' in a garrison state awash in permanent war. Palestinians, on the other hand, became test subjects for the new 'humanitarian' order and, later, for the settler colonial war on 'terrorism'. Both of these sets of experiences have proven to be prophetic, as later developments revealed that all of us are increasingly subject to the post-political sovereignty of permanent war.

Notes

1 For further examples of scholarly work that has contributed to the deconstruction of earlier myths about 1948, see, *inter alia*, Finkelstein 1995; Flapan 1987; Khalidi 1992; Masalha 1992; Morris 1987; Pappe 1992; Sa'di and Abu-Lughod 2007; and Shlaim 1988.
2 The United States did not initially support Israel's desire to join the nuclear club. President Kennedy, worried that an Israeli nuclear capability could spark a regional arms race, sought to establish an inspections regime designed to ensure that Israel's nuclear programme was used only for its stated purpose of producing electricity for water desalinization. According to Warren Bass, the Israeli government under Ben-Gurion engaged in a series of 'evasions, stalls, and attempts to emasculate' the inspections. Ben-Gurion's successor, Levi Eshkol, took a more conciliatory stance but 'made sure that those inspections never found Israel's best-hidden secrets' (Bass 2003, p. 189). While Kennedy eventually acquiesced to the sale of Hawk missiles to Israel in early 1963, Patrick Seale (2003) argues that Lyndon Johnson played the key role in putting the US-Israeli alliance on the road to the 'special relationship' that leaders of both countries celebrate today.
3 In explaining this process, Virilio offers an unsourced, late-1940s quotation from the Pentagon: 'Logistics is the procedure following which a nation's potential is transferred to its armed forces, in times of peace as in times of war' (Virilio and Lotringer 1997 [1983], pp. 23–4).
4 Under the terms of UN Resolution 194, Palestinian refugees have the right to return to their homes or, should they choose not to return, to be compensated for their losses. International agreements including the Geneva Conventions and the UDHR provide further support for the general principle behind the right of return. The Israeli counter-argument, therefore, has always been based on an implicit claim of exceptionalism, one of the core ideological pillars of settler colonial projects in general. In this case, opponents of the 'right of return' do not dispute the general principle, only its application to the case of Israeli dispossession of the Palestinians.
5 The Agency's mission was to 'prevent conditions of starvation and distress among [the refugees] and to further conditions of peace and stability' with the explicit proviso that these responsibilities would ultimately be passed on to 'interested Near Eastern Governments … when international assistance for relief and works projects is no longer available'. UNRWA, whose mandate has been regularly extended ever since, continues to provide basic services to more than four million registered Palestinian refugees throughout the region.

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12

Displaced Nations: Israeli Settlers and Palestinian Refugees

Salah D. Hassan

There can be no undoing the effects of settler colonialism; in the post-colonial world the politics of settler colonialism is inescapable. Even in places such as Ireland, South Africa, or Algeria, where direct colonial rule came to an end as a result of nationalist struggles, the legacies persist. That said, settler colonialism as an explicit policy of land expropriation and the plantation of colonies now belongs to another not-so-distant historical era, an era when European powers celebrated colonial conquest and settlement in the name of national aggrandizement. Even in the post-World War II context, the assumption that great nations must be imperial found expression among philosophers and politicians. For example, Raymond Aron wrote in the inaugural issue of *Les Temps Modernes* (October 1945) that the autonomy and future development of France depended on its negotiating power, which in turn depended on securing its national integrity and preserving French colonies in Africa:

> In this hard world, a country such as our own can only survive by concentrating on the essential, by accepting fully its role, that of a *regional power* and not of a *world power*. Therefore, the essential issues, for French diplomacy, are first the reconsolidation of the internal affairs (and relations with the exterior which that entails), then the preservation of French Africa (in the absence of which our country will fall back several rungs on the ladder of nations). (My translation, pp. 100–1)

Aron's acknowledgement of the reduced status of postwar France to 'a regional power' is balanced by the fantasy of the continued projection of imperial power overseas in Africa, most importantly in Algeria. And

although Britain retained a far larger Empire, it too was diminished as a world power that sought to retain its stature by reasserting its authority in the colonies, particularly in East Africa. As French and British governments strategized to hold onto their colonial empires between 1945 and 1960, settler colonialism came under increasing attack both on the ground in the form of anti-colonial revolutions, and in diplomatic circles at the United Nations. The diplomatic assault on colonialism culminated with the adoption of UN *General Assembly Resolution 1514 (XV)*, on December 14, 1960, 'Granting Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples'.

It was during this historical period of ostensible decolonization that the United Nations also partitioned British Mandate Palestine and, in doing so, legitimized some fifty years of Zionist settlement. At its origins, Zionism, which found its most significant elaboration in Theodore Herzl's *The Jews' State* (1896), was without question modelled on settler colonialism. Herzl explicitly promotes Zionist settlement in colonialist terms. He writes in a crucial section of the book, where he outlines the plan for Jewish emigration from Europe to the future Jewish state – in Ottoman Palestine – that he envisions:

> Palestine is our unforgettable historical home. This very name would already be an enormously powerful rally cry for our people. If His Majesty the Sultan were to give us Palestine, we could undertake the responsibility of putting the finances of Turkey completely in order. To Europe we would represent a part of the barrier against Asia; we would serve as the outpost of civilization against barbarism. As a neutral state we would remain allied to all of Europe, which in turn would have to guarantee our existence. (Herzl (1997) [1896], pp. 148–9)

This passage clearly establishes the colonial model for the Jewish State in Palestine. The telltale phrase 'an outpost of civilization against barbarism' ties Herzl's view of Zionist emigration to Palestine with European colonial projects, especially those colonizing companies in Africa. Indeed, Henk Overberg notes in his glossary to the 1997 English edition of *The Jews' State* that 'Herzl was most impressed by Cecil Rhodes' activities, and even sent him a copy of *The Jews' State* for his comment on 11 January 1902' (p. 211).

Despite this early textual attempt to set in motion the Zionist project of creating a state for Jews in Palestine, today the Israeli mainstream and international supporters of Israel reject all attempts to link Israel with colonial settler politics, even as Israel continues to expand

settlements in the West Bank. The growth of the Israeli population in occupied Palestinian territories over the last thirty years appears to have no impact on Israel's self-perception. It is as if to acknowledge Israel's colonial settler origins and its current colonial settler policies would undermine the entire legitimacy of the state, whose founding in 1948 and policies since 1967 have been premised on the almost total disenfranchisement of the Palestinian Arab population. Maxime Rodinson's famous essay titled simply 'Israel: A colonial settler state' first appeared in *Les Temps Modernes* in the summer of 1967, at the very moment when Israel began its occupation of Palestinian East Jerusalem, the West Bank, and the Gaza Strip. Rodinson's essay works through the history of Zionism and the creation of Israel to illustrate the colonial settler character of the Jewish state. He summarizes his argument in the following passage:

> The advancement and then success of the Zionist movement thus definitely occurred within the framework of European expansion into the countries belonging to what later came to be called the Third World. Given the initial aims of the movement, it could not have been otherwise. Once the premises were laid down, the inexorable logic of history determined the consequences. Wanting to create a purely Jewish, or predominantly Jewish, state in an Arab Palestine in the twentieth century could not help but lead to a colonial-type situation and to the development (completely normal, sociologically speaking) of a racist state of mind. (Rodinson 1973, p. 77)

For Rodinson, it is the logic of history that produced Israel as a colonial settler state. The conditions in which Zionism emerged, the conditions that prevailed during the British mandate period, the conditions that governed the UN partition of Palestine, and finally the conditions that resulted from the first Arab-Israeli war, have come to define the colonial-settler character of Israel. At a certain level, Rodinson's argument implies that given the history of the period from the 1890s to the 1950s, it was inevitable that Israel become a colonial-settler state, for 'it could not be otherwise'.

Rodinson's analysis examines the political history of Zionism and Israel, focusing on the period leading to the UN partition of Palestine, an event that serves as additional evidence of the effective alliance between Zionists and European colonial powers. But the UN partition plan articulated in General Assembly Resolution 181 (November 29, 1947) gave international legitimacy to the founding of Israel in historic

Palestine, and, at the same time, provided the basis for Palestinians to seek redress within the framework of international law. To a certain degree, the mountain of UN resolutions in support of Palestinian rights indicates the significant responsibility that the UN assumes with regard to the injustices experienced by Palestinians since 1948. This sense of historical responsibility is especially evident in connection with Palestinian refugees, the most direct victims of Zionist settler politics. This chapter addresses the Palestinian refugee issue as a consequence of Israel's settler colonial policies, for the most significant feature of colonial settlement is the displacement of the native peoples by the new settler population. I would argue that the Palestinian refugee populations are evidence of Israel's colonial settler policies, which in the worst of cases in the first Arab-Israeli war amounted to an ethnic cleansing of large areas of historic Palestine of the Arab population, and more recently has been marked by ongoing erosion of the Palestinian land base in East Jerusalem and the West Bank through the continual construction of settlements in the occupied territory.

During the first Arab-Israeli war, a result of the partition of British mandate Palestine and the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948, approximately 750,000 Palestinians (almost half of the Palestinian population) were forced to leave their homes. As documented by many historians, including Israeli scholars such as Benny Morris in his book *The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem, 1947–1949* (1989), the cause of this uprooting of Palestinians was a calculated campaign of expulsion of Arab civilians from cities, towns, and villages waged by the forces of the newly established Israeli state. Despite UN efforts to resolve the refugee issue, in the years immediately following the war, Israel systematically blocked the return of Palestinian refugees to their homes and confiscated their property. The new Jewish State also enacted a number of laws making the possibility of repatriation of Palestinians practicably unworkable within the UN framework. These laws included the 'Abandoned Areas Ordinance' (1948), 'Emergency Regulations concerning the Cultivation of Waste Lands' (1949), the 'Absentees' Property Law' (1950) and the 'Land Acquisition Law' (1953). Through the implementation of these laws, Israel 'legalized' the expropriation of Palestinian land and property and secured its sovereignty over most of the territory of historic Palestine. All of these actions were aimed at enlarging the land base and property available to Jewish 'immigrants' to the new State of Israel and the further displacement of the Palestinian natives. The following passage from the November 20, 1951 'Progress Report' of the United Nations

Conciliation Commission for Palestine demonstrates both the UN's commitment to the repatriation of the Palestinian refugees, and its inability to address the complications resulting from Israel's seizure of land and property:

> 28. In submitting its proposals on repatriation (point 2), the Commission was aware that the first difficulty confronting anyone seeking a solution of the refugee problem is that of co-ordinating the wishes of the refugees themselves with the practical possibilities of any proposed solution; for these two aspects of the question are interdependent and mutually affect each other. The concrete conditions of repatriation and resettlement would undoubtedly influence the wishes of the refugees, and the expression of these wishes would in turn determine the extent of any repatriation plan.
>
> 29. When, in 1948, the General Assembly first resolved that the refugees should be permitted to return to their homes, the land and houses which these people had abandoned in their flight were considered to be still, for the most part, intact and unoccupied. The operation involved in their return did not, therefore, present any very great difficulties; all that would have been necessary was for those refugees who wished to do so to undertake the journey of return and resume their uninterrupted lives, perhaps with a little financial assistance from the international community. It was this kind of movement of return that the Conciliation Commission was instructed to facilitate.
>
> 30. For reasons that were beyond the Commission's task of facilitation, this movement did not come to pass. […]
>
> 32. The physical conditions, moreover, have changed considerably since 1948. The areas from which the refugees came are no longer vacant, and any movement of return would have to be carefully worked out and executed with the active co-operation of the Government of Israel. […] (UN 'Progress Report', 1951)

Israel's initial tactic of simultaneously displacing Palestinians, seizing their land, and then codifying the entire process within its legal system was repeated following the June 1967 war, which resulted in the displacement of some 400,000 Palestinians from the West Bank and Gaza Strip, many for the second time. According to Badil Resource Center for Palestinian Residency and Refugee Rights, in the years between 1967 and 1986, 'an Israeli policy of expulsion and forced migration continued with an average of 21,000 Palestinians a year leaving the

occupied Palestinian territories' (Badil *Bulletin* 19). The central feature of the Israeli occupation that followed the 1967 war has been the extensive land confiscations in the West Bank and East Jerusalem for the construction of Israeli settlements. It should go without saying that the privileges and quality of life enjoyed by the Jewish Israeli citizens in Israel since 1948 and the Israeli settlers in the occupied territories since 1967 have been achieved at the expense of Palestinians, primarily those Palestinians who today are classified as stateless refugees and who lost their land and possessions, which became the property of the Israeli state and were used for the benefit of the Jewish settler population.

The international community generally acknowledges the fundamental injustice of Israel's policies with regard to the Palestinian population, even as Israel and its few international allies persist in producing myths about Israel's founding and its need for security. One indicator of international responsibility has been the central role of the United Nations since 1949 in assuming responsibility for the Palestinian refugee problem, primarily through the establishment of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), which has administered the refugee camps and addressed the humanitarian crisis arising from Israel's actions. At the political level, however, the UN has been generally ineffective in challenging Israel's settlement activity and its expulsion of Palestinians from their historic lands despite the numerous UN resolutions regarding Palestinian refugees, two of which provide the basis for right of return politics. The first is General Assembly Resolution 194 (III), which was adopted on 11 December 1948 and has been endorsed annually since then. Resolution 194 (III), *inter alia*,

> resolves that the refugees wishing to return to their homes and live at peace with their neighbors should be permitted to do so at the earliest practicable date, and that compensation should be paid for the property of those choosing not to return and for loss of or damage to property which, under principles of international law or in equity, should be made good by the Governments or authorities responsible.

The second is Security Council Resolution 237 (1967b), adopted on 14 June 1967, which calls upon the Government of Israel 'to facilitate the return of those inhabitants who have fled the areas since the outbreak of hostilities'. Since then the General Assembly has adopted numerous resolutions reaffirming the basic and inalienable right of the Palestinian

refugees to return to their homes and invoking the applicability of the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949 to the territories occupied since 1967, including Jerusalem; in addition the General Assembly of the UN has explicitly condemned Israel's expulsions and deportations of Palestinians, for example, in resolution 799 (1992). Among the most significant Security Council Resolutions in this regard is 242 (1967a), because it has been the basis of all Arab-Israeli peace talks and agreements from Camp David, to the Oslo Accords, to the present. Resolution 242, adopted on 22 November 1967, emphasizes 'the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war' and affirms the necessity of 'achieving a just settlement of the refugee problem'.

Despite the political ineffectiveness and the limited resources of UNRWA, the agency's history and continuing operations remain a testament to the UN's obligation to Palestinians; moreover, UNRWA's reports to the General Assembly reaffirm annually the legal parameters of Palestinian refugee rights, noting 'with regret that repatriation or compensation of the refugees, as provided for in paragraph 11 of its Resolution 194 (III), has not yet been effected and that, therefore, the situation of the refugees continues to be a matter of concern'. The refugee issue was so central to the UN's initial engagement with Palestine that, in the years between 1949 and 1967, the question of Palestine was reduced almost completely to managing the humanitarian emergency faced by Palestinian refugees. From 1973 to 1993, a period which witnessed the rise of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) within the UN as well as various diplomatic initiatives, international debates on Palestine focused on political self-determination construed in terms of a two-state solution and the so-called 'land-for-peace' formula.[1] One can observe this shift in emphasis through the language of the main peace agreements, namely Camp David, which over-emphasized the refugee issue and avoided a direct statement on Palestinian self-determination, and the Oslo Accord, which bracketed the refugee question in the US-sponsored peace process. But the diplomatic route to self-determination, from Yasir Arafats's appearance at the UN in 1974 to his signing of the Declaration of Principles in 1993, produced little in the way of self-determination and served to marginalize the claims of the refugees. Ironically, it appears that within the existing diplomatic frameworks, self-determination and Palestinian repatriation cannot be mentioned in the same sentence.

Nevertheless, following Arafat's return to the occupied territories in the 1990s, the future of the refugees resurfaced with a vengeance at the centre of Palestinian politics, not as an exclusively humanitarian matter, but rather as the focal point of a new activist initiative that emphasized

the 'right of return'. In the 1990s Palestinian politics of return sought to reverse partially and belatedly the dislocating effects of the expulsion of Palestinians from their homes in 1948, and again in 1967.[2] Right of return politics emerges as the antithesis of Israel's policy of transfer, which can be traced back to the origins of modern Zionism, but which has now gained growing support among some contemporary Israeli politicians.[3] The right of return is also dialectical in relation to the institutionalization of Palestinian exile formations, which have been idealized as the vanguard of Arab culture and politics. Return politics aims at resolving an indeterminate condition of exile and statelessness, which more recently is described as the Palestinian 'diaspora'. If 'diaspora' is the contemporary sign of loss, notably in the form of a national catastrophe (*al-nakba*) characterized by a historical rupture and geographical dislocation, then 'return' is the synthesis of nation and territory, a re-suturing of the people and the land. This grounding of a radical Palestinian diaspora politics in the right of return stands against a significant trend in contemporary critical theory that advances the cultural model of exile, particularly in the writings of Edward Said during the 1980s, as the antithesis of territorialist national programmes; this approach is especially evident in Said's *Reflections on Exile* (1984), which Darku Suvan critically reassesses in his 2005 essay titled 'Displaced Persons'. Around the same time in the early 1990s that diaspora began to have a wider usage in cultural studies, for example in the work of Paul Gilroy and Jonathan and Daniel Boyarin, Palestinians also began to use the term to describe communities living outside of historic Palestine. Prior to that period, these Palestinians were either represented as refugees or, in part under the influence of Said's work, as exiles. Said's *After the Last Sky* (1986), is perhaps the most significant English-language text to represent Palestinian political and material conditions after 1967 and clearly emphasizes territorial dispossession and exile. The book is a collaboration with the photographer Jean Mohr, in which Said's text mixes history, political analysis, critical theory, and commentary inspired by Mohr's powerful documentary photographs of Palestinians both inside and outside Palestine. For Said, exile is not an entirely disabling condition, but it does evoke loss or at the very least a disconnection between things and what or how they signify: 'Exile is a series of portraits without names, without contexts. Images that are largely unexplained, nameless, mute' (Said 1983, p. 12). Throughout the first chapter, where Said outlines the situation of Palestinians, 'exile' is used to define Palestinian life and even the very place of Palestine after 1948: 'Wherever we Palestinians are, we are not in our Palestine, which no longer exists .... Exiles

at home as well as abroad, Palestinians also still inhabit the territory of former Palestine (Israel, the West Bank, Gaza), in sadly reduced circumstances' (p. 11). And later: 'Palestine is exile, dispossession, the inaccurate memories of one place slipping into vague memories of another' (p. 30). Said makes a distinction between exile as the sign of the Palestinian condition, on the one hand and 'diaspora', on the other, which he invokes as a fundamental component in the drama of Zionist redemption. He writes in a section where he discusses the dominating force of Jews over Palestinians that:

> [b]ecause the Diaspora by definition was not in Palestine, a great deal of what was done in the Promised Land on Zionism's behalf was also presented – perhaps projected is the better word here – as if onto a kind of world theater stage .... For the Diaspora this drama had very different meanings at different times. It was always meant to be a didactic alternative picture to the traditional view of Jews in the West. (pp. 102–3)

Exile here is the critical term that both allows for a unique perspective 'from outside', and also is characterized by the insecurity of being always 'out of place'.

By the late 1990s however, Said along with most other commentators on the condition of Palestinian refugees and reluctant migrants had embraced diaspora as the general concept best suited to represent the varied situations of Palestinians 'on the outside'. In the introduction to an important collection of essays edited by Naseer Aruri on Palestinian refugees and the right of return, Said comments on the potential political role of Palestinians 'who live elsewhere': 'That leaves the Palestinian diaspora, which produced Arafat in the first place' (Aruri 2001, p. 5). The shift in terminology from 'exile' to 'diaspora' can be read critically in relation to Palestinian national politics. What might partially account for the shift from exile to diaspora in Said's writing and the more general employment of diaspora in the Palestinian case, especially since the 1990s is both the rise of diaspora theory and the pseudo-recognition of the Palestinians as a nation with the right to self-determination following the signing of the Oslo Accords (1993).

It is not clear who originally used diaspora – a term that can never disassociate itself from the biblical narrative that underwrites Jewishness and Zionism – to describe the collectivity of Palestinians living outside the borders of historic Palestine, but *Before Their Diaspora*, Walid Khalidi's 1984 photographic history of Palestinians from the years between 1880

and 1948 is probably the first major book in which diaspora is made to signify the dislocation experienced by Palestinians in 1948. While *After the Last Sky* (Said 1986) moves from 1948 into the 1980s and is primarily focused on the way that Palestinian history has been shaped in the absence of Palestine, *Before Their Diaspora*, published a year later, moves through a chronology of photographs and images produced in the period between the 1880s and 1948. Khalidi's book is much more self-consciously documentary and archival in its method and rhetoric as it strives to establish the historical presence of Arabs in Palestine prior to partition and the creation of Israel.

These two books work together to narrate the continuous history of Palestinians over a 100-year period across the dividing line that is partition. Both *After the Last Sky* (Said 1986) and *Before Their Diaspora* (Khalidi 1991) are refutations of an Israeli discourse of denial premised on the contention that 'there are no Palestinians', a rhetorical effacement whose violence was surpassed only by the actual physical destruction of Palestinian villages. Equally important is the way that Said and Khalidi counter the denial of Palestinian national existence and engage critically with the language and strategies that have reduced Palestinians to a non-entity. For instance, Said writes:

> Identity – who we are, where we come from, what we are – is difficult to maintain in exile. Most other people take their identity for granted. Not the Palestinian … It is not only that we are regarded as terrorists, but that our existence as native Arab inhabitants of Palestine, with primordial rights there (and not elsewhere), is either denied or challenged. (Said 1986, p. 16)

These books, which document through photos both Palestinian life in historic Palestine and the conditions of Palestinians in exile and under occupation, made the case in the early 1980s for recognition of the exile condition of Palestinians and the grounds for formulating a politics of return.

In the context of the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations, the twin questions of Israeli settlements and Palestinian right of return constitute the most difficult political issues and as a result have remained generally off the table. The movements to halt the ever-increasing Israeli settlement activity in the West Bank and to block the ongoing construction of the so-called 'security wall' are paralleled by affirmation of the Palestinian 'right of return', especially by groups like al-Awda, which is 'committed to comprehensive public education on the rights of all Palestinian refugees

to return to their homes and lands of origin, and to full restitution of all their confiscated and destroyed property in accordance with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, International law and the numerous United Nations Resolutions upholding such rights' (www.al-awda.org/about.html, accessed 22 December 2009). Following the Oslo Accords and throughout the 1990s, right of return advocacy became one of the most focused activist initiatives on behalf of Palestinians. This political work has been reinforced by a substantial body of research by Salman Abu Sitta and others demonstrating the 'feasibility of the right of return' of Palestinians,[4] in the face of what appeared to be broad concessions by the Palestinian political elite in the 1990s.

When Sari Nusseibeh, the Palestinian philosopher, argued in the Autumn of 2001 that it was irrational for Palestinians to demand both the right to an independent state alongside Israel and also the right of return for refugees who had been forced from their homes in 1948–49, he put in tension two of the fundamental demands that have defined Palestinian politics since 1967. Nusseibeh's argument hinged on a distinction he makes between individual rights (right of return) and collective rights (right of self-determination):

> Speaking in terms of history, Palestinians could have adopted one of two possible strategies: one based on individual rights, and the other on collective or national rights. A strategy based on the first approach might have been formulated in terms of the struggle for the rights of return and equality (I have long ago espoused such a strategy only to find almost total opposition to it in the mid-eighties). A strategy predicated on the basis of the second approach can be – and eventually was – formulated in terms of the struggle for the rights of self-determination and statehood. My contention is that these are two incompatible strategies, at least in terms of the practicable international framework. In terms of personal preferences, I would support the adoption of the first strategy, but I realize it has far less support, both among Israelis and Palestinians. Furthermore, it is my contention that, given a balance between collective and individual rights, giving weight to one clearly and logically supposes a minimization of the weight accorded to the other. Thus giving a preference to a national right clearly diminishes from the weight accorded to an individual right. (Nusseibeh 2001)

According to Nusseibeh, since the PLO embraced a two-state solution grounded on the right of self-determination, the Palestinian right of

return must be restricted to the territory of the future state of Palestine in the West Bank and Gaza Strip following the full withdrawal of Israel to the 1967 borders. He suggests that the limited repatriation of refugees coupled with some form of compensation had been the unstated negotiating position of the Palestinian leadership throughout the Oslo process.[5]

Nusseibeh outlined and defended his position at a moment when Israeli repression of the al-Aqsa Intifada was increasing under the cover of the post-September 11 US-led 'war on terrorism', which assumed its most tragic form in the brutal assault on Jenin refugee camp several months later. Both the al-Aqsa Intifada and Israel's violent reoccupation of the Palestinian territories constituted rejections of the Oslo framework and underscored the failure of the doomed peace process. In the absence of viable negotiations, many Palestinians and their supporters read Nusseibeh's public statements, which amounted to a renunciation of the right of return, as an inexplicable capitulation to a belligerent occupying power. More importantly, for al-Awda, Badil, Salman Abu Sitta and other 'right to return' organizations and activists, Nusseibeh's argument constituted an abandonment of a fundamental principle of the Palestinian struggle as it took shape outside the occupied territories. In a letter to Yasir Arafat in connection with Nusseibeh's statements, Salman Abu Sitta begins by linking the origins of the Palestinian national movement in exile with the aspirations of return: 'Since that time [1948], you promised us to struggle relentlessly and uncompromisingly for our right to return to our homes and country; a right that has today become a slogan among our people and known as the right of return – sacred, legal and obligatory' (Abu Sitta 2001).[6] For Abu Sitta, the right of return motivates Palestinian political organization outside the national territory and brings together a quasi-religious ('sacred') understanding of the nation framed within the secular doctrine of international law. In this sense the right of return is non-negotiable and is not conditioned by any future territorial settlement between the Israelis and the Palestinians, for it is as 'inalienable' as the right to self-determination.

Although the right of return had long been part of the PLO demands, it would be a mistake to think that refugee rights were ever anything but secondary to the establishment of an independent Palestinian state; that said, in the context of the peace negotiations following the Oslo Accords, Palestinians outside the territories insisted on linking the right of return to the right of self-determination. The centrality of right of return in Palestinian politics stems from the concern that the

Palestinian Authority would in fact sacrifice the refugee issue on the altar of 'peace'. By advancing a position that undercut the PLO's most radical historical demand, Nusseibeh brought to the fore the philosophical impossibility of activating the right of return when its implementation was in fact the most remote option in the face of Israel's post-September 11 military operations in the occupied territories. Indeed, since 2001, one witnessed in Israel increased public discussion of 'transfer', or further ethnic cleansing of Palestinians from Israel. At the same time, the idea of right of return receded as Palestinian politics splintered and conditions in the Occupied Territories deteriorated.

The emergence of right of return politics appears therefore to be related to the context of the Oslo Process, which produced, paradoxically, the conditions for imagining an implementation of right of return and also set the terms for annulling the rights of refugees. With the end of the Oslo Process, right of return and the rights of Palestinian refugees more generally became once again distant political preoccupations as Israel asserted its authority over the entire West Bank and declared Gaza to be 'hostile territory'.

There are at least two additional points that need to be made about Palestinian returnist politics and its relationship to Israeli settler politics. The Palestinian 'right of return' appears at least superficially to mirror Israel's Law of Return, in that the general idea of return provides a solution to the problem of diaspora. In both cases, the politics of return operates on humanitarian grounds; it is activated in response to the collective political disenfranchisement of Jews in Europe during World War II and Palestinians following the partition of Palestine in 1948. Nevertheless, the politics of return is not simply or even primarily humanitarian; its main motivation is tactical and aims at constituting a majority ethnic community on the land. While the humanitarian understanding of the politics of return emphasizes the respective 'ethnic' communities and their suffering in the diaspora or as refugees and as racial or ethnic or religious minorities, the importance of demographics and control of the land reveals its overriding tactical dimensions. In effect, it is through a *de facto* implementation of the law of return that Israel made legal its policy of settlement and constituted itself as a nation-state, and on the basis of a similar principle, Palestinians seek to constitute their nation-state. More than anything else, 'returnist politics' is fundamentally tied to actualizing sovereignty and citizenship in connection with a specific territory by establishing majority rule over the land.

The differences between the Palestinian 'right of return' and the Israeli Law of Return are, however, rather significant. First, the Palestinian 'right' is grounded in international law on the rights of refugees, UN resolutions on Palestine, and also in historic cases of Palestinian refugees actually returning to their homes in 1949. The Israeli Law is a national code with no basis in historical residency on the territory; it has international implications, but is not supported by international law and has no equivalent in other national citizenship law. An additional difference between the Law of Return and the right of return is the status of Palestinian refugees as stateless subjects many of whom possess no citizenship. It is therefore a means to seeking citizenship rights within the territory of historic Palestine, the ancestral home of these refugees. Israel's Law of Return applies to all Jews, the vast majority of whom have no established tie to historic Palestine, prior to 1948, and who often are already beneficiaries of the citizenship rights of other nation-states. In effect, the Law of Return provides Jews with the opportunity to obtain a surplus of citizenship rights.

There are many reasons why Israeli politicians refuse to recognize the Palestinian right of return, but particularly important is the so-called 'demographic threat' posed by a growing Palestinian minority in Israel. The transfer of Palestinians from their homes and the denial of the right of return of refugees remain the means used by Israeli authorities to secure Jewish demographic superiority. In April 2002, at the time that the Israeli Defense Forces were destroying Jenin Refugee Camp in the West Bank, Ariel Sharon stated: 'Israel cannot discuss the return of Arab refugees – a consequence of a war forced upon Israel by the Arabs – to its territory, as it would effectively terminate the existence of the State of Israel as a Jewish state' (Sharon 2002). Sharon's fear exposes the future dilemma facing Israel, which must either embrace the growing Palestinian population and its bi-national character or undertake once again the massive ethnic cleansing of Palestinians. Granting Palestinians the right of return would be a significant step toward actualizing the bi-national one-state solution and integrating Israel-Palestine more broadly into the Arab region of the Middle East, a distinct vision for the future that is outlined by Ali Abunimah in his book *One Country* (2006). The Palestinian right of return potentially provides the basis for opening the borders of the Middle East, allowing for movement between those places of refuge in Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, and Egypt and Palestine and Israel. Unfortunately, Israel's construction of the wall and the emphasis in the peace process on a two-state solution indicate that the integration of Israel into the Arab region is unlikely to take place through the free

movement of people across national borders, but rather in the form of regional security arrangements that further the occupation and partitioning of Palestinian land.

In an interview published in *New Left Review* in 1967 in the wake of the Israeli defeat of the Arab armies in the June War and right before his death, Isaac Deutscher, the Marxist journalist who emerged as a major commentator on the Soviet Union in the 1960s, asserted the fundamental obstacle to a settlement of the conflict between Israelis and Palestinians:

> From the outset Zionism worked towards the creation of a purely Jewish state and was glad to rid the country of its Arab inhabitants. No Israeli government has ever seriously looked for any opportunity to remove or assuage the grievance. They refused even to consider the fate of the huge mass of refugees unless the Arab states first recognized Israel, unless, that is, the Arabs surrendered politically before starting negotiations. (Deutscher 1967, p. 37)

Deutscher's comment in 1967 implicitly identifies Israel with a form of settler colonialism premised on the displacement of the 'Arab inhabitants'. He also underscores Israel's consequent inability to acknowledge that it is primarily responsible for the harm done to Palestinians whose grievances relate to its 'huge mass of refugees', and is one of the primary signs of settler politics.

Some thirty years later, in the context of Israel's brutal assault on the Gaza Strip in the winter of 2008–09, Juan Cole, the University of Michigan historian, wrote explicitly about Israel as a colonial settler state in his widely-read blog 'Informed Comment', contrasting Israel's actions in Gaza with US imperial policies in Iraq.

The difference between Israeli military action in Gaza and most US operations in Iraq is not a matter of national character or some other essentialist attribute. It is the difference between imperial occupation for specific purposes and settler colonialism. The Israelis are both an army and a settler movement. The US never considered flooding Iraq with colonists from Alabama and Mississippi. The key point here is the unequivocal identification of Israelis with 'a settler movement'. But more importantly, Cole goes on to reflect on the violence of settler colonialism, positioning Israel in relation to British and French colonial settler policies:

> When threatened by an indigenous population trying to expel it, settler colonialism is vicious. It is after all facing an existential threat.

The US can withdraw from Iraq with no dire consequences to the US. In 1954–1962, the French killed at least half a million, and maybe as much as 800,000 Algerians, out of a population of 11 million. That is between nearly 5 percent and nearly 10 percent! The French military had been enlisted to fight for the interests of the colonists, who were in danger of losing everything. (In the end they did lose almost everything, being forced to return to Europe, or choosing to do so rather than face the prospect of living under independent Algerian rule).

The brutality with which the British put down the Mau-Mau revolt in Kenya in the 1950s is another example of massive human rights violations on behalf of a settler population.

This latest sanguinary episode is a further manifestation of Israel's insecure brand of settler colonialism, in which the lives of the indigenous population are viewed as worthless before the interests of the colonists. The Israelis have not killed on the French scale, but I would argue that they kill, and disregard civilian life, for much the same reasons as the French did in Algeria. (Cole 2009)

From 1948 to 1967, and from 1967 to 2009, Israel's settlement policy has had two principle objectives: establishing and maintaining a Jewish majority in historic Palestine. These objectives have been achieved as Deutscher noted in 1967 by ridding 'the country of its Arab inhabitants', but also by 'Israel's insecure brand of settler colonialism' as Cole commented in 2009. These two statements question the well-established Israeli myth that Zionism is the positive expression of Jewish national self-determination made manifest in the creation of Israel in Palestine. This myth, premised as it is on the denial of the history of the Palestinians, blocks out the negativity associated with Israel's colonizing past and the persistence of its settler politics in the present. The existence of Palestinian refugee populations, in Gaza, the West Bank and the neighbouring Arab countries, belies the national myth of Israel's self-creation.

Notes

1 The Camp David Accords signed between Egypt and Israel in 1976 were premised on the 'land-for-peace' idea, but did little to bring about a broader settlement in the Mid-East. In fact, the implementation of the requirements of Camp David – that is, Israel's withdrawal from Egyptian territories occupied in 1967 – was followed by the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon and a more intensive occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip in the 1980s.

2 See for example Benny Morris, 'A New Exodus for the Middle East'.

3   See Nur Musalha, *Expulsion of the Palestinians: The Concept of 'Transfer in Zionist Political Thought, 1882–1948*.
4   See Salman Abu Sitta's detailed 1997 demographic study 'The Feasibility of the Right of Return', which is available through the webpage of the Palestinian Refugee Network based at McGill University.
5   For a thoughtful analysis of the place of the refugees in the context of peace negotiations, see Rosemary Sayigh, 'Dis/Solving the Refugee Problem'.
6   See also the various documents that elaborate the international basis for the right of return, produced by Badil (badil.org), al-Awda (al-awda.org).

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13
Telling the End of the Settler Colonial Story

Lorenzo Veracini

Settler colonialism has been resistant to decolonization. Some settler polities decolonized later, some tentatively, some not at all (Veracini 2007a). And yet, as underscored, for example, by the 2007 UN declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples and by its careful assertion of an indigenous right to self-determination respectful of the sovereignty of existing states, there is a need to focus on the possibility of postcolonial futures in a not-yet postcolonial world.[1] Considering the at times irresistible trajectory of decolonization processes during a number of crucial decades in the twentieth century, settler colonialism's resilience requires explanation.

This chapter suggests that an appraisal of a narrative deficit (and, specifically, an exploration of the structural differences separating colonial and settler colonial narrative forms), can contribute to explaining particularly contested traditions of decolonization in settler polities. The first section deals with what is here defined as the settler 'narrative form': a particular way of understanding and organizing historical change in a number of settler colonial political traditions. The second section explores the specific difficulty of telling the end of the settler colonial story.

a) Colonial narratives; settler colonial narratives

Narratives and their availability matter. Narratives are a fundamental part of everyday life; their construction constitutes an act that allows nations, communities, and individuals to make sense of the world. As settler colonialism is immediately premised on a foundational and historically situated movement, there is a specific need to focus on the way different narratives and their availability inform political life in settler societies. A sustained scholarly activity on the literatures of colonialism (and, of course, postcolonialism) has not yet explored the

specific differences separating colonial and settler colonial storytelling. This section makes a case for a systematic distinction between colonial and settler colonial narrative forms, and suggests that the stories we tell regarding these two phenomena are structurally different, even antithetical. It acknowledges that they interact, overlap, and inter-penetrate, and yet, as they remain analytically distinct, it suggests that they should be seen as two structurally different types.

Colonial narratives normally have a circular form, they correspond to an *Odyssey* consisting of an outward movement followed by inter-action with exotic and colonized 'others' in foreign surroundings, and by a final return to an original locale (interaction, of course, can take many different forms, from captivity at one end of the spectrum to wanton genocidal destruction at the other end [on colonial narratives, see, i.e., Haddour 2000; on captivity narratives, see Colley 2002]). We should attend to the ongoing relevance of a circular narrative structure: as Mary Beard recently put in a *Sunday Times* review of Alberto Manguel's *Homer: Iliad and Odyssey* (she was quoting critic Harold Bloom), 'Every-one who reads and writes in the West is still a son or daughter of Homer' (Beard 2007).[2] This is particularly so in relation to colonialism. Emma Christopher, Cassandra Pybus, and Markus Rediker, have recently noted that colonial narratives are foundationally shaped by a multiplicity of 'middle passages', an expression originally designating 'bottom line of a trading triangle, between the "outward passage" from Europe to Africa and the "homeward passage" from the Americas back to Europe' (Christopher *et al* 2007, pp. 1–2; see also Klein 1978).

These authors are specifically interested in retrieving the experience of enslaved colonized people and in the possibility of deploying this category to the understanding of other forced migrations. Coherently, they note this term's limiting Eurocentrism and develop the 'middle passage' as a foundational interpretative category – as 'not merely a maritime phrase to describe one part of an oceanic voyage', but as 'the structuring link between expropriation in one geographic setting and exploitation in another' (Christopher *et al* 2007, p. 17, n. 10, p. 2). This is analytically groundbreaking. And yet I would argue that the 'middle passage' retains an exceptional constitutive cogency as it applies to colonizing Europeans as well. After all, in the context of the narrative structure of colonialism, 'colonialism' can be seen as a 'middle passage', as what happens in between an outward and a homeward journey. A Dutch proverb referred to in one of the essays of their collection, neatly confirms colonialism's narrative circularity (and a characteristically colo-nial binary encoding separating 'home' and 'colony', a separation that

settler colonialism inevitably complicates by collapsing settler 'home' and colonial locale): 'He who does not take Amsterdam with him to Batavia will not bring Batavia back with him to Amsterdam' (quoted in Penn 2007, p. 87).

On the contrary, there is no middle passage for settler colonizing Europeans because no return is ever envisaged. Indeed, far from being the bottom line of a triangular movement, in the words of Ralph Waldo Emerson, the oceanic crossing can be seen as a Lethean passage over which settlers 'have had an opportunity to forget the Old World' (quoted in Bercovitch 1975, p. 162). It is not an *Odyssey*. As settlers come to stay, the narrative generally associated with settler colonial enterprises rather resembles an *Aeneid*, where the settler colonizer moves forward along a story line that can't be turned back. We should attend to the ongoing consequence of this narrative structure as well, and if it is true that we are sons and daughters of Homer, it is also true that, as he did with Dante, Virgil is still taking us by the hand. Richard Waswo's *The Founding Legend of Western Civilization* (1997), for example, provides a compelling argument in this direction. Indeed, as persuasively demonstrated by Ben Kiernan in his study on the relationship between settler colonialism and genocide, the *Aeneid* provides a specific foundational reference for settler colonial endeavours (2007, pp. 169–212).[3]

The structural difference between a line and a circle thus expresses one inherent dissimilarity between colonial and settler colonial narrative forms: settler migration remains an act of non-discovery. The archetypal voyage of discovery is Ulysses's – but discovery is necessarily about going *and* coming back. Discovery, by definition, requires a circular narrative structure. Ulysses returns: he engages with many peoples in a multiplicity of places but never thinks of settling as an option. His urge to return is also due to a need to avenge those who doubted his eventual homecoming: unlike the settler, he slaughters at home. Aeneas – who has nothing left behind – also will not settle anywhere, focused as he is – with a force and an intensity that also resembles a 'return' – on his final destination. Settlers do not discover: they carry their sovereignty and lifestyles with them. At times, they even relocate with their neighbours. As they move towards what amounts to a representation of their world, as they transform the land into their image, they settle another place without really moving. Significantly, settlers often subvert normal travel narratives and construe their very movement forward as a 'return': a return to the land, but also a return to an Edenic condition (now, *this* is a return), and to a Golden Age of unsurrendered freedoms (or, in the case of Zionist settlers, a return to Palestine). In any case, settlers do not report back: Aeneas does not report back.

Moreover, whereas colonizers see themselves in a middle passage between home and home, between departure and return, settler collectives inhabit a third narrative phase, a segment that succeeds both the 'Old World' and a period in the wilderness, a 'frontier' phase made up in succession by entrance into a district, battling the land, community building, and, eventually, by the 'closing in' of the frontier. Quite naturally, inhabiting structurally different narrative spaces influences the way in which colonizers and settler colonizers interpret their respective enterprises. As a result, the possibility of multiple middle passages allows a flexibility that settlers do not have: defeat and relapse do not necessarily imply the failure of a colonial ideology. On the contrary, the settler colonial story locates the consolidating settler collective in history's latter days, hence a stubborn, recurring and inherent anxiety at the prospect of defeat or compromise (see Akenson 1992). That settler polities are perceived as inhabiting a narrative space that cannot be followed by an ulterior passage crucially contributes to block out indigenous peoples' struggles for a post settler colonial future.

Colonial and settler colonial narrative forms emerge as structurally distinct. Colonialism reproduces cycles of opposition between civility and barbarism; colonialism immobilizes relationships and establishes a pattern of repetition. In marked contrast, settler colonialism mobilizes peoples in the teleological expectation of irreversible transformation. Anthropologist Deborah Bird Rose's perceptive understanding of a Western settler narrative form (as opposed to an Australian Aboriginal one) refers, for example, to a white Australian settler palindrome in which all time is seen as developing towards the birth of Christ and then towards his second coming. A palindrome, she concludes, 'articulates the view that a plan of history exists, that history moves from an early (proto- or pre-) configuration through disjunction/transfiguration to the realised or fulfilled configuration [...]' (Bird Rose 2004, pp. 56–7). In another context but in a similar way, Arthur Bird's 1889 description of the United States efficiently expressed both a settler colonial project's unboundedness and a settler palindromic narrative structure:

> the United States of America, – bounded on the north by the North Pole; on the South by the Antarctic Region; on the east by the first chapter of the Book of Genesis and on the west by the Day of Judgement. (quoted in Bercovitch 1975, p. 148)

However, while a settler colonial narrative form should be seen as opposed to an indigenous one, as Rose demonstrates, a settler colonial palindrome is also structurally incompatible with colonial understandings of history.

What is crucial in the context of an exploration of colonial and settler colonial narrative structures is that whereas a settler sensibility envisages a particular set of narrative refrains and a specific understanding of history where 'progress' is typically understood as a measure of indigenous displacement and ultimate erasure, a colonial ideology would understand 'progress' as characterized by indigenous displacement and permanent subordination.

The fact that settler narratives are palindromic, however, does not necessarily mean that they are invariably seen as 'progressing'. Settler colonial narrative orders often display a special narrative form emphasizing decline from settler colonial to inordinately non-settler, a narrative order opposed to the traditional 'from rough frontier to civilized settled life' paradigm (after all, a palindrome is by definition a sequence that retains its meaning even if it is read backwards). In any case, whether they envisage a progressive movement or identify a degenerative tendency, settler narrative structures remain powerful, reproducible, and 'mobilizable', as confirmed recently by the remarkable success of TV series like *The Colony*, a well packaged reality TV product developing a 'real' version of Australian nineteenth-century settler colonial life (see Gibbon 2004).

Perhaps more importantly, the ongoing activation of settler narrative refrains and their impact in shaping perception and political action should be emphasized as it applies to other contexts as well. Elsewhere, for example, I have argued that, in the context of developing sensitivities regarding the conflict in the Middle East, a narrative convergence related to a settler colonial enterprise can contribute to explaining US support for Israeli policies in the Occupied Territories (Veracini 2007b). Indeed, the settler narrative form is especially foundational and powerful in a multiplicity of contexts because it responds, reproduces, and engages with one of the fundamental Western stories: Exodus. The basic narrative of journeying to the Promised Land involves promise, servitude, liberation, migration, and the establishment of a new homeland; all tropes that specifically inform settler colonial projects on a multiplicity of levels (see, i.e., Walzer 1985; O'Brien 1988; Boyarin 1992; Prior 1997).[4]

b) Telling the end of the settler colonial story

This section discusses the decolonization of settler colonial forms. It contends that while the possibility of discontinuing a colonial regime remains within colonialism's cultural horizon, the discontinuation of a settler colonial circumstance remains unthinkable. In an essay entitled 'The Settler Contract', political theorist Carole Pateman has noted the

impossibility of settler decolonization unless what she describes as an original 'settler contract' is undone. She argues that the power of the settler contract, where the settlers are 'the natural figures of the thought experiment in the texts of political theory come to life', has meant that, even if the 'process of decolonization and national self-determination that began after the Second World War has swept away all but tiny remnants of the colonies of the European powers', the 'Native peoples of the two new Worlds [i.e., North America and Australia], living within the boundaries of the states constructed from the plantation of settlers, have never been seen as candidates for sovereignty' (Pateman 2007, pp. 55, 73). Similarly, Patrick Wolfe has also noted that 'settler colonialism is relatively impervious to regime change' (2006, p. 402). How can this resilience be explained? This section argues that in the case of *settler* colonial contexts, a specific narrative form produces a circumstance in which there is no intuitive narrative of settler colonial decolonization, and that, as mentioned, a narrative gap contributes crucially to the invisibility of anti-colonial struggles.

The scramble for colonies at the end of the nineteenth century produced colonial polities that could be turned over to successor states in a symmetrical process of counter-scramble. As pointed out by Roger Louis (2006, pp. 1–31), the great imperial scramble of the late nineteenth century was mirrored by the decolonizing counter-scramble of the 1960s. However, decolonization is generally understood as a transition whereby a colonial state is turned into a self-governing territorial successor polity. Problems inevitably arise when the (settler) colonizing state *is* the self-governing territorial successor polity.[5] Besides, a focus on external relations and sovereign independence, or autonomous self-rule against a variety of colonizing metropolitan centres inevitably obscures the position of internally colonized indigenous constituencies. Moreover, as Alan Lawson noted, a focus on settler independence allows a 'strategic disavowal of the colonizing act' and a concomitant transformation of 'invaders' into 'peaceful settlers'. 'In the foundations of [settler] cultural nationalism' he wrote,

> we can identify one vector of difference (the difference between colonizing subject and colonized subject: settler Indigene) being replaced by another (the difference between colonizing subject and imperial centre: settler imperium) in a strategic disavowal of the colonizing act. The national is what replaces the indigenous and in doing so conceals its participation in colonization by nominating

a new colonized subject – the colonizer or invader-settler. (Lawson 2004 [1995], p. 160)

Sovereignty in a settler colonial context needs to be negotiated *within* a polity rather than *between* polities; the decolonization of settler colonial formations was bound to be complicated.

Broadly speaking, one can detect three general experiences of settler decolonization: settler evacuation, the promotion of various processes of indigenous reconciliation, and denial associated with an explicit rejection of the possibility of reforming the settler body politic. These three possibilities, however, often overlap and intertwine in complex ways.

Even if they had come to stay, at times settlers depart. This is especially the case when their sovereignty has been subsumed within the operation of a metropolitan colonial endeavour. In these cases, as the settler project was premised on an enabling colonial order, the discontinuation of a colonial regime spells the discontinuation of the settler colonial one. As Fanon remarks, 'the settler, from the moment the colonial context disappears, has no longer an interest in remaining or in co-existing' (Fanon 1967, p. 35). The settlers do not necessarily leave together and at once. There are varied patterns of departure, and even examples of accommodations with nationalist movements taking over at the moment of decolonization. The reverse process is also possible, and at times it is the community of settlers that is eventually expelled by nationalist forces. Soon after taking control of Libya in the late 1960s, for example, Colonel Gaddafi threw out the remaining Italian community. In a dense commemorative calendar and in a split fashion that underlines an inherent distinction between colonial and settler colonial regimes, Libya celebrates 'Independence Day' to mark the end of colonial domination, and 'Evacuation of Fascist Settlers Day' to symbolize an ultimate break with a settler colonial past (see Zerubavel 2003, p. 30). Radically different colonial regimes require a split celebration of their separate ending.

Quite significantly, however, where decolonization takes the form of a settler collective exodus, as happened in Algeria, Libya, Kenya, Angola, Mozambique, North and South Rhodesia/Zimbabwe, South West Africa/Namibia, and more recently, in the Gaza Strip (evacuated of Israeli settlers, but not yet of colonial control), the decolonization of territory is not matched, even symbolically, by an attempt to build decolonized relationships. Indeed, settler departure conceptually mirrors and reinforces settler colonialism's inherent exclusivism, and confirms

a 'winner takes all' settler colonial frame of mind that demands that settler sovereignties entirely replace indigenous ones or *vice versa*. By denying the very possibility of a relation between colonizer and colonized after the discontinuation of a settler colonial regime, settler departure produces a circumstance where decolonization cannot be construed as a relationship between formally equal subjects.

Settler colonialism in locales where the population consisted of variously defined white minorities could not afford decolonization. On the other hand, in the white settler nations it was settler exodus that was never an option. Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, however, many of these polities were facing contradictions arising from their encompassing a number of unreconciled 'nations within' (see Fleras, Elliott 1992). In response, as the possibility of the ultimate disappearance of indigenous peoples became a non-viable option, others strategies were developed. In white settler nations, a number of political processes, each envisaging a variously defined postsettler compact, were thus initiated. Projects of national or indigenous reconciliation developed in dramatically different political circumstances and produced varied results; and yet, despite this diversity, these initiatives collectively represent a possible type of postcolonial institutional endeavour in settler societies (see, i.e., Havemann 1999; Ivison *et al* 2000; Langton *et al* 2007). Nonetheless, even partially reforming the settler structures of the body politic, usually under the impulse of judicially-led reforms endorsing constitutional and legislative transformation, has proved painstakingly difficult, has encountered increasing opposition, and in some jurisdictions eventually came to a standstill or was even reversed.

Besides settler exodus and a variety of political processes aimed at establishing postsettler compacts, a third type of circumstance also developed, where a sustained denial of the very existence of the colonizing structures of the settler colonial polity, let alone the possibility of their discontinuation, was upheld: Israel and the US, for example. While in these polities the very invisibility of imperial and settler colonizing endeavours has remained conventional thinking, the prospect of enacting postsettler decolonizing passages *vis-à-vis* indigenous peoples remains unlikely.

Of course, the decolonization of settler colonialism needs to be imagined before it is practised, and this has proved especially challenging, especially as Iris Marion Young has remarked, an 'institutional imagination' of an entirely new character needed to be developed (Young 2000, pp. 237–58, 280–1). If it is devised as an exercise in *settler* nation building, even well meaning processes of indigenous and national

reconciliation, or the incorporation of indigenous governance structures within the settler polity, ultimately contribute to the erasure of variously defined indigenous sovereignties and therefore to the reproduction of settler colonizing practices.

And yet, if the positioning of indigenous sovereignty in the context of settler political orders is indeed a most challenging undertaking, it should be noted that not all settler stories are equally powerful and that there are alternative, very commanding, equally available and equally mobilizable narrative structures. Some settler regimes could be discontinued because, among other reasons, the story of the end of settler exclusive political ascendancy was easier to tell. The end of the settler colonial story could be told, for example, as the end of ethnic and racial discrimination and the attainment of civil and constitutional rights.

Recognizing the crucial importance of the demise of apartheid South Africa (in the context of an analysis that otherwise stresses the continuities between colonial and postcolonial political orders), Mahmood Mamdani, for example, remarked that for 'the first time in the history of African decolonization, a settler minority has relinquished exclusive political power without an outright political defeat' (Mamdani 1998, p. 7). This process, he concluded,

> has set the political trajectory of the African continent on a course radically different from that of the Americas. The Americas is the continent of settler independence. The South African transition means that nowhere on this continent has a settler minority succeeded in declaring and sustaining the independence of a settler colony. (Mamdani 1998, p. 7)

Beyond Africa, on the other hand, telling the story of an end to attacks on indigenous substantive autonomy, a move that demands abandoning a cluster of narrative refrains inherent in settler narrative structures, was a much more complicated matter especially if one considers that the powerful narrative of an extension of civic rights to indigenous constituencies had already been deployed in the context of forced and less coerced assimilation campaigns.

And yet, even if the story of what a postsettler colonial passage to come, of what should happen next, has been impossible to tell, the story of what happened *in the past* could change. All processes of constitutional rearrangement involving indigenous constituencies in settler nations have necessitated a significant revision of traditional

historical narratives and a comprehensive reinterpretation of national and/or regional pasts. Indeed, the role of historians in contributing to institutional and judicial readjustment has in some cases been decisive, and historians and other academics involved in the production of indigenous and national histories in settler societies have in some cases made history by literally (re)writing it (see, i.e., Reynolds 1987; Ward 1999).

Constitutional rearrangements typically promote historiographies where an evolving partnership *in the present* finds confirmation in specific representations of pre- or non-settler colonial pasts. In a reforming Aotearoa/New Zealand during the 1980s and 1990s, a historiographical upgrading of ostensibly discontinued (or never really existing) traditions of partnership underpinned a general process aimed at establishing 'treaty' practices as a way to address historical grievances (see Veracini 2001). While, in the context of a discussion of Aotearoa/New Zealand's attempts to judicially 'rectify' the past, W.H. Oliver has even talked about a 'retrospective utopia', a similar inscription of 'treaty' traditions was also initiated in an Australian historiographical context by Henry Reynolds in *The Law of The Land*, as pointed out in a recent article by Bain Attwood (Oliver 2001; Attwood 2004). Attwood saw Reynolds's intent as similar to what Eric Hobsbawm has referred to as the 'invention' of a tradition, specifically, a moral tradition of colonial if not settler respect for indigenous title and rights. While the Australian government certainly legislated in the spirit of, and in accordance with, this 'invented' tradition in the early 1990s, this tradition could be forgotten subsequently, as demonstrated by Aboriginal policies which ensued under John Howard, or partially reinstated, as suggested by newly elected Prime Minister Kevin Rudd's February 2008 parliamentary apology.

Elsewhere, history and public debate surrounding indigenous politics decisively informed each other as well. South Africa's transition to post-apartheid also produced a rapidly and dramatically changing historiographical landscape. In this case, the historiography of the northern frontier witnessed a remarkable acceleration, possibly because it provided a contemporary relevant example of an original multiethnic, hybrid frontier setting. Nigel Penn noted in a historiographical outline that 'the widespread acceptance of the election results of 1994 has begun a process of the rolling back, or opening, of frontiers everywhere'. He then concluded that it 'is possible that an "open" frontier situation, as existed in the northern frontier zone for so long, will be seen as being the more typical South African scenario after all' (Penn 2001, p. 39). In

North America a renewed historiographical tradition emphasizing frontier exchange and a long lasting 'middle ground' also revolutionized received understandings of colonial and Western history and underpinned evolving contemporary relations between Indian nations and settler polities at the same time (see, e.g., White 1991; Nelson Limerick 2000).

These trajectories confirm that narrative (and historical discourse) are crucial to all the processes of indigenous reconciliation in settler polities. However, as the historiographical shifts that have underpinned these processes have generally produced a situation where non-settler colonial pasts were upgraded and retroactively mobilized to sustain renewed postcolonial compacts, the reforming settler polities of the 1980s and 1990s share debates where a settler colonial past is displaced rather than addressed. In the end, an emphasis on 'invented' traditions of settler indigenous partnership has been easier than insisting on the need to decolonize settler colonial sovereignties and reform the settler colonial polities. Simultaneously, a widespread disinclination to enact substantive decolonizing ruptures resulted in a tendency to avoid disturbing foundational structures, including foundational narratives of origin and settlement and their linear form. Ultimately, the acknowledgment that 'settlement' establishes legitimacies without extinguishing indigenous ones, and that indigenous sovereignties need to be accommodated in a decolonizing, postsettler move, has remained elusive.

Conclusion

If settler colonialism is an ambivalent circumstance where the settler is colonized and colonizing at once, decolonization necessarily requires at least *two* moments: the moment of settler independence and the moment of indigenous self-determination. The first moment is easily conceptualized – we instinctively *know* about the 4th of July – the second passage is yet to be formulated.[6]

The structural difference between colonial and settler colonial narrative forms does have an impact on the ways in which the decolonization of settler colonial formations can be conceptualized. Indeed, *there is* an acceptable narrative of decolonization for the formerly colonized Third World, centred around nation-building and economic development, irrespective of whether this actually happens – it very rarely does. From this perspective, postcolonial histories can then be approached either as a progressive narrative of independence and nation-building (i.e., there is *some fit* between this narrative and reality), or as a more sober-

ing denunciation of neocolonialism and state failure (i.e., there is *no fit* between this narrative and reality). Either way, getting out of the colonies could be represented as a 'forward' movement (a circular narrative form allows one to proceed forward even when going back). Conversely, in settler colonial contexts, withdrawing from colonial practices of indigenous dispossession can only be perceived as a 'backward' movement signalling the demise of original settler claims and their legitimacies. Lacking the possibility of a clearly defined decolonizing moment, the settler colonial polities have retained the policy objectives, if not the methods, of their settler colonizing pasts, i.e., further extinction and/or assimilation of indigenous law, tenure, autonomy, and identity.

There is still no intuitively acceptable narrative of settler colonial decolonization, and/or indigenous/national reconciliation. There are by now substantial histories of the various settler societies, and, for example, in the case of Australia, a recent apology for past injustice, but no compelling story about what should happen next. If decolonization implies by definition a degree of restoration/devolution of political sovereignty, taking responsibility for a painful history, as Rudd has proposed, is bound to be better than a denial of responsibility, but it certainly does not amount to a *relinquishment* of responsibility for a postsettler future (Rudd 2008; see also Thompson 2002).[7]

When and if indigenous communities are acknowledged, access native title, receive an apology, and possibly some compensation (all necessary elements of any genuinely postsettler/postcolonial compact), the widespread pattern of public perception is that of a sovereignty inherently subversive of settler/national foundations. In the context of a settler colonial mentality, the very presence of indigenous peoples is normally unsettling; but an acknowledgement of indigenous sovereignty is even more so. As long as there are no available narratives of settler decolonization, narratives identifying indigenous dispossession and loss of collective autonomy as 'progress' are bound to remain paradigmatic. If settler colonization is an ultimate colonizing act where settlers envisage no return, settler colonialism still tells a story of either total victory or total failure. Ultimately, discontinuing settler colonial forms requires conceptual frames and supporting narratives of reconciliation that have yet to be fully developed and narrated.

Notes

1   For an argument emphasizing an unbroken continuity between 'colonizing' and 'postcolonizing' Australia, see Aileen Moreton Robinson (2003).

2　She then adds: 'There is at first sight something faintly depressing about the idea that, almost 3,000 years on, we are still enthralled – or, to put it more brutally, enslaved – to the works that first launched our literary tradition. And the notion that we are still busy reinventing Homer, from James Joyce to the Coen Brothers (in *O Brother, Where Art Thou?*), is almost shaming'.

3　Kiernan highlights, for example, how a specific reading of Virgil's opus underpinned the formulation of English plans for the settler colonization of Ireland during the second half of the sixteenth century.

4　For a convincing response to Walzer's argument, see Said (1988).

5　Ann Curthoys's intuition that Australia, for example, is colonial and postcolonial at once, and colonizing and decolonizing at the same time emphasizes the inherent ambiguity of postcolonial passages in settler contexts (see Curthoys 2000, pp. 21–36).

6　'Decolonization' in settler contexts is further complicated by the fact that one decolonization (i.e. settler independence) inevitably constitutes an effective acceleration of colonizing practices at the other end (i.e. further indigenous loss of autonomy).

7　Rudd's apology was crucially framed in the comparative context of settler societies.

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14
J.M. Coetzee and the Idea of Africa
David Attwell

> *[M]y intellectual allegiances are clearly European, not African.*
> (J.M. Coetzee, *Dagens Nyheter* 7 December, 2003)

There are two obvious positions in the polemics suggested by this title, which I shall begin by naming in order to open other possibilities. The first would be that in J.M. Coetzee's writing the African subject or African humanity is under-represented and under-valued, and to this extent Coetzee's work exhibits the *mentalité* of the settler colonial. The kind of evidence that is ready to hand for this argument would be that in *Foe* (Coetzee 1986) Friday is mutilated and voiceless; in *Disgrace* (Coetzee 1999) Petrus is a schemer who connives in Lucy's rape; in *Age of Iron* (Coetzee 1990) the revolutionized youth and their mentors, Florence and Thabane, allow their war with the regime to become a war on the very concept of childhood. This position finds it regrettable that the novels tend to place resistance in question rather than representing it positively; where it is represented it is displaced onto faceless subjects like the barbarians, or marginal characters like Michael K. whose refusals are unrecognizable in terms that have any connection with the African experience of colonialism. Especially awkward in this view is the indubitably seedy figure of Emmanuel Egudu, the Nigerian novelist in *Elizabeth Costello* who manufactures authenticity by celebrating the ersatz orality of the African novel to sustain himself in the Western literary marketplace.

   The opposing position points to the literary naiveté of these objections: they all demand that the game being played is that of representation, *Darstellung* as Gayatri Spivak would describe it, a simplified understanding of realism, whereas the games the novels play are autotelic, referring frequently to other discourses and not, in first instance (or as the immediate

referent) to social conditions themselves (Spivak 1994, p. 71). Typically, Coetzee deconstructs the discourses of power from within. In this view Coetzee is also said to acknowledge the African presence, but he withdraws from directly representing it for what is an ethically defensible reason, which is that he avoids the epistemological capture that would only confirm the position of privilege. Coetzee is sensitive to the problem of *Vertretung*, Spivak's other term for representation, in the political sense of 'standing-in-for' (Spivak 1994, p. 71). This position would also argue, finally, that Coetzee is scrupulously circumspect in acknowledging the positionality of his work – indeed in foregrounding positionality itself in a complex reflection on the limits and possibilities of writing under broadly postcolonial conditions.

The second position would appear to be more sophisticated than the first, but it has not settled the matter. The Africanist objections, if I may refer to them as such, do not disappear, and the fact that they continually resurface in discussions of Coetzee (often in the voices of students, certainly South African students) suggests that there might be an intimate or inescapable connection, between a wounded historical memory brought about by settler colonialism and the representational practices associated with mimesis. In which case, no amount of nuanced positionality on the part of the author can displace it.[1] Coetzee himself seems to acknowledge something like this when he says, '[I]t is not that one *grants* the authority of the suffering body: the suffering body *takes* this authority: that is its power' (Coetzee 1992, p. 248). But perhaps the most salient reason for revisiting this question is the fact that Coetzee's writing *does* gesture towards homogeneous ideas about Africa in ways that *do* place it within a history of exogenous representations of the continent. That being the case, we should not shirk the question posed by my title; on the contrary, we should be willing to explore the implications and possible functions of the idea of Africa in Coetzee's writing. The scope of this chapter will not allow me to track every instance in his oeuvre in which Africa as sign appears; instead I shall be isolating three distinct moments that might be discussed as points of departure.

Coetzee declares that his intellectual allegiances are European, but that is surely not the end of the story. We can ask of his work the questions he asks of other writers who work within a European tradition but who take Africa as their provenance. In a review of Karel Schoeman's *'n Ander Land* ('Another Country') in the progressive Afrikaans journal *Die Suid-Afrikaan* (1985) Coetzee points to a 'hiatus in the philosophical argument' of the novel that corresponds to a 'hiatus in the social reality it represents' (Coetzee 1985, p. 48). The philosophical hiatus is that 'if there is a lack of congruence between European language and

African reality', does it follow that there must be 'a congruence between African language and African reality'? Is Africa *known* ('in the most metaphysical sense of this term') to those 'to whom African language is native'? The hiatus in Schoeman's novel is that it neither asks nor answers this question; instead, it has its protagonist Versluis pursue a metaphysical truth by immersing himself in the African landscape. But why, Coetzee asks, 'must the truth about life be learned from the African landscape (*koppies*, *vlaktes*, *bossies*; "hills, plains, bush"), as Versluis learns it, rather than from the mouth of the African? Thus at the social level the hiatus in the book is: dialogue with the African' (Coetzee 1985, p. 48).

In *White Writing* (1988), which is collected from essays he was writing at this time, Coetzee takes up the question of dialogue with Africa in a more abstract sense – predominantly in terms of literary representations of landscape and the ways in which they obscure the social relations produced by settler colonialism. Seldom is the problem of dialogue with *the African* as sharply focused as it is in the review of Schoeman's novel, especially in relation to the task of the novelist. What is startling is that Coetzee's characters, on the whole, are the bed-fellows of Versluis, who themselves repeatedly fail the test Coetzee asks of Schoeman's protagonist. Indeed, Coetzee's novels continue to elaborate the hiatus found in Schoeman, rather than sublimate it. Or, instead of speaking of a hiatus we could refer to an anomaly: why should his protagonists persist in the failure to hear the language of the African, when that language might enable them to overcome the alienation from the African landscape which they experience as their most pressing dilemma? Rather than attempting to get beyond this anomaly, Coetzee's characters repeatedly fail to overcome it and fail so acutely that the anomaly itself and its consequences become the stuff of the fiction. Failure thus transmutes into success; having taken this turn, the novels open themselves to modernist and postmodern self-staging and self-examination.

The repetition of failed reciprocity is a central trope in Coetzee and lends itself to a range of interpretations: philosophical, ethical, and aesthetic.[2] The particular aspect of this problematic that I wish to take up here is the one suggested by the review of Schoeman: how do representations of Africa figure in it? I am therefore interested in Africa *as sign* within Coetzee, but also within Coetzee's particular reprisal of the tradition of European representations discussed by V.Y. Mudimbe in *The Idea of Africa*, in which he identifies a paradox that

> if, indeed, these outsiders [Africans] were understood as localized
> and far away geographically, they were nonetheless imagined and
> rejected as the intimate and other side of the European-thinking

subject, on the analogical model of the tension between the being In-Itself and the being For-Itself. (Mudimbe 1994, p. xi)[3]

Africa as the Sartrean being-in-itself, then, failing to rise fully to self-consciousness.

The hiatus found in Schoeman, and Mudimbe's paradox is that they point to Africa as the place – or the sign of a place – of a crisis of representation arising from a crisis of non-relation, a sign standing for a founding violence of cultural alterity. Achille Mbembe's analysis in *On the Postcolony* (2001) is consonant with this reading: as a fund of images representing absolute otherness, 'Africa as an idea, a concept, has historically served, and continues to serve, as a polemical argument for the West's desperate desire to assert its difference from the rest of the world' (Mbembe 2001, p. 2). The life of Africans 'unfolds under two signs': the sign of 'the strange and the monstrous', which can only be grasped by 'abandon[ing] our world of meaning'; and the sign of intimacy, which involves 'a process of domestication and training, bring[ing] the African to where he or she can enjoy a fully human life' (Mbembe 2001, pp. 1–2). In Coetzee, these positions find a perfect analogue in the figure of Friday in *Foe*, to whom I shall turn later in this chapter. In Mudimbe's analysis this violence of alterity is not easily shaken off, as its continuing life in discourses of African cultural nationalism reveals. The African subject as propounded by Aimé Césaire and Léopold Sédar Senghor, for example, is marked by it (Mudimbe 1994, p. 45), though both these writers in different ways sought to overcome it with lyricism. Coetzee accepts this originary violence but instead of seeking a compensatory lyricism, he discerns in it a moral and a political authority that has the power to cancel the self-absorption of the European subject. I shall explore this more fully later, but for the moment I wish to argue that in addition to the idea of Africa as the site of non-relation and the source of an irresistible if hostile authority, Coetzee's Africa is also a site of *occultation*. By this I do not mean *the occult* as that term is commonly understood, nor am I drawing on the psychoanalytic possibilities of occultation: notions of displacement and repression, although these implications are relevant. I mean something like the older, astronomical meaning of the word: a planetary object is occulted when it is eclipsed; it does not disappear, but it is rendered potent and mysterious. Outrageous though it may seem, I am arguing that Coetzee deliberately subjects Africa as sign to a process of occultation so that it becomes a source of aesthetic power. The opposite of occultation would be the assumption that the full apprehension

of objects was possible; it would deliver an accretion of detail, in an extreme form as in naturalism, perhaps. Occultation means that Africa is installed not as a place for knowledge, but as a place where the subject is at a distance, removed, and frequently awed. The occulted sign of Africa ensures that the eclipsed object continues to hold sway over the subject's imagination, releasing an aesthetic charge and leaving an ethical disturbance. These are familiar effects in Coetzee; what I am proposing here is that the sign of Africa is frequently deployed specifically to achieve them.

Let me illustrate this first with *Age of Iron*. In this novel, Mrs Curren's moment of deepest crisis arrives not when she goes out to Cape Town's shack settlements to find Bheki – where, in witnessing the contestation between the police, the vigilantes, and the youth she lives through a kind of personal purgatory – but later, when the police come to her home where the weapons trail has led them to John, who is hiding in the servant's quarters of her backyard. There, John is executed: the door of the room is flung open and the police kill him before he is able to fire a pre-emptive shot. 'John' is one of Coetzee's many doubles: the name is one of those routinely given as Christian names to black, specifically African, labourers; this John has kept it as a *nom de guerre* – Mrs Curren believes – to overturn the colonial nomenclature. However, as one of John Maxwell Coetzee's names, it implies the other within – *pace* Mudimbe, the intimate other of the European subject. 'John' is now dead and Mrs Curren finds herself implicated in his insurrection. She chooses to be implicated, in fact, by claiming that the pistol John is found with is her own, that she lent it to him to protect himself, perhaps even from the police, although she is evasive on that point. There has been no suggestion that Mrs Curren ever owned a weapon, indeed we deduce it most unlikely that with her liberal temperament and charitable, humanistic views, she would ever have done so. Besides, John is also discovered to have possessed detonators, of which she knows nothing. The detonators reveal that he has placed himself in the supply-chain of the guerrillas, the liberation forces acting from outside the country. By claiming to own the pistol, Mrs Curren seeks to protect him from the implications of this fatal association – except that the impulse is anachronistic. That we are in a time-warp where Mrs Curren's ethical gestures have ceased to be meaningful is clear from the policeman's comment in response to her demanding the return of her private papers: 'Nothing is private anymore' (Coetzee 1999, p. 157). This is a peculiarly misplaced statement: implausible in the mouth of a policeman, it belongs properly to the narrator, or to Mrs Curren

herself where it helps to define the post-ethical world in which she finds herself. Be that as it may, Mrs Curren is sufficiently in touch with reality to know that since the police are onto the trail of weapons, whoever else might be linked to John is also in danger, so she tries to phone Thabane, her domestic worker Florence's brother who acts as their political mentor and spokesperson, to warn him that his association with the youths could cost him his life.

   In my account thus far, I reduce the novel to its plot, but in their context these events are presented through Mrs Curren's distracted and despairing consciousness. As she approaches her own death through what appears to be rapidly metastasizing breast cancer, she would like her world to be a place of meaningful last acts – though in every sense, it is not. The terms of the phone call are revealing:

> A word appeared before me: Thabanchu, Thaba Nchu. I tried to concentrate. Nine letters, anagram for what? With great effort I placed the *b* first. Then I was gone.
>
>   I awoke thirsty, groggy, full of pain. The clockface stared at me but I could make no sense of the hands. The house was silent with the silence of deserted houses.
>
>   Thabanchu: *banch*? *bath*? With stupid hands I unwrapped the sheet from around me. Must I have a bath?
>
>   But my feet did not take me to the bathroom. Holding to the rail, bent over, groaning, I went downstairs and dialled the Gugulethu number. On and on the phone rang. Then at last someone answered, a child, a girl. 'Is Mr Thabane there?' I asked. 'No.' 'Then can I speak to Mrs Mkubuleki – no, not Mrs Mkubuleki, Mrs Mkubukeli?' 'Mrs Mkubukeli does not live here.' 'But do you know Mrs Mkubukeli?' 'Yes, I know him.' 'Mrs Mkubukeli?' 'Yes.' 'Who are you?' 'I am Lily.' Lee-lee. 'Are you the only one at home?' 'There is my sister too.' 'How old is your sister?' 'She is six.' 'And you – how old are you?' 'Ten.' 'Can you take a message to Mrs Mkubukeli, Lily?' 'Yes.' 'It is about her brother Mr Thabane. She must tell Mr Thabane to be careful. Say it is very important. Mr Thabane must be careful. My name is Mrs Curren. Can you write that down? And this is my number.' I read out the number, spelled my name. Mrs Curren: nine letters, anagram for what? (Coetzee 1999, p. 158)

The name, Thabane, must be deciphered from its encryption in another, Thabanchu. The way is not clear to the ethical act; it may be possible after a decipherment; however, the word that comes to her in place of

Thabane ('Thabanchu') remains indecipherable, circulating in her mind like an inassimilable stone (to borrow a metaphor from *Life and Times of Michael K* [1983]). The name of the person for whom she is assuming ethical responsibility surfaces only as code: 'Nine letters, anagram for what?' The encryption deepens when she tries to put the *b* first, producing more obscurity: the nonsensical *banch*, and *bath*, which is a red herring. The problem is not simply that Mrs Curren is shocked and medicated; it goes further, because the socio-linguistic conditions governing the conversation over the phone contribute to the miasma. She is unused to having to refer to Florence by her own given name as Mrs Mkubukeli, so she has to correct herself when she says Mkubuleki. The isiXhosa speaker on the other end, Lily, confuses male and female pronouns in English, leaving Mrs Curren in doubt about whether they are referring to the same person. Mrs Curren actually doesn't hear the speaker's (English) name 'Lily', at first, but only its pronunciation, 'Lee-lee'. Then, Lily turns out to be a child of ten, who should not be burdened with passing on a message on whose reception someone's life may depend. (That this is happening confirms Mrs Curren's general impression that the age of iron with its ethical upheavals and reversals – including the destruction of childhood – has indeed arrived.) Since the conversation is a mess, the translation and completion of the ethical act which it promises are stalled. The result is that to the physical debilitation and ethical frustration we must now add *existential* crisis: 'Mrs Curren: nine letters, anagram for what?' Her name might be code to Lily, who is writing it down, but worse than that it has now become code to Mrs Curren *herself*. Like 'Thabanchu', her own name becomes mysteriously encrypted and like many other Coetzeean protagonists she slips deeper into isolation and solipsism following a moment of attempted but failed reciprocity. In this case, reciprocity with what? Surely, the African subject. The supposed impermeability of the child's speech, and of African speech in general which is figured in the unassimilated word, 'Thabanchu', are key ingredients in this process, facilitating the destruction of a secure image of her own identity.

Since the pattern is paradigmatic let me reflect on the implications of the choice of the word 'Thabanchu', as the hinge on which this passage turns. Coetzee uses it as a fragment, a misplaced and unintelligible sign in Mrs Curren's discourse. In doing so, he lifts it out of another complex lattice, out of well-established patterns of naming and history and indeed of intelligibility in which it sits much more comfortably. Thabanchu, or Thaba Nchu: in Setswana, 'black mountain'. It

is the site of a Wesleyan mission station in the eastern part of the Free State Province, in the Plaatberg region near the Lesotho border. Its founding in 1838 was negotiated by James Archbell and John Edwards with the Sotho king Moshoeshoe as a refuge for a party of several thousand Barolong-Tswana people who had been displaced from their home near Mafeking by Mzilikazi's troops during the *difaqane* … the period of migrations following the consolidation of the Zulu kingdom (Comaroff 1985, pp. 23–4). In South African literature, the story is told prominently in Sol Plaatje's canonical novel, *Mhudi* (1978). The very existence of Thaba Nchu (and the existence of Plaatje's novel) speaks of numberless acts of translation and cultural transaction: of Rolong-Tswana's orality into print; of Christianity into African epistemologies and spirituality; of conversations about everything under the African sun, including, surprisingly, the forging of a military alliance between Moroka, the Chief of the Barolong, and a party of Voortrekkers, a detail which is central in *Mhudi*. All this took place under the eyes of another mission station not far away: Morija, where members of the Paris Evangelical Society had been busy for some years under Moshoeshoe's authority creating a print culture in Sesotho that would in due course produce the first novel of substance in an indigenous southern African language, Thomas Mofolo's famous epic, *Chaka* (1925).

Mrs Curren's 'Thabanchu' registers none of this history. Indeed, so well known and so *literary* is the name in South African letters that it seems reasonable to suggest that it is being disavowed. There are other moments in which local histories are subsumed beneath their fictional refashioning in Coetzee's novels. Michael Green, for example, has shown how different Mariannhill Mission, the Trappist monastery and hospital near Durban, is from its fictionalization in Coetzee's story, 'The Humanities in Africa' (Green 2006, p. 136). No one would dispute that writers are in the habit of appropriating places and their names to their own narratives and structures of meaning, but these particular appropriations are revealing; they involve emptying signs that are *not* free of social content and filling them with something else. They are a classic instance of the social semiotics of the sign as described by V.N. Vološinov:

> By no means does each member of the [speech] community appre-
> hend the word as a neutral medium of the language system, free
> from intentions and untenanted by the voices of its previous users.
> Instead, he receives the word from another voice, a word full of that
> other voice. The word enters his context from another context, per-

meated with intentions of other speakers. His own intention finds the word already occupied. (Vološinov 1973, p. 199)

The name Thaba Nchu, is thus reoccupied and occulted, becoming a fragment serving the representation of Mrs Curren's purgatorial journey.

Mrs Curren's 'Thabanchu' has less to do with the place's history than with another (equally familiar) tropic pattern in South African letters, in which the dominant image is of a silent, brooding and untranslatable Africa – the figure of Adamastor.[4] Adamastor is the last of the fallen Titans who rebel against Jupiter in Luís Vaz de Camões' epic of Renaissance Portugal, *The Lusiads*. Camões' poem of 1572 writes the journey of Vasco da Gama in 1497 around the Cape of Good Hope to open the trade route to India both as a Homeric tale and an allegory of the Portuguese entry into global modernity. At the mid-point of the epic, the mariners reach the Cape and encounter Adamastor materializing out of the storm clouds to threaten them with the consequences of their hubris. As a suggestive trope in English-language writing, Adamastor's reactivation in South African literature and historiography, especially in modernist writing, involves the Titan being increasingly localized. As Jonathan Crewe puts it, he becomes 'the punitive ghost in the white South African cultural imaginary' (Crewe 1997, p. 32). Behind Mrs Curren's fragment stands this other, nine-letter word, this other 'black mountain' of South African literature.

What is surprising about this is that Coetzee is an especially astute critic in pointing out what Jonathan Crewe calls 'the imperviousness of Southern Africa to literary penetration and occupation'; the essays collected in *White Writing* tell the story of the 'painfully discovered resistance to already encoded literary desire' (Crewe 1997, p. 35). It seems it is one thing to acknowledge the Adamastor tradition, and another to reposition oneself, to find a position to refuse being interpellated by it. Given Coetzee's analysis of the failures of his literary forebears, we might ask whether Mrs Curren's 'Thabanchu' is perhaps a *doubly-encrypted* sign, a sign that conveys both the 'punitive ghost' of settler colonial representations and the *shame* of its reactivation? The occultation is a function not only of a discursive appropriation but also of the continual resurfacing of stubbornly unreconstructed knowledge, the very recalcitrance of colonial myths. The continual interpellation of the present by the past traps the European subject in the caste, confining him or her in the ethical malaise: 'The masters in South Africa form a closed hereditary caste,' says Coetzee. 'Everyone born with a white skin is born into the caste … you cannot resign … You can

imagine resigning, you can perform a symbolic resignation, but short of shaking the dust of your country off your feet, there is no way of actually *doing* it' (Coetzee 1992, p. 96). The view of history Coetzee suggests here is that it is both irredeemable and repetitive. Linguistic acts of self-refashioning (the stuff of so much postcolonial writing) have no purchase; settler colonial history is such that subjects are doomed to repetition.[5]

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II

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Let me turn to a second use of Africa as sign, this time in *Foe* – by way of one of the interviews in *Doubling the Point* (Coetzee 1992). Here Coetzee is reflecting on the centrality of the body and of suffering in his fiction (and the reader will find the context for remarks quoted earlier):

> Let me put it baldly: in South Africa it is not possible to deny the authority of suffering and therefore of the body. It is not possible, not for logical reasons, not for ethical reasons (I would not assert the ethical superiority of pain over pleasure), but for political reasons, for reasons of power. And let me again be unambiguous: it is not that one *grants* the authority of the suffering body: the suffering body *takes* this authority: that is its power. To use other words: its power is undeniable. (Coetzee 1992, p. 248)

The passage is cited often, but usually in order simply to corroborate the critic's interest in representations of the body; the counter-intuitive notion of the suffering body *assuming the position of power* is much less discussed. But the point is perfectly explicit and the context in which the suffering body, for political reasons, takes authority is also explicitly stated: it is South Africa. The idea of the African subject that this passage encodes is similar to, but also quite different from, the representations suggested by Mudimbe. This is certainly an instance of the Sartrean 'being-in-itself' because Coetzee is referring to the *body*, after all, in Cartesian terms, half-a-subject (in the context of *Foe*, the mutilated half) but what Coetzee adds to Mudimbe's account is that this subject's suffering is *undeniable*, ensuring that it is not merely an absence; it is not 'that which is not' (Coetzee 1992, p. 248). We appear to have another anomaly here: a being-in-itself that, by definition, is not fully conscious of itself but which nevertheless is capable of taking authority. This half-subject has agency, enough to render its represen-

tation (by those who falsely assume the authority to do so) incomplete, marginal, and turned-in-on-itself. The result of the anomaly is to ensure that the emphasis falls not on the half-subject itself (or the being-in-itself) but on its effects on the traditionally authoritative subject. One of those effects is that this formerly powerful subject is made aware of his or her failure to grant full recognition. In this sense, the taking of authority is a *taking-away* of the power to recognize, a loss which leaves the one formerly in power diminished, less than fully human. The suffering body, in its real power, strips the illusions from the subject falsely assuming the position of authority.

This is exactly the progress of all the narrators in *Foe* in their relationships with Friday, and Coetzee's comments on the authority of the body and its suffering are made specifically with this novel in mind: 'Friday is mute, but Friday does not disappear, because Friday is body', he says (Coetzee 1992, p. 248). Friday manifests the anomalous terms of the agentive half-subject: he is mute but he does not disappear; he is indubitably Mudimbe's European idea of the African subject but he acts out a political return of the repressed. Coetzee's Friday is therefore clearly *not* a figure representing the wholly other because he is other in his very historical *specificity* (Spivak 1994, pp. 187–90). It is in keeping with this distinction, after all, that Coetzee turns Friday into an African. In *Robinson Crusoe*, he says, 'Friday is a handsome Carib youth with near-European features. In *Foe* he is an African' (Coetzee 1987, p. 463). In the novel, Susan Barton's narration is startlingly clear on this point:

> The man squatted down beside me. He was black: a Negro with a head of fuzzy wool, naked save for a pair of rough drawers. I lifted myself and studied the flat face, the small dull eyes, the broad nose, the thick lips, the skin not black but a dark grey, dry as if coated with dust. (Coetzee 1986, p. 6)

Friday's agency is rendered explicit in the novel's closure. As the author-narrator descends into the wreck which represents the narrative tradition inaugurated by *Robinson Crusoe*, seeking to divine its still-unresolved mysteries (which are judged by those with powers of representation to be associated with Friday and his history) this, memorably, is what is found:

> His mouth opens. From inside him comes a slow stream, without breath, without interruption. It flows up through his body and out upon me; it passes through the cabin, through the wreck; washing

the cliffs and shores of the island, it runs northward and southward to the ends of the earth. Soft and cold, dark and unending, it beats against my eyelids, against the skin of my face. (Coetzee 1986, p. 157)

This is an image of undeniable power, but power without subjectivity, an irruption into the world of an indecipherable being-in-itself; power without consciousness; another occultation. What Coetzee achieves here is extraordinary in a particular sense: he *covers* the narrator's loss of the power to authorize subjectivity – it is now Friday's power – with the modernist gesture of self-cancellation. What is gained in so doing? Surely it is to preserve the self in some other guise, despite the claim of self-cancellation – preservation in some supervening sense, possibly of the aesthetic, or perhaps in the notion of a larger, encompassing order of language which is tacitly agreed upon in the compact between author and reader.

   The end of *Foe* gives us an occultation of Friday's authority, then. It is an extraordinary textual event but it is not one without precedent in South African literature. It is an intensification of, rather than a departure from, the terrain broached by Roy Campbell's poem on the Adamastor theme, 'Rounding the Cape' (of which the title, 'Doubling the Point' is also surely a deliberate echo). Here is Campbell:

Across his back, unheeded, we have broken
Whole forests: heedless of the blood we've spilled,
In thunder still his prophecies are spoken,
In silence, by the centuries, fulfilled.

(Campbell 1968, p. 16)

As the mariners sail on east to India, Cape Point 'sinks into the deep, / The land lies dark beneath the crescent, and Night, the Negro, murmurs in his sleep' (Campbell 1968, p. 17). It is not far from there to Friday's silence 'washing the cliffs and shores of the island, [running] northward and southward to the ends of the earth'. One of Campbell's editors, Malvern Van Wyk Smith, remarks that the poem was a 'valediction' and an 'exorcism' as the poet left South Africa seeking to establish himself in Europe (Van Wyk Smith 1988, p. 28). I would not want to suggest anything proleptic and biographical here about Coetzee's departure from South Africa which took place nearly two decades later, but one could use these terms to account for the ending of *Foe*, in reference to the implied narrator whose journey into the wreck is also

both a valediction and an exorcism. It is a valediction spoken about the entire tradition on which *Robinson Crusoe* is based, and whose detritus lies in the wreck; it is also a valediction spoken at the passing of a life in which the authority to speak has been assumed but has now passed into history. It is an exorcism of the inevitable powerlessness that lies in the future. The familiar self-cancelling gesture of the modernist tradition is raised to another power, one in which the act is registered as not self-chosen, but which the subject still miraculously manages to survive.

Friday's irresistible authority is what distinguishes Coetzee's treatment of the African subject from earlier modernist treatments of Africa, beginning, arguably, with Conrad. Whereas Marlowe is left at the end of *Heart of Darkness* to ponder guiltily both his own capacity to lie and Europe's capacity for degradation (a contemplation facilitated by his horror of life in the Congo) at the end of *Foe* the narrator is simply overwhelmed. He does not face a life of protracted self-disgust; on the contrary, he has been eclipsed, so what Coetzee adds to the Conradian moment is a sense of bounded historicity, leading to the narrator's self-conscious self-cancellation. The subject who survives this annihilation does so in a different textual realm. The survival is bequeathed to us, in fiction.

III

Let me turn now to a third and final example of Coetzee's deployment of Africa as sign. Also in *Doubling the Point* (1992), he speaks of the 'social vitality' of the literature of pastoralism in Europe. He is referring to the poem by Zbigniew Herbert called 'Five Men' in which condemned men are executed after a night of talking about girls and remembering card games. He continues: 'Herbert writes: *therefore* one can write poems about flowers, Greek Shepherds and so forth. A poem … justifying poems that stand back from calls to revolutionary action' (Coetzee 1992, p. 67). In Poland, Coetzee then remarks, it appears one can oppose 'the power of [pastoral] poetry' to 'the shambling beast of history'; 'in Africa', however, he goes on to say (and this is the argument I wish to take up),

> the only address one can imagine is a brutally direct one, a sort of pure unmediated representation; what short-circuits the imagination, what forces one's face into the thing itself, is what I am here calling history. 'The only address one can imagine' – an admission

of defeat. *Therefore*, the task becomes imagining this unimaginable, imagining a form of address that permits the play of *writing* to start taking place. (Coetzee 1999, pp. 67–8)

Africa is offered as a place of unmediated representations. In the language of *Foe*, Africa is a place 'where bodies are their own signs'; that is a related observation, but here the stakes are still higher. Coetzee has shifted the emphasis from Friday and his peculiar agency to the continent itself with Africa indistinguishable from the real – Africa as a place where history powers through mediations, a place which traumatizes by threatening the work of signification, or in the older register of the extract, by threatening the imagination. But is it possible for 'Africa', or any place for that matter, to force 'pure unmediated representation' on the subject? Surely not: surely, to put it simply, the encounters to which Coetzee's remarks testify are those in which certain representations are not recognized in the terms of the subject's own semiotic economy? The force, or the 'brutal directness' of an African mode of address is less a case of having one's face thrust into the Kantian 'thing in itself' than a matter of having the contingency and precariousness of one's habitual systems of representation exposed. The notion of a 'brutal directness' speaks less of an invasion of the real than of the shame of one's own nakedness. It is this moment of exposure, of self-doubt and vulnerability, that Coetzee has turned into a special kind of *metier*, enabling him to begin 'imagining this unimaginable', 'imagining a form of address that permits the play of *writing* to start taking place' (Coetzee 1999, pp. 67–8).

We are back in the world of Schoeman's Versluis, because this begs the question whether the African representations that are part of this world of supposedly undifferentiated power are decodable in some other form, perhaps a form used by Africans themselves. As one might expect from its title, the story, 'The Humanities in Africa' (first published independently and then taken up in *Elizabeth Costello* [2004]) attempts an answer to this question. It does so in the person of Blanche, or Sister Bridget, Elizabeth Costello's biological sister, who has made a life of service to her patients in a mission hospital in Zululand where the HIV/AIDS pandemic is rife. In Sister Bridget's perspective, Friday coalesces with the figure of Christ: Africans, who know all about suffering, are by their plight especially able to identify with the saviour. In these terms, the story offers a fairly benign view of a transculturated world of religious signs and discourses where dialogue across the racial divide is possible – Sister Bridget recuperates Africa in these terms. Costello, however (who carries more of the story's sympathy), cannot

accept Sister Bridget's verdict, and amongst other things she is critical of the carver Joseph's derivative Gothic productions. Costello would like to affirm a very different, preferably Greek model of sculptural beauty, but Sister Bridget is not impressed:

> 'Well, the Zulus [know] better'. She waves a hand towards the window, towards the hospital buildings baking under the sun, towards the dirt road winding up into the barren hills. 'This is reality: the reality of Zululand, the reality of Africa. It is the reality now and the reality of the future as far as we can see it. Which is why African people come to church to kneel before Jesus on the cross, African women above all, who have to bear the brunt of reality. Because they suffer and he suffers with them'. (Coetzee 2004, p. 141)

As in the discussion of Herbert's poem, Africa is a place of unmediated representations – 'this is reality, the reality of Zululand, the reality of Africa',[6] – but to Sister Bridget this lack of mediation makes it more amenable to religious rescripting. To Costello, this is all insufferable, literally: the heat of the church, combined with the heavy liturgical discourse of the service she attends, leave her feeling asphyxiated and she faints like Adela Quested in *A Passage to India*, 'the one who cannot take it, who panics and shames everyone. Who cannot take the heat' (Coetzee 2004, p. 144). The rest of the story plays out as a series of attempts on Costello's part to revisit and replace Sister Bridget's religious aesthetic and the spare but purposeful embodiedness that lies at its heart. Costello even attempts to turn her own preferred aesthetic of Hellenic perfection into a living philosophy to rival her sister's by linking it with sensuous empathy and compassion, a mélange that she dignifies with the term *caritas* but which leads to the story's oddest moment when she recalls baring her breasts and later performing fellatio on an elderly and dying family friend in a hospital bed. The sober assessment of this moment would probably have us observe that Costello's accommodation of physicality includes sex in a way that Sister Bridget's could not. Behind these developments in the story, however, it is not difficult to discern Africa as their putative origin, as a place of explicit physicality; Costello has, in terms of this logic, been Africanized. Or, to put it in the terms of this chapter: here the idea of Africa is occulted into a certain complex of ethical and aesthetic impulses where spare embodiment becomes a source of renewal. *Disgrace* (1999) takes a similar turn: when Africa – in this novel, the village of Salem, as the site of a rural frontier where colonial violence and anti-colonial vengeance are locked in a kind of death-struggle – proves irredeemable, David Lurie's

perspective shifts to a vision of embodiment that he shares with distressed animals. *Caritas* is offered here as an ideal based on the relationship Lurie develops with animals, suggesting that the postcolonial (but still racialized) social relations of Salem are incapable of producing a redemptive position, but nevertheless some of the novel's most intense moments of defamiliarization – of ethical chastening and aesthetic self-consciousness – are played out against this background of what Graham Pechey correctly refers to as *Disgrace*'s purgatorial view of Africa (Pechey 2002, p. 374).

Let me conclude by trying to clarify an area of ambiguity that would not have escaped the reader. I have isolated three moments in which Coetzee develops the idea of Africa in ways that chasten and embolden his art at the price of rendering Africa obscure. I have argued, furthermore, than the rendering obscure, or the occultation of the sign of Africa, is part of, indeed serves, the chastening and emboldening of the art. Why is it that when described in these terms, the aesthetic achievement strikes us as not just bold, but outrageous? The reason is no doubt that we would prefer Coetzee to do equal justice to two compulsions: we would wish from him an aesthetically powerful rendering of Africa, but equally, we would also wish that his representations of African history, subjectivity, and humanity accord with our desire for an Africa in which a full and meaningful life is possible. We would also like to leave open the possibility of a perfectly quotidian Africa, not to mention a dynamic Africa in which processes of cultural translation enable us to put aside the unreconstructed myths of the past. But perhaps it is the case that we cannot have it both ways; perhaps the price that is paid for the aesthetic achievement is disquiet without resolution.

What Jacques Derrida says about the effects of structuralism in his essay 'Force and Signification' seems relevant to Coetzee's treatment of the sign of Africa – Africa as a place of mutilated meanings and hostile intentions. Structuralism, says Derrida, provides the basis for a 'catastrophic consciousness', in which the 'living energy of meaning' is 'neutralised', but in which the structures of language and representation stand out more clearly, like 'the architecture of an uninhabited or deserted city, reduced to its skeleton by some catastrophe of nature or art. A city no longer inhabited, not simply left behind, but haunted by meaning and culture' (Derrida 1978, p. 4). Coetzee's philological emphasis, on processes of representation chastened and charged by the history of settler colonialism and apartheid, produces similar effects, effects that, as literature, have left their mark on the times.

There is something emblematic about the situation described in *Youth*, where the protagonist, another John, finds himself sharing a house briefly with Theodora, a Malawian woman employed as the Merringtons' house-

keeper in London where he is lodging. Theodora says little, but John feels accused by her very silence. Before her presence, as the reluctant settler colonial on the run as much from provincialism as from apartheid, and as an artist in the making, still unsure of affiliations, he is tempted to say – but doesn't: 'Africa belongs to you, it is yours to do with as you wish' (Coetzee 2002, p. 121). Before this figure of Theodora, as much as before Friday, Coetzee's fiction performs its *danse macabre*.

Notes

1 The larger question here would be about the social energies carried by the form of the novel. If it is the case that the realist tradition has contributed to the historical achievements of the bourgeoisie, it would not be surprising if the emergent middle classes of postcolonial states wished to secure this advantage for themselves.

2 Arguably the most powerful ethical-philosophical interpretation of failed reciprocity in Coetzee is that offered by critics working within the terms of Emmanuel Levinas, in particular, Stefan Helgesson and Michael Marais. In *J.M. Coetzee and the Ethics of Reading* and *The Singularity of Literature* Derek Attridge develops the aesthetic implications of this position, exploring the ways in which the failure of social allegory draws attention to the performativity of the text.

3 Far from being a distraction, Mudimbe's Sartrean language is entirely germane to Coetzee's treatment of this theme, especially in *In the Heart of the Country* and *Life and Times of Michael K*.

4 In *White Writing*, Coetzee speaks of the failure of the romantic poetry of landscape to translate 'the desert of the Southern African plateau' as anything other than 'the home of a Sphinx, a Sphinx all the more baffling for having no material form, for being everywhere present yet nowhere apprehensible' (p. 177). As a literary figure Coetzee's Sphinx is suggestive but the trope which has more frequently represented the impenetrable, untranslatable interior – coupled with imagined prophecies of doom for the settler colonist – is that of Adamastor.

5 Coetzee seems to be skeptical about the scope of cultural translation. Consider the name Pollux, the youngest of Lucy's rapists in *Disgrace*. David Lurie is exasperated by its incongruity. One way of reading the name is to give it allegorical status: track its source in Greek mythology (Pollux and Castor are fratricidal twins) and then decide who are the analogues in the novel of the mythic figures (possibly Pollux and Lurie himself). But such a reading does not seem compelled by the textual context – we are free to take it or leave it. It is more useful, I suggest, to be guided by Lurie's reaction, and simply to accept that the name represents an imperfect cultural translation. As such it becomes another unassimilable fragment much like 'Thabanchu'. Cultural translations merely throw up more anomalies; they do not transform.

6 Here too, Coetzee abrogates a previously mediated sign, in this case the famous first sentence of Alan Paton's *Cry, the Beloved Country*: 'There is a lovely road that runs from Ixopo into the hills', so that the barren hills around the mission de-spiritualize Paton's religious-allegorical landscape.

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15
Zionism Then and Now

Saree Makdisi

For the most part, when we speak of settler colonialism today, we are referring to colonial projects that took place in the distant past: sixteenth-century America; seventeenth-century Ireland; eighteenth-century Africa or Australia. There is, however, one form of enduring settler colonialism from the twentieth century. I refer, of course, to Zionism.

The project to remove – or, to use the term that was circulating in Zionist circles as early as the 1930s, 'transfer' – the indigenous population of Palestine and replace it with an incoming Jewish settler population achieved a partial victory with the ethnic cleansing of most of Palestine in 1948. That year, Zionist militias systematically purged the country – which had entered the twentieth century with a population that was 93 per cent Muslim and Christian – of most of its Muslim and Christian Palestinian inhabitants, 90 per cent of whom were forcibly removed from the land that would be consolidated into the Jewish state of Israel (Morris 2004a; Pappé 2006; Masalha 1992). The 1948 ethnic cleansing and colonial resettlement of Palestine continues to this day as a result of Israeli policies that methodically remove and displace Palestinians from their homes in the towns and cities in which they were born so as to make room for new Jewish arrivals. This is the case, for example, in the Israeli policy to strip Palestinians in East Jerusalem of their residency papers, which results in their removal from the city of their birth; in the Israeli policy of denying Palestinians permits to build homes on their own property in East Jerusalem, and demolishing those homes when they are built anyway, both of which also serve to displace the Palestinian population of the city into the West Bank and overseas (and to facilitate their replacement by newly arriving Jewish colonists). There is also the Israeli policy to displace

tens of thousands of Palestinians from the centre of Hebron, in the southern West Bank, in order to make life easier for the 400 or so Jewish colonists who have set up settlements there, with state support, in total violation of international humanitarian law (OCHA 2009; B'Tselem 2007; Makdisi 2010a).

What further distinguishes Zionism as a settler colonial movement is that, unlike many of the advocates of earlier colonial projects, who produced unabashed and often brutally frank statements of support for the kinds of violence that colonialism necessarily involves, the best known contemporary advocates of Zionism go out of their way to repackage what they stand for in more palatable terms. This has involved a nearly complete denial and rewriting of the history of the Zionist conflict with the Palestinians, thus standing the well-documented evidentiary record on its head. So powerful is this denial, such is the extent of the self-indoctrination that it generates, that it even enables, for example, the construction – without even a trace of irony – of a so-called Museum of Tolerance (in fact a kind of shrine to Zionism) right on top of what had been, until 1948, the most prominent Muslim cemetery in Jerusalem (Makdisi 2010b).

The really strange thing, however, is that this softened version of Zionism (that in all seriousness regards itself as a movement for liberation and 'tolerance') coexists with another, much harder, version of Zionism. In an unbroken line running from Vladimir Jabotinsky in the 1920s to Arnon Sofer and Benny Morris today, this recapitulates the brutal honesty of earlier episodes of settler colonialism and is absolutely unrestrained in advocating further violence – murder, demolition, expulsion – in order to safeguard the Zionist project in Palestine. This essay aims to explore this remarkable Dr Jekyll and Mr Hyde tension in contemporary Zionism, beginning with one of its best-known advocates, the Israeli novelist Amos Oz, who has worked assiduously to produce one of the most remarkable rewritings of recent history.

In his 2005 memoir, *A Tale of Love and Darkness*, Oz describes the celebrations in Jewish areas of Jerusalem after the UN voted in favour of the controversial plan to partition Palestine in November of 1947:

> Strangers hugged each other in the streets and kissed each other with tears, and startled English policemen were also dragged into the circles of dancers and softened up with cans of beer and sweet liqueurs, and frenzied revelers climbed up on British armored cars and waved the flag of the state that had not been established yet,

but tonight … it had been decided that it had the right to be established. And it would be established one hundred and sixty-seven days and nights later, on Friday the fourteenth of May 1948, but one in every hundred men, women, old folk, children and babies in those crowds of Jews who were dancing, reveling, drinking and weeping for joy, fully one percent of the excited people who spilt out on to the streets that night, would die in the war that the Arabs started within seven hours of the General Assembly's decision … – to be helped, when the British left, by the regular armed forces of the Arab League, columns of infantry, armor, artillery, fighter planes and bombers, from the south, the east and the north, the regular armies of five Arab states invading with the intention of putting an end to the new state within one or two days of its proclamation. (Oz 2005, pp. 344–5)

I will return in a moment to the oddly foreshortened nature of Oz's account of the creation of Israel, an account in which the concomitant destruction of Palestine is hardly even mentioned. Oz does indeed recognize that the Palestinians were not celebrating that night the news that a meeting of diplomats in upstate New York had decided on the dismemberment of their country. Palestinians did not agree with this dismemberment, but no one had thought to ask them what they thought ever since the American King-Crane Commission of 1919, which had warned a world that refused to listen that the Zionist programme in Palestine could only be put into effect by the use of force. Reporting after their visit to Palestine that year, where they had interviewed Zionists, British officers, and indigenous Palestinians, King and Crane warned presciently that

The [British] officers generally thought a force of not less than fifty thousand soldiers would be required even to initiate the [Zionist] program. That of itself is evidence of a strong sense of the injustice of the Zionist program, on the part of the non-Jewish populations of Palestine and Syria. Decisions, requiring armies to carry out, are sometimes necessary, but they are surely not gratuitously to be taken in the interests of a serious injustice. For the initial claim, often submitted by Zionist representatives, that they have a 'right' to Palestine, based on an occupation of two thousand years ago, can hardly be seriously considered. (King and Crane 1919)

The King-Crane Commission, however, is conspicuously absent from Oz's narrative.

Also absent is any substantive discussion of the UN Partition Plan, which seems so innocuously positive in Oz's account of it. The Partition Plan proposed giving over more than half of Palestine to the one-third of its inhabitants who were by then Jewish (the great majority of them recent arrivals from Europe and survivors of the Holocaust), and who owned less than 7 per cent of the total land area. Even in the 5,500 square miles proposed for the Jewish state, Jews legally owned only about 600 square miles. The proposed Jewish state would actually have had almost equal Jewish and Arab populations, the latter to face permanent disenfranchisement on their own land, or worse. Walid Khalidi observes that nearly all of Palestine's citrus groves, 80 per cent of its cereal land, and 40 per cent of Palestinian industrial capacity would fall within the borders of the proposed Jewish state. Jaffa would be cut off from its hinterland, facing the Mediterranean Sea in one direction – and surrounded by the sea of the Jewish state in the other. Hundreds of Palestinian villages would be separated from their fields and pastures. The Palestinians, Khalidi notes, 'failed to see why it was *not* fair for the Jews to be a minority in a unitary Palestinian state, while it *was* fair for almost half of the Palestinian population – the indigenous majority on its own native soil – to be converted overnight into a minority under alien rule in the envisaged Jewish state according to partition' (Khalidi 1991, pp. 305–6). The Arab Higher Committee rejected the plan as unfair, inequitable and inherently absurd.

Oz allows none of these qualifications to sully his narrative of the celebrations following the publication of the Partition Plan. Continuing his description of the Jewish jubilation in 1947, Oz notes:

> they [the Palestinians] must have heard the sounds of rejoicing from the Jewish streets, they may have stood at their windows to watch the few joyful fireworks that injured the dark sky, pursing their lips in silence … Even though neither Katamon, Talbieh or Bakaa [neighborhoods in Palestinian Jerusalem] knew or could know yet that in another five months they would fall empty, intact, into the hands of the Jews and that new people would come and live in those vaulted houses of pink stone and those villas with their many cornices and arches. (Oz 2005, p. 325)

In one continuous passage, then, Oz both consciously signals and elides the terrible reality of what it means for a country to be dismembered and ultimately destroyed; this is the reality of one people being driven from their homes so that another, largely immigrant people, could take

their places. Indeed, the book is remarkable for conveying a sense of patriotic jubilation at the creation of the state of Israel while recognizing – albeit as though it were no more than a rather odd coincidence – the chilling reality of what happened to the Palestinian people in 1948.

So, while emphasizing the giddy joy at the creation of the state of Israel, Oz does actually admit that unpleasant things happened in 1948, that massacres took place, that people were forced from their homes; he even expresses a certain degree of compassion for the displaced, at least the ones he knew personally. In fact his autobiographical narrative of 1948 returns frequently to one Palestinian family, the Silwanis, whom he met before the war, and in particular to Aisha, a Palestinian girl with whom he played when Jerusalem was still a united city, and Palestine a united country belonging to Christians, Muslims and Jews alike. 'The whole Silwani family, I was told after the Six Day War, left Jordanian Jerusalem in the fifties and early sixties', Oz writes.

> Some went to Switzerland and Canada, others settled in the Gulf emirates, a few moved to London and some others to Latin America …. And what about Aisha? And her lame brother? Where on earth is she playing her piano, assuming she still has one, assuming she has not grown old and worn out among the dusty, heat-blasted hovels in some refugee camp where the sewage runs down the unpaved streets. And who are the fortunate Jews who now live in what was once her family home in Talbiyeh, a neighborhood built of pale blue and pinkish stone with stone vaults and arches? (Oz 2005, p. 325)

'Where did Aisha go', he continues,

> with her little brother? To Nablus? Damascus? London? Or to the refugee camp at Deheisha? Today, if she is still alive, Aisha is a woman of sixty-five. And her little brother … would be nearly sixty now. Perhaps I could set out to find them? To discover what happened to all the branches of the Silwani family, in London, South America and Australia? But suppose I found Aisha, somewhere in the world, or the person who was once that sweet little boy: How would I introduce myself? What could I say? What could I really explain? What could I offer? (Oz 2005, pp. 355–6)

Of course, it is right that this question should haunt Oz's tortured conscience and, indeed, the conscience of Israel as a whole. Oz's

relationship to Aisha and her brother – wandering, exiled, displaced by an inhuman act is nothing less than an allegory of Israel's relationship to the Palestinians. For what could be more inhuman than denying a people the very thing that defines their humanity in the first place, namely, their home, their right to belong? Thus what we trace in the writing of Israel's best known man of letters is in some sense an allegory of how his nation has come to feel collectively when in its most generous frame of mind.

What indeed could Oz offer Aisha and what could Israel offer the Palestinians six decades after driving them into exile? Peace and restitution, naturally, come to mind; but let's give Oz the benefit of the doubt and admit that, as a single individual, he is not capable of delivering peace and restitution on his own. What then can one man offer? Would an apology have any meaning? But Oz is most certainly not offering that: how could one apologize for something that one is also celebrating? If not an apology, how about a really profound, sincere, soul-searching acknowledgment of what actually happened to the Palestinians in 1948? Not just a nod to the fact of their displacement and exile, but an acknowledgement at a human level of what that displacement was all about, where it came from, who was responsible for it – and above all how it might end?

That, however, is precisely what we will *not* find in Oz's book – or anywhere in Amos Oz at his most sincere and compassionate. For one thing, his memoir narrates the momentous events of 1947–48 in a subtly lopsided way. The best known massacre of Palestinian men, women and children, at Deir Yassin, is mentioned, for example; but it is allotted a single sentence – which is succeeded by the seven paragraphs devoted to the description of a counter-massacre of Jews; no mention at all is made of the more momentous massacres and forced expulsions that took place, for example, at Ramle and Lydda, where more than 60,000 Palestinians were forced to leave their homes by a military unit operating under the command of one Yitzhak Rabin (see Pappé 2006). The reader is told more than once that Arab armies attacked within hours of Israel's declaration of independence, though she is never given a sense of the disparity in numbers, armament, or capabilities – let alone a sense that Arab armies came feebly to Palestine's defence only at the point where there was hardly anything left to defend any longer, since massacres and expulsions had been taking place for two or three months before Israel even declared its independence; or a sense that these much overrated Arab armies never even attempted to enter territory that the UN, in its wisdom, had pro-

posed allotting to the Jewish state – thanks, as we now know from the work of Avi Shlaim and others, to a pact between David Ben Gurion and King Abdullah of Jordan, who agreed before the fighting even got started as to where the eventual armistice line should fall (Shlaim 1988).

In fact, one of the most remarkable features of Oz's book is that, although it was published in the twenty-first century, and although Amos Oz is regarded in the US and UK as one of the leading exponents of Israeli progressivism and what is referred to by some as the peace camp, the historical narrative that his memoir recycles is the classic, orthodox, standard-issue narrative that first saw the light of day in a mix of patriotic chronicling, propaganda, and outright falsehoods following the 1948 foundation of Israel. *A Tale of Love and Darkness* bristles with footnotes intended to add a measure of authority to its historical claims; but a single glance at the footnotes reveals that Oz goes far out of his way to avoid mentioning, let alone acknowledging and taking into account, any of the histories of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and specifically of the events of 1948, produced since the 1950s: not only the work of Palestinian historians such as Nur Masalha and Walid Khalidi, but also those of the so-called 'new' Israeli historians, like Simha Flapan, Avi Shlaim, Benny Morris, Ilan Pappe, Tanya Reinhardt, Tom Segev, and so on. With none of these scholars does Oz seem to have even a passing acquaintance, even though they revolutionized Israeli historiography, precisely by stripping away the layers of denial that had been built into Israel's founding story of itself (see, for example, Masalha 1992; Flapan 1987; Morris 2001). Such a momentous lacuna demands two immediate questions: why would this be? And what difference does this elision make?

The second question is perhaps easier to answer than the first. Denied any of the proper historical context going back to the 1930s and 1940s, a reader who did not know otherwise would conclude that Palestine was and had always been primarily a Jewish country, or, at most, a Jewish country with an Arab minority (Oz makes hardly any mention of Palestinians as such). Such a reader would not know about the intensive immigration campaign that failed to make much of a dent in the numerical superiority of native-born Palestinians to largely European Jewish immigrants. She would not know about the very detailed plans for ethnic cleansing ('transfer') that were circulating at the highest levels of the Zionist leadership at least as early as the mid-1930s; in short, she would not be in a position to understand the reality of the events that unfolded in 1947–48. The cleansing of Palestine would appear to such a reader to have been merely a kind of

coincidence, however tragic, rather than the deliberate outcome of a pre-meditated policy. Thus 'Arabs' (not Palestinians) might be seen to have been killed, massacred, and displaced; but as a consequence of the invasion of the mighty Arab armies, not as a deliberate and systematically planned project of ethnic cleansing. Above all, stripped of this contextual and historical information, the naïve reader would not be in a position to know that the 1948 war was hardly a 'civil war' between two long-established communities, both equally at home in Palestine, but rather a war between one established community and what was at the time still an overwhelmingly immigrant settler population.

In other words, Oz's reader would have absolutely no way of knowing that when the 1948 war began – after four decades of intensive Jewish immigration – two-thirds of Palestine's population was *still* Palestinian, and that when the war ended, half of that population – and, more significantly perhaps, some 90 per cent of the Palestinian Arabs who had once lived in the territory that would become the state of Israel, that is, some three quarters of a million people – had either fled or been driven from their homes, never to be allowed back. The contrived cleverness of Oz's literary reconstruction of 1948, then, is that it admits a kind of general sketch of what happened without allowing any of the contextualization which would make sense of what happened by placing it in a continuous historical narrative. To be precise, certain facts are *mentioned* without actually being *narrated*.

Admittedly, footnotes or otherwise, this is a memoir. But Oz handles these questions in his more expressly non-fictional, political interventions in much the same way. 'For at least a hundred years now', Oz writes in the afterword to the 1993 edition of his best known book, *In the Land of Israel*,

> Israelis and Palestinians each have been claiming to be the rightful owners of the country that we call the Land of Israel and they call Palestine …. In one hundred years of tension and violence, these two societies have remained two societies … [except for, he admits] Israel's Palestinian citizens: theirs is not a case of divorce but of legal equality, democratic plurality, and multiethnic coexistence within Israel. (Oz 1993, pp. 246, 249)

Note that Oz's gesture endows the Israelis not merely with national existence but with actual nationhood for several decades before Israel actually existed – which would not necessarily be so problematic if, several decades before Israel actually existed, Jews constituted more than 6 or 7 per cent of Palestine's population – and if those Jews had not

considered themselves *Palestinian*, which is, of course, what they were! What Oz is aiming for here is a kind of retroactive mirror image of the Palestinian argument that the Palestinians still constitute a nation even if they have been dispersed across various national boundaries and scattered across the world; in this version of the argument, however, the nation actually somehow pre-exists its own people: whether they want it or not, Palestine's Jews are retroactively transformed into Israelis, and so are the hundreds of thousands of European Jews who in 1893, or 1903, or 1913, or 1923 had barely even heard of Palestine, and who were perfectly happy to be German, or English, or French, at least until the horrors of the Nazi Holocaust fell upon them.

What all these elisions and distortions are meant to feed into is Oz's recurring theme – one which he recycles in his memoir – that when it comes to the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians there is no right and wrong, no immigrant and native, no usurper and usurped, no colonizer and colonized. 'Even after peace is achieved', he argues, 'both parties will still disagree over who was to blame for the whole conflict. They will disagree about the past. They will almost certainly remain divided over who was David and who was Goliath in this conflict' (Oz 1993, p. 251). Because the Israeli-Palestinian struggle is essentially one between two rights, Oz says that he refuses to use terms such as 'the promised land', which are terms of faith rather than of secular politics. 'Happy are those who believe', he writes, 'Why should they trouble themselves with questions of morality or rights of others? … Their Zionism is simple and carefree. Mine is hard and complicated'. His Zionism is complicated, Oz explains, because he wants to be able to reconcile his commitment to Zionism with what he claims to be his concern for morality and the rights of the Palestinians.

'The Zionist enterprise', Oz writes in a different piece, 'has no other objective justification than the right of a drowning man to grasp the only plank that can save him'. But he says that there is

> a vast moral difference between the drowning man who grasps a plank and makes room for himself by pushing the others who are sitting on it to one side, even by force, and the drowning man who grabs the whole plank for himself and pushes the others into the sea …. This is the difference between making Jaffa and Nazareth [i.e., Israel] Jewish, and making Ramallah and Nablus [i.e., the West Bank] Jewish. (Oz 1967, p. 237)

In making such an argument, Oz is expressing a specific strand of Zionism, one that I have elsewhere characterized as Romantic, in the sense that it

is profoundly concerned with the land, and part of a long tradition with an explicit and continuous set of narratives going back to at least the emergence of the Romantic interest in ethnically defined nationalism in the early nineteenth century: a line of thought running roughly from Lord Byron through George Eliot and on to Theodor Herzl himself.

One of the key components of the modern incarnation of this kind of Romantic Zionism, however, is the distinction it seeks to make between what happened in 1948 and what happened in 1967 – which is the point of the plank analogy invoked by Oz. The urge to distinguish between 1948 and 1967, however, is what prompts me to characterize this kind of Zionism not merely as Romantic but also as an attempt to be 'postcolonial', in ways that I must now further elaborate. Such an account imagines itself as 'postcolonial' in that it situates itself post-1948 and pre-1967. For this strand of Zionism, 1967 may have turned into a mistaken adventure, but 1948 was a genuine war of independence. This is why, in Oz's account of it, the early Zionists appear as natives to what he calls the Land of Israel, fighting off the colonial oppression of the British on the one hand, and the invading Arab hordes on the other. For this strand of Zionism, in other words, the period between 1948 and 1967 was a kind of Golden Age: Israel had freed itself from colonial oppression and had not yet become a colonial power itself.

One problem here, of course, is that, in its obsession with differentiating 1967 from 1948, this would-be 'postcolonial' Zionism not only refuses to see the actual continuities between those two events, it also seeks to deny pre-1948 links between European colonialism and Zionism itself.

> 'Zionism is not a colonial phenomenon', Oz himself argues in *In the Land of Israel*. Actually, the early Zionists who came to the land of Israel at the turn of this century had nothing to colonize there. It's one of the few countries in the Middle East with no resources. In terms of colonial exploitation, the Zionists have involved themselves in the worst bargain of all times; they have brought into the country thousands of times more wealth than they could ever hope to get out of it. Wrong diagnosis begets wrong perception and wrong treatment. So I think that Palestinian ideologists, as well as some of the world left, should set about revising their concept of Zionism. It's not a form of colonialism, neither is it a form of racism. It is a national liberation movement. (Oz 1993, p. 258)

In insisting that Palestine was always already the 'Land of Israel', in insisting that that land was essentially empty or barren, if not alto-

gether devoid of population – which is an old Zionist refrain – Oz seems to be blithely unaware that he is articulating a classically colonialist argument. And this insistence on not seeing Zionism as an expressly colonial mission can amount to little more than a denial of the very reality that links together 1897 with 1922 with 1948 and 1967 and on to 2007. After all, in 1917 when Lord Balfour declared that His Majesty's Government 'viewed with favour the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people', over 90 per cent of the population of Palestine was non-Jewish. Even the majority of Palestine's Jews were themselves indigenous native Arabs, as Arab, and as Palestinian, as the Palestinian Christians and Palestinian Muslims. My point is that Palestinian Jews were then an integral component of what had been, until the commencement of the Zionist enterprise, a vibrant and genuinely multiethnic society, of the sort that would prove – and to this day continues to prove – intolerable to Zionism itself.

The earliest European Zionists were under no illusion that they were members of an indigenous settler community. They thought of themselves proudly as settlers and frontiersmen, and they worked hard to establish relations with European colonialism, to formulate a kind of joint project in which Zionist and European could face the indigenous people of Palestine as a common foe. 'A voluntary agreement between us and the Arabs of Palestine is inconceivable now or in the foreseeable future', Vladimir Jabotinsky pointed out as early as 1923. 'Every indigenous people', he argued, 'will resist alien settlers as long as they see any hope of ridding themselves of the danger of foreign settlement. This is how the Arabs will behave and go on behaving as long as they possess a gleam of hope that they can prevent "Palestine" from becoming the Land of Israel'. Thus he concluded: 'We must either suspend our settlement efforts or continue them without paying attention to the mood of the natives. Settlement can thus develop under the protection of a force that is not dependent on the local population, behind an iron wall which they will be powerless to break down'. Jabotinsky's words, which can be seen to underlie Israeli policy to this day, were prophetic: 'The only way to achieve a settlement in the future is total avoidance of all attempts to arrive at a settlement in the present' (Jabotinsky 1984).

One problem with the concept of the iron wall, however, is that such a wall – even if it is material rather than metaphorical – is of little use if too many natives are left standing on the wrong side. It was precisely this difficulty that led to the consolidation of the Zionist concept that would come to be known, albeit somewhat euphemistically, as 'transfer'. As Benny Morris has pointed out, Ben Gurion recognized that 'there could

be no Jewish state with a large and hostile Arab minority in its midst. There would be no such state. It would not be able to exist'. Transferring, uprooting, dispossessing, ethnically cleansing – call it what you will – as much as possible of the native Palestinian population was essential to the Zionist project from the beginning. 'There are circumstances in history that justify ethnic cleansing', Morris says.

> A Jewish state would not have come into being without the uproot-ing of 700,000 Palestinians. Therefore it was necessary to uproot them. There was no choice but to expel that population. It was nec-essary to cleanse the hinterland and cleanse the border areas and cleanse the main roads. It was necessary to cleanse the villages from which our convoys and our settlements were being fired on. (Morris 2004b)

In reconsidering the momentous events of 1948, Morris points out that 'thinking about the transfer of all or part of Palestine's Arabs out of the prospective Jewish state was pervasive among Zionist leadership circles long before 1937, when Lord Peel recommended transfer alongside par-tition as the only possible solution to the conflict, and continued to exercise the Zionist imagination during the following decade' (Morris 2001, p. 40).

Ben Gurion and others were circumspect in discussing plans for transfer. They recognized that the less said about it the better. But in closed meetings, there was considerable frankness about the matter, as Morris's work amply demonstrates. Eliahu Dobkin, director of the Jewish Agency's immigration department, said, 'There will be in this country a large minority and it must be ejected. There is no room for our internal inhibitions [in this matter]'. Eliezer Kaplan, who would become Israel's first finance minister, said, 'Regarding the matter of transfer I have only one request: Let us not start arguing among ourselves', as 'this will cause us the most damage externally'. Dov Joseph, who would become Israel's first justice minister, agreed. Werner David Senator, the founder of the Hebrew University, added: 'I do not regard the question of transfer as a moral or immoral problem'. Shlomo Lavi, one of the kibbutz movement's early leaders, went further. The 'transfer of Arabs out of the country in my eyes is one of the most just, moral and correct things that can be done'. Avraham Katznelson of the dominant Mapai party could conceive of nothing 'more moral, from the viewpoint of universal human ethics, than the emptying of the Jewish State of the Arabs and their transfer else-where', which, he acknowledged, 'requires the use of force'. Speaking at

the Zionist world labour movement in 1937, Eliahu Lulu declared that 'this transfer, even if it were carried out through compulsion – all moral enterprises are carried out through compulsion – will be justified in all senses'. It is, he added, 'a just, logical, moral, and humane programme in all senses'. In an uncharacteristically frank moment, Weizmann himself pointed out to the Soviet Ambassador to London in 1941 that 'if half a million Arabs could be transferred, two million Jews could be put in their place. That, of course, would be a first installment; what might happen afterwards was a matter for history' (All quotations from Morris 2004a, pp. 49–50).

Zionist discussions and formulations of 'transfer' went on through the 1930s and early 1940s, as Jewish immigration into the country – and Arab resistance to it – ebbed and flowed. According to Nur Masalha, transfer committees were set up by the Jewish Agency between 1937 and 1942 precisely in order to formulate the plans for removing the Palestinians from their land. The Zionist concept of transfer reached the decisive tipping point with the outbreak of actual fighting in late 1947, following the issuance of the United Nations Partition Plan of 29 November – the event that Amos Oz celebrates in that passage from his memoir which I quoted earlier.

The point here, however, is not that in Oz's would-be 'postcolonial' version of all this the Partition Plan was cause for celebration; the point is that Oz wants to make his uncomplicated narration of the Partition Plan the point of departure for a process that in reality had been set in motion decades previously. For Oz, then, the Jewish state that emerged from the rubble of Palestine had its origins in the Partition Plan, rather than in necessarily violent schemes of expropriation and transfer (a word that does not come up once in his account) that were being circulated and discussed for years, even decades, before 1947. The key condition of possibility for this 'postcolonial' Zionism, in other words, is that its account of the struggle for the foundation of Israel begins in November 1947 and ends several months later in the jubilation of May 1948. The prehistory of 1947–48 simply has no presence at all; it is deleted from the narrative. Which is precisely why Oz's account of 1948 seems so strangely foreshortened.

What I am calling here 'postcolonial' Zionism is hardly the only current form of Zionism. On the contrary, it presents itself as a kinder, gentler Zionism, one opposed to that form of Zionism that explicitly conceives of itself as extending the work of Ben Gurion and Jabotinsky, and that is perfectly clear about the direct continuities of the narratives and processes set in motion in 1923, 1937 and 1948, on into the present. This latter

form of Zionism – to which I have referred elsewhere as hardcore Zionism – for which 1948 was only one event in a story expressed in concrete and steel, blood and tears, continues to this very day.

The most important spokesman for this hardcore Zionism is the former Israeli government advisor Arnon Sofer of Haifa University, who is one of the principal architects of Israeli policy during the Sharon era. His proposal – now embodied in Israel's so-called disengagement plan – is for Israel to eliminate as many Palestinians as possible from the territory under Israeli rule, by annexing all land in the occupied territories deemed worth retaining (as long as it is clear of Palestinians), and expunging all the rest, along with as many Palestinians as possible. Asked by a *Jerusalem Post* interviewer what the region would look like after the separation barrier (which Sofer, like most Israelis, refers to simply as a 'fence') is complete, he responds:

> When 2.5 million people live in a closed-off Gaza, it's going to be a human catastrophe. Those people will become even bigger animals than they are today, with the aid of an insane fundamentalist Islam. The pressure on the border is going to be awful. It's going to be a terrible war. So, if we want to remain alive, we will have to kill and kill and kill. All day, every day. (Sofer 2004)

Sofer admits of only one concern at all this killing. 'The only thing that concerns me', he says, 'is how to ensure that the boys and men who are going to have to do the killing will be able to return home to their families and be normal human beings'. But in the end the point of all this is not just killing for the sake of killing. The point is separation – and transfer. 'Unilateral separation doesn't guarantee "peace"', Sofer says; 'it guarantees a Zionist-Jewish state with an overwhelming majority of Jews; it guarantees the kind of safety that will return tourists to the country; and it guarantees one other important thing', he adds. 'Between 1948 and 1967, the [border] fence was a fence, and 400,000 people left the West Bank voluntarily. This is what will happen after separation. If a Palestinian cannot come into Tel Aviv for work, he will look in Iraq, or Kuwait, or London. I believe that there will be movement out of the area'. 'Voluntary transfer?' the interviewer asks. 'Yes', Sofer replies.

So the talk, and the policy, of 'transfer' live on in Israel today. It does not take much to recognize in Sofer's statements echoes of the words – uttered six or seven decades earlier – of Ben Gurion, Weitz, Katznelson, Senator, Shertok, Dobkin, Lavi, and Weizmann. He shares with them the same conceptual language; the same bleak, crude, bipolar, Manichean

vision of the world. Indeed, Sofer's Zionism is part of the same by now anachronistic, even ossified, intellectual and political formation that Ben Gurion and Jabotinsky had been elaborating decades previously. Ideologically speaking, this formation has not matured in any substantive way since the days of the original 'transfer talk' in the 1930s. It has no way of coming to terms with the vibrant, colourful, heterogeneous world that we all live in. Its exponents prefer instead – indeed they seek comfort in – the blinkered and blinded monochromatic world of ethnic categories and racial hierarchies that one would have thought had no right to exist in the ever more complex and integrated global reality of the twenty-first century.

The methods and modalities may have changed, but the seamless continuity between Sofer's language and that of the 1930s suggests that this strand of hardcore Zionism represents an ideology, a worldview, that has not only not developed, but that is flatly incapable of developing. It was born at a particular moment in the history of European colonialism – and, in ideological terms, that is exactly where it has remained, while its contemporaries from the late nineteenth century have, by and large, vanished, or learned somehow to reconcile themselves to a new reality (as in South Africa). This strand of Zionism has consistently shown itself to be capable of only one vision of the world. And, as dictated by that vision – to which its proponents cling at all costs – it has only one set of methods for dealing with all those multitudinous features of reality that do not conform to, or that threaten to undermine or interrupt it: their annihilation, more or less along the lines proposed by Sofer and current Israeli policy. I can think of no other country today that would willingly, with eyes wide open, embrace a policy that will require it to 'kill and kill and kill, all day, every day'. This is a policy that Israel's democratically elected leaders have *chosen* to pursue. It is essential to bear in mind, in other words, that Sofer is not a lonely lunatic or a voice crying in the wilderness: he is, as the American Jewish newspaper *The Forward* recognizes, 'the voice of the Israeli consensus' (Derfner 2004).

The question now is whether the soft, 'peacenik' Zionism of people like Shimon Peres and Yitzhak Rabin, and the would-be 'postcolonial' Zionism of Amos Oz differs substantively (rather than merely ideologically) from the ruthless, hardcore Zionism of people like Sofer and Sharon. Along with A.B. Yehoshua and David Grossman, Amos Oz is, of course, widely regarded as one of the most eloquent spokespersons of this other Zionist tradition, whether one imagines it as 'postcolonial' or merely softcore rather than hardcore: a tradition that has been saying for years that it is ready – under certain conditions – for peace with the

Palestinians. In his 1993 'Afterword' to *In the Land of Israel*, written as the first round of the Oslo peace process was getting under way, Oz describes the conflict between Israelis and Palestinians as essentially 'a dispute over real estate' that can be resolved through compromise. Just as Israelis must learn to make 'painful sacrifices', the Palestinians must learn that what has happened to them is essentially their fault: that their national struggle has caused an immense amount of misery and tragedy 'not only to the Israelis but especially to their own people, by taking, for decades, such an uncompromising stance, by endorsing the Nazis in the thirties and forties, and by blatantly aiming at and attempting to exterminate Israel, a purpose they have openly proclaimed for decades' (Oz 1993, p. 252). As I argued earlier, in order to make such a claim, Oz must flatten out the history of the struggle to the point where it ceases to be recognizable. For the point is not that Oz is attempting to rewrite the history of what happened in 1948: it is that the kind of history that he has in mind is flatly incapable of acknowledging what actually happened in 1948.

This is, in other words, not a rewriting, but rather a skipping over of history, a resetting of historical chronologies such that 1947 marks the beginning and nothing that came before counts. It is not just historical myopia: it is historical, and hence political, blindness: a categorical refusal to really acknowledge not only the actual events of 1948 but also to consider seriously what the Zionism of Ben Gurion and Jabotinsky – Zionism as practised rather than merely preached – was fundamentally all about. There are two sides, two rights, two Davids and two Goliaths, Oz is saying; each has done bad things to the other, and so let's put it all behind us. Both sides have to get over what happened: the Israelis that they captured only 78 per cent of Palestine, the Palestinians that they lost 78 per cent of their homeland (and for Oz these are more or less equivalent losses). Not only do the Palestinians have no business complaining, he adds: they had better come to terms now, and hope to end up with 'a fraction of what they could have had with peace and honor in 1948' (Oz 2003).

So it is not quite true that for Oz there are two more or less equally guilty parties to this conflict. Ultimately, the real villains in the Oz version of history are the Palestinians, who ought to have recognized Zionism as a national liberation movement, welcomed it with open arms, and … what? What should they have done? Should they have accepted the UN Partition plan? Should they have quietly done as they were told to because Lord Balfour said so – because Zionism, 'be it right or wrong, good or bad, is rooted in age-long tradition, in present needs,

in future hopes, of far profounder import than the desires and prejudices of the 700,000 Arabs who now inhabit that ancient land?' (Balfour quoted in Said 1979, pp. 16–17) Should they have simply packed up and left their homes, moved out, abandoned ancestral olive groves, fields they spent their lives working, landscapes they shaped for their own purposes, houses they built with their own hands, and human communities that they were collectively part of? History is full of conquests and expulsions, but I can think of no example of a people voluntarily packing up and leaving its native land simply because a distant power said so.

The simple, brute fact of the matter is that if one believes in the creation and maintenance of a Jewish state on land that has long had – and still does have – a considerable non-Jewish (that is to say, Palestinian) heritage and presence, not only is there only one way to proceed, there has only ever been one way to proceed. Jabotinsky and Ben Gurion recognized this long ago, and had the courage to admit it to themselves, if not necessarily (or not always) to others. As brutal as his words may sound to humanist ears today, Arnon Sofer is at least to be commended for his honesty in recognizing the same fact today. And he is by no means alone. In one of his recent pieces in *Ha'aretz*, the Israeli journalist Gideon Levy describes his encounter with a farmer in the human-made wasteland of southern Israel who, pointing at the dusty traces of pre-1948 Palestine, tells him: 'Anyone who tells you that there was no ethnic cleansing here will be lying, and anyone who tells you that without the ethnic cleansing Israel would have been established will also be lying' (Levy 2005). But, the farmer adds, had that ethnic cleansing not taken place in the way that it did, 'Ahmed and Mustafa would now be holding a discussion about us, and I prefer me holding a discussion about Ahmed and Mustafa'.

Thus there is one central claim linking Ben Gurion and Weitz to Arnon Sofer and Avigdor Lieberman: Israel could come into being, and can maintain itself today, only by eliminating the Palestinian presence, or at least reducing it to the point of irrelevance. The only question that remains is the actual method by which this is to be achieved. Terrorism and expulsion were the methods of 1948; restricting human life to the point that it ceases to be recognizably human ('they will become animals') is the method today, as envisioned by the likes of Sofer and carried out by the likes of Sharon and his successors: hence the grid of permits, passes, curfews, checkpoints, roadblocks, embargoes, walls, ditches, fences, encampments, prisons, detentions, military regulations, administrative formulae, and bureaucratic procedures through which the Israelis govern the Palestinians today, holding them in an iron grip.

The major difference between the softcore, would-be 'postcolonial' Zionism of someone like Amos Oz (or Yehoshua or Grossman) and the hardcore Zionism of someone like Arnon Sofer, is that the hardcore Zionist is willing to state expressly and bluntly what the softcore Zionist is unable even to acknowledge. The hardcore Zionist sees with crystalline clarity the seamless continuity between the 1930s and the present, and thinks of himself as participating in a long tradition of serving Zionism at the expense of the Palestinians, or anyone else who gets in the way. The condition of possibility for softcore Zionism is, on the contrary, its categorical refusal, its inability, to look the ugly facts of the 1930s and 1940s – and even 1948 itself – in the face and see them for what they are. The softcore Zionist cannot understand what the Palestinians are so upset about, why they can't just sit down and talk real estate, cut a deal.

But my point here is not that people like Oz can preach tolerance and respect for the other only by being utterly blind to the experience of the other and zealously intolerant of the other's fundamental claims. It is that essentially softcore, 'postcolonial' Zionism is not so fundamentally different from hardcore Zionism. Putting the foundational events of 1948 safely behind it – as a done deal, a *fait accompli*, not open to discussion, not subject to debate – is the only thing that enables it to persist with the idea of separation in the present and the future. For the softcore Zionist, how that separation came to happen and what its prehistory is does not matter; all that matters is that it be confirmed for the future. Thus the soft, peacenik Zionism of the 1990s is founded on Israel's supreme grip over the Palestinians – while remaining utterly blind as to the nature of that grip, what it entails, what it was and is all about. Softcore Zionism, in other words, does not challenge the accomplishments of hardcore Zionism, it builds on them – it owes them its very existence. This is why people like Sofer and now Morris (he used to hold a different point of view, but saw the light after Camp David) hold the peaceniks and so-called left Zionists like Amos Oz in such disdain (and rightfully so – brutal honesty is always preferable to the mendacious manipulation of the truth).

For Oz, on the contrary, the so-called peace process of the 1990s represented the definitive solution to the problems plaguing the Land of Israel. He has reiterated this argument tirelessly over the years. In a 2003 article in the *Los Angeles Times*, for example, he celebrates the so-called Geneva Accord because it demonstrates, according to him, that both sides are willing to give up their dreams – the Israelis the

dream of a 'greater Israel', and the Palestinians the dream of a 'greater Palestine' (Oz 2003). In return, the Israelis would get to hold on to the Jewish state of their dreams (never mind that it's not really Jewish because more than 20 per cent of the population is not Jewish), and the Palestinians would get a little statelet of their very own. It is of course essential to Oz's argument not merely to equate the dream of a 'greater Israel' with that of a 'greater Palestine', but also to make it seem that an equal sacrifice would be demanded of each side. The Israelis would give up their illegal and brutal colonization of the West Bank, Gaza, and east Jerusalem, and in exchange the Palestinians would give up their historical and legal claim to their homeland, from which they were violently expelled by an army of European immigrants (for the whole premise of the Geneva Accord, which drew Israelis like Oz to it, is that it renounces the Palestinian right of return, as founded not merely on historic claims but on the principles of international law).

Setting aside the historical arguments, the fact of the matter is that the proponents of softcore Zionism had their chance to put their beliefs into practice, and what they came up with was Oslo, which was premised on the division and subdivision of Palestinian territory, and the institution of mechanisms of exclusion and control that differed from what Sharon and Olmert would later offer only in that they were more subtle, more nicely packaged. The Oslo process lasted for so many years only because it allowed the Israelis to stall for time while creating facts on the ground – expropriating more land, building more colonies, expanding the bypass road network, not to mention carrying on with the forms of collective punishment inflicted on the Palestinian population – and deferring all the most important issues to an occasion whose time, inevitably, never seemed to be right. In fact, for all its naked brutality, all that Israel is doing today is building on the principle of ethnic separation which was essential to Oslo: where Area A was outlined by a line on a map at Oslo, it is today marked by a concrete wall in the West Bank – but the underlying principle is *exactly* the same, and its sameness expresses precisely the essential sameness and continuity of the two forms of Zionism that I have been discussing.

Whether in its hardcore or softcore formulation, then, Zionism has not noticeably matured or developed ideologically; as I said, there are far more points in common than there are differences between a hardcore Zionist like Arnon Sofer and a peacenik Zionist like Amos Oz: the latter may play the Dr Jekyll to the former's Mr Hyde, but they both share the same soul.

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16

Where We Belong: South Africa as a Settler Colony and the Calibration of African and Afrikaner Indigeneity

Elleke Boehmer

Settler colonialism is generally defined by its claims at once to new land and new identity – land and identity distinct from, yet linked, to the motherland. The first set of claims is usually based on usurpation, which throws the second set of claims into relief; that is, such claims to new identity are mapped not so much within geography as upon the terrain of the imagination. It is a case of 'no nation but the imagination', in Derek Walcott's felicitous construction (Walcott 1998, pp. 36–64). I deliberately cite the Caribbean poet out of context, as I also misquote Samoan novelist Sia Figiel in my title, as the work of both writers has plotted a conflicted yet complicit relationship with settler traditions of writing (Figiel 1999).

As we find in settler writing from the nineteenth century onwards, in Adam Lindsay Gordon, Marcus Clarke, Thomas Pringle, Bliss Carman, to name only a handful, though a representative group, the tense of the settler colonial tends to be the future tense (Boehmer 1998, pp. xv–xxxvii). New identity is projected on to this dimension of fantasy and potential, and land claims, too, are based on the making-fruitful that can be realized only in the realm of the future. By contrast, the past, the space of history, is a contested zone. This is because the one claim that the settler, by definition, is not able to make, is the claim to indigeneity, to ancestral belonging: to having inhabited the land from time immemorial. Therefore, the central or indeed definitive definition of the settler colonial is a negative one: the settler *is* the *non-*indigene. It is on this negative that the inherent violence of the settler colonial situation rests, as Frantz Fanon amongst others describes (Fanon 1986). Considering that the settler colony attempts to found its claims to the land by erasing, repressing, or fencing away those people with prior claims, violence in the settler colony, as he recognizes, is

endemic and intractable. It cannot effectively be resolved unless with the ousting or elimination of the settler.

In this chapter I want to examine settler colonialism as if through a convex lens, or from the other side: that is, from the point of view of the indigenous, currently a much discussed and contested topic. One of the reasons why it seems to me indigeneity is contested right now is because it represents a zero point or *ne plus ultra* with respect to postmodern ideas of identity as plural, provisional, imagined, *ad hoc*, as I will outline further. This limit can be examined, as I attempt to do here, by looking at African in relation to Afrikaner indigeneity – the one more *foundational*, the other more *constructed* – in the context of South Africa in the second half of the twentieth century, the era of apartheid (in other words, state-enshrined racial segregation). Across this notoriously divisive context, where apartheid was founded on an absolute division of native/non-native (and black South Africans were named as such, as 'natives'), it is interesting to observe what happened when mutually exclusive, by nature different, claims to indigeneity within coterminous *and* overlapping terrains came into contact. What was it that took place when a settler group seized control of the nation-state in the name of their particular constructed indigeneity, and so attempted to delegitimate other claims? And, further, how did 'natives' approach, contend with, and deflect these non-native constructions of their nativism (even within the land of their ancestors)?

To explore these questions the essay will unfold a particular case study, involving Nelson Mandela, in which the South African 'settler', if not the settler colonial as such, was approached, and then deliberately dismantled and *undone* through a parsing or calibration of the notion of indigeneity. Importantly, however, this dismantling avoided Fanon's scenario of violent elimination. I suggest that what was conclusively demonstrated in this case was how, as Paradies quoting Langston writes of the Australian context, indigeneity necessarily involves the Indigenous and non-Indigenous in a 'process of dialogue, of imagination, of representation and interpretation' – a process which apartheid of course resisted (Paradies 2006, pp. 355–67). As this might intimate, my case study focuses in particular on Mandela's interrelationship with the Afrikaner from the 1970s up till the end of his presidency. Much of the essay will review key moments drawn from Mandela's story of the conversation with the Boer he held during these crucial years of incarceration. To date, I will venture to say, Mandela's overture to the Afrikaner, upon which, arguably, the entire new South African national experiment rested, represented the first successful accommodation of a minority

settler colonialism to a majority indigenous nationalism without, in Mandela's phrase, a bloodbath ensuing (Boehmer 2008a; Sampson 2000). In a nutshell, his approach to and negotiation with Afrikaner nationalism in the name of the South African nation sought to nuance its purist claims through an empathetic pan-nationalist appeal to its love of the land and of patriotic spectacle. As this suggests, I will finally submit that claims to an ultimate, grounded, essential indigeneity, even these, can be mediated and calibrated with respect to other claims. In other words, the settler can be made to belong (the passive mode being intentional). The settler can be made to belong, but in a conditional sense only – only, that is, if the indigene claims the settler as belonging, and is willing to suspend his or her own claims to ancestral priority.

As critics of traditional performance and performativity routinely observe, claims to indigeneity, especially in the contested settler context, often depend on displays of staged authenticity, displays which become more vigorous and earnest the more the claims are questioned or threatened, or the pressure to assimilate and integrate is felt. Such scholars of anthropological performance – Christopher Balme, Helen Gilbert, Dean MacCannell, Barbara Kirshenblatt-Gimblett, amongst others – bear the imprint of ideas associated with Benedict Anderson and Stuart Hall, that national/cultural identities are more constructed than they are a matter of body and blood (Balme 2007, p. 175). Bearing this out, if in an ironic sense, performances not of African but *Afrikaner* indigeneity in the days of apartheid – where apartheid was basically an expression of the Afrikaner's exclusivist nationalism – were founded on exuberantly staged claims that the South African hinterland was largely uninhabited when the Dutch settlers arrived. There were, it was said, a few nomadic beachcomber tribes living along the littoral of the country, with whom the whites first came into contact – the Khoi or Hottentots – but beyond that was emptiness: virgin land. The Nguni migrations to the South from Central Africa unfolded *after* white settlement, this school of thought claimed (Welsh 2000).

For a *volk* insecure about its lack of full indigeneity, and anxious to claim a secondary or lesser form of nativehood and belonging as fundamental to its nationalism, this was a neat mythic and dramatic manoeuvre – and one that until very recently survived in popular myth. No one could claim a true authenticity within this southern land; therefore those who most nearly could, who stood next in line, were those who had first moved in and made it their own: the original white settlers. Moreover, these settlers had been inspired by a divine calling to claim the land: they were a chosen people, Afrikaner Israelites, chosen by God, for

the land. They made up in terms of spiritual connection what they might lack in terms of umbilical cord and blood. Hence, as Mandela and others did not fail to notice, when they named themselves as a nation, they were happy to name themselves as *Afrika*ner – people of Africa, of this earth. For all that the Afrikaner was later understood, and for good reason, to be one who reviles Africans, even so, when the first claims to national belonging were made, this name indicating identification and connection, an ur-association with Africa, was evidently not repellent. In effect, the Afrikaner was saying, in so far as we are God's people, and this is our covenanted land, we are its true inheritors – we, the only white tribe of Africa.

As is obvious, however, these claims, even if innovative, were fuelled by a cultural and national panic, aggravated in the aftermath of the Anglo-Boer War. By this time, as Anne McClintock perceptively wrote about a decade ago, Afrikaner nationalism had turned into a 'doctrine of crisis'. Within only a few years after their bloody and humiliating defeat at British hands, Afrikaners acquired in a hurry – invented, in Anderson's term – a common historic purpose, as expressed in the myths of the journey into empty land and the conflicts for its soul, and in a unifying language. As did people like Douglas Hyde and Lady Gregory during the Irish Literary Revival, the Afrikaans literary elite founded a 'language movement' that produced the language Afrikaans out of a cluster of local Malay pidgins and Dutch dialects, and formalized these within the crucible of its poetry, songs, and novels. Yet, just as compelling and effective as media of national unification as their language, were the vast collective spectacles and pageants through which the Afrikaners now began staging and confirming their identity. From their strong impulse to inhabit to the exclusion of all others – to deny their settlerhood and claim 'nativeness' in this fertile African subcontinent – came not only violent repression, but the grand-scale, choreographed performances of Afrikaner indigeneity – or secondary indigeneity, as I would term it – that marked the mid-twentieth century. The most notable of these performances was the 1938 re-enactment of the Great Trek during which, as Anne McClintock writes, dispirited urban Afrikaners '[captured] in a single fetish spectacle the impossible confluence of the modern and the archaic, the recent displacement and the ancestral migration' (McClintock 1995, pp. 368–79).

The African National Congress and exclusive nationalism

To set up my story about the African calibration of Afrikaner indigeneity, it is necessary to go back to the history of the African National Congress

(ANC), and also of Mandela's involvement with it from about 1942. Here it is important to bear in mind that when the ANC Youth League (ANC YL), which radicalized ANC politics, was established in the 1940s, Mandela, one of its founders, was an unabashed Africanist. Strongly under the influence of people like Anton Lembede and A.P. Mda, who were persuasive, indeed vehement, proponents of an exclusive form of African nationalism, Mandela, as a young activist, for a number of years resisted forming common cause with other oppressed groups, such as, most obviously, South African Indians. For over a decade he would noticeably lag behind his colleague Walter Sisulu in extending a hand of collaboration to the South African Indian Congress (SAIC), and to the South African Communist Party (Sisulu 2003). As late as 1950 he openly expressed suspicion about cooperating with 'Indians' and with whites, however radical, on the grounds that their leaders' education and expertise gave them an advantage over African leaders 'out of all proportion to their numbers'. It was a class as well as a race-based point. For him, the ANC alone could be the embodiment of the African will against oppression and the ANC alone demanded his loyalty.

Though Congress had from the outset taken the line that opposition to white racialism must entail a refusal to assert black racialism, Mandela felt strongly enough about the prior promotion of more marginalized black African political claims in these early years to depart openly from this *bien pensée*. For him, though many South African Indians had found in communism a viable anti-colonial political critique, the international allegiances of communism were a potential threat to the commitments demanded of a nationalist. As late as 1950, he and other African nationalists were involved in breaking up meetings of ANC and SAIC communists – 'tearing up posters and capturing the microphone' – on the grounds that, in their view, communism was un-African: African workers, they felt, were oppressed on the grounds of race primarily. In 1949, controversially, Mandela, unlike Sisulu, refused to sign the ANC/SAIC joint statement of communal grief following the Durban riots in which Africans had turned on Indians, perceiving them, within the punishing hierarchy of apartheid, to be their exploiters. And yet, it now appears from the vantage point of hindsight, the broad front then demonstrated did have an effect upon him, if gradually, and ultimately dramatized that there was benefit to be gained from expressing solidarity in practice.

The nationalist purism of the ANC YL aside, an understanding of the potential of cross-border solidarity had crucially shaped ANC politics almost from the organization's inception. This was fundamental, I

believe, to the change of approach and strategy in relation to alternative and rival forms of nationalism, including settler nationalism; Mandela began to trace this change from about 1952, the year of the ANC's Gandhi-influenced passive resistance campaign. Further back in time, it also helps to explain how it was that the ANC, campaigning in London in the 1910s, almost immediately fell into a difficult relationship with the Anti-Slavery and Aborigines' Protection Society (ASAPS), which was potentially their ally. For the ANC, opposition to white oppression on the grounds of race entailed the rejection of all forms of racial segregation and preferential treatment, as Mandela himself said so eloquently in his 1964 speech from the dock. For the ASAPS, by contrast, the protection of oppressed minorities justified limited forms of reverse discrimination. Claims to indigenous against settler rights, it is worth noting, legitimated such protection.

In a nutshell, therefore, the reason why the ANC, and later Mandela as *de facto* leader of the ANC, became receptive to other expressions of resistance and alternative assertions of rights to citizenship, stems from a situation of dual action in a context of geographical proximity. In the relatively closed South African context, the ANC had, as far back as 1912, when it was established, experienced tacit forms of interaction with Gandhist policies, a cooperation occasioned and encouraged by Gandhi having worked in South Africa as a lawyer-activist for nearly twenty-one years, 1893–1914. In Mandela's retrospective words, 'The Indian struggle, in a sense, is rooted in the African' (1995). And this was despite the fact that the founders of the ANC rarely owned up to the rooting, and despite the discomfort expressed by Gandhi and his followers at being classed with 'Natives' in prison – and his routinely using the word 'kaffir' to describe such people. As his *Hind Swaraj* (1910) and *Autobiography* (1927) explain, Gandhi developed in South Africa his strategy of passive resistance to imperial oppression, in particular, restrictions on their rights to land, business practice and citizenship. Here he led and encouraged his first symbolic, highly influential acts of political refusal (certificate burning, marches), and morally committed law-breaking.

Established some eighteen years after Gandhi's Natal Indian Congress was formed, the African National Congress had been at no point unaware of the influential non-violent operations of its Indian nationalist counterparts, as the journalism of its key members, such as Pixley wa Seme and Sol Plaatje, reflects. As early as 1913, African women in the Orange Free State province had, apparently spontaneously, expressed their rejection of the extension of pass laws to women through staging a Gandhist-type passive resistance protest, dumping pass books at police stations, and

giving themselves up for arrest. (As an aside it is worth noting that throughout the 1950s, even as Mandela moved closer to endorsing armed struggle, his engagement with passive resistance strategies was consistently abetted and amplified by the protests organized by the ANC Women's League, most notably their 1956 March on Pretoria. It could fairly be said that a Gandhist mode within ANC activism was most strongly expressed in women's activities.)

But to return to the situation of dual action in the context of geographical proximity: in the mid-1940s, as Mandela, Sisulu and others were developing Congress into a broad-based national liberation movement, the Indian Congresses in Natal and the Transvaal, too, were powerfully organizing against repressive laws applied to Indians. Two of Mandela's fellow law students, Ismail Meer and J.N. Singh, spearheaded the 1946 passive resistance campaign against Smuts's so-called 'ghetto laws' restricting Indians to particular urban areas, so reawakening Gandhist strategies from the early decades of the century. Mandela, who sometimes stayed at Meer's inner-city lodgings, Kholvad house, participated there in lively discussions with a variety of campaigners, Gandhists, radical Christians and communists. Here, first as an African nationalist, then increasingly as a socialist humanist, he began to relate to the provocative contradiction that Indian claims to citizenship represented in the South African context. Following the claims of history and race, they could not be said to belong in Africa and were to all intents and purposes settlers. Yet they were concerned to assert their rights on the basis of their South Africanness, a constructed claim to national identity that had rich potential for political arbitration and mediation. Indeed, as Isabel Hofmeyr and others have been investigating in recent years, the first group to set out to define what citizenship meant in the South African context comprised South African Indians, descendants of indentured labourers. As Mandela began to move away from his youthful, fundamentalist black nationalism, and towards a more open understanding of identity as in part contingent, especially during the 1952 Defiance Campaign, it was from his Indian countrymen that he first learned what a plural South African identity might comprise.

But collaborating with Indians, an oppressed minority, was a far cry from relating to Afrikaner nationalism, on the basis of which, and in protection of which, the edifice of state apartheid had from 1948 been erected. As the years 1964–90 would show, Mandela's parleying with Afrikaners was the eventual slow product of twenty-seven years of incarceration, and of the tentative, one-to-one interpersonal connections between inmates and wardens that the prison situation made possible. In

this next section I will set out the important milestones on his journey towards coming to appreciate, as if from their point of view, what the Afrikaners' Afrikaanness meant to them, and to negotiate with them precisely on the contested terrain of their indigeneity. Yet, it is worth underlining that in this process the traces of his early collaborations with nationalists from groupings like the SAIC are discernible: these conversations had prepared the ground for a far more difficult cross-border conversation to take place. From them he learned how to work within, and with, the interstices of settler colonialism, reaching out *not only* to anglophone South Africans, descendants of British settlers, who did not seek to claim a national past in the country, *but also* to the more recalcitrant yet patriotic and anti-imperial Boer. Building on his early experiences of political cooperation he became interested in appealing to a competitor nationalism that, like African nationalism, legitimated itself through stories and dramas of authenticity.

Parleying: the African and the Afrikaner

The first vehement sign of Mandela's coming to see the Boer not only as represented within the apartheid state, but also as a one-time anti-imperial freedom fighter and potential discussant on the topic of South Africanism, came in the early 1960s, significantly with Mandela's shift from passive to active resistance. When during these years he began to transform himself into a guerrilla fighter, he did so in the same way as he approached any other project, systematically and by the book, that is, 'by reading and talking to the experts'. He immersed himself in the literature on war and revolution available to him, including Mao, Taruc and Clausewitz, and also, prominently, Boer War rebel leader Denys Reitz's memoir *Commando* (1929), to which he would return several times in the years following (Sampson 2000). In fact, decades later, during the tentative early discussions with F.W. de Klerk, the Afrikaner Nationalist president like his predecessor Botha would declare himself to be consistently impressed at Mandela's knowledge of Afrikaner resistance history.

Commando, Reitz's evocative account of his time as a guerilla fighter in 1899–1900, portrayed the British army in South Africa as an imperial and alien force, and the Afrikaner, by contrast, as a brave, resilient patriot. As Mandela was later openly to recognize, the history of twentieth-century South Africa had subsequently been profoundly shaped by the fierce contest between the two anti-colonial nationalisms, African and Afrikaner, for the 'same piece of earth', the beginnings of which was charted in the annals of the Anglo-Boer War. In the heat of his own armed struggle's

emergence, in support of which he would be imprisoned for life, *Commando* reminded him not only of the Afrikaners' nationalism – a nationalism based, like African nationalism, on a bond with the land – but also, especially, of its plucky defensiveness. As the book helped to show, the Boers' experience of marginalization and oppression by British-descended settlers and British imperialists across the nineteenth century, culminating in the fiasco of the Boer War, had sharpened their sense of predestination and tendency to entrenchment and inwardness, what is called their *laager* mentality. By seeing the Boer War as a defensive guerrilla struggle, Mandela began to realize that in order to achieve an equable settlement in South Africa, it would be necessary to work with, against, and around this *laager* nationalism, to disband it even while to some degree conceding to it. So it was with a fine sense of historical irony that when Umkhonto we Sizwe, the ANC's armed wing, was launched in December 1961 with a series of bombings, the day chosen was a public holiday commemorating the Afrikaner defeat of the Zulus. During this battle, according to the legend, they had used their famed *laager* (or circle of drawn-in ox-wagons) to devastating effect.

If the historical confrontation with Boer resistance represented Mandela's first milestone along the road towards finding a forum for discussion with the Boers, the second stage in the journey came some years later, in prison on Robben Island, this time shaped by interpersonal rather than textual encounters with Afrikaners. As is now well known, not least from the book and now film *Goodbye Bafana* (2007), in prison Mandela worked out means of ameliorating the political prisoners' situation in two ways (Gregory 1995). First, he sought strategically to conform to the prison regime's rules, and then, secondly, he attempted, with painstaking patience, to forge a dialogue with the representatives of what he and his comrades still called the enemy, namely, their warders. Noticing from close observation that the warders – all young, Afrikaans, and working class – were not necessarily all depraved as characters, he perceived that in individual cases it might be possible to stand upon his seniority and appeal man-to-man to what he saw as their underlying human capacity for change. In his view, the prison system rewarded brutes for their brutish behaviour, whereas a different approach might produce a modified response.

When his prison study schedule allowed, Mandela elected to learn Afrikaans in order to facilitate the process of creating the conditions for a conversation on common national interests to take place. Recalling that Afrikaans had been the vehicle of an anti-imperial nationalism, he also noted that it was the first language of many black South Africans.

Crucially, he was happy boldly to assert this fact even at the time of the 1976 Soweto protests against the use of Afrikaans in black schools. Even now he suspected that African perceptions of Afrikaners linked to 'English' prejudices dating from the time of the Anglo-Boer War. Consolidating his knowledge of the language, he worked his way through Afrikaans literature, convinced that this would give him insight into this people's resilience of spirit and love of the country. He kept in mind examples of dissident Afrikaners, such as his friend the communist lawyer Bram Fischer, and the outspoken writers Breyten Breytenbach and André Brink. In an important 1976 prison essay about unity within the freedom struggle he presciently wrote:

> We ought to speak directly to the Afrikaner and fully explain our position. Honest men are to be found on both sides of the colour line and the Afrikaner is no exception. … [even if] this country [is] reduced to ashes it will still be necessary for us to sit down together and talk about the problems of reconstruction – the black man and the white, the African and the Afrikaner. (Mandela 2001, p. 17)

This perception, that a dialogue could be forged between the two polarized groups on the basis of their shared feelings of *nationalist loyalty* to the country, and that *Afrikaner support* in particular was a pre-requisite for reconstruction, represents among the most important intellectual breakthroughs Mandela underwent on Robben Island. The perception was at first practically expressed in his calculated attempt to win over the prison warders, primarily by speaking to them in their language, but also, for example, in his bartering copies of the leading Afrikaans household-and-gossip magazine *Huisgenoot* in exchange for more reading time. On the basis of this dialogue Mandela continued building, if in a small-scale way, what he and the ANC had begun to forge in the 1950s, a coalition politics resting upon a mass-support, non-exclusive understanding of what South African national citizenship might entail. Afrikaner and African national traditions, he now began to see, might eventually be juxtaposed and brought together – though not necessarily hybridized – in an intercalated or 'salad bowl' way. As he ever more firmly asserted, particularly in heated discussions with the more radical and firmly communist Govan Mbeki, it was on this conciliatory foundation alone that racial oppression could be successfully contested and overthrown.

   For their part, the warders in time came to understand that they relied on Mandela's cooperation in order to deal constructively with and within the political prisoner community. In this simple but powerful sense of

mutual, interpersonal dependency – and so, relationship – the ground for the 1990s negotiation process was effectively laid down, engineered from both ends, though first motivated by Mandela. The political education of the young warders by seasoned prisoners was, wrote Neville Alexander, one of 'the great human events' on the island (Alexander 1994, p. 26). Even the rebellious Soweto generation of prisoners who arrived from 1977, were successfully inducted into the older men's principle that the authorities should be dealt with in a controlled, rational manner: as Sisulu put it, 'negotiation with the enemy did not mean selling out' (Sisulu 2003, p. 352).

From 1976, therefore, began Mandela's most significant encounter with – and subtle rejection of – versions of African nationalism that appealed to an essentialist notion of the indigenous. In this period, in response to discussions with the Black Consciousness activists who were arriving on Robben Island as political prisoners, he wrote the essay with the marvelously punning title, 'Whither the Black Consciousness Movement?'. A companion to the essay about confronting the Afrikaner from which I have already cited (Mandela 2001, pp. 21–64), 'Whither the Black Consciousness Movement?' represents an extraordinary statement from a political leader who himself had once held purist notions that black national self-assertion had necessarily to be conducted from a racially exclusive platform, and that the African should determine the African future by his own special efforts.

In 'Whither the Black Consciousness Movement?' Mandela is concerned to spell out what to him are the drawbacks of Black Consciousness thinking; primarily, that it is too closely influenced by African American and European ideas of black self-determination, which moreover are individualist and existentialist in provenance, and hence neither collectivist nor authentically African. In a deft double manoeuvre he turns the exclusivist black nationalist claims of the period on their head, first by outlining their transnational, far from intrinsically African formation, and then by pointedly remarking that any number of African resistance heroes – Moshoeshoe, Cetshwayo – have originated closer to home than people like Stokely Carmichael. The clenched fist Black Power salute, too, he is anxious to point out, was first used not by the American Civil Rights movement, but by the ANC. Throughout the essay he speaks in the name of a loosely defined indigeneity, by which he basically means activities and identities created on South African soil, including, significantly, Gandhi's 'quest for unity' through passive resistance, which he comfortably praises as a strategy emulated by the ANC. There is no pure race, he writes, and to harp on the word black is 'fanatical'. As this suggests, his

overriding concern is to move away from a narrow Africanism and advo-
cate instead an inclusive, generously framed South Africanness confirmed
in the rehearsal of patriotic symbols like the raised fist, or, as will be seen,
the Afrikaans poem. The essay thus casts a lateral light on his interest in
the Afrikaans language expressed in the companion essay. To his mind
the language was worthy of attention because it was a language that was
homegrown: a black dialect with black linguistic roots.

   Social cooperation, consensual government, community unity, cultural
dignity – Mandela's core values as a nationalist, he has always been
concerned to assert, were embedded in regional and even local African
traditions and practices. In this sense, it is true, he did appear to invoke
essentializing connotations of the indigenous as being superior, fixed,
and true. At the same time however he appealed to ideas of a modern
South African identity as constructed and malleable: as with the Gandhi
example, Africanness in general and South Africanness in particular
entailed that which worked to promote these ways of being, or expressed
belief in them. I submit that it was his ability to keep this bifurcated
understanding of indigeneity in play that made possible and facilitated
his tactical interactions with the Afrikaner government from 1986 onwards.
He allowed them their notion of a core identity, because emotionally
he partook in it. Yet his simultaneous admission that indigeneity could
be adapted, modified, and added on to, opened the way to the Afrikaner
to redefine their identity in more plural or diverse terms.

Signifying South Africanness

In the 1990s, among the more prominent symbolizations of Mandela's
willingness to *deal with* Afrikaner definitions of belonging and nation-
hood, were the construction of the new South African national anthem,
and the 1995 Rugby World Cup celebrations. It's worth briefly looking
at these, as they illustrate the precarious cultural intercalations and deft
generic double-crossings that the notion of a negotiated indigeneity
demanded. With respect to the new anthem, in a striking if cheesy
instance of the compromise on which Mandela's 1994 Government
of National Unity was based, the national song was deliberately, even
stolidly, forged as a hybrid. The more obvious choice of anthem, the
stirring ANC freedom hymn, 'Nkosi Sikelel' iAfrika' ('God Bless Africa'),
modulates into (or is frontloaded upon) a modified version of the old
South African anthem 'Die Stem'/'The Call'. With respect to the second
area of mixed symbolization, Mandela famously celebrated South Africa's
fortuitous victory at the 1995 Rugby World Cup by wearing the tradi-

tional if not at this time still-notorious green-and-gold Springbok rugby-shirt and cap in order to present the trophy to Francois Pienaar, the captain. Far from baulking at the cringe-worthy commonplaces of regressive patriotism and bellicose masculinity with which the event was loaded, as novelist J.M. Coetzee describes these symbols (*Stranger Shores*), Mandela at this point seemed wholeheartedly to embrace them (Coetzee 2001, pp. 351–6). Though the performance looked dangerously compromising to many observers his priority remained clear, to dramatize conclusively if not to embody the principle of reconciliation with Afrikanerdom by indulging its love of spectacle and most sacred patriotic signs – the shirt, the cap, the game of rugby itself.[1]

To my mind a more striking symbolization of his political compromise even than these two was his citation from the work of the Afrikaans poet-suicide Ingrid Jonker in his 24 May 1994 State of the Nation address on the occasion of his first opening of parliament (Asmal *et al* 2004). Why this represented such an influential sign of his political negotiation with Afrikanerdom, was that it built on his strategic study of Afrikaans literature in prison in order to acknowledge the Afrikaner's visceral sense of connection with Africa, and, hence, potential feelings of shame at the suffering apartheid wrought. The first cluster of perceptions the address offers, of connection with Africa, is captured in the poem itself, 'The Child who was shot dead by soldiers in Nyanga', a translation of Jonker's 'Die Kind', in which the dead African child is seen to bestride Africa and then the world, wherever oppression is resisted. The second cluster is signified by the citation of Jonker itself, a woman poet whose depression at the state to which her country had been reduced by apartheid's laws and restrictions led to her suicide by drowning in 1965 (Jonker 1988, p. 27).

The common thread running through all three symbolizations, as through others, is how significations of the indigenous – the African child, the African president – are differentially integrated with a self-consciously open, inclusive nationalism, represented in the multi-lingual 'call' of South Africa, or the poet who was both 'an Afrikaner and an African'. This strategic play with the gradations that may be registered even through as purist a concept as that of the native or indigenous, marked Mandela's public performances well beyond his standing down as president. For example, in the early to mid-nineties, abandoning the suits that had been central to his former cosmopolitan image, he took to wearing the relaxed, colourful 'Madiba' shirts that became his trademark – and a desirable commodity in South African tourist shops. Yet, far from these shirts being authentically African, it was Indonesian President

Suharto who had first introduced them to Mandela on his October 1990 Asian tour. He took to the loose-fitting yet dressy garment not so much for how it harmonized with the concept of the rainbow nation, but because, as he said, the shirt allowed him to *feel* freedom. Rainbow colours and ethnic motifs were thrown into the mix only as an attractive extra.

* * *

In conclusion, what these remarks on Mandela's negotiations between Africa and Afrikanerdom have explored, is how his shift from an exclusive to an inclusive nationalism, a closed to an open-ended indigeneity, activates what Said calls the 'interdependence of cultural terrains of the colonizer and the colonized' (Said 1993, pp. xxii–xiii). Without ever renouncing certain core principles, including what he considered the legitimate right to political violence (Ahluwalia 2003, pp. 341–56), Mandela calibrated politicized notions of Africanness and Afrikanerhood as embedded and essential against self-consciously modern ideas of identity as contingent and constructed. In this way he was able to forge an accommodation with settler colonialism by positing a South African identity that was at one and the same time plural and various, and yet based in what he would call an essentially African humanism. To him, intrinsically African qualities, of reciprocal brotherhood and consensualism, were, at the same time, intensely human qualities: *Africanness* and *humanness* were co-extensive, not oppositional (Boehmer 2008a and b).

Note

1   See Clint Eastwood's 2010 film *Invictus* which is based on this incident.

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17
Race and the Trace of History: For Henry Reynolds

Patrick Wolfe

The term 'postcolonial' does not have a good name among Indigenous scholars. The problem lies, of course, in the 'post'. Indigenous people's colonizers never went home. National independence only deepened the settlers' stranglehold on their lives. To tell someone from, say, India or Algeria that they are still colonized would be to insult that person's mentality. To say the same thing to an Indigenous person from Australia or the United States is to acknowledge that person's continuing history. This is not to understate the limitations of formal decolonization or the continuing inequities of neocolonialism and globalization in the 'post'colonial third world. It is simply to state the specifically territorial character of settler colonialism. A society premised on the exploitation of colonized labour requires the continuing reproduction of its human providers. By contrast, a society premised on the expropriation of Native people's land requires that the people who provided it should never be allowed back.

   Across the post-conquest generations, what settler colonialism reproduces is not human potential but human elimination. This end is pursued by means of strategies which, though varied and versatile, exhibit a high degree of cross-cultural consistency. Apart from the relatively straightforward procedure of frontier homicide, these strategies typically include territorial removal and/or confinement, the imposition of regimes of private property (whereby ancestral patrimonies are broken down into private allocations that can be individually transferred into settler hands), discourses of miscegenation (whereby Natives produce settler offspring), Native citizenship, child abduction, total-institutional surveillance (reserves, prisons, boarding schools), intensive educational programmes, religious conversion and related assimilationist interventions. These procedures continue the invasion beyond the frontier, demographically eroding the

Native constituency. Thus we should not view settler colonialism purely negatively, as solely an imperative to remove or destroy the Native since, along with the Native, that imperative survives the consolidation and development of settler society. Moreover, it has positive as well as negative dimensions, replacing as well as destroying. As Theodor Herzl, founding father of Zionism, observed in his allegorical manifesto/novel (1941, p. 38), 'If I wish to substitute a new building for an old one, I must demolish before I construct'. To express this positivity through time, I have characterized settler colonial invasion as a structure rather than an event (Wolfe 1994, p. 96; 1999, p. 2). The Native child is not only taken away. In train with his or her disappearance, the child is domesticated, individualized, reprogrammed, bred White. Through the alchemy of assimilation, the social death of the Native becomes the birth of the settler. In its positive aspect, therefore, the logic of elimination marks a return whereby the Native repressed continues to shape settler social institutions.[1]

In addition to being structured as a continuity across time, however, settler colonial invasion is structured in the morphological sense, in that it is globally complex. Settlers, by definition, come from somewhere else. They bring other histories with them, forged in other places, and expropriate Native territory into wider socioeconomic networks. In the interest of avoiding dependence on Native labour, for instance, settlers generally import labour from outside, as in the cases of enslaved Africans in the Americas, White convicts in Australia, indentured Indians in Fiji or the so-called 'Oriental Jews' (*Mizrahim*, *Spharadim*) in Israel. In the case of British North America, settlers initially relied on enslaving Natives as well as importing indentured White servants and convicts together with African slaves, but increasingly favoured an enslaved labour force made up exclusively of Black people. The outcome was a triangular transcontinental relationship in which the labour of enslaved Africans was mixed with the land of dispossessed Americans to produce European property.

Ubiquitously, colonizers have encoded and orchestrated this complexity by reference to some version, however inchoate, of the doctrine of race. In the sound-bite vocabulary of race, the three points of the Atlantic triangle (Williams 1944, pp. 51–107), Africa, America and Europe, became chromatized as Black, Red and White respectively, a phenotypical triad that continues to inscribe the historical relationships that gave rise to it. In the analysis to come, I shall consider the distinctive regimes of race that settlers have sought to impose on Indigenous peoples with a view to illuminating the combined operation of these two senses in which settler

colonialism is structured, both as a continuity through time and as a complex global network. In the process, I hope to begin to reconcile the tension that is generally perceived to exist between comparative and transnational approaches to the writing of world-history.

* * *

Useful though it may once have been for denaturalizing race, the well-worn piety that race is a social construct (with exculpatory quotation marks to prove it) does not get us very far. It simply begs further questions: 'Under what circumstances was (or is) race constructed?'; 'Has race been differently constructed under different circumstances?', and so on. Posed thus, however, these questions give us the beginnings of a historical enquiry.

Historically speaking, race can be dated reasonably straightforwardly. Almost everyone agrees on the second half of the eighteenth century (Hannaford 1996; Malik 1996). In other words, the Enlightenment is the culprit. Without disputing this periodization, it only tells part of the story. It tells of the emergence of race as an organized narrative or doctrine but not as a set of practices. As will be shown, racial practices have taken very different forms in different times and places and in their application to different populations. As enacted and contested on the ground of history, therefore, we need to examine racial discourses sociologically, as group-specific practices of domination that categorize populations differentially in furtherance of particular historical agendas.

For this purpose, we may distinguish between race as *doctrine*, which is of a piece with Enlightenment thinking and has a measure of generality and discursive coherence, and *racialization* as a variety of practices that have been applied to colonized populations under particular circumstances and to different (albeit coordinated) ends. The hypothesis that I wish to advance here is that racialization preserves the trace of colonial histories – which is to say, colonized populations are racialized in specific ways that mark and reproduce (in ways that can change across time) the unequal relationships into which Europeans initially co-opted these populations. Thus the racial characteristics assigned to settler colonized Indigenous societies are often highly unstable or vulnerable to dissolution. These are the dying races, whose fragile bloodlines readily dissolve into the settler stock under post-frontier policies of Native assimilation. By contrast, the blood of the formerly enslaved can be remarkably resilient. Indeed, in the case of the one-drop rule in the United

States, whose half-life persists, Black blood was held to be capable of withstanding unlimited amounts of White admixture, so that any degree of African ancestry whatsoever, regardless of physical appearance, would make a person Black.

When, then, or under what historical circumstances, does racialization take place? When, to put it crudely, does race kick in? I argue that racialization represents a response to the crisis occasioned when colonizers are threatened with the requirement to share social space with the colonized. In the context of this novel challenge, race restores the inequality that the extension of citizenship has theoretically abolished (Wolfe 2002, 2008). This situation can arise in various ways. In the case of the enslaved or internally colonized, racial discourse has often intensified in the wake of emancipation. In this sense, race should be seen as a by-product of democracy, as vouchsafing the particularity of the bearers of the ostensibly universal rights of man. In the case of Indigenous peoples, who are our principal concern here, the intrusion into settler social space occurs more typically on the passing of the frontier, when Native societies become contained within that of the invaders. Thus the Native case obliges us to adjust the critique of democracy, levelled by Marxism, feminism and postcolonialism alike (Marx 1843; Pateman 1988; Mehta 1990; see also Mills 1997), that liberal universalism relies on practical exclusions, since democracy's intolerance of difference has operated through inclusion as much as through exclusion. Some differences are absorbed rather than excluded. Racialization can achieve either outcome.

* * *

To stay with the different relationships into which Europeans co-opted Indians and Black people in the United States, the manifest polarity between them was resolved (strictly, encompassed [Dumont 1980]) at the level of the White man's discourse of property, which recruited both relationships. As John Locke had provided, in texts that would profoundly influence Euroamerican colonial discourse, private property accrued from the admixture of labour and land (Locke 1963). To put it very simply, Blacks provided the former and Indians the latter – the application of enslaved Black people's labour to evacuated Indian land produced the White man's property, a primitive accumulation if ever there was one. It followed that the two societies, Red and Black, were of antithetical but complementary value to White society. Where Black people were valuable commodities, Indians obstructed the expansion of

settlement. Though juridically excluded, therefore, enslaved people were demographically fostered, to the extent that their numbers continued to grow even after slave imports into the United States were finally halted in 1808.[2] In the Indian case, by contrast, no effort was spared to eliminate them, by whatever means proved necessary and available.

At its simplest, therefore, we can say that, whereas the foundational relationship into which Europeans co-opted Africans was one of exploitation, that into which they co-opted Indians was one of elimination. Thus it is no accident that the most durable names that have been applied to the two communities, Black (or Negro) and Indian, refer respectively to a bodily characteristic and a territorial designation. Racially, Black people's value as labour was registered in a regime whereby no amount of amalgamation (miscegenation, as it would come to be termed after the civil war) would affect a person's status as a slave – and, in its fully racialized post-emancipation form, as a Black person (Davis 1991).[3] The founding logic of this calculus is brutally obvious – it maximized the reproduction of slaves. As such, it contrasts with the logic informing the racialization of Indians, whereby, as in the case of Indigenous people in Australia, non-White blood figured as highly unstable rather than as inexhaustibly resistant to admixture. In both the US and Australia, White blood has been credited with a cuckoo-like capacity to breed nativeness out, a biogenetic extension of frontier massacring that contrasts diametrically with the one-drop rule that applied to the formerly enslaved. In the contemporary United States, blood quantum regulations, which exclude Indians with non-Indian ancestors from tribal reckoning, constitute a post-frontier analogue to the Vanishing Indian.[4] In Australia, light skin has rendered Aboriginal children liable to governmental kidnapping (National Inquiry 1997; Haebich 2000). Thus there is nothing stable or essential about being Black, since Black people in Australia were targeted for biocultural elimination in a manner antithetical to the racial targeting of Black people in the United States. On the other hand, Indigenous people in both countries, whether classified Red or Black, have been racialized in remarkably similar ways (Wolfe 2001). What matters, then, is not phenotypical endowment. It is not as if social processes come to operate on a naturally present set of bodily attributes that are already given prior to history. Rather, racial identities are constructed in and through the very process of their enforcement. In other words, just as, for Durkheim, religion was society speaking (in his terminology, through collective representations), so, I argue, race is colonialism speaking, in idioms whose diversity reflects the variety of unequal relationships into

which Europeans have co-opted conquered alien populations. The process produces the ontology.

* * *

It should be apparent – at least, I hope it should – that the discussion so far has been both comparative and transnational, a distinction that can be glossed as metaphoric and metonymic respectively. We do not need evidence of actual interchanges between policymakers in the USA and Australia to be able to compare the regimes of race that officials devised in the two countries and to appreciate the symmetry between the two sets of policies on Indigenous peoples. Symmetry is not synergy. The two can be compared in isolation. Yet once these racial constructs are recognized as bearers of historical traces, they bespeak transnational relationships of inequality. Indeed, for settlers, the maintenance and modification of racial constructs has been the primary cultural labour involved in reproducing these historical relationships into the present. Just as, in the United States, Black inequality survived emancipation even though slavery did not, so, albeit under a more genteel dispensation, has segregation survived civil rights (at least, if urban zoning and imprisonment rates are anything to go by[5]). Comparably – which is not to say equivalently – in Australia, the steady transfer of Aboriginal land into settler hands has survived the high points of Aboriginal rights: the 1967 Referendum removing the constitutional discriminations that applied to Aborigines, Land Rights legislation, the national *Native Title Act* and, more recently, the much-vaunted 2008 government apology to the Stolen Generations of abducted Aboriginal children and their natal families.[6] Apparently, none of these advances is inconsistent with an armed intervention into Aboriginal communities in the Northern Territory, the legislating of which required the suspension – in the case of Aboriginal people alone – of the *Racial Discrimination Act* of 1975, which had been adopted under the terms of an international convention. It is not clear how this ongoing intervention – which is officially justified as being required by an endemic level of child sexual abuse in Aboriginal communities that conscientious witnesses acknowledge to be an urgent human-rights crisis – is likely to deliver Aboriginal children from sexual violence.[7] In among the total-institutional array of special powers over Aboriginal people's lives that this 2007 legislation arrogates to the Australian government, however, some have a settler colonial ring that is only too familiar.[8] Under part 4, division 2 of the *Northern Territory National Response Act*, for instance, the Australian

government is authorized to 'resume' so-called special-purpose leases that were entered into with Aboriginal associations representing town camps abutting urban centres. This resumption not only extends to enabling the government to take over management of the camps (a measure that could perhaps be seen as helping to combat sexual violence against children), it also enables the government to assert freehold title over them. Moreover – and again in the case of Aboriginal people alone – the legislation carefully waters down the constitutional safeguards that apply to non-Aboriginal people under such circumstances. Section 51, subsection 31 of the Australian Constitution provides for compensation on 'just' terms in cases of compulsory land acquisition by the government. Alert to this provision, Section 134 of the intervention legislation specifically provides that anyone whose loss of land is covered by Section 51, subsection 31 of the Constitution will be entitled to a 'reasonable' amount of compensation. Settler reason, presumably – something other than justice, at any rate.

Though comparable in their longevity, therefore, the racial discourses that have been imposed on Black people in the US and in Australia are very different in content. Indeed, confronting the practical daily impact of the intervention legislation, Aboriginal people might well wish for a greater degree of segregation. Land rights are not apartheid. Conversely, the African American civil-rights era campaign to be included on equal terms in White society represents an agenda that, on their own account, Indigenous people in both Australia and the United States have been obliged to devote much of their political energies to resisting. Thus there is no paradox in the fact that, whereas forty acres and a mule were alleged to be enough to satisfy Black aspirations in the postbellum United States, the 160-acre sections that were allotted to individual Indians under the late nineteenth-century Dawes-era legislation were the centrepiece of a concerted campaign to destroy Indian tribes.[9] The disparity reflects the antithetical complementarity that the colonial rule of private property has imposed on the two populations. Transferring tribal patrimonies to individual Indians who could be prevailed on to sell them to White people was not only a means of acquiring Native territory. Positively, it was intended to inculcate a cultural transformation whereby the magic of private property ownership would propel Indians from the collective inertia of tribal membership into the progressive individualism of the American dream. This cultural transformation had a genetic correlate in blood quantum requirements, which were originally introduced by Dawes Act commissioners to determine which tribal members would be eligible for what kind of allot-

ments (Morgan 1892). As observed, under the blood quantum regime, Indianness declines in tune with a 'biological' calculus that Juaneño/ Yaqi scholar Annette Jaimes (1992, p. 137) has termed 'statistical extermination'. This genetic/cultural two-way loss meant that the allotment campaign not only devastated Indians' land base. It also qualified them for US citizenship, a transition that was completed in 1924. In the case of Black people, by contrast, their racialization conflicted rather than converged with their citizenship. The hysterical policing of the one-drop rule that characterized the Jim Crow era was above all directed towards undoing the equality that Black people's formal citizenship had brought about. The difference could not be clearer. Black people did not need to be equal to be exploited. Their inclusion would not add millions of acres to the national estate.

At first sight, offering individual Indians 160 acres apiece may seem like a strange way to dispossess them. It hardly recalls the homicidal Plains exploits of the US Cavalry. Yet Indian allotment, which was initially generalized as federal policy in the Dawes severalty legislation of 1887 and, as observed, provided for tribal land to be broken down into individual holdings, turned out to yield a faster method of land transference than the Cavalry had previously provided. In the half century from 1881, the total acreage held by Indians in the United States fell by two-thirds, from just over 155 million acres to just over fifty-two million (US Bureau of the Census 1955, p. 180). For our purposes, two features of this legislation stand out. First, for all its massive destructiveness, it *was* just legislation – an exercise in bureaucratic governmentality rather than naked violence. In continuing the conquest of Indian territory by governmental means (John Wunder's (1994, pp. 17, 39) 'new colonialism'), the Dawes-era campaign was of a piece with the invasion by administrative procedure, the 'hyperregulation of everyday life' that Saree Makdisi (2008, pp. 5–6) has poignantly termed the background music of military occupation, a banal everyday regime of detail which, even more than the tanks and the bombs and the house demolitions, constitutes the primary Israeli technique for driving Palestinians out of the Occupied Territories. The second feature of the Dawes legislation that is significant for our purposes is that it coincided with the end of the frontier. That diffuse watershed is conventionally dated from around 1890 – which is to say, though it is not always said, from the massacre at Wounded Knee. Understood as the culmination of the centuries-long process whereby Indian societies were overcome and contained within settler society, however, the end of the frontier had been legislatively marked in 1871, when the practice of treaty-making

with Indian tribes was officially discontinued as the result of an indi-
vidual member's rider to a Congressional appropriations bill.[10] Though
the form of this legislation was unimposing, the importance of the
overall historical transformation that it signified can hardly be over-
stated. Once finally contained, Indian affairs became detached from
the realm of international relations.[11] The outcome was a thorough-
going domestication whereby, through being rendered internal, the
'Indian problem' became administrative rather than political. The end
of the frontier signalled a regime of hyperregulation. Invasion became
bureaucratized, a paper-trail of tears that penetrated the reservation
in the form of Bureau of Indian Affairs functionaries rather than sol-
diers. Internalized, the Indian problem took on the characteristics of a
Foucauldian discourse, becoming a tech-nical domain which, like
crime or insanity, was to be shaped and managed by a bureaucratically-
credentialled coterie of specialists whose disciplinary mission was
the reconstitution of Indian subjecthood. This depoliticization was
enabled by race, a natural – as opposed to political condition which war-
ranted the requisite specialization (anthropology, a discipline – whose
inscription of Indian difference became increasingly cultural as the
pressure to assimilate intensified). With this incomplete, and readily
reversed, shift from armed violence to disciplinary minutiae, settler col-
onialism's versatile continuity across time emerges with particular
clarity. Thus we can turn now to its global complexity. To illustrate
this, we shall consider one of settler colonialism's most well-known
episodes, the Cherokee Trail of Tears, which took place over the winter
of 1838–39.

* * *

The violence of territorial dispossession is not, of course, hard to under-
stand. For all its notoriety, the Trail of Tears was not exceptional. Rather,
it was representative. Indeed, it was one among many coercive trans-
fers that were conducted in the south-eastern United States under the
provisions of Andrew Jackson's *Indian Removal Act* of 1830, which
also saw the rest of the ironically-named 'Five Civilized Tribes' (the
Choctaw, Chickasaw, Creek and Seminole peoples) forcibly removed
from their homelands to make way for the slave society of the Deep
South. At the same time, though less well-remarked, Native peoples
in the northern states were also being driven West.[12] But removal itself
had not required the Indian Removal Act. As numerous scholars have
recounted, Indians were being pushed out (usually West) since the

beginnings of European settlement (Richter 2001; Stannard 1992; Thornton 1987). After the civil war, when the Plains were invaded with a rapidity that Genghis Khan would have marvelled at, territorial removal (at least, for those who survived the military onslaught) took the form of confinement to reservations. Moreover, all this has a generality that extends well beyond the invasion of North America. From seventeenth-century Irish people fleeing Cromwell to nineteenth-century Aboriginal people fleeing settler violence in Australia, from Palestinians fleeing Zionist militias in the *nakba* of 1948 to the Dalai Lama's flight of the following decade and beyond; *mutatis mutandis*, settler colonized Natives anywhere would recognize the following account:

> Families at dinner were startled by the sudden gleam of bayonets in the doorway and rose up to be driven with blows and oaths along the weary miles of trail that led to the stockade [where they were held prior to the removal itself]. Men were seized in their fields or going along the road, women were taken from their wheels and children from their play. In many cases, on turning for one last look as they crossed the ridge, they saw their homes in flames, fired by the lawless rabble that followed on the heels of the soldiers to loot and pillage. So keen were these outlaws on the scent that in some instances they were driving off the cattle and other stock of the Indians almost before the soldiers had fairly started their owners in the other direction. Systematic hunts were made by the same men for Indian graves, to rob them of the silver pendants and other valuables deposited with the dead. A Georgia volunteer, afterward a colonel in the Confederate service, said: 'I fought through the civil war and have seen men shot to pieces and slaughtered by thousands, but the Cherokee removal was the cruelest work I ever knew'. (Mooney 1900, p. 124)

On the basis of this passage, I once observed that the structural complexity of settler colonialism could sustain libraries of elaboration:

> A global dimension to the frenzy for native land is reflected in the fact that, as economic immigrants, the rabble were generally drawn from the ranks of Europe's landless. The cattle and other stock were not only being driven off Cherokee land; they were being driven into private ownership. Once evacuated, the Red man's land would be mixed with Black labour to produce cotton, the white gold of the Deep South. To this end, the highest echelons of the formal state

apparatus fused seamlessly with the disorderly pillaging of a nomadic horde who may or may not have been 'lawless', but who were categorically White. Moreover, in their indiscriminate lust for any value that could be extracted from the Cherokee's homeland, these racialised grave-robbers are unlikely to have stopped at the pendants. The burgeoning science of craniology, which provided a distinctively post-eighteenth-century validation for their claim to a racial superiority that entitled them to other people's lands, made Cherokee skulls too marketable a commodity to be overlooked. In its endless multi-dimensionality, there was nothing singular about this one sorry removal, which all of modernity attended. (Wolfe 2006, p. 392)

While this observation may illustrate some features of settler colonialism's global complexity, I was trying to make a different point (one about genocide) to the one that I am making here, and I did not preclude the misleading impression that, in being driven onto the Trail of Tears, the Cherokee were being driven into history (which is to say, of course, into European history). But it is not as if they had been waiting over the frontier in some pristine Indigenous space until the tide of White settlement eventually caught up with them. By 1838, Cherokee society had been experiencing a continuous series of profound transformations that had been occurring in and through their contact with Europeans for over a century and a half. Their southern Appalachian homeland had placed them between the English on the Atlantic coast, the French in the Ohio and Mississippi valleys, and the Spanish in Florida. As a result, they had long been central to these rival powers' endless competition for Indian allies. Different tribes were armed and supplied by European powers who fomented hostilities between them, a situation that had placed Cherokee society on something like a permanent war footing, bringing about a centralizing of the cellular village structure that had generally obtained until quite late in the seventeenth century (Goodwin 1977, pp. 112–24). Until slavery became an almost exclusively African domain towards the end of the seventeenth century, the Cherokee had been involved in the Indian and Black slave trade with Europeans, a lucrative undertaking that exacerbated the belligerent situation by encouraging slave raids on surrounding Native peoples (Perdue 1979, pp. 19–40; Halliburton 1977, pp. 3–19). The Europeans traded their manufactured goods for war prisoners, so this commodification stimulated the Indians to further conflict. As chattel slavery became increasingly an African-only business, the Cherokee's trade with Europeans came to centre on deerskins, which were an extremely important

commodity in Europe (where they provided goods ranging from military uniforms to book-bindings). As a result, Charleston, the principal export centre for Appalachian deerskin, came to rival Albany, capital of the northern fur trade, in the volume and value of its animal exports to Europe. Whether for hunting, slaving or warring, men's constant absences had a significant impact on gender and family roles.[13] Economic historian Wilma Dunaway has aptly sketched the transnational density of the situation:

> The Cherokees marketed slaves and deerskins to Charleston for re-export to the West Indies and to the northern colonies … In return, Charleston received sugar and tobacco from the West Indies and rum from the northern colonies. The rum traded to Charleston merchants, a large part of which ended up in Cherokee villages, had its origins in West Indian molasses, for which the northern colonies swapped lumber and provisions. In exchange for the deerskins exported to England, Charleston received manufactured goods – including woolens, clothing, guns, and iron tools that were bartered to the Indians for slaves and deerskins. In return for the luxury goods it manufactured from Cherokee deerskins, England received raw materials, luxury goods, and meat provisions from all over the globe. (Dunaway 1996, p. 34)

The outcome of this involvement in global capitalism was predictable enough. Cherokee society rapidly became deindustrialized and dependent. With dependency comes power – especially, in the Europeans' case, the power to threaten to cut off trade. As Daniel Richter tersely observed of the Iroquois North-East as early as the mid-seventeenth century, 'Ironically, to continue to live as "Indians", Native people needed to trade with Europeans' (2001, p. 51). In 1751, over eighty years before the Trail of Tears, Cherokee chief Skiagonota was already acknowledging that 'The clothes we wear we cannot make for ourselves. They are made for us. We use their ammunition, with which we kill deer. We cannot make our guns. Every necessity of life we have from the White people' (Dunaway 1996, p. 39).

For all its concentrated horror, therefore, the Trail of Tears was not an isolated event. Just as the middle passage cannot be separated out from the long-run of African-American slavery, so the Trail of Tears brought together key components of an eliminatory process that was not only long-established but which would continue long after the Cherokee had crossed the Mississippi into the federal realm of Indian

Territory. By the end of the century, in the Indian country that was poised to become Oklahoma, the removed Western Cherokee would become one of the central targets of the allotment campaign (Thornton 1990, pp. 116–17).[14] Thus the idea of the frontier catching up with them is multiply misleading. There was no dividing-line in space but a complex and uneven historical process. Moreover, this process never passed over them, so there is no dividing-line in time either: not an event but a structure. Accordingly, rather than viewing the Trail of Tears, for all its stark containedness, as a monolithic occurrence, we should see it as a symptom, a synecdochic moment that condensed key features of a historical relationship of inequality. Salient points in the historical career of this inequality include the Louisiana Purchase of 1803, which provided the territory west of the Mississippi that the federal government could exchange by means of its favoured device, the treaty, for the homelands of removed Eastern tribes.[15] A decade later, the defeat of the British in the War of 1812 finally deprived Indian tribes of European allies, the Spanish challenge in Florida having effectively receded.[16] In addition to the military dimension, however, state-formation is inconsistent with the presence of unincorporated populations. In the case of Indians in the United States, individual states were hampered in this regard, since the power to declare the exception inhered in the federal government.[17] In 1802, following the withdrawal of the Spanish from the Gulf-coast hinterland between Louisiana and the Florida panhandle, Georgia had entered into a compact with the federal government whereby, in return for Georgia's surrendering its charter-based claim to the lands lying between its borders and the 'southern sea' (i.e. parts of the Gulf hinterland that would subsequently become the states of Alabama and Mississippi), the federal government had undertaken to disencumber Georgia of the treaty-sanctioned islands of Indian title that persisted within its state limits. In this connection, with Mississippi and Alabama long admitted as states of the Union, Cherokee removal acknowledged Georgia's impatience at the tardiness with which the federal government was fulfilling its side of the bargain.[18] More immediately, a major spur to removal had been provided by the discovery of gold on Cherokee land, which had led to an inrush of White prospectors and, accordingly, to the violent interchanges between Whites and Indians that everywhere provided the pretext for military intervention into Indian territory.[19] Much more generally, as an incident in the global career of King Cotton, Cherokee removal reflected the rise of industrial capitalism. The mercantile relationships that had centred about the trade in deerskins had been comparatively unintrusive. Like the intercultural middle ground

around the Great Lakes that Richard White (1991) has magisterially narrated, with its assorted boundary-straddlers, *coureurs du bois*, mixed marriages, *métis* and related hybridities, the Cherokee deerskin economy had produced dependency but not – at least, not on a general scale – directed exploitation.[20] The Cherokee as a whole had not become a proletariat. They had hunted and traded deer where they found them rather than farmed them under White control. Their dependency had not extended to the wholesale directedness of labour on the plantations or in the factories of the industrial revolution. Moreover, when capitalist industrialization incorporated the dark soil of their homelands, it brought an enslaved population who were better suited to its purposes than refractorily constituted Indigenous societies whose territorial integrity provided both a limit and an alternative to dependency. Industrialization cut out the middle ground.

The list of historical determinations – major and minor, long and short-term – that crowded in on the Cherokee as they embarked on their catastrophic forced migration could, of course, be extended indefinitely. The foregoing factors are intended merely to illustrate the complexity of this single event, and, by extension, the structural complexity of settler colonialism globally. They also show that, in addition to being institutionally heterogeneous, settler colonialism harmonizes with other modalities of domination. As we have seen, the eliminatory project of replacing Native peoples on their land was one side of the coin of European property, the other being the enslavement of imported Africans and their descendants. Moreover, as the transcontinental ramifications of the Cherokee deerskin trade illustrate, domestic settler colonialism and slavery together participated in capitalism's global expansion which, in addition to dispossession and enslavement within the bounds of the United States (or British North America), also incorporated rather than eliminated Native labour in colonies such as British India and, in the case of China, engaged in a kind of coercive (gunboat) mercantilism. On the Manchester cotton exchange, slave-produced cotton from the Deep South competed with cotton produced under different colonial conditions in India and Egypt while, over the Pennines in Yorkshire, merino fleece produced on land seized from Aboriginal people in Australia enjoyed a preferential position on the Leeds wool exchange.

None of these industries can be understood in isolation. Nor can production be understood apart from consumption. In addition to providing metropolitan factories with their raw materials, the colonies provided the ever-expanding markets that this escalating productivity required. A Eurocentric tendency within orthodox Marxism

has understated the centrality of consumption to primitive accumu-
lation. The proletariat was not only wage-labour. By the same token,
and equally crucially, it was also a market.[21] There was no cow in
the back yard. You can't eat cash. In addition to stripping the worker
of alternative means of subsistence, leaving the daily exchange of
labour for cash as the only way to survive, industrial capitalism simul-
taneously rendered the worker dependent on exchanging that cash
for the alienated products of its own labour. This was by no means
an exclusively metropolitan phenomenon. Indeed, one of the most
charismatically symbolic campaigns of collective disobedience to be
devised by that master anti-colonial strategist Mahatma Gandhi tar-
geted the metropole's reliance on docile consumerism on the part of
the colonized. To this day, in picture shops in any Indian bazaar, one
of the best-known of all images of the Mahatma depicts him sitting at
his village spinning-wheel, promoting his *khadi* ('homespun') cam-
paign by example. This adroitly indigenous campaign, which urged
Indians to make their own fabrics in defiance of a British ban designed
to secure a market monopoly for Manchester's industrial products,
pierced to the heart of the colonial condition.

* * *

Understood theoretically, as a colonial formation that relied on the
exploitation of native labour, British India was colonialism without
settlement. This is not to say that individual Britons could not end up
living out their lives there. Many planters and others did, of course.
Nor is it to say that the Raj did not eliminate its colonial subjects.
In many cases – only too many – it did. It is rather to say that settle-
ment and native elimination were incidental rather than central to the
British colonial project in India.[22] In addition to colonialism with-
out settlement, moreover, the wider global system in which settler
colonialism participated could extend to settlement without colonial-
ism. The 'purest' example of this phenomenon is surely Antarctica.[23]
Allegedly, the interest that rival powers took in Antarctica did not centre
on natural resources until the 1970s, though this would seem to over-
look whaling, sealing, krill-harvesting and even speculations as to
the towing of icebergs.[24] Nonetheless, this seeming absence of exploit-
able wealth has not stopped the usual line-up of colonial suspects from
scrambling to partition the southern continent with all the exactitude
that they once brought to the dividing-up of Africa (see figure). It could,
of course, be said that, rather as an anthropomorphic nature abhors a

Map of Antartica

vacuum, so do personified nation-states just happen to dislike uncharted territory, but this would still leave the question of why. What is it about this cartographic will to power that is so appealing to the state? And what does this style of explanation have to tell us about the inter-national division of labour? A more patent, though not necessarily exclusive, explanation relies on global strategy. Whether or not Antarc-tica should eventually turn out to secrete untapped wealth, it is stra-tegically vital to the free flowing of sea-lanes as well as to satellite and other global communications systems. This very obvious consideration can only be missed by means of a fragmentary perspective. Yet it is

highly significant that control of an Antarctica that is, as it were, 'ready settled' – lacking Antarcticans[25] to eliminate – is integral to the maintenance of colonial domination elsewhere in the world.

Settler colonialism's global structuring has profound consequences for Indigenous peoples. Demographically, the fact that the reproduction of settler society is a global enterprise means that, in contrast to the fixed Native stock, there will always be more settlers where the first ones came from. Legendarily, for instance, Ireland's greatest export has been Irish people. Yet Ireland has yet to colonize anywhere else. Its disproportionate throngs of human exports have gone to settle other nations' colonies. Similar things could, of course, be said for enslaved Africans or indentured Asians.

James Belich has asserted that:

> In 1780 the total number of Britons, settler and metropolitan, loyal and rebel, was about twelve million – half the number of Spanish and Spanish Americans. Mexico alone was more populous than what became the United States, and Cuba than all of Canada. By the 1920s, this ranking had reversed. The Angloworld had about two hundred million citizens, as well as five hundred million subjects, whereas the Spanish world had less than one hundred million of either. It was not that the Spanish-speaking populations had stagnated; in fact, they had multiplied four-fold. It was that the Anglos had exploded, multiplying sixteen-fold. This rate of population growth dwarfed even that of Asia, Africa, and Latin America in the twentieth century. In the nineteenth century, it was the Anglos who bred like rabbits. Moreover, Anglo economies grew to match. It was the nineteenth century that gave Britain and the United States the economic and demographic muscle to provide the world's leading superpower for two centuries. (Belich 2005, p. 39)

The boys'-club rhetoric aside, there is much to dispute in this unexamined assertion. In particular, Belich's slippage between Anglos as a language group and Anglos as a genetic population hides the enormous contribution that biocultural assimilation makes to demographic reckonings. A probably untraceable number of the Anglos whom he includes in his explosion would have been accounted Native in previous generations. Moreover, as already indicated, many others among these Anglos were actually Celtic, while Whites from further east and south in Europe obligingly produced English-speaking offspring who swelled Belich's Anglo settler population in the second generation. Thus the hyper-

production and reproduction of Anglos was both a global and a classificatory phenomenon that bore little or no resemblance to the fabled proclivities of rabbits. Nonetheless, the demographic overwhelming of Native populations was emphatic. Little Big Horns there were, but these were temporary reprieves that could not stem the inflow of settlers. Industrial capitalism provided both the systemic motivation for settler colonialism – primary production and the expansion of markets – and individual motivations in the form of adverse domestic conditions that were sufficient to drive millions of people to set off for unknown destinations.[26] Moreover, this is only to view the Native predicament in terms of raw demography. It does not take into account such major factors as resource depletion, military and technological disparities, long-range logistics and communications, or the introduction of exotic diseases and alcohol. In its second aspect, as a global structure that Natives confront from the finite reproductive context of individual homelands, settler colonialism is not so much an event as an endless catalogue of events.

* * *

Why, then, when it is clear that settler colonialism in countries such as the United States and Australia is but one component of an all-encompassing global process, should we insist on categorically distinguishing the settler variant from other kinds of colonialism? What is the justification for a seemingly abstract comparative typology when the types only find empirical realization as so many nodes in a transnational network? The principal justification – only it is much more than a justification – is that the global perspective suppresses the Natives' points of view.

Epistemologically at least, Archimedes was an imperialist. The global system is experienced differently. From an Indigenous point of view, the issue of whether the arrival of particular intruders is voluntary or coerced does not affect these intruders' standing as rivals for a Native people's space and subsistence resources.[27] In North America, enslaved Africans participated in Indian dispossession. Correspondingly, many Indians not only owned but bought and sold Black slaves. Indeed, Stand Watie, one of the leaders of the Cherokee treaty faction at the time of the Trail of Tears, was a slaveholder who went on to become the last Confederate general to surrender in the Civil War (Strickland and Strickland 1991, p. 136). In a Manichean moral universe, the empirical anomaly of good guys behaving like

bad guys is hard to accommodate, confounding the liberal shibboleth of subaltern agency. For the liberal conscience, Black invaders and Indian slaveowners can represent altogether too much agency. The discomfort arises, of course, from the assumption that the enslaved and the banished – James Madison's 'the black race within our bosom' and 'the red on our borders'[28] – should naturally be companions in more than misfortune. The surprise occasioned by tensions between Blacks and Indians is an artefact of a liberal universalism that takes for granted a pastiche of difference – colours, races, minorities, ethnicities – on a multicultural canvas that levels the varied histories that produced these differences in the first place. How, for instance, can universalism deal with the predicament of so-called Red-Black people, who, by virtue of the one-drop rule (*pace* Jack Forbes[29]), have no demographic existence? Red-Black people's predicament is above all historical. Their social nonexistence follows from the primacy of the one-drop rule, which, in classifying them Black, simultaneously eliminates them as anything else. To classify them as White may have furthered the elimination of Natives but it would have violated the one-drop rule. Classifying them as Black simultaneously furthered both Native elimination and the one-drop rule. As Ira Berlin noted of eighteenth-century Chesapeake slaveowners who found themselves barred from owning non-Black slaves, a ready solution lay in reclassifying the Indian ones Black (Berlin 1988, p. 145). Two centuries later, under the 1934 New Deal *Indian Reorganization Act*, which eased blood-quantum restrictions so long as Indians were safely on the reservation, the same logic caused people to change colour as they passed through the reservation gate (US Senate 1934, p. 264).

The bizarre formula that makes chameleons of Indians is the obverse of a rule that allows African Americans to be any colour they want so long as it's Black. In combination, as we have seen, these chromatic antinomies reconstitute the twin bases of the colonial rule of private property on which Euroamerican society was founded, reinscribing the Atlantic Triangle in the era of multiculturalism. With race understood as a bearer of histories, the differences that it signifies require to be asserted rather than elided under homogenizing rubrics such as colour, otherness or, for that matter, subalternity. On this basis, it is not surprising that settler colonized Indigenous people should view 'post'colonialism with suspicion.[30] Moreover, the distinction on which they insist, the distinction between their histories and those of peoples historically co-opted into different colonial relationships, is simultaneously both comparative and transnational.

Notes

 1 No-one has made this point better than Gershon Shafir (1989), who shows how the emblematic Israeli institution of the *kibbutz* arose not from Zionist ideology as that had been theorized in Europe but from Jewish settlers' struggle to dispossess Native landowners on the colonial ground in Palestine.
 2 'The endurance and even expansion of United States slavery, without any substantial additions from importation, is unique in the world history of slavery' (Degler 1971, p. 61).
 3 Contemporary sources remain highly informative. See, e.g., Jenks (1916); Mangum (1940); Murray (1951).
 4 'Set the blood quantum at one quarter, hold to it as a rigid definition of Indians, let intermarriage proceed as it has for centuries, and eventually Indians will be defined out of existence. When that happens, the federal government will finally be freed from its persistent "Indian problem"' (Limerick 1987, p. 338). See also Churchill (1999, esp. pp. 48–58); Jaimes (1992, p. 137); Thornton (1997, pp. 1–10).
 5 'According to the latest [2003] statistics from the US Department of Justice, more than two million men and women are now behind bars in the United States ... Although blacks account for only 12 per cent of the U.S. population, 44 per cent of all prisoners in the United States are black' (www.hrw.org/backgrounder/usa/incarceration). This amounts to around 900,000 Black prisoners. For evidence concerning the residential zoning, a drive through any major US city is conclusive.
 6 For the text of the Australian Government's February 2008 apology to the Stolen Generations, go to www.pm.gov.au/media/Speech/2008/speech_0073.cfm
 7 For an excellent overview and critique of the Northern Territory intervention, see Manderson (2008).
 8 To paraphrase Gayatri Spivak, the colonizing pretext can be rendered as one of White men saving Brown children from Brown men (*cf*. Spivak 1999, p. 287).
 9 The best source on this campaign remains Otis (1934), the authoritative report that found its way into the House hearings preceding the *Indian Reorganization Act* of 1934.
10 16 *Stat.*, 566 (Act of March 3rd, 1871), c.120, s.1.
11 A process whose earlier development had included the decision to move Indian affairs from the War Department to the Department of the Interior in 1849.
12 See, e.g., the 1838 treaty with the New York Indians (Kappler 1972, pp. 502–16). As a result of this treaty, 'As in the Cherokee "Trail of Tears", members of the New York tribes died, en route to or in Indian territory, of cholera, exposure to the elements, or starvation' (Hauptman 1995, p. 48).
13 For diametrically opposing accounts of how Cherokee women's traditional relationship to agriculture was affected by dependency, see Perdue (1979, p. 53), *cf*. Dunaway (1996, p. 37).

14 The Eastern Cherokee, a much smaller group who had managed to escape removal earlier in the century and survive in North Carolina, would also avoid the worst excesses of allotment in the twentieth century, though not, it would seem, entirely by their own design. See Finger (1991), pp. 24–42.

15 In common with many others, I have fallen for the myth, which Robert J. Miller has recently exploded, that the Louisiana Purchase was the 'greatest real estate deal in history'. As I put it, Thomas Jefferson bought 'approximately one-third of the present-day continental United States at a knock-down price from Napoleon' (Wolfe 2006, p. 399). In fact, as Miller has pointed out (2008, pp. 71–2), the US government was subsequently obliged to pay out enormous sums to Indian groups for fee-simple title to (as opposed to dominion over) the lands affected by the Purchase, sums that do not include the vast military expenditure that was required to bring Indian 'representatives' to the treaty table to transfer those titles in the first place. In my defence, I did point out in a footnote (Wolfe 2006, n. 52) that 'What Jefferson bought was French dominion', though I failed to follow through the implications of this observation.

16 Though Spain's formal cession of Florida to the USA did not take place until 1821 (the Adams-Onis Treaty).

17 For the exception, see Schmitt (1985, p. 15); Agamben (2006). For an extension of the concept from states of emergency (diachronic) across society to individual groups (synchronic) within society, see Wolfe (2007, pp. 145–6).

18 Though finding against Georgia in the third of the foundational 'Marshall triad' of Indian-law cases, for instance, Justice McLean acknowledged that the state had 'strong grounds for complaint' over the delay of thirty years since the Georgia Compact. *Worcester v. Georgia*, 31 U.S. (6, Peters 1832, 515–96), p. 595.

19 The state of Georgia's distinctive variation on this theme was to distribute treaty-guaranteed Cherokee landholdings among the White citizens of the state by way of lotteries (Williams 1989). See also Williams (1993).

20 White has also described the dependency of the Cherokee's neighbours the Choctaw – resulting more, in their case, from deerskin trading with the Spanish than with the British – in illuminating detail, concluding that: 'For the Choctaws as a whole, trade and market meant not wealth but impoverishment, not well-being but dependency, and not progress but exile and dispossession. They never fought the Americans; they were never conquered. Instead, through the market they were made dependent and dispossessed' (White 1983, p. 146).

21 This issue was exhaustively ventilated in the pages of *Past and Present* and *New Left Review* in the 1970s and 1980s in the so-called Brenner debate (Aston and Philpin 1985).

22 Something corresponding could be said about the English enslavement of Native Americans. As Perdue observed (1979, p. 46), 'From the beginning of their permanent settlement of North America, Englishmen desired Indian land more than Indian slaves'.

23 For an interesting discussion of settler colonialism and Antarctica from a perspective that differs from the one that I am advocating here, see Howkins (2010).

24 The conventional periodization posits a heroic/masculist age of exploration from Cook through to the end of World War Two, which was succeeded by

an age of pure science that extends into the present, where it is ominously overlapped by an emergent competition over petrochemical resources that are presumed (though not yet known) to lie under the Antarctic shelf. See, e.g., Shapley (1985, p. 16). For the iceberg towing, see Beck (1986, p. 111).

25 Typing the word Antarcticans in Word format incurs the wiggly red underline that warns of a non-existent term.

26 'The middle of the nineteenth century marks the beginning of the greatest migration of peoples in history … Between 1846 and 1875 considerably more than 9 million people left Europe, by far the greater part of these for the United States. This was the equivalent of more than four times the population of London in 1851' (Hobsbawm 1975, p. 193).

27 For critiques of Asian immigrants' pretensions to Native ('local') status in Hawai'i, for instance, see most of the articles in Fujikane and Okamura (2008).

28 Letter from James Madison to Thomas McKenney, February 10, 1826. Manuscript. James Madison Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress (116.02.00) [Digital ID# us0116_02p1]

29 Forbes (1990, 1993). See also Brooks (2002); Katz (1986).

30 Thus I venture an appreciative qualification to Gabriel Piterberg's (2008, p. 57) observation that comparative approaches to settler colonialism such as mine do 'not seek to salvage and reassert the voices of the dispossessed victims of settler colonialism'. The primacy that my methodology attaches to the settler colonial context is not so much a reassertion of these voices, however, as a condition of their audibility.

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